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CK
Portfolio

THE PORTFOLIO;

A

COLLECTION OF

STATE PAPERS,

AND OTHER

Documents and Correspondence,

HISTORICAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND COMMERCIAL.

VOL. III.

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[The importance of the following Despatch on the affairs of Portugal can hardly be fully appreciated without a previous study of the Despatch of Count Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode, given in the 6th No. of the Portfolio, and which, as being addressed to the Russian Cabinet, may be considered to have expressed its real views with regard to the affairs of the Peninsula.

His Excellency, referring in that Despatch "to the chances of "collision between Spain, alarmed, violent, and obstinate, and Por-"tugal in the revolutionary act," states, "that his fears of a deplorable "result were founded, on the one hand, on the incompatibility of the "interests of the two countries, and on the other, upon the error of "the two Cabinets of England and France—*that of England in not "pronouncing itself favourably on the fate of Don Miguel*," &c.

The present Despatch is interesting in a different point of view, inasmuch as it was written for communication to the Cabinets of England and France, whose mutual jealousy had been excited by the arrival of their respective armies on the arena of collision which Russian diplomacy had been for many years preparing for them.

The interminable complications in which England and France were to be involved, towards each other, towards the countries whose internal dissensions they were to appease, whose external relations they were to determine, have borne their fruits. Our arms, our capital, our sympathies, our interests, were enlisted in an intervention in the West, whereby the attention of Europe was artfully

diverted from watching the progress of Russia to universal dominion, in the East.

Her progress has hitherto been triumphant. Three years ago when Sultan Mahmoud invoked our aid to support his throne against a rebel in collusion with Russia, the refusal of England to succour our natural and commercial ally was founded on the fact of the whole of our disposable forces being occupied on the Scheldt and *the Tagus.*

We consider this Despatch as affording one of the best illustrations of the mode in which Russia has for the last half century, in every diplomatic transaction, beguiled us into executing her own ends, inflicting upon us the odium of ruining our own interests, together with the humiliation of not daring to avow our simplicity, and therefore to resent her perfidy. Every secret end that she aimed at in this Despatch was attained; although Sir Frederick Lamb had the sagacity, on the arrival of Don Miguel at Lisbon, to frustrate one object at least of the intrigue, viz. the payment of an English loan to enable the usurper to carry on war against the friends of England and of Portugal.]

COPY OF A DESPATCH

FROM

COUNT NESSELRODE TO PRINCE LIEVEN.

ST. PETERSBURG . . . JAN. 1827.

[In our first Numbers we thought it right, so long as there was a question of the authenticity of the State Papers we published, to append the original in French and German; but since the authenticity of the Despatches has been long since admitted, we think it unnecessary to continue the French version of them.]

MON PRINCE,

IN our despatches of the 9th (21st) of this month, we reserved to ourselves to answer separately your Excellency's reports, in which you communicated the opinions of the British Ministry on the affairs of the Peninsula, and the measures which they adopted on the news of the insurrection of the Marquis de Chaves, and of his entrance on the Portuguese territory.

The present despatch will treat of the questions which these deplorable events involve.

The Emperor has been profoundly afflicted by

them. They have come to surprise the Peninsula at a moment when positive promises seemed to offer a fortunate guarantee of union and tranquillity. In seeing these promises violated, civil war kindled in Portugal, blind passions presiding over the counsels of Spain, English forces transported to the theatre of this contest, *France and England suddenly arrived at a position, delicate both for one and the other*, it is impossible not to feel a sentiment of regret and uneasiness, which even the Cabinet of St. James has doubtless been unable to escape from. Never, during the last twelve years, had the peace of Europe run greater risks. It is still maintained; but by the side of such grave complications, of such real evils, and of the well-founded alarms which they inspire, the entire hopes of the Monarchs, whose first wish has never ceased to be the preservation of peace, repose on the moderation and the wisdom which have prevented the explosion of a general war. On this point the decisions of France leave us nothing to desire. The policy of the Cabinet of the Thuilleries has been loyal towards Spain as much as her language has been conciliatory towards England. It is not less just to say, that the message of his Britannic

Majesty to Parliament, announced that spirit of prudence and moderation which one is always happy to find in the declarations of a great state, and that the explanation of the existing conventions between England and Portugal, in establishing the necessity of sending troops, seemed also to determine, that the same respect for treaties which engaged the Cabinet of St. James to protect the Court of Lisbon, would lead it to observe the principles of its union with all the others. We shall not speak of the ulterior explanations of the English Ministry, and convinced that it will find, in its haste to soften them, *and in our friendship*, the sole motives of our silence, we shall proceed to the examination of the rôle of Russia, in the midst of a crisis which threatens the destinies of the Peninsula.

This rôle is entirely traced. The opinions of the Emperor on the conduct that Spain ought to hold towards Portugal, sufficiently make known its judgment on the conduct she has held, and the invariable maxims of his Majesty indicate beforehand the object of his efforts. Frankly to apprise the Court of Madrid that it forces the Allies to deplore its march and to abandon its cause, to sup-

port the useful measures which we invite it to take, to recover its claim to the solicitude of which it has always been the object, to require Portugal, assisted by British troops, not to extend its success beyond the limits of its territory; to strengthen the pacific dispositions which the Cabinets of London and of Paris mutually manifest towards each other; to second and facilitate the accomplishment of the wishes they form, to maintain their relations of reciprocal good-will; such has been, and such will continue to be the task of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. In order to perform the duties which it imposes on us towards Spain and Portugal, we forward to M. M. d'Oubril and de Palença the subjoined instructions. In order to manifest our intentions with regard to the Courts of England and of France, we instruct you, as well as Count Pozzo di Borgo, to communicate the present Despatch, with its annexes, to the Ministry of his Britannic Majesty and to that of his Most Christian Majesty. But it is not enough to put a term to the discussions which have been raised between the two states of the Peninsula; we must prevent the return of them: it is not enough to re-establish tranquillity in Portugal; it is not less essential to

consolidate it. The first of these results will, we believe, be the effect of the unanimous representations which the first Courts of Europe address to Spain, the effect of the experience which reveals to it the vanity of the attempts which inspired it with so unfortunate a hope, the effect of the critical position into which it has been thrown by its system, of the severe lessons it has received, of its adhesion to the demands which have been presented to it on the part of England; of the certainty, in fine, that if it again violated its promises, it would have to sustain both a struggle supported by Great Britain, and the weight of a European disapproval. On this point all the allied Cabinets could not but pursue a common end, for one common interest unites them. They all acknowledge that serious complications between Spain and Portugal may occasion more serious ones still between England and France.* They know what would be the consequences of them. They must therefore all seek to prevent them. They must all pronounce at Madrid the same wishes, evince there equal sincerity, display there equal energy. With

* Is not in this short sentence revealed the secret of Russia's intense application to the affairs of the Peninsula!—Ed.

regard to the establishment of solid tranquillity in Portugal (to speak with perfect sincerity),* it rests entirely in the hands of England. It is to her that Providence proposes, in a certain degree, this problem. (!) It rests with her to meditate on it and to solve it. And if our policy could be indifferent to the repose of other countries, if the internal and external peace which the governments and the nations enjoy were not in the eyes of his Majesty a benefit, for the preservation of which Russia is obliged to watch, as well from her positive engagements as from the advantages she derives from them, we might dispense with agitating this question. But the irresistible testimony of events is there to show two truths which seem to us of deep importance. The first is, that in the actual state of Europe there exists no isolated evil. The last troubles of Portugal have been a blow, of which the recoil has been felt in Italy as in Spain, in France as in England. Spain has seen an excited party rush to the combat; Italy has seen its old sectaries bestir themselves anew; France has been forced to

* We must leave to the reader to judge of the sincerity of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh by perusing part of the Despatch of Count Pozzo di Borgo, in p. 275, beginning with "people" down to "characterise them," p. 278..

adopt measures of *eclât;* England to have recourse to arms; Austria herself, to save from a dangerous snare the young Prince whose destiny has been confided to her. So true it is that, in our days, the ties of the monarchs and the contact of the people have confounded for them both benefits and evils. Another truth not less proved is, that as much as the future tranquillity of Portugal interests the rest of Europe, so much does it seem still to depend on the fate of the Infant Don Miguel and of the definitive resolutions which shall be taken with regard to him. It is in fact his name that the agitators invoke, and it is equally on him that the friends of peace found their hopes. He it is whom the army awaits, and he is already sought by the regards of those even who had been frightened and alienated by the errors of his early youth. The future fate of this Prince, therefore, is the future fate of his country. In pronouncing these opinions, our object is by no means to contest with Great Britain the principal part which belongs to her in this grand political drama. Far from this we maintain, that the denouement can only be effected through her; and we know that if the Cabinet of St. James were not too just to set aside entirely

affixed by Don Pedro to the abdication of the crown of Portugal are fulfilled in all their extent; and this abdication has now full and entire validity.

The first consequence of this irrefragable fact is, that from the day on which the above-mentioned conditions have been fulfilled, Don Pedro, according to the very terms of his own decisions, has ceased to be King of Portugal.

The second is, that from the date of this day, as it is a principle that the sovereignty never experiences interruption, it is the Infanta Donna Maria who reigns in this kingdom.

The third, that from the date of this day the relations of sovereign towards the subject have ceased between Don Pedro and Don Miguel, to give place solely to the relations of elder brother to younger brother.

The fourth, in fine, that the elder brother may indeed invite the younger brother to repair to him, but that he has not the right to give him the order

the same breath she adds, "the marriage is concluded, and *thus* the conditions affixed by Don Pedro to the abdications are fulfilled in *all their extent*." Is it not evident that Russia must have ascertained or contrived, before Don Miguel left Vienna, that he never *would* marry Donna Maria? The reader will be able to form his own opinion as he proceeds.—Ed.

to do so, and that as regards the latter, the execution of this order is no longer a rigorous duty.

On the other side it is evident that John the VIth of Portugal, in fixing the provisional stay of the Infant Don Miguel at Vienna, had made use of his paternal authority to confide this Prince to His Majesty, the Emperor of Austria. Now, in the state of the respective rights, such as we have just defined it, is the Emperor of Austria, exercising the discretionary power which had been delegated to him by King John VI., under an obligation to engage this Prince to proceed to Rio Janeiro at the invitation of Don Pedro? We do not think so, and it appears to us, on the contrary, that the observations, above presented, show that this obligation cannot exist.

To our doctrines as to the right, perhaps one may oppose the qualification of king hitherto given in Portugal, to Don Pedro, although the Infanta Donna Maria da Gloria is also there qualified as queen. The answer is easy. There cannot be two sovereigns at the same time in one country. The father cannot still be king when his daughter is already queen. This qualification granted to Don Pedro is then evidently an abuse.

Further, Don Pedro has not, as appears to us, the right to retain indefinitely near his person, the Infanta Donna Maria de Gloria, for on the one hand, he has fixed in his act of abdication, the term of the stay of this Princess in Brazil, at the epoch when he should receive the official news of her betrothment, and of the oath taken to the Portuguese Charter; on the other hand, the Infanta having become queen, belongs to the State which she must govern, and her absence, occasioned by the sole fact of a will paternal, it is true, but already foreign, would not assuredly appear either free or legal.

The Emperor of Brazil does not appear, either, to have the right to give orders in the name of the Queen of Portugal his daughter; for this queen, being a minor, according to the terms of the Charter of Don Pedro, only administers through the intermediary channel of a Regency, and the Emperor of Brazil could neither represent this Regency, nor indeed be a member of it in his quality of sovereign, and henceforward a foreign sovereign.

In fine, the rights of the Infant Don Miguel to the titles and functions of Regent are independent of his quality of the betrothed and future spouse

of Donna Maria. He derives them from the rights of his birth, and from being the nearest relation of the queen, a minor. He derives them from Art. 92 of the Charter which his brother has just given to Portugal.

But notwithstanding all these circumstances, ought not the Allied Courts, and Austria at their head, to engage through other motives, the Infant Don Miguel to proceed to Brazil? It is here that the question of *interest* presents itself.

Our intentions certainly will not create suspicion in the Cabinet of London, if we adopt with reference to these *interests* the opinions which it has itself put forward.

For the last two months, during his stay at Paris, on the occasion of the mission of M. de Neumann, and in his explanations with your Excellency, the principal Secretary of State of His Britannic Majesty, has constantly acknowledged and declared that a definitive separation between the kingdom of Portugal and the empire of Brazil was indispensable. It is one of the theses that we have sustained already. We may then affirm that on this point the *rights* are in accordance with the interests.

The Court of London seems equally of opinion, that it is urgent that the Queen of Portugal should repair to Europe.

It has approved of this point of the instructions of M. de Neumann, and has even charged Lord Ponsonby to obtain it.

We believe we have just proved the absolute legality of this measure. Therefore on this point also the same accord is manifested between the *interests* and the *rights*.

But it appears to us that this happy identity between that which is legitimate, and that which Great Britain regards as advantageous, extends much farther. And first, since a definitive separation between Brazil and Portugal is indispensable, since it is urgent that Queen Donna Maria da Gloria should repair to Europe, since after the act of abdication of Don Pedro, she ought not to remain in Brazil beyond the moment when the sovereign of this new empire would receive the news of her betrothment, and of the oath taken to the Charter, what, we ask, would be the motive of the voyage of the Infant Don Miguel, to Rio Janeiro? Would this Prince traverse the Atlantic to ask for counsel?

But is it the author of a Charter which the Bri-

tish Ministry has qualified as *defective* and *inopportune* that can offer to him salutary counsels? Should he go to receive orders? But the Emperor of Brazil having ceased to be King of Portugal has he the power of giving him orders? Would the nuptial benediction be the object of his arrival? But the act of abdication of his brother does not impose upon him the obligation of receiving it in Brazil. Would his object be to obtain the Regency? but Art. 92 of the Portuguese Charter secures it to him. This voyage would not then be the effect of a necessity, and from that moment what interest commands it? What is the good which could result from it? The real good which we desire to effect, the major *interest* which we cannot lose sight of consists in restoring to Portugal a durable tranquillity. This, doubtless, is the noble intention of Great Britain; this its desire, since Mr. Canning has not concealed from you, Mon Prince, that the English government would wish to abridge as much as possible the stay of the troops that it sends to this country, and nevertheless it cannot withdraw them so long as imminent dissensions shall make us apprehend new evils there. But would not the departure of the Infant

Don Miguel suffice to excite these troubles? If whilst the Infant was at Vienna, the vows of which he is the object, and *the anxiety spread on the question of his rights essentially facilitated the culpable enterprise of the Marquis de Chaves*, will not this anxiety increase and provoke other perils on the news of a voyage to a distant country, which no plausible motive justifies. Malevolence will hand them over to credulity, a thousand different reports will find credit as to the dangers which are about to environ the Infant Don Miguel at Rio Janeiro. A thousand suspicions, unjust, it is true, but annoying, which it is important to prevent, will be raised against the Regency and the government that protects it. Hence an inevitable fermentation, a redoubled activity in the fanatical party in Spain; perhaps revolt, and a civil war; in the best supposition, a state of things that a foreign force can alone hold together.* Will the English government then have means of realizing its wishes, and recalling its troops? Will it then have the means of guaranteeing the return of the Infant Don Miguel, and

* In the original, "pourra seule conservir." The meaning of this word, as *Russia* understands and applies it, is illustrated by her present *conservative* conduct at Cracow.—Ed.

might not the rising agitation of Portugal communicate itself to the rest of Europe?

The more we meditate on these questions, the more we think we recognize the advantages of another measure which we have already confidentially indicated. The Infant Don Miguel, instead of going to Brazil, might repair to England. He would doubtless there meet with the most flattering and friendly reception, and no obstacle would oppose itself to the accomplishment of this project, forasmuch as it appears to us difficult to overcome the scruples which His Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, would feel in counselling the Portuguese Prince to depart for Rio Janeiro, as much have we reason to think that His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty would agree to recommend to him a voyage to London, if His Majesty could give him the legitimate hope of meeting there a favourable disposition. By this step the Infant would prove his firm intention *to use his rights under the tutelary influence of Great Britain.** Great Britain would recognise them, *since she recognises the Charter which confirms them.** She would concert with him the exercise of them at the epoch of his majority.

* Not in italics in the original.

She would also concert with the Infant the resolutions, of which experience has revealed the necessity in Portugal, the mode of administration required by the real wants of this State, the guarantees which would prevent all personal reaction, the choice of the counsellors most worthy of confidence by their principles and their talents. The artisans of internal and external commotions would thus see their most dangerous arm fall from their hands; the conduct of the Infant Don Miguel, already so noble at a recent juncture, when a criminal intrigue sought to shake his integrity, would completely conciliate all suffrages in his favour. Spain would be compelled henceforth to follow in her relations with the Court of Lisbon, that line of policy which she ought to have adopted from the beginning, and Europe would escape from one of the most serious complications that has ever tried the wisdom of its principal Cabinets.

With regard to the Emperor of Brazil, the Court of London might easily represent to him, that considering the actual position of Portugal, and the interest which Don Pedro takes in the domestic peace of his native country, England has herself advised the Infant not to make a long absence,

and consequently not to go to Rio Janeiro. This observation would be accompanied, *in case of necessity*, with an exposure of the principles of right, which do not any longer admit of the crown of Portugal being considered as belonging to Don Pedro. As to what regards the definitive separation of the two Monarchies, and the departure of Queen Donna Maria da Gloria for Europe, these two measures evidently result from the terms of the act of abdication made by the Emperor of Brazil, and are the necessary consequence of it.

The moment appears to us so decisive that we do not hesitate to enter into these explanations with the British Ministry. We should have thought ourselves wanting in the duties of friendship, had we disguised from them the opinions of the Emperor, and we have too high an idea of the qualities which distinguish Mr. Canning to doubt his appreciating the feeling which leads us to express to him candidly the thoughts of his Imperial Majesty.

Your Excellency will be pleased to present this Despatch to the principal Secretary of State for perusal.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

[The next Despatch, addressed by Count Pozzo di Borgo to the Vice-Chancellor at St. Petersburgh, again reveals the real policy of Russia, viz. to prevent the departure of the French army of occupation from the Peninsula, to burthen the Treasury of France, to excite the discontent of England at the prolongation of the French occupation, to encourage the Miguelites of Portugal, and either to render the stay of the British troops in that country a matter of necessity, or to secure, in the event of their departure, the triumph of the anti-constitutional faction.]

COPY OF A CONFIDENTIAL DESPATCH

FROM

COUNT POZZÓ DI BORGO TO COUNT NESSELRODE,

DATED PARIS THE 1st (13) APRIL, 1827.

YOUR Excellency has been apprized by the despatch which I had the honour to address to you, under No. 38, that the Spanish Cabinet appeared disposed to demand the withdrawal of the French and English troops from the Peninsula, offering, if this withdrawal should take place, to disband the troops it had thought itself obliged to assemble, in consequence of the state of Portugal, and during the commotions which have latterly agitated that country. It now becomes my duty to submit to the Imperial Cabinet the development which the Spanish Ministry has since given to its proposition.

When France, frightened at seeing Spain plunge into a war with Portugal and England, ordered the two Swiss regiments in its service to quit Madrid,

the Catholic King, fearing lest the same measure would be adopted with regard to the other French troops who occupy different places in his states, presented the note, of which a copy is herewith inclosed (*see letter A.*), for the purpose of inquiring whether it was the intention of His Most Christian Majesty, equally to withdraw in the month of April the garrisons of the above-mentioned places.

The French Cabinet answered, by the communication (*Letter C.*), that in reality the charges on the treasury, in consequence of the military occupation of some Spanish fortresses, had determined them to fix on the month of April as the period for the retirement of their French troops, but that as events had introduced new complications into the relations between Spain and Portugal, they had decided on deferring this measure, which in every case would never take place before the month of October next.

It is evident that the step of the Cabinet of Madrid towards that of the Thuilleries had for its object to sound the dispositions of the latter on the duration of the occupation which it desired to see prolonged. France, on her side, wishing neither to inspire Spain with too much confidence, by pro-

mising her the indefinite duration of the presence of her troops, nor to abandon her at the sight of the dangers which the situation of Portugal gave reason still to apprehend, decided not to act precipitately, allowed Spain to infer the possibility of the evacuation in the month of October, and thought to have gained for herself the necessary time either to witness the arrival of events or to come to an understanding with Spain, on a measure which depended on an infinity of circumstances and incidents, which it was then impossible to define.

Having been myself invited by the Ambassador of Spain to support his measures, it is in the spirit above indicated, that is to say, the intention of obtaining the prolongation of the military occupation, that he begged me to act, and when I announced to him that France would accede to it, he regarded the answer of the latter as satisfactory and conformable to the desire of his Government.

This affair then seemed either terminated or adjourned with the consent of the parties interested, when the Catholic King determined, in an unexpected manner, to demand the entire evacuation of the Peninsula by the French and English troops. This determination has been simultaneous with that

of the recall of his Ambassador from Paris, and yet it is to this same Ambassador, thus recalled, that His Catholic Majesty has given the order to present the note (*Letter C.*) in the interval which elapsed between the notice which announced to him the cessation of his functions and the presentation of his letters of re-credence. Count d'Alcudia has made the same demand to the English Government, and Count Ofalia is sent on an extraordinary mission to Paris and to London to support it and to negotiate its adoption.

The first impression which the Spanish note has produced on the French Cabinet is the conviction that it was suggested by Mr. Canning. This minister manifested extreme irritation on the occasion of the war waged in Spain against the revolution, and he has since seen with uneasiness the presence of the French troops in the most important fortresses of that country. As events determined him to send English troops to Portugal, and France had wounded the ruling faction at Madrid, in order to prevent the war which England herself dreaded more than any other power, Mr. Canning has chosen this moment to propose to this same faction which rules the Spanish ministry, the entire evacua-

tion of the Peninsula. Such is, at least, on this point, the persuasion of M. de Villèle and of his colleagues.

When the President of the Council imparted to me this view of the subject, I hesitated, or at least suspended my opinion; he added, that I should soon see his opinion confirmed by the favourable reception that the English Ministry would give to the demand of Spain. This supposition has been verified, according to the information received from London.

Notwithstanding this apparent agreement, if it exists, between the Apostolicals and Mr. Canning, the project of both is that of mutually deceiving each other.* The former see in the departure of the foreign forces facilities for effecting by arms the counter revolution in Portugal. The latter expects to be able to boast of having by his dexterity obliged the French to quit Spain with the *arrierè pensée* that, if the apostolical faction were to renew their attempts, he would have the right to re-occupy Portugal without France having the right to send

* The malignity of this expression arises from the appreciation by Russia of the system of neutrality observed by Mr. Canning between contending principles and contending parties.—Ed.

troops to Spain, because the faction being reputed the aggressor, England would act under the authorization of the obligations she has contracted of defending her ally, whilst France could not declare herself in favour of the Court of Madrid, without associating herself with its errors and rendering the resistance of England against it, entirely legitimate. The result of these manœuvres in the present uncertain state of the Peninsula, will only be disturbance and confusion. Instead of profiting, as I may say, by the armistice which we have succeeded in establishing between contending passions, in order to terminate in a plausible manner the questions relative to the Sovereignty in Portugal, to the Regency, to the definitive mode of Government which ought to rule that country; instead of remaining armed in the Peninsula, in order to arrive at this salutary and indispensable end, it is proposed, from considerations which, if they exist, I shall pronounce culpable, to abandon the fate of this country to all the fury of passions, with the intention, no doubt, of intervening in the midst of these troubles, and turning them to profit, if indeed profit will accrue to any one in this work of iniquity and disorder.

To pretend that Spain and Portugal in their present state, in the relative position in which they are placed towards each other, will remain in peace after the foreign troops shall have quitted them, is to give the lie to evidence and to one's own conscience.

The evacuation will only be the signal for war, and for the renewal of those commotions which there has been so much difficulty to calm, and which we have been so strongly urged to appease. Convinced of this truth, of the inevitable consequences already mentioned, and of the vexatious situation in which she would find herself placed when they shall be realized, France has decided on making to M. d'Ofalia the observations I have just mentioned. M. M. de Villèle and Damas have already fulfilled this duty in the conferences which they have had with him, and the King, to whom he has the honour of being presented to-day, will manifest the same sentiments to him.

M. d'Ofalia came to see me and conversed with me on this subject. Without taking upon myself the suspicions entertained by M. de Villèle with regard to the part which Mr. Canning may have had in this manœuvre, I nevertheless explained to him the degree in which the demand of the Spanish

Ministry was unseasonable and contrary to the interests of Spain, to the peace of the Peninsula, and even to the secret end that its authors propose to themselves, because England never will allow the establishment in Portugal of an influence by the act of Spain, and opposed to her own, and that instead of removing British arms from Lisbon, the conduct of the Cabinet of Madrid will occasion their return thither without France being able reasonably to come to the aid of the Catholic King, who will thus find himself deprived of the support of his Allies, at the time when he will have most need of it against those who are not so. M. d'Ofalia entirely coincides with me in this opinion, and wishes that the French Cabinet and the King should afford him an opportunity of submitting it to his Court, without concealing from himself that the rectitude of his ideas and sentiments may occasion his complete disgrace.

Doubtless, France, who has expended about three hundred millions of francs in the expedition to Spain, and who spends twelve millions every year to maintain garrisons there, wishes to relieve herself of that burden, but she has the prudence not to precipitate the moment for doing so at the risk of

war, and with the prospect of future dangers and complications.* *Let England restore to Portugal the order which the Constitution imported thither by her agents has destroyed; let the Sovereign appear in the country which she ought to govern; let the Prince destined to be husband and regent take his place; in fine, let the Portuguese nation and Europe in general, applaud that which shall have been established, and then the foreign troops will depart, because they will no longer be necessary to the preservation of tranquillity. Their abandonment of the Peninsula, as it is now demanded, will open the avenue to every kind of discord, and Mr. Canning, if he is an accomplice in this measure, will only let loose on this unhappy country the revolutionary winds which he imagines he holds at his disposal.*

The object in question has appeared to me too grave to admit of my not exposing my view of it to Prince Lieven in a private letter which I addressed to him by a safe opportunity, leaving it to his wis-

* We have seen in the first despatch in this number, that Count Nesselrode animates England to support the constitution! This only shows the duplicity with which Russia avails herself of the warring principles of absolutism and liberalism whenever she has an object to gain. That object is exposed in the present despatch, which was not of course intended to be communicated to the British Cabinet.—Ed.

dom to make what use he may think fit of the facts and opinions which I have thought it my duty to bring to his knowledge. Meantime, the French Ministry will suspend all decision, and leave time for the question being regarded more reasonably and more loyally (!) by Spain and by England, and for the other Powers being equally informed of it, in the hope that they will, on this point, participate in their views, which *in reality are but sacrifices made to the peace of the Peninsula.**

* How sagaciously Mr. Canning saw through the danger of this position, may be proved by a reference to the following extract from Stapleton's Political Life of that Statesman. Vol. iii. p. 211.—Ed.

"Mr. Canning had just left Paris, when these accounts reached him. He at once directed them to be communicated to the French Ministers, warning them that, if they were persevered in, Great Britain would be called upon to fulfil her treaties with Portugal; and if she should be so called upon, and the *casus fœderis* should be clearly made out, the British government would infallibly act with good faith towards its Ally. These warnings were addressed to the French Ministers, because their army in Spain constituted the chief difficulty in the case, and rendered the probable consequences of a British force being sent to Portugal, a matter of infinitely greater hazard than if Spain had stood single. For it is difficult to suppose that the Spanish government, or, perhaps, rather, the Spanish ultra-faction, which controlled the government, would have dared to carry its hostility to Portugal, to the lengths which it had done, if they had had to depend on their own exclusive resources, for preserving the tranquillity of their country. If Spain persisted in her course of aggression against Portugal, while France still occupied the former,

Persuaded that the most efficacious means of making the Spanish Ministry return from their infatuation are to be found in the obstacles which they will meet at Paris and at London, if Mr. Canning is sincere, and that efforts made at Madrid would be not only fruitless, but that they would add still more to the misunderstandings and jealousies which so often complicate and pervert the best intentions

France must have been responsible for the war, which Spain would have provoked, and would not long have escaped herself, from mingling in the contest. If Portugal were forced into a war, had she thought proper to have called the Spanish exiles to her assistance, the British government could not have counselled her to abstain from such a measure. In that case, it would have been not a war between Portugal and Spain, but a war between the Constitutionals and Apostolicals. In such a war, begun by Spain, and countenanced by the French army, it would have been difficult for France not to have joined. She could hardly have submitted to witness the re-establishment of the Constitutional fabric, which she had demolished, and the destruction of that which she had raised, at such a vast expense; while on the other hand, the maintenance of national faith would have compelled the British Government to send succours to Portugal.

"Thus France and England would have been engaged in a war, as auxiliaries of Spain and Portugal. But how long could such a relative state of things have lasted? Can it be supposed that Spain and Portugal would have continued principals in such a contest, for a week, or even for a day?

"The French Ministers saw the impending danger, and were really anxious to avert it, so far as they could do so, by the instructions which they sent to their Ambassador."

on this theatre, I have abstained from requesting the Privy Counsellor, M. Oubril, to give himself any trouble to point out their error to the Ministers of the King, so long as they are probably persuaded that their conduct is the acme of finesse and good policy. The correspondence of M. d'Ofalia, founded on the observations which are made to him by the French Ministry, is certainly more adapted to enlighten the Government, whose agent he is, than any other lateral and less direct intervention.

Count Laferronays will probably confer on this subject with your Excellency. Besides, the arrival of the Spanish courier, who has passed by Vienna and Berlin, and who ought to proceed to St. Petersburgh, will have given room for explanations. If it does not belong to us to raise a definitive opposition to the plan of the Court of Madrid, it is at least our right, since she consults us, to expose to her all the dangers which would result from the measure proposed, if it were executed, without having previously arrested and determined, to the common satisfaction of all, the causes of discord and of war, which are only suspended by the presence of the forces whose removal is desired.

Furnished with similar directions, the servants

of the Emperor accredited to the Courts more particularly interested in this affair, will act with all the zeal and effect which may be possible; and if unfortunately their counsels should not be listened to, the responsibility of the events would fall entirely on those who had been unwilling to foresee them.

The nature of the preceding instructions and the opinion put forward by the Imperial Cabinet on the subject of Portugal, seem in the mean time to authorise us, viz. his Majesty's Ambassador at London, his representatives at Madrid and Lisbon, and me, to hold a language conformable to the views put forward in the present despatch, and to invite the Cabinets on which the question more directly depends, to examine it under every point of view, and not to prejudge it by a resolution which would render it infinitely more grave, and which would be inevitably the source of troubles and disorders, much more difficult to appease than those which we have even now been hardly able to suspend.

The mission of Count Ofalia to London has equally for its object to resume the negotiation relative to the claims of English subjects who have

a right to be indemnified for certain losses for which Spain has declared herself responsible, in virtue of the treaty dictated by Mr. Canning to the revolutionary Cortes, the ratification of which was imposed on the King at the moment of his deliverance, under pain of England declaring war against him, and seeking to obtain by force the payment of her pretensions. When this ratification took place, it was supposed that the above-mentioned claims might amount to twelve millions of francs: the moderateness of the sum was indeed an argument which the Chevalier d'A'Court made use of to induce the Catholic King to recognise the engagements which the Cortes had made him take.

Since this epoch the two Courts have named a commission of liquidation, which has settled nothing. It is true that, by an article of the treaty, it was said that, in case of difference of opinion, it should be settled by drawing lots; this foolish or barbarous clause could not be executed; England, in putting forward an unjust or doubtful demand, was sure of a chance of fifty per cent, because the result of the chance must necessarily have been in this proportion. Fatigued with overreaching each other, the parties agreed to settle upon a determi-

nate sum *én bloc*. In order to fix it, conferences were held at Paris, the result of which was the signature of a convention, by the Spanish Ambassador making his Court answerable for a debt of eighty millions of francs! This act, transmitted to Madrid, was not ratified. Count Ofalia has to justify in London the refusal. The enormous difference between the first claim of the English and the sum which has been passed to their account by the convention, consists in the legalization of a debt which, far from having been foreseen, was virtually excluded by the spirit of the former treaty. The First Secretary of the Spanish Legation, Colonel Cordova, is accused of having led the Ambassador into error; both of them declare that they have strictly executed their instructions.

This circumstance, M. Le Comte, adds to the proofs which the world already possessed of the ignorance and confusion, *I dare not say of the corruption*, which infect all the operations of the Spanish Government. The misfortunes, the losses of this great empire, the anarchy of its administration, the weakness of its Princes,* offer a lamentable exam-

* In explaining, at a future period, the policy of Russia, during the eleven negotiations of M. de Tatistcheff with the Court of Madrid,

ple to all those who are called to contemplate it, and throw discouragement on the zeal of the boldest and most confident, who, animated by the desire of good, and exalted by the nobleness of the enterprize, have spared nothing to preserve that country, or at least to arrest the tide of its calamities.

I have the honor to be,

&c. &c. &c.

(Signed) POZZO DI BORGO.

P.S. Count Ofalia has just entered with me again on the subject of the proceeding in Spain, with reference to the withdrawal of the troops. He told me, that before quitting Madrid, he was completely ignorant of the determination of his Court on this point, and that the instructions which he has received from it, refer solely to the liquidation of the English debt, and to the non-ratification of the convention to which I allude in the Despatch;

when the Camarilla was entirely under the control, "*we dare not say corruption,*" of the Russian Ambassador,—we shall point out to Spaniards of both hemispheres, the influence which has hitherto prevented the commercial re-union of the Spanish nations. It may suffice, for the moment, to add, that the South American states offered to assist Spain in defending her constitutional liberties against their overthrow by France, for Russian ends, with a subsidy of 20 millions of dollars.—ED.

that, to speak the truth, his Minister sent to him, whilst on his journey, a copy of the note presented to France by the Ambassador, simply for his information, and without adding other directions; that having well meditated on this note, he saw that it related to the establishment of a negotiation between Spain, France, and England, for the evacuation of the Peninsula, and that if this negotiation took place, it was natural to embrace in it the future state of Portugal, as a condition of the proposed evacuation, and of the cessation of the extraordinary military measures taken by the Cabinet of Madrid; that this mode appeared to him the fittest for bringing about a satisfactory conclusion, and that he was the more confirmed in his opinion after the audience which he had just obtained of the King, his Majesty having told him that he ardently longed to see the moment arrive, when the troops might quit the Peninsula without inconvenience, but that in the actual state of things, the interest of the King of Spain, and his own, required the continuation of the occupation, until the relations between Spain and Portugal should be established on a certain and unalterable footing.

M. d'Ofalia will write, therefore, to-morrow, to

his Court, to request to be authorised to give the above-mentioned developement to the proposal of the withdrawal of the troops, in such a manner as to make it depend on the arrangements which refer to the future state of Portugal, in order then to make use of this authorisation, when he repairs to London.

Without adding implicit faith to the ignorance in which he pretended to be of the proposal of his Cabinet, at the moment of his departure from Madrid, I told him that since the King had spoken to him in so explicit a manner, it appeared to me indispensable to take into great consideration the words of his Most Christian Majesty, and to make of them the text of new explanations in the sense the most adapted to give to the step of Spain the character of reason and prudence, which it did not appear at first sight to possess.

The course which the Spanish Minister is preparing to adopt, already announces that he has ceased to hasten, or that he never intended to hasten, the decision. We shall see the answers that he will receive from his Court, and the ulterior communications that he will make.

Affairs with this government invariably assume

a character of slowness, tergiversation and intrigue, which cause fastidiousness and discomfort; but one must not be discouraged, or disgusted, because great interests depend on them.

[The following Despatch shows the *success* of Russian diplomacy in Portugal, and the attitude in which that country was thereby placed towards England, by the triumph of the apostolical faction.]

THE EARL OF DUDLEY TO THE MARQUIS DE PALMELLA.

Foreign Office, 22nd April, 1828.

THE undersigned, &c., has received His Majesty's commands to acknowledge the receipt of the note of his Excellency the Marquis de Palmella, &c. dated the 8th instant, in which his Excellency has enclosed the extract of a letter from the Vicomte de Santarem, and to inform his Excellency that his Majesty receives the assurances of the sincerity of the intentions of his Royal Highness the Infant Regent, which his Excellency the Vicomte de Santarem has conveyed to the Marquis de Palmella, for the information of his Majesty's Government, as a proof of the desire of his Royal Highness the Infant Don Miguel to cultivate the friendship and acquire the confidence of his Majesty.

The undersigned, however, would be wanting, both to his duty, and to that frankness and sincerity which ought to prevail in the intercourse betwixt two countries so long and so closely connected as England and Portugal, if he were to conceal from his Excellency, that many events which have marked the outset of his Royal Highness's Regency, had excited in the mind of his Majesty sentiments of uneasiness and disappointment.

By the letter of those engagements, under which his Royal Highness took upon himself the government of Portugal, he was obliged to observe the Constitutional Charter; by the whole spirit and tenour of them, he was no less bound to abstain from all such measures as might afford just cause of public apprehension and alarm. It is with the utmost regret that the undersigned feels himself compelled to remark, that in neither view do these engagements appear to have been fulfilled.

It may not be improper to recall to his Excellency the promises by which his Royal Highness bound himself, before his arrival in

Portugal, and at the same time those circumstances in his subsequent conduct which do not correspond with them.

In the year 1826, his Royal Highness took the oath of fidelity to the Constitution, enjoined by the Portuguese Charter. In the month of October, 1827, his Royal Highness, having been appointed by his brother the Emperor and King, Don Pedro, to be his Lieutenant and Regent of Portugal—"*aux termes des Lois existantes dans cet Etat, et conformément aux Institutions données par l'Empereur Son Auguste Frère à la Monarchie Portugaise,*"—declared by his Plenipotentiaries, the Baron de Villa-Secca and the Count de Villa-Real, upon the Protocol of a Conference at Vienna, which was held upon that occasion, that he had ordered a letter to be prepared for his signature, addressed to his sister, the then Regent, Donna Maria Isabel, "*de manière à ce qu'elle (cette lettre) puisse être rendue publique, et à ce qu'elle ne puisse en même tems laisser aucun doute sur la ferme volonté de ce Prince, en acceptant la Lieutenance du Royaume, que l'Empereur son Frère vient de lui conférer, d'en maintenir religieusement les Institutions,* de vouer le passé à un entier oubli, mais de contenir en même tems avec force et fermeté l'esprit de parti et de faction qui a trop long tems agité le Portugal.*"

His Royal Highness likewise addressed his Majesty, in a letter, dated Vienna, the 19th October, in which his Royal Highness stated: "*convaincu de la part qu'elle y prendra par suite de l'Ancienne Alliance entre le Portugal et la Grande Bretagne, et que je desire sincèrement cultiver, j'osé me flatter qu'elle voudra bien m'accorder sa bienveillance et son appui; le but que je me propose étant de maintenir invariablement la tranquillité et le bon ordre en Portugal, au moyen des Institutions octroyées, par l'Empereur et Roi mon Frère,—Institutions que je suis fermement résolu de faire respecter.*"

It was impossible for his Majesty, without harbouring suspicions most injurious to the character and dignity of a young Prince, then acting under the guidance of a wise and virtuous Sovereign, to doubt the intention of his Royal Highness to carry into execution promises

* It is evident that Don Miguel meant, at this time, the Institutions of the Cortes, and by no means the Constitution of Don Pedro.—Ed.

thus solemnly and publicly announced. His Majesty, therefore, received his Royal Highness upon his arrival in England, with that honour and distinction due to his exalted station.

During his Royal Highness's stay in this country, it was agreed upon, by a protocol, dated 12th January, 1828, and drawn up under his Majesty's authority, to facilitate the raising a loan of money for the use of his Royal Highness, and to allow the British troops, which had been ordered to return immediately from Portugal, to remain there during a reasonable period, according to his Royal Highness's wishes; and at his departure, a squadron of his Majesty's fleet was detached, for the purpose of escorting his Royal Highness, and in order to mark to the world the satisfaction which his Majesty felt, upon seeing the Government of Portugal confided by the Emperor Don Pedro to his brother the Infant Don Miguel, as his lieutenant.

In the mean time, his Majesty's influence at the Court of Rio de Janeiro had been uniformly exerted to persuade the Emperor Don Pedro, to complete his intended abdication of the Crown of Portugal, and to send to Europe the young Queen, Donna Maria da Gloria.

All these acts, so friendly, and at the same time so serviceable to his Royal Highness, were founded on his Majesty's conviction, that his Royal Highness the Infant was determined to uphold the charter granted to the people of Portugal by the Emperor and King Don Pedro, which his Royal Highness had himself promised to observe, both in his letter to his august sister, and in that to his Majesty, and to which he had solemnly sworn, before he left Vienna.

His Majesty naturally regards with preference and favour a form of Government, resembling in principle that under which his own dominions have enjoyed so many years of happiness, and risen to so high a pitch of prosperity and glory; and he would have wished that the people of Portugal, in whose fate his Majesty takes so deep an interest, should possess the advantage of similar institutions, conferred upon them by their Sovereign in the legitimate exercise of his authority, and confirmed by their own acceptance and consent.

His Majesty, therefore, the more deeply laments that circumstances had occurred, since the arrival of his Royal Highness in Por-

flight of the other. The alarm may be exaggerated; but it is difficult to conceive how so many persons, stained with no crime, should seek safety in exile, if their apprehensions of danger were altogether groundless.

Under treaties which have now existed nearly two centuries, his Majesty is bound to defend the Kingdom of Portugal *from all attacks by a foreign enemy:* and, equally with his royal predecessors, he has shewn himself ready to assist his ancient ally in a moment of danger or of difficulty. His Majesty cannot but feel that the best chance for safety and tranquillity in Portugal, is now to be found, in *the maintenance of the Charter granted by the Emperor Don Pedro,* and in his Imperial Majesty's abdication of his rights to that crown. Any attempt on the part of the Infant to set aside the Charter, is calculated to excite its adherents to consider the Emperor Don Pedro as their Protector,—perhaps, their avenger. The least that could be expected, in such a state of things, is that Don Pedro should, contrary to his Majesty's most earnest entreaties, delay his abdication; and should order from Rio de Janeiro the execution of those laws, upon the acceptance of which in Portugal, his Imperial Majesty had declared his abdication to depend. The foundation would thus be laid for a civil war betwixt the two great parties in the State,—the one headed by the Emperor,—the other by the Infant:—and Portugal thus divided, enfeebled, and exhausted, would fall an easy conquest to a foreign enemy. It is not with Portugal, placed in such circumstances, that his Majesty's predecessors, or himself, have been allied;—or that the strength of England has been put forth for her assistance.

The undersigned has, therefore, received his Majesty's commands to inform his Excellency the Marquis de Palmella that these occurrences, and the consequences too obviously to be apprehended from them, have excited the anxiety of his Majesty for the fate of Portugal, *and the welfare and happiness of the Infant himself.* The undersigned does not conceal from his Excellency, that this anxiety has not been removed from the minds of his Majesty's servants, by the extract of the letter from the Vicomte de Santarem, inclosed in his Excellency's note of the 8th instant.

The impression made by such acts—inconsistent as they are with the oaths repeatedly taken, and the promises so frequently renewed, by a Prince—cannot be removed by the letter of a minister, declaring *that the intention of his master is not that* which the whole spirit and tendency of his Government, ever since his accession to it, but too clearly indicate.

Under these circumstances, his Majesty waits for the result of the events now passing in Portugal, though without impatience, yet with an anxiety proportioned to the interest which he has invariably felt for the happiness and tranquillity of that kingdom, and to the sense which his Majesty sincerely entertains of the risk to which all these advantages, *as well as the security and honour of his Royal Highness*, are exposed, *by the conduct of the Portuguese Government*, from the moment of his Royal Highness's return.

The undersigned, &c.

The Marquis de Palmella. DUDLEY.

[It will have been seen in the above Despatch that England expresses deep anxiety for the welfare and happiness of a Prince, instead of standing forward to maintain the constitutional principle, which must have been an effectual check upon that Prince, which he had taken an oath to observe, and on the faith of which oath alone we consented to his proceeding to Lisbon.

It only remains for us to add a Despatch of the Earl of Aberdeen to the Marquis de Barbacena, in reply to a demand that Great Britain should, according to the stipulations of existing treaties, grant assistance to Donna Maria da Gloria to take possession of her kingdom.

In this Despatch the British Government endeavours to prove that England *gave no guarantee against the effect of Don Miguel's conduct.*

What must not be the enthusiasm of Russian agents at seeing England reduced to such shifts as these?]

THE EARL OF ABERDEEN TO THE MARQUIS DE BARBACENA.

Foreign Office, 4th February, 1829.

THE undersigned, &c. thinks it unnecessary to repeat the statements which he has already had the honour of addressing to the Marquis de Barbacena, &c. in reply to the arguments brought forward by his Excellency, with the view of establishing the claim of her Most Faithful Majesty, under the existing treaties between Great Britain and Portugal, to receive from the King his master those effectual succours which may be necessary for the conquest of her kingdom. For although these arguments have been again adduced by the Marquis de Barbacena, in the note dated on the 27th of January, which the undersigned has had the honour to receive, yet as, in the judgment of the undersigned, they have been already fully disproved, he is content to leave the result of the discussion to the deliberate reflection of the Marquis de Barbacena himself.

It may be maintained that the stipulations of the treaties existing between the two Crowns give no right to claim the succour in question. It may be contended, with equal justice, that the conduct of the Infant Don Miguel, since his return to Lisbon, can afford no valid grounds for imposing upon Great Britain the obligation of complying with the demands of the Marquis de Barbacena.

Had it been the object of the Marquis de Barbacena's note to describe that conduct, and to awaken the resentment of his Majesty, the task, although perhaps superfluous, would not have been difficult, for, in point of fact, his Majesty had already evinced his displeasure, in the most grave and unequivocal manner, without having recourse to the extremity of war. His Majesty resented the conduct of the Infant precisely in the same manner as the Emperor Don Pedro himself, who maintains a commercial intercourse between the sub-

jects of Portugal and Brazil, although his diplomatic relations with the Portuguese Government have ceased.

But the question for his Majesty's Government to consider is, *not the degree of reprobation which may be due to the measures adopted by Don Miguel, but, whether or not, it can be truly asserted, that his Majesty has given any guarantee against the effects of the misconduct in question.* Upon this subject the undersigned entertains no doubt whatever, and the absence of any such guarantee is a sufficient answer to the remonstrance of the Marquis de Barbacena.

The Marquis de Barbacena, probably feeling that neither the stipulations of existing treaties, nor the conduct of this misguided Prince, afford his Excellency any real grounds for demanding from his Majesty succours, of the nature to which he has referred, now proposes that his Majesty should enter into a new treaty with the Emperor of Brazil, expressly for the purpose of effecting the conquest of Portugal. To this proposition his Majesty's servants can by no means advise his Majesty to accede. Such a course, which has not been sanctioned by existing treaties, would, if adopted under present circumstances, be both imprudent and unjustifiable. It is clear to the undersigned that to enter into a treaty with Brazil, as proposed by the Marquis de Barbacena, would be, in point of fact, to throw the whole burden of the conquest on the King his master, while the Emperor Don Pedro would be the nominal principal in the war. The King's servants cannot but foresee likewise that their acquiescence in the proposal of the Marquis, sooner or later, might but too probably involve all Europe in a war, a misfortune which, as it is the greatest they are able to contemplate, they are determined to avert by every means in their power.

The prosperity of Portugal and of the House of Braganza being objects constantly near the heart of his Majesty, no time was suffered to elapse after the disappointment of his Majesty's hopes by the conduct of Don Miguel, before his Majesty sent his ambassador to the Court of Rio de Janeiro, furnished with instructions, which the circumstances of the case appeared to demand, and which might have been effectual in producing a reconciliation between the Em-

peror Don Pedro and his brother. It is not necessary for the undersigned to inquire at present into the motives which have induced his Imperial Majesty to desire to transfer the seat of this negotiation from Rio de Janeiro to London, but the undersigned learns with sincere pleasure that the Marquis de Barbacena is invested with full powers and instructions which may enable him to bring the points at issue to a speedy termination.

The obstacles which have been opposed by the conduct of the Infant Don Miguel to the completion of those measures which originated with the Emperor Don Pedro, regarding the future sovereignty of Portugal, are not, in the opinion of his Majesty's Government, so great as to preclude the possibility of their being surmounted by friendly negotiation. Propositions modified by the force of circumstances, but formed upon principles of reconciliation and peace, are such as his Majesty will most approve in any attempt to terminate these unfortunate differences.

The undersigned is ready and impatient to confer with the Marquis de Barbacena upon the important interests with which his Excellency is charged, and to co-operate with him in the endeavour to effect an arrangement, *which may restore tranquillity and happiness to Portugal*, and fulfil, as far as may be possible, the just expectation of his Imperial Master.

The undersigned, &c.

The Marquis de Barbacena. ABERDEEN.

PRECIS OF THE DEBATE ON THE AGGRESSIONS OF RUSSIA, April 20.

Mr. Patrick Stewart stated that his motion amounted in substance to the prayer of the two petitions which had just been laid on the table. The discussion which had already taken place this session, on the motions of Lord Dudley Stuart and Sir Stratford Canning, with regard to the aggressive policy of Russia, had only led to further acts of wanton hostility towards our political and mercantile interests, to fresh aggressions on the Poles, and also to interruptions of our commerce in the Black Sea. The question was one of the highest importance; it involved the existence of some of the states of Europe, the independence of others, and the honour of all. After proving the violation by Russia of the treaty of Vienna, and the consequent breach of faith with the seven powers of Europe who signed that treaty, by destroying the freedom of commerce and the constitutional rights expressly secured to the kingdom of Poland, he drew the attention of the House to the importance of our trade with Turkey, a trade which so far as Turkey was concerned, had ever been conducted with a spirit of the most perfect liberality—most fully in that spirit which he doubted not would be found in exact accordance with the views of his Right Hon. Friend, the President of the Board of Trade. It was perfectly amazing how any British Government could be insensible to the importance of Turkey as an outlet for the manufactured produce of England. He would lay before the House a few short statements relating to the period between 1827 and 1834. The total cotton manufactures exported from the United Kingdom in 1834, amounted to 355,793,809 yards, valued at £14,157,352. of which Turkey took 28,621,490 yards, and paid £828,245. He should now beg the attention of Hon. Members to a comparative statement of the value of shipments of British manufactures to Russia and Turkey, which he begged to read, and as it had been prepared most carefully from authentic sources, he could answer for its accuracy :—

1827.—To Russia £1,408,970. Turkey, £531,704.—of which for twist £933,204.—ditto, Turkey, £39,694.

1834.—To Russia, £1,382,309. Turkey, £1,207,941.—of which for twist, £1,037,533.—ditto, Turkey, £100,723.

So that our export trade to Russia had declined 13 per cent. whilst with Turkey it had increased 100 per cent. and more, and was rapidly increasing.

SHIPPING EMPLOYED IN THE TURKEY TRADE.

All British, 1831, 28,249 tons (outwards).
1832, 28,882 —
1833, 24,831 —
1834, 28,789 —

Foreign, increased about 1000 tons the last two years, equal to our tonnage in the China trade.

EXPORTED TO TURKEY.

Cotton Cloth.		Cotton Twist.	
1827,	11,560,172 yards.	1827,	647,094 lbs.
1828,	4,719,481 —	1828,	156,860 —
1829,	15,566,350 —	1829,	662,538 —
1834,	28,621,490 —	1834,	1,989,851 —

VALUE OF MANUFACTURES EXPORTED TO TURKEY.

1827, £531,704.	1829, £568,684.
1828, £185,842.	1834, £1,207,041.

IMPORTS FROM TURKEY.

1829, Silk, 358,757 lbs.	1829, Sheep's Wool, 315,807
1834, Silk, 419,368 —	1834, Wool..... 1,474,322

It would, therefore, be madness to shut our eyes to the immense value which the Turkish trade was to this country, a value not less than our trade with China. In further illustration of the views he was labouring to impress upon the House, he begged to state that, in 1830, the transit trade through Trebizond, consisted of about 5000 bales, valued at £250,000; in 1834, it had increased to 12,000, valued at £600,000; and in 1835, to 19,300 bales, valued at £965,000; and in the ports of Persia connected with it during 1835. Thus, in five years (1830 to 1835), trade increased 140 per cent.; in the sixth year, as compared with the first year, 300 per cent.; and as compared with the preceding year 60 per cent.; consisting of European manufactures, nine-tenths being British.

After alluding to the disastrous treaties extorted from Turkey ever since the year 1812, the Hon. Member alluded to the retention of Silistria, and its occupation by a garrison of 6000 men, and there was another fort within a very inconsiderable distance of it, and the garrison became thereby linked with another army of 40,000 men. In direct violation of the treaty of Vienna, which enacted that the navigation of the Danube should be free to ships of all nations, Russia had recently extorted tribute from British shipping passing down that river, and not only had she put a stop to the trade of England, but to the trade of the whole of central Europe. Our remonstrances had hitherto been fruitless. He claimed the protection of the British Government to our trade in the Black Sea, a protection which, as

we had so lately increased our navy for the purpose of protecting our commerce, he earnestly hoped would not be withheld. He concluded by moving that—" An humble address be presented to His Majesty, praying that He will be graciously pleased to take such steps as to His Majesty may seem best adapted to protect and extend the commercial interests of Great Britain in Turkey and the Euxine,"—and sat down amidst loud cheers.

SIR EDWARD CODRINGTON begged to contradict a misrepresentation which had appeared in the French papers, of his sentiments with regard to the Russian fleet. He was stated to have spoken disrespectfully of that fleet, but the fact was, that he had never done so, for he had seen them in battle, and it was because he felt that the Russian fleet was very powerful that he was anxious the navy of this country should be strengthened, so as to meet them on equal terms. It was evident to him, that we had the means in our power of stopping the aggressions of Russia. It was the old mode, and one which had always been successful—it was to arm. (Hear, hear.) If we did not, we should only lead Russia on from aggression to aggression—if we did not, we should lose one by one, the allies whom an earlier show of determination would have maintained in our interests, and what is more, we should lose our own honour.

We were bound to send a fleet into the Black Sea to protect our commerce against the aggressions of Russia, and if we took that line of conduct, and exacted reparation as we ought, it would put an end to the danger of that war which he as much as any merchant deprecated.

LORD PALMERSTON, whilst complimenting his Hon. Friend on his very able and eloquent speech, wished to correct the opinion that the Cabinet was divided on this question. They were desirous of maintaining peace so long as peace could be maintained consistently with the honour and interests of the country, but they were alive to the interests of British commerce, and they indulged the hope of being able to protect their interests without having recourse to war.

His Majesty's Government entirely concurred with the Hon. Member in his expressions of the extreme importance—politically and commercially—in respect to the relations of the country with Turkey and the countries beyond the Black Sea. His Lordship admitted the rapid increase, in recent years, of our trade with Turkey and Persia. He could assure the House that there existed no desire or disposition to submit to aggression from any power. He begged to take this opportunity to correct an error in the reports which had gone forth as to his views, on a former occasion. What he then stated was, that if the Government of Russia did entertain the project of exterminating the Polish nation, the attempt would be hopeless, for that it would be impossible to extinguish a nation of so much bravery.

LORD MAHON, after lamenting that assistance had not been afforded by

England to the Sultan against Mehemet Ali in 1833, added, that with regard to the statement that British vessels had experienced obstacles in the navigation of the Danube, he was of opinion, that not a moment ought to be lost before the complaint was investigated, and if proved to be well founded, the amplest satisfaction should be insisted on.

MR. WARBURTON, deprecating the event of war, suggested a more simple and less expensive recipe for maintaining and extending British commerce with Turkey. *Let encouragement be given to importation from Turkey, by reducing the import duties, and it would follow as a matter of course that the amount of exportation to Turkey would be greatly increased.** (Hear, hear.) And let it be our care to secure powerful friends in whatever quarter Russia is to be feared. (Hear, hear.)

MR. ROEBUCK strongly objected to our interfering in European politics. Ours was an isolated position. Justice was a virtue, but justice like charity should begin at home. *Were we bound to maintain a treaty which had been broken by every other power? (!)* Supposing Russia was to send a diplomatic agent to some of the Rajahs under British control in India. Should we not speedily send him about his business?

SIR ROBERT PEEL could not concur with the Hon. Member for Bath, when he maintained that this country ought to withdraw from all connection and interference with continental affairs. He did not stand there to defend Russia, or to under-rate the importance of those aggressions, if aggressions had been committed. If there had been any undue encroachments on the part of Russia, he said, let us have redress. But if he was not to continue to leave the matter in the hands of the King's Government, and if he was to call for the aid of the House, of course before he took the first step that approximated him to hostile movements, he must have demonstration clear as day that such a proceeding was required. He must have direct evidence—he must have the treaty—he must compare the alleged infraction of it with its provisions. He must determine the *character* of that *aggression*, and then he would not content himself with calling on the King to take such steps as might seem to him best adapted to extend and promote the general interests of our commerce, but he would tell the Throne, and he would tell the House, that an injustice had been done to England, and that reparation had been refused; and he knew that the House would assure the King of their determination to support him in his demand for justice. (Loud cheers.)

MR. CUTLAR FERGUSON'S speech closed the deliberation. He could not refrain from remarking that the Hon. Member for Bath was, perhaps, the

* We feel the fullest confidence that this idea, coming from such a quarter, and from so distinguished an authority on matters of general commerce, will not be lost upon the President of the Board of Trade.—ED.

only man in the civilized world who had appeared as the apologist of the partition of Poland! (Hear, hear.)

MR. P. STEWART said, that his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs having acceded to his first proposition, viz. the appointment of a diplomatic mission to Cracow, and the second part being in substance conceded, he deemed it unnecessary to press his resolution.

We cannot abstain from offering a few observations on one portion of the speech of the Member for Tamworth, in which he made a sort of apology for our not having taken part in the late war in favour of Turkey against her northern antagonist. The honourable Baronet imagined that in order to defend Turkey in 1829, we must have incurred an enormous expense, unless we had been assured of the co-operation of the other powers. We feel morally convinced that the mere presence of two line-of-battle ships in the Black Sea, during the second campaign, would have decided the contest in favour of Turkey. The Turks had at that time a magnificent fleet in the Bosphorus, which on its first cruise in the Euxine captured the finest frigate in the Russian navy. Sir Robert Gordon, then our ambassador at the Porte, justly appreciated the resources of that power, and indignantly spurned the idea entertained in England that Turkey was lost because she had made peace on disadvanta-

geous terms. It was by Russian diplomacy, not by the force of arms, that Turkey was compelled to make peace. The London Protocol of March, 1829, was the means by which Russia triumphed over our natural ally. It must not be forgotten that Turkey was paralyzed by England and France, acting in virtue of the Treaty of July, for the pacification of Greece, and that during the winter of 1829, the Conference of London proposed to extend the limits of Greece, and therefore the sphere of the Greek contest.

The struggle on the Danube, by drawing thither an immense majority of the forces of the Sultan, pointed out to the Greeks every chance of success in the southern portion of an empire then shaken by the double scourge of foreign war and of a sanguinary contest between its Greek and Turkish subjects. The unity and enthusiasm given to the former on the first arrival of Capodistrias seemed to secure these successes.

Capodistrias confined himself, during two years, to deploy more than 15,000 men from Athens to the Gulf of Arta, without there occurring the least combination in the military operations which could bring about the result which it was so natural to

expect from them. Nevertheless one memorable fact could not escape the attentive observer of the course of this war. The demonstration of the Greek army did not remain without influence on the success of the campaign. The whole of the Albanians, threatened at home, refused to march to the Danube and to the Balkan, and so strong was the impression amongst these populations produced by the Greek manœuvre, combined with the success obtained *in spite* of the President, who wished to confine himself to threats, by the western army commanded by the Generalissimo, Sir Richard Church, that the Pacha of Scodra did not leave his Sandjak until after the raising of the blockade of Prevesa, in May, 1829.

The 25,000 men of Mustafa, Pacha of Scodra, arrived at Philippopolis in Sept. 1829, evidently retarded in their departure by the state of uneasiness which tormented Albania at that period. The numerical forces of the Russians had just decided the fate of the campagn, in permitting them to pass the Balkan. Had an additional force of 25,000 men, and those men Albanians, been placed in the defiles between Schumla and the sea, it is allowable to believe that General Diebitch, would not have

gained the title of Sa Balkanski. Thus, it is not presumptuous to suppose that Count Capodistrias obtained for him his laurels on the Gulf of Lepanto.

It may not be uninteresting to quote an extract here from the Memoir of a Greek Patriot, dated from Ægina, in Nov. 1829. It was at that period equally applicable to Turkey and to Greece.

"The Cabinet of St. Petersburgh has never concealed her projects. It is too strong to require to do so, and too skilful to undertake that which had no probability of success. Profiting by the disposition of the powers, Russia explained, from the very commencement of the Greek revolution, her views as to the fate which she thought convenient to accord us. It is at Laybach; it is in the notes of Lord Strangford at the period of the interview of the Emperors at Czernovitz; it is in her memoir presented to the European Courts in the winter of 1823 to 1824; it is in fine in the Protocol of 4th April, 1824, that she has given before-hand the explanation of the Xth Article of the Treaty of Adrianople. * * * * * * * * * * *

"What fatal charm blinds the eyes of our generous supporters, France and England? The word Liberty engraven on our chains! this is the work

of their magnanimous intervention? Servile resignation to the will of Russia! Is this the task worthy of the two great powers who have to defend, not *only the interests of their own policy*, but those of civilization in general? Since the battle of Navarin, until the steps taken with Diebitch, at the Treaty of Adrianople, how many anomalies, how many contradictions, how many errors do we not see in their conduct? What abandonment of principle, what subjection to the power of words, what a want of independence, of dignity, of courage! They united themselves with Russia in July, 1827, in order to prevent a war from taking place with the Porte, and not only has war resulted from the union, but furthermore, subaltern assistants at the sacrifice, they have garrotted the victim and placed it on the altar. They have taken part in the intervention, in order to secure to themselves that Russia should not dispose of us according to her good pleasure, and they have placed their fleets, their troops, their millions, at the disposal of a Russian Cabinet, and of a Russian minister, to make of Greece (*and Turkey*) what Russia expressed her desire to make of her from the first day, or rather *from the eve of our revolution*. In fine, it seems that they have

prided themselves on omitting nothing in this affair to surrender up their political consideration, and Russia, doubtless, will account to them for these short moments of wakefulness which, in unmasking their chagrin, has still more unmasked their weakness."

After every consideration of the opinions of the various speakers on this question, we think there is great ground of satisfaction for the Merchants who petitioned Parliament, and for the advocates of Mr. Stewart's views, in finding that the Members of both sides of the House of Commons, however much they might differ in other respects, and as to the mode of dealing with the question about Cracow, were unanimous as to the value of our commerce and relations with Turkey and Persia; and that, if clear ground could be shown for complaint against Russia as interfering with these interests in a directly hostile or injurious manner, they would support any measure which would be necessary to counteract such national injury, should the Government find the means they ought first to use insufficient.

We hear that among mercantile men this is the decided and general impression; and also that, as there was such a variety of opinions in that respect, the Government has by the defence of its course of policy taken upon itself the entire responsibility of the proper protection and support of our Eastern commerce, and of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. It was argued by some of the speakers that there was no positive case of Russian aggression made out—that it was only feared; and that, if any such case had been shown, the House might then have expressed a much more decided opinion as to the course to be pursued by the Government. But it appears, by the letter of a mercantile house in the *Times* of the 26th April, that a most flagrant case of aggression on our commerce did occur several months ago in the Danube.

It would appear that Russia, doubtful as to the efficacy of her demand of tolls at the mouth of the Danube, has resolved on establishing there such a vexatious system of quarantine, that if permitted to be carried into effect, both Great Britain and Austria may give up all idea of carrying on trade in that river, and thus the only egress of the produce of these powerful "rivals" of the Southern Pro-

vinces of Russia will be sealed up effectually. The Ukase is so important a document, and the observations upon it so illustrative of its operation, that we give them at length from the *Times* of Saturday last.

March 27.

I have now to call your attention to an extract from an Imperial Russian ukase, which I find in the *St. Petersburgh Russian Gazette*, which I received last week, relative to the erection of a Russian quarantine at the Soulineh mouth of the Danube.

Before making any observations upon it, I shall give you a literal translation of the extract:—

"His Imperial Majesty, in consequence of a representation from the Minister of the Interior, made from a report of the Governor-General of New Russia and Bessarabia, and conformably to a decision of the committee of Ministers, has been pleased augustly to order,—1st. To construct a quarantine at the Soulineh mouth of the river Danube, in two divisions; the one for pratique, at the extreme end of the Island Leti, to which the quarantine cordon has at present been advanced; and the other for suspicious vessels, on the Island of Georgi, with this provision, that this second division of the quarantine, not purifying any kind of merchandise, but sending them either to the quarantines of Odessa or Ismail, should serve merely as a port for vessels prevented from proceeding on their voyage up the Danube, through contrary winds or the strength of the current; or wishing to receive a supply of provisions, or refit. Sometimes also it may receive from ships, merchants, their clerks, or other passengers, who, meeting with delay in their journey by water, should wish to save time, to hold quarantine on the spot, and afterwards proceed to Ismail by land, over the island of Leti. It may also receive the crews of vessels which have been shipwrecked on those islands. The division for pratique will overlook vessels proceeding from healthy ports; and the second division will overlook vessels which

are in quarantine. Both these divisions to be under one director, in order that vessels in pratique should have no communication with those in quarantine. This quarantine, in so far as regards the Customs, must be regulated by the same laws as the present quarantine of Bazertcheck. 2nd. This last port, established by the ukase of the 26th of October, 1832, and situated at the Kilian mouth, as it will be found now quite superfluous, is to be evacuated. This, the will of his Imperial Majesty, has been published in an ukase of the Senate, dated the 7th of February, 1836."—Extracted from the *Commercial Gazette of St. Petersburgh*, No. 21, published the 18th of February, 1836.

Such a barefaced and impudent aggression, and executed so coolly in the face of all Europe, I have seldom heard of; and I trust that our Cabinet will make immediate and strong representations to the Russian Government, who have now evidently thrown off the mask they have worn so long. Measures should also be taken to rouse the sleeping energies of Austria, whose interests are more directly compromised by this violent measure than those of any other country. Now, also, the eyes of Turkey may be completely opened to the astute and deceitful policy of their rapacious neighbours; who, under the mask of friendship, have pursued ever since the peace of Adrianople, with the most uncompromising obstinacy, a deep-laid plan of gradual, but ultimate, occupation of all her European provinces.

It is necessary for me to point out to you the impediments that this measure will throw in the way of our commerce: indeed, a more ingenious plan to have the complete command of the navigation of the Danube, without the odious parade of forts or gunboats, could not have been conceived. Under the pretext, forsooth, of solicitude for the public good, they are about to subject all ships to the mysterious, arbitrary, and severe regulations of a quarantine, on a territory to which they have no right, and the inutility of which is more than proved from the absurd and confused reasons given in the above Ukase for its establishment. The quarantine on the Georgian is, they say, to enable vessels in quarantine to anchor, in the event of contrary winds, to receive a supply of provisions, and to refit. What vessel will refit or buy stores at the mouth of the Danube, within 24

hours' sail of Odessa, three days' sail of Constantinople, and three days' sail of Ibrail and Galacz? And there is no necessity of a quarantine in order to have a safe and convenient anchorage within the Soulineh bar at all times. It does not require also any depth of penetration to foresee, that under the pretence of building a quarantine, fortifications may be traced out; and to mount them with guns, in any emergency, is an affair of 24 hours' labour. No doubt, as this Imperial Ukase has been published in St. Petersburgh, our Cabinet, long ere now, will have been informed of it; but I thought it judicious to make you aware of its existence, and to draw your attention to the influence it will have on the commercial interests of Great Britain.

On second thoughts, I have cut out the *Gazette*, and send you the original, of which I have given you above a translation, in order that there may be no doubt as to its authenticity.

Believe me, my dear Sir, your's, very truly,

OBSERVATIONS ON THE COMMERCE OF WALLACHIA AND MOLDAVIA.

The importance which Russia attaches to the commerce of the Euxine and that of the countries of Asia which are supplied from the ports of that sea —the means which she has resorted to for the purpose of embarrassing the commerce of every other nation which competes with her own,—and the persevering assiduity with which she pursues the schemes she has projected, for impeding, and, if possible, annihilating every trade, whether in manufactured commodities, or in raw produce, which appeared to her to interfere, or to threaten to interfere with her own, in any of the markets of Europe or Asia,—are curiously illustrated in a work, which we are happy to see is about to be made accessible to the English reader by a translation. The work we allude to is entitled—"Memoire sur le "Commerce des Port de la Nouvelle Russie, de la "Moldavie et de la Valachie par Jules de Hage-"meister, 1835, à Odessa et à Simpheropole."

It will not escape observation, that the means by which Russia has endeavoured to relieve herself from the disadvantage of competition, has been rather to throw embarrassments in the way of her rival, than to give additional facilities to those who resort to her markets; and that, in the true spirit of her policy, she enters upon commerce, not as a fair competitor, but as a jealous antagonist.

We cannot better introduce Mr. Hagemeister to our readers than in his own words.—

"Employed by the administration of New Russia, the author of this work was commanded by the Governor-general, Count Woronzow, to visit, in the course of the year 1834, all the northern ports of the Black Sea, and of the Sea of Azof, from the Danube to the Don. The local authorities were, at the same time, instructed to furnish him with all the information he might require of them. The report which, in consequence of this inspection, was presented to the Governor-general, is now delivered, without any alteration, to the public; and consequently the opinions there advanced can be looked upon as those of the author only. In the whole work there is nothing official but the figures."

"Since the beginning of the 19th century, the quantity of grain brought into consumption has had an enormous augmentation by the opening of the Black Sea. So long as the countries which encompass it were under the power of the Turks, it was only the dominions of the Sultan which drew from them their supplies; but, since they became *subject to Russia*, the passage of the Bosphorus has been opened to other nations, and the vast steppes of New Russia have been peopled as if by enchantment; the provinces, formerly Polish, have found egress for the excess of their products by the new opening which is now presented; and all other agricultural countries are convinced that they cannot enter into competition with these."

"As industry, in the two principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, limits itself to the culture of raw produce, all other merchandise must be imported thither from abroad. Austria has taken upon herself to supply this want; English merchandise is supplied in but small quantities,* and the fair of

* *Note by Author.*—In 1834, an English ship, laden with manufactures, arrived at Galacz, to compete with the articles brought by the Austrian steam-boat. There is no doubt but that the English may much injure the vent for Austrian (Russian?) merchandise.

Leipsig furnished them only some stuffs; such as cloths, cottons, silks, and linens."

"The articles for which Russia has till now preserved a monopoly in Moldavia and Wallachia, are, tarred cordage, sail-cloth, caviare, and hempseed oil, and she can *rival Austria* in leather, articles of iron, steel and copper, cordage, coarse linen, ordinary woollens, flannel, all sorts of pottery and porcelain, peltries and paper. In 1833 there were imported into Moldavia by the barrier of Scouliani, such articles to the value of 680,000 roubles. Russian iron, thongh dearer, would often be preferred to that of England, on account of its superior quality, if its form were better adapted to the purpose it is used for, and if it were brought forward in smaller bars. The candles and soap also of Russia could be sold there to advantage; but those in the principalities who deal in Russian articles, get them generally from Kichineff (in Bessarabia); and the Russian shops at Ibrail are even at present supplied from the stores at Bukarest. No one has direct intercourse with the manufacturers of Russia; it is only the cordage, candles and soap made at Odessa, which are sent directly into the ports of the Danube."

"Although the three principal mouths of the Danube are in the power of Russia, it is only a small number of her products that is exported by the two ports of Bessarabia, Ismail and Reni. It is the towns of Galacz and Ibrail, the only "debouchés" of Moldavia and Wallachia, which pour the superfluity of these rich provinces into the commerce of the Black Sea. The protecting sceptre of Russia has created *these formidable rivals of herself*."

"If the obstacles which have hitherto impeded the navigation of the Danube come to be entirely removed, this will much facilitate the vent of Austrian articles of merchandise in the provinces, and will open up for some of them a way to arrive *at other countries*."

"Ibrail, receiving the products of Wallachia, must have a greater exportation than Galacz, which acts only upon Moldavia, the extent of which is much less. But the import trade of this last town, which has always been greater than that of Ibrail, will become still more so, in consequence of the communication by steam-boats, which an Austrian company has just established between Vienna and Constantinople. The four steam-boats intended for this trade, will ply between Presburg and Pest,

Pest and Moldavia, Orsowa and Galacz, Galacz and Constantinople. An attempt is to be made to remove the rocks which impede the navigation between Moldavia and Orsowa.

"The advantages of this navigation for the trade of the Principalities, which consists principally in exchanges for the products of Austria, are incalculable. Galacz, especially, will gain by it greatly, as an entrepôt for Austrian goods, which will be sent thence to the Levant, and to the ports of the Black Sea. Austria may even export by the Danube the wheat of the Banat, which can be bought on the spot at 11 roubles the tchetwert, and is said to be of a superior quality. The hemp of Hungary, of which the English have already made great purchases, and formed depôts at Apathin and at Eszek (whence it is sent by water to Siszeck and Carlstadt, and from these places by land to Trieste), might here find perhaps an easier route than by Trieste; as well as building-wood, which is, at present, sent with difficulty to Fiume.

"It is evident that the ports of Ismael and Reni, having no other resource but a small portion of Bessarabia; reduced, in their exportation, almost to one article, grain; and without the possibility of

ever having a considerable importation, from the absence of issues for it,—have, by no means, a brilliant prospect for the future. Odessa, lying nearer, by 200 wersts, to the centre of the empire, must exclude them, by her immense means, from all competition for the trade of Russia. But in rivalship, on the other hand, with Galacz and Ibrail, which are likewise about to cultivate virgin countries, and of great extent,—Ismail and Reni must, of necessity, attach themselves to these giants who threaten to overwhelm them. So long as those who are engaged in the trade of Ibrail and Galacz shall be free from every impost, it would be necessary at least to reserve to the merchants of Bessarabia, the same immunity, to prevent their leaving the country, as many of them have already done. Reni, which is only 15 versts from Galacz, might maintain considerable connexion with that place, if there were established for persons coming from Wallachia a quarantine of only 4 days, as is the case at other points of the frontier, as at Leovo and Scouliani. If even the trade between these two places did not become very great, the frequent communications which would take place would be enough to raise again the little town of Reni, whose inhabitants are

at present deprived of every means of subsistence; but Russian speculators might easily find a vent for our goods in Bulgaria, and that would be the trade best suited to Reni and Ismail."

These extracts sufficiently explain the cause of the tolls and vexatious quarantines by which Russia seeks to exclude British commerce from the Danube —to convince the populations of Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, and Bulgaria, that their resources cannot be developed, or their prosperity secured, until they shall have ceased to be "rivals;" that is, until they shall have become integral parts of the Russian empire. Determined to persevere in her own system of high duties, she is equally determined, it would seem, to prevent, by every means in her power, every other people from benefiting by liberal commercial regulations, and therefore she stifles the rivalry of the Principalities, by endeavouring to make them inaccessible.

Having described the transit trade, which had, for some time, been permitted from Germany, through Odessa, the author observes—

"This transit trade which brought little increase to the trade of Odessa, was become of very great importance to the Transcaucasian provinces. By

an ukase of the 8th October, 1821, there had been granted for ten years, commencing with the 1st July, 1822, great prerogatives to the traders of that country, in conceding to every Russian subject or foreigner, who established there a house of commerce, the rights of a merchant of the first class, without exacting from them any impost, and even freeing their houses from all duties and rents.—Foreign goods had only to pay upon entry, a duty of 5 per cent; but if they were imported into the other provinces of Russia, they were subject to the duties established by the general tarif. This ukase remained neglected till 1823, at which period some merchants of Odessa resolved to send the refuse of their warehouses to Redout-Kalé. The success of this enterprise produced a revolution in the trade of Georgia. From the following year, Armenians of Tiflis came to Odessa, to make purchases there; afterwards they proceeded to the fair at Leipsig, and sent their goods, by Brody and Odessa, to Redout-Kalé; in 1828 they even sent them by land from Brody to Tiflis, after having obtained permission for so doing from the Emperor, by the ukase of the 12th June. Some impediments thrown in the way of this transit, from the year 1830, forced the

goods from Leipsig to take the route by Trieste, whence they were transported to Redout-Kalé. But the term of the privileges granted to the ultra-Caucasian trade was about to expire, the petitions of the Russian manufacturers who thought themselves deprived, by the competition of foreigners, of a sure vent, became stronger, and the ukase of the 3rd June, 1831, declared, that, from the 1st January, 1832, the European tarif, with some few modifications, should be extended for four years, by way of experiment, to the Transcaucasian countries. The duty of 5 per cent on value should be retained only on goods of Asiatic origin, which might enter the country, either by the frontier of the south, or by the Caspian sea. The goods which came in transit by Odessa, should pay the duties there; which required the advance of a large sum. The custom-house of Redout-Kalé could only receive a very small number of articles; even the greater part, if destined for the consumption of Mingrelia or of Imeretia, had to be carried to Tiflis to pay the duties there. It is easy to conceive that these impediments would destroy foreign commerce beyond the Caucasus."

The objects which Russia had in view, are thus described by her own agent:—

"By embarrassing commerce in the Transcaucasian provinces, it was hoped that an opening might be made for the products of Russian manufactories, not only in the interior of these provinces, but also in Persia and Turkey. It was recollected that Armenians went formerly to make large purchases at the fair of Negeni-Novgorod, and that this trade had ceased for ten years, because Russian goods could not stand competition with those of foreigners, which, as we have just seen, yielded a profit of 100 per cent. The new ukase of 1831 foresaw even still the possibility that European goods, making the circuit from Trebizonde to the Russian frontier, might compete with advantage against Russian goods, which, transported from Negeni-Novgorod, on the Wolga, to Astrakan, and thence by sea to some southern port of the Caspian, would have a journey by land of only a few days, to arrive at Tiflis or Tauris. The consumption of Georgia has always been very limited, and the articles which were brought there from Russia, were, for the most part, intended for the use of the Persians. By opening, in 1821, the Transcaucasian ports to

foreign goods, the Armenians had been enabled to judge of their cheapness, and how can the Persians be now constrained to prefer Russian goods to those of foreigners?"

It is but just to Mr. Jules de Hagemeister to observe, that he altogether disapproves of the prohibitive system he has described, (but this is his private opinion only, see "Avis"), at least so far as it is applied to the Transcaucasian provinces; and he justly observes, that it has tended to create the British and German commerce through Tribizonde, to the material detriment of that of Russia.

"Trebizonde has always been of importance, as the port nearest to Erzerum, and its commerce may be estimated at 20,000,000 roubles per annum. By this route, England and Germany supply Persia and Anatolia with cloths, ladies cloths, calicoes, cotton yarn, paper, sugar, coffee, glass ware, porcelain, iron, tin and steel goods. France takes but little share in this trade. But England will soon have crushed her rivals, by the great establishment which she has formed at this point. A single caravan, despatched for Tauris in 1834, was composed of 650 camel loads, 450 of which were pillaged by the Kurds on the road from Erzerum to Tauris.

"By putting the Russian stamp upon the iron of their country, which is of a very superior quality, but which costs 7 to 8 piastres less, the English have destroyed the principal branch of Russian trade. The ukase of 1831 has inflicted an additional injury, in promoting the commerce of the English at this point. They export from Trebizonde, Persian silk, tobacco, wool, wax, opium, box and walnut wood, the value of which amounts to 3,000,000 piastres per annum.

"*What means can Russia adopt for rivalling the English in this locality?*"*

* The means she is adopting.—Ed.

COPY OF PETITION TO BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT.

The humble Petition of the undersigned Merchants of London and others, interested in the Trade with Turkey, Persia, and the Levant, strongly impressed with the opinion of the imminent peril in which that trade is placed by the past acts and apparent designs of Russia in these quarters.

SHEWETH,—

1st. That Russia, in order to attain great manufacturing and trading pre-eminence, has adopted a system of commercial policy decidedly restrictive and adverse to all principles of reciprocity, and particularly to trade with Great Britain, and that she endeavours to procure the adoption of such principles in every country where she acquires influence.

2nd. That Turkey, on the contrary, has manifested at all periods and continues to shew the strongest disposition to leave commerce free from all legislative trammels or imposts, and to encourage friendly commercial intercourse with this

country; but that of late years restrictions and local abuses have been introduced into the export trade of Turkey, mainly by means of the extraordinary influence which the Russian Government has acquired over the Government of that country, which restrictions are highly prejudicial to the interests of your Petitioners, and of British commerce generally, and that these injuries are being extended daily through the increase of the influence before stated.

3rd. That it appears to your Petitioners that the Russian Government, by the extension of such interference with the first principles of Turkish and Persian commercial policy, (any change in which policy must materially impede the development of the great natural resources of these countries) aims at the disorganization of both Turkey and Persia, with the view to great political and mercantile results at variance with every recognized British interest.

4th. That Turkey and Persia having vast populations ready and willing to receive all our staple manufactures, and much of our Colonial produce, the most beneficial results will accrue to Great Britain by her extending to the Governments of

these countries that moral and political support which will enable them to increase the cultivation and exportation of many of their valuable products, which are of staple consumption in this country, and by which alone they can make return for a larger quantity of manufactures.

For these reasons we feel justified in calling the immediate attention of your Honourable House to the state of our commercial relations with Turkey and Persia, and we pray that your Honourable House will take such steps as may obtain a removal of the restrictions we complain of, and may extend, under adequate protection, this most valuable and rising portion of British trade.

CORRESPONDENCE.

Extract of a Letter, dated Cracow, April 7, 1836.

* * * * * * * *

* * We have received accounts from our Exiles, who, on their way to Trieste, have every where been greeted with the deepest interest and succoured by the populations. Thus the whole of Europe testifies its pity, but nothing more.

They are at the present moment shut up in the Castle of Trieste, where they are made to wait for transports. Amongst them are to be found Prince Gedroye, M. Janiszewicz, formerly Prefect of the Palatinate of Sandomir, M. Wiercinski, Doctor Terlecki, &c. The entire number of the refugees carried away from hence amounts to more than a thousand. A new census of the population is now commenced. This work is directed by an *Austrian officer*, and is to be reviewed by a Commission named by the three Courts for the purpose of striking out all the inhabitants who have arrived since the year 1821. If this measure is executed the population of the town will be diminished by nearly 10,000 inhabitants.

The evacuation is announced for the 15th. Nevertheless, General Kaufmann is making preparations for a grand parade in honour of the Emperor of Austria, whose name-day is the 18th; besides, what signifies the presence of the troops on the territory, since the *Conference* of the Residents remains, and may at any moment call them back. *The Conference of Residents* has usurped the Sovereign power. This circumstance is much more grave than a *temporary* occupation would be, however violent the proceeding.

The Senate decrees no further acts without saying,

" The Senate, having received the sanction of the Conference of the Residents of the Protecting Courts, orders," &c. &c.

The greater part of the soldiers of the Austrian corps are natives

of Gallicia, and live on good terms with the inhabitants. But the officers dread an explosion of despair on the part of the Cracovians. The spies of the police have spread the rumour of a projected massacre. The officers at first believed it, and now they blush for their credulity.

The Ex-President of the Republic, Wiegloglowski has addressed to Prince Metternich a Memoir by which he maintains, that "Summoned by *the Conference* of the three Residents, he had for a long time solicited passports for a small number of persons who had been designated as turbulent; but that he had not obtained these passports from any of the three Courts whose possessions surround the territory of Cracow; he calls to mind that to answer the uneasiness expressed by the Conference on the subject of the Militia of the Republic, and of the number of refugees admitted into this Militia, and of the degree of authority that this force might in case of need give to the Senate, he had long since offered to increase the amount of this militia by recruiting from the inhabitants of the territory—but that this proposition remained without any answer.

"In a word, he maintains that the Residents *desired* the inconveniences which subsequently gave a motive for the occupation. With respect to the pretended powerlessness of the Senate, he observes, that on the simple demand of this authority five hundred refugees repaired to Podgoree without compulsion; resistance and presumed revolts were spoken of, but nothing of the kind has appeared; and even the execution of the rigours which had been ordered only caused tears to appear in the eyes of those who were thereby reduced to despair."*

The Bishop of Cracow is not the only victim of the religious persecution exercised by the Russians against Catholicism. The Bishop of Podlachie has also incurred the displeasure of the Emperor Nicolas. Driven from his diocese he lives in destitution. Latterly he commissioned his Chaplain to sell a gold snuff box. The proprietor of the neighbourhood to whom this box was presented sent it back to the Bishop filled with gold pieces.

* An admirable article on the affairs of Cracow has just appeared in the British and Foreign Quarterly Review, No. IV. for April.—Ed.

THE speech of Sir Stratford Canning on the 18th of March, on the occupation of Cracow, so clearly developing the sound principles of a truly British policy, that any comment on our part would savour of presumption, terminated with "the expression of a hope that some step might be taken by Parliament to mitigate the sufferings of the unfortunate individuals who are to be shipped off to America."

The infringement of the law and rights of nations by the forcible abduction of the natives of an independent state through the agents of a foreign power, which can exercise no legal jurisdiction over them, is a question deeply interesting to the statesmen of Europe and the United States. The expulsion of the Morescoes from Spain, incompatible as it was with the principles of humanity, did not involve the separation of families. The father was not separated from his children, nor the husband from the wife; and although torn from the land which contained the ashes of their forefathers, they were allowed to convey to another and a neighbouring shore, the elements of a new home and the living objects of their earthly affections.

What the feelings of the Americans will be on the arrival on their shores of exiles from Cracow, may be easily imagined. But can the enlightened benevolence that will animate every community amongst our Anglo-Saxon brethren, compensate to these unhappy men for the apathy of Europe? What must be their sensations on passing the rock of Gibraltar, when their last glance of despair rests on that banner on which the sun never sets, and dwells on the scene where, in a few short hours, one English arm scattered to the winds the powers of despotism, and identified the name of England with the liberation of the world?

SULPICIUS.

The gentlemanlike style of the Letters in the "Times" of the 20th and 22d ult., addressed to the Editor of the Portfolio, under the signature of "Sulpicius," entitled them to an earlier notice on our part, but with every desire of replying to the arguments of the writer we are compelled to postpone our remarks until we expose in more minute detail the whole drama of Russian Diplomacy as connected with the origin and negotiation of the Treaty of July the 6th.

In the mean time we hope that "Sulpicius" will not suffer himself to be deterred by our silence from continuing his criticisms of our opinions, the discussion of which, we feel convinced, will serve the purposes of truth, and thus conduce to the national interest.

We should be glad, however, to be favoured with any observations from "Sulpicius," or any other quarter, which may tend to prove that our notions of the finesse and skill of Russian Diplomatists have been in any degree exaggerated, for we are not conscious of having hitherto ventured on a single assertion which cannot be substantiated by evidence, and which may not be fully borne out in the progress of this work.

POSTSCRIPT.—*May 3rd.*

Extract of a Letter from Cracow, April 15th.

"THERE is to be a grand parade on the 19th in honour of the Emperor Ferdinand, after which the troops composing the corps of occupation will commence their march to quit the territory of Cracow.

"An Austrian detachment of five hundred men and fifty cavalry will, however, remain. The Senate, that is to say, its President, has demanded, they say, this prolongation of their stay, to give time to reorganise the militia of the town, which has been disbanded.

"The three Powers had in vain sought to obtain that the Senate should previously demand the occupation; but since then the President of this body has been induced to lay down his office, and the *Conference* of the three Residents has replaced him arbitrarily, and contrary to all the laws, by a man who will now demand, in the name of the Senate, all that they desire.

"It happened accidentally that, on the very day of the announcement of the evacuation, a grand menagerie arrived at Cracow, on which the people amused themselves with repeating, 'that the lion 'of England had put to flight the troops of the three Powers.'

"We had received, a few days before, the details of the debate brought on in the English House of Commons by the inquiries of Sir Stratford Canning, on the subject of the armed occupation of our city."

THE PORTFOLIO.

ALTHOUGH the following translation from the German is only a review of the first Numbers of the Portfolio, yet it contains so much interesting information, and is so ably drawn up, that we cannot abstain from reproducing it. The principal cause, however, of our doing so is to allow the people of this country to appreciate the effect silently produced on the public mind in Germany.

One of the most singular incidents connected with this periodical is, that although its tendency has been of a nature hostile to the views of those who entertain aggressive projects, still it has not been prohibited in any Continental State.

Two reasons may be assigned for this.

The first, that it has no community or participation with any principles, or with any party, as regards internal government. Hitherto the aggressive views of Russia, as of Prussia, have been opposed in the spirit of the French Propagande. The opposition manifested so acrimoniously by Austria and Prussia, and with such *appearance* of

acrimony by Russia against those political movements which have agitated more particularly the West, has been conducted under the banner of legitimacy and absolutism, and thus all feelings of national interests, which really are attractive in their natural force and their honest tendency, have become revolting to the people of Europe by their being constantly mixed up with party animosity and with domestic dissensions; and have been rendered fatiguing to men's minds by a series of external and internal complications which scarcely allowed two neighbours to agree in one principle, or to believe in the same fact.

We think we may, without presumption, lay claim to having separated the question of natural interests from political party. In this country, as on the Continent, while our views have been adopted by no organs of the press in consequence of political partizanship, so have they not been combated or opposed by any through political opposition. Thus presented, this question, great and impressive from the circumstances of the moment, has been rendered simple and intelligible, and as amidst the struggle of principles in England, so in face of the restrictive censorship of the Conti-

nental Governments, this publication has obtained emancipation from those inflictions which have been hitherto applied to the criticism of Cabinets.

A second, and we believe a far more important reason for the fact of the non-prohibition of the *Portfolio* by the censorship, is the effect which it has had upon those Governments which have hitherto, in a greater or less degree, visited with penalties every publication which had an appearance of enmity to Russia. They were justified in doing so on the mere point of expediency, because nothing really had appeared capable of producing any effect which could sustain them in taking a line of opposition to her.

The disclosures and the views communicated through our pages, while they could not fail to act on the opinions of the individuals composing those Governments, must have awakened the hope of systematic and effectual opposition to that Power, and induced many individuals to look forward to the arrestation of those projects which they had long seen or now at length become convinced of. Thus was presented to the Statesmen of the Continent an entirely new prospect of future combinations, which would lead some to calculate

on a change of influence and of policy, which might lead those to distinction who had the sagacity to see it from afar. This is not a mere supposition. We represent circumstances which to our certain knowledge exist.

It is not easy for those who have judged of England within her seas, and of Europe from England, to comprehend the powerful effect thus produced on the mind of the people and Governments of the Continent. It is not in England that the power of England can be appreciated. It is not whilst sitting under the shadow of a banner that rules the seas, and surrounded with the security of equal laws, that men can comprehend how deeply a few printed words may be capable of affecting a nation, placed in immediate contact with overwhelming military masses, and overshadowed by foreign political influences:—where, too, the recollections of the late wars, which we saw only from our shores, and remember by trophies, are associated with melancholy reminiscences of the devastation of the village and of bloodshed on the hearth.

While, therefore, throughout Germany, there exists that deep and sullen dread of Russia, and that universal, though indistinct, feeling of con-

fidence and hope in England, the *Portfolio* has come to excite, to justify, and confirm their worst apprehensions of the one, to awaken new and almost startling expectations from the power of the other. It cannot be questioned that this feeling has arisen from an association, direct or indirect, of the *Portfolio* with the English Government: and although this popular opinion may not extend to those who are better informed, may not be common to those who are initiated in the secrets of governments and the intricacies of diplomacy; still, even amongst that class of persons, those who have felt and understood the import of the disclosures which have been made, those who have followed and approved the views we have advocated, and the remedies we have suggested—and those are neither few nor uninfluential—have come to the conclusion, that if the *Portfolio* is not to-day the expression of the views of the British Government, British policy to-morrow will be the expression of the views of the *Portfolio*.

Without any desire to arrogate to ourselves the importance here forced upon us, incontestably the publication which becomes the channel of such disclosures, must in itself obtain a weight and con-

sideration which must increase in proportion as it is removed from its original source, and in proportion as the insignificance of its immediate conductors is lost in the distance.

On the Continent there is a general feeling of distrust in the policy of England, which partly results from observation, and partly from their prejudices. They look with dread on the struggle of parties, and on the incessant changes in our Government; they believe in the impossibility of a popular government either attending to foreign policy or keeping its engagements; they cannot be blind to the manifest neglect, during a long course of years, of all those circumstances which have connected the interests of England with those of Germany more particularly; all these considerations have given consistency to this mistrust of the English Government, whilst at the same time most exaggerated notions prevail of the political character and power of the British *nation*. No German, therefore, reading the *Portfolio*, and knowing it published in England, can help arriving at the conviction, that the English people must soon arise from its apathy with regard to the threatening aspect of Northern policy, and having

done so, that it will commence the application of that process of coercion, without which the Government of Great Britain seems incapable of action.

We take this opportunity of commenting on two observations that have been made.

1st. That we see Russia in every thing.

2ndly. That we are hostile to Russia.

With regard to the first, we were ridiculed for supposing any designs of Russia on Turkey; we were considered as alarmists in supposing her policy masterly or her influence universal. People did not believe that Russia had exercised a decided influence over France, and they did not believe that she cajoled England, at least in Downing-street; they did not believe in her predominance in Greece, Turkey, Persia, Sweden, Holland; in none of these States were our general assertions, in the commencement of our publication, considered in any degree borne out. Prussia, instead of being deemed the tool of Russia, was considered a barrier against her. The German league was believed to be destructive of her influence in Germany.* With what ridicule was

* A Minister of the Crown, in reproving Parliament for adopting our opinions with reference to the German league, informed

not our first mention of Circassia received? No one credited her exercising any decided influence as regards Spain and Portugal. On all these points, therefore, our opinions were set down as exaggerated and unsound; but unless that opinion had prevailed, the disclosures of these pages would have been useless.

On all these points we differed from those who censured us, merely because we knew what they did not know. We have as yet scarcely done more than touch upon them; and yet our opinions have been re-echoed, not from England alone, but from all those countries which they have reached, and to which they have been addressed.*

As to the second accusation, of hostility to Rus-

the House that the Portfolio was a publication "singularly absurd." That Right Honourable Gentleman had had the advantage of minute acquaintance with the details of commerce, and administration of the Russian Empire, and had visited its distant limits, the shores of the Gaspian and the heights of the Caucasus. What then must have been the opinions respecting the Portfolio of his colleagues, who did not enjoy such advantages?

* Although this periodical appears in French at Paris, is largely reproduced by the German press, and is more or less translated into Spanish, Italian, Polish, Greek, and Turkish, still our *foreign* circulation alone amounts to seven hundred and fifty copies, independent of the copies taken by foreign governments, through their agents in this country.

sia, we place against it the most unqualified denial. Our hostility is to the policy of the Russian Government, not to the prosperity of the Russian people. We seek not to disturb the repose of Russia, but to prevent Russia from disturbing the repose of Europe. We would say with Prince Metternich, to the Emperor Nicolas, that he has "*greater and more useful conquests to make in his own empire than elsewhere;*" and we feel convinced, that in labouring to counteract the projects of foreign growth, which have struck such deep root into the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and which have converted the mighty Sclavonic race into a great and unhappy instrument, we are rendering not less essential service to the Russian people, than to the nations threatened with destruction by this combination of refined policy and brute force.

Having had occasion thus to allude to our own position, we cannot help, in justice to the Government and to ourselves, taking this opportunity of contradicting the assertion, that any documents contained in this publication have been communicated to us by the British Government. It is not generally the part of governments to desire the publication of documents like these, which

may place them, as it does in this case, in so embarrassing, we had almost said so ridiculous a predicament, and deprives them of the great advantage of the exclusive possession of such secrets. From the hands into which these papers have fallen, no consideration which the government of *any* country can offer, can obtain their suppression, and no authority which the government of Great Britain possesses can legally prevent their publication.

The motives of this resolution have been sufficiently exposed in these pages. They are briefly these: A deep and matured conviction, founded not alone upon the means of information which have been published, or yet remain, of the approaching dissolution of the Turkish Empire—its appropriation more or less by Russia, and her occupation of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. Our conviction is not less profound, that when such an event does take place, not even the ultimate means of arms, in the actual state of European combinations, will be had recourse to. That event we consider destructive of the maritime supremacy of Great Britain, and the commencement of a progression of circumstances tending towards the ruin of the commerce and the Colonial Empire of Great Britain.

At the same time we believe, that it is a thing of the utmost facility at this present moment, to maintain the Ottoman Empire against Russia, and therefore to prevent the commencement of that progression, which to our eyes ends in the destruction of our country's greatness and prosperity.

There is but one means by which the Government can purchase our silence; and that is, by the adoption of a line of policy less unworthy and less fatal. It is by seizing the present favourable conjuncture for arresting the accomplishment of the forebodings, and the realization of the projects of sixty years!

To those who coincide with us in conviction and apprehension, we pledge ourselves to be deterred or restrained by no consideration whatever from persevering in the prosecution of the great task which we have undertaken, and from using, to the best of our abilities, the materials thus providentially placed at our disposal. We consider this declaration to be necessary, because we feel that the uncertainty prevailing as to our real position, paralyses the support which otherwise would be afforded to us by the opinion of our country, and which, very naturally impressed with the belief that the Govern-

ment cannot be in reality indifferent to the dangers that threaten, desists from the expression of that interest and alarm which, if expressed, would render impossible the continuance of the present apathy and inaction.

EXTRACTED FROM THE

Blätter für Literarische Unterhaltung.

"THE PORTFOLIO, No. I. TO V."

HERE then are the mysterious Papers, so pompously announced, whose contents have incessantly occupied foreign Journals, and have excited the curiosity of the Germans, especially since it was announced that they would treat also of Germany. Their exterior at once distinguishes them from all other periodicals, inasmuch as they announce themselves by their form and by their title as intended to become a work, and each Number stalks abroad in a deep-blue cover with a simple title in gold letters. The Editors still persist in their incognito, which is perhaps not so difficult to see through, and in their silence on the

question, much more difficult of solution, whence these documents were procured. The more we are accustomed in our days to see every period of modern history elucidated from archives by the fortunate industry of inquirers, the more are we surprised at this exposure of events which are passing almost before our eyes. No small astonishment was excited last year when Klüber in a supplementary volume of the acts of the Congress of Vienna, furnished us with the secret Triple Alliance between England, Austria, and France, of Jan. 3, 1815. But this document was already historically known, and the authenticity of it was guaranteed by the well known and respected name of one of the oldest among the German political writers. Of another kind was the communication, which surprised the world last autumn, viz. the copy of the Secret Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, which had found its way, we know not how, into the pages of an amusing, tattling and harmless book, "A Steam Voyage down the Danube by Michael Quin." And now this "*Portfolio!*" It will remind the German reader of the fate of the Bulletins of Kotzebue, or more forcibly of those Despatches which the penury of a Saxon Secretary once betrayed to a Prussian

Ambassador, and by which Frederic the Great justified the seven years war. Such discoveries occur *per fas et nefas*, but this is an affair which does not concern us. The question then remains with regard to the right of making use of that which has actually become accessible. In the last instance we quoted the conqueror ordered search to be made in the Dresden archives for the originals, and Herzberg made it clear that an injured or threatened party had the right to procure the requisite means of proof. We are reminded of this case, because we cannot allow ourselves to be persuaded that the contents of the "Portfolio" have remained a secret to the English Government, and as coinciding with this conviction we have certain recent nominations in the eastern diplomacy of Great Britain which have given ground for serious reflection.

So far as regards the authenticity of the documents before us, it must be left to the decision of a province which lies beyond the reach of literary criticism. Still perhaps it may be allowable to the critic to offer a few hints. Above all every article must be considered singly, according to its own claims, and for itself. No one will be willing

to insure unexamined the cargo of this craft, however proudly its British streamers wave.

The Declaration of Independence of the Circassians, which has just gone the round of the German newspapers, is the Document, the authenticity of which it is most difficult to admit. It is not to be denied that the tone has something apocryphal, however rhetorical the effect. A half confession lies in the remark of the Editor, that the Declaration of the Circassians would speak for itself, though it had not yet been communicated in an ostensible manner. Herein perhaps we may perceive an indication that it was unnecessary to attach to this memoir the same official origin, that is maintained of the others. It may be questioned whether the Editors act wisely in allowing it to be supposed, that it is with them a matter of indifference whether or not they make use of fiction by way of variety. This arrangement may have been adopted to bring out with greater effect the answer to the question "Who are these Circassians?" "*They are* "*the only people from Nova Zembla to Tangiers, from* "*the Caspian to the Atlantic, who have dared to oppose* "*Russian iniquity with valour and resistance.*" At all events, the object of directing attention to the

state of these tribes is fully attained, and the notices which are given in the Memoir itself and in an explanatory article (i. 231—244.) are clearly in earnest. They go more into detail, but in general they accord in essentials with what Balbi has said of the tribes of the Caucasus. The principal fact, their position towards Russia, is less unknown than the Editor perhaps thinks, at least in Germany, where a manual (Volger's) which is in every hand, thus conclusively expresses itself: "The Nations of the Caucasus are almost all sworn "foes of the Russians, and many of them are in "continual warfare with the latter." Of the importance of this fact no doubt can be entertained. A glance at the map shows the gates of the Caucasus, the passes of Vlady-Caucase and Dariel, each of which (i. 233.) can be closed by a hundred men. The road leads immediately to Tiflis, to the headquarters of the army of Georgia.

If nothing therefore contradicts the supposition that the Declaration of the Circassians was drawn by a person not unacquainted with their relations, without having the intention to deceive, it might be far more difficult to carry through the same supposition with respect to the first document,

which leads the way in No. I. This professes to be a Report of Count Bernstorff to the King of Prussia, dated Jan. 29, 1831, on the means of maintaining tranquillity in Germany in the event of an inevitable foreign war, and on the mode and means by which Prussia is to utilize her position and her influence in Germany. The German press has not as yet re-produced this Memoir, either because the English Journals took less notice of it as a purely German affair, or because it was feared that a collision would arise with the Censorship. But this apprehension is unfounded. For considering the Memoir as genuine, there does not in reality appear that any state secret is revealed in it, or that it contains anything that Prussia need disavow, in order not to stand in contradiction with her published measures or declarations. It might not perhaps be entirely unwelcome to some of the defenders of the Prussian system, as showing that in a memoir, which, not destined for any sort of publicity, there was after all nothing more than what is here revealed. That the Memoir is translated from the German is indicated by many things. Among other things appears the phrase "the art and manner," where

it clearly must have been "die art und weise," a mistake, which may be placed by the side of the amusing blunders in Lord Gower's Faust, where his Lordship translates der Kühne Freier, (the bold suitor), by the Bold Friar. But that this Memoir was translated from the German by no means proves that the original was genuine; but what forger would have so repeatedly dwelt on Prussia's using only strong legal means, and employing a strong moral influence for the attainments of her objects? A forgery is generally undertaken in a malicious view; nor do we indeed see what motive the English publishers could have to put forward an obliged compliment to the loyalty of the Prussian government.

It doubtless is the intention of the Editors to influence the public opinion, even of Germany. If this tendency were to give offence to any party the most convenient way would be to forbid the circulation of these papers. In that case the Governments will have to inform, enlighten and tranquillize public opinion upon those matters on which it has been alarmed or misled (!) The English Editors themselves acknowledge the intelligence of those whom they designate "their op-

ponents." It is at the present day far too difficult (however honestly some politicians may cherish the design) to convince the people of the propriety of not asking questions, and of persuading them that their only duty is blindly to follow. Most fortunate is that power which has the least to conceal, for where the greatest secresy prevails, indiscretion most easily arises. And the old, innate failing of human nature,

> To seek
> Forbidden knowledge, by forbidden means,

is not yet overcome.

More boldly, but not less artfully invented, *if invented*, are the Despatches of Prince Lieven and Count Matuszevich of June 1, 1829, of Prince Lieven, Jan. 4, 1829, and of Count Pozzo di Borgo, Dec. 10, 1826. Here many passages, and sometimes the complete text of the French original are printed at the foot of the columns. But did it require these Despatches to prove, that it was Russia's interest in those years to occupy France with the Peninsula, and that Russia succeeded in keeping in inactivity one English Ministry after another (Tories and Whigs in the same damnable predicament), whilst she prepared in the East that

which is now ripening before their eyes? It appears that even M. Nebenius must consent to see the production in these pages of his prophecies, that England when she again takes a fancy to stand forward and domineer at sea, will find the Euxine closed. The Dardanelles have become a vital question for the maritime power of England. Hence the efforts of the Editor to keep in the background that which public discussion might draw into the whirlpool of party strife, although he has said enough to allow it to be guessed, that the Tories would do well to adopt the convictions of their political opponents, in order not to see themselves exposed by farther revelations to the hatred of all those who value the honour of England. The language of the Tory Journals has for several months shown that they understood the state of the question, even before the last very intelligible hint was given. A crisis is at hand, serious and difficult, which threatens to invade the courts and the hearths of the distant, of the unsought, and of the scarcely enumerated, unless Prussia's conciliatory policy, or the inflexible attitude or imposing decision of Austria succeed in conjuring the storm. May that instinctive

impulse point to peace, which has so suddenly moved the heart of Germany, to animate the old arteries of her streams, and to create new paths of communication; an activity from whose busy and still only half conscious action, will spring into life the thousand years dream of the union of the Rhine and Danube.

In several short articles the different versions of the Warsaw speech are exposed with comments.

Most remarkable is the Memoir (i. 57. 92; ii. 114—155) which, under the title of a Russian Memoir, or a Russian note on the State and Prospects of Germany, has been alluded to in many German Journals, and of which important extracts have been given in the Hamburgh "Zeitschrift fur Politick, Handel und Handelsrecht." In examining the whole article, we are first struck with the circumstance, that it is neither dated nor signed. The superscription says, "This Memoir was composed "under the guidance of a Minister at St. Peters-"burgh, and confidentially communicated to many "German Governments; further it appears to have "been drawn up in 1833, and to have been used "in 1834; probably after the States had acceded "to the Prussian Customs Union." Supposition

against supposition: probably this document was no more communicated through any ostensible channel, than the celebrated "Declaration of the Circassians." An attentive reader will be very much startled at the passage where it is said, that the opposition to Prussia in all the minor States, offers the hope that the union will sooner or later be dissolved, and will be succeeded by a general German regulation of Tolls, under the direction of the Diet. "And," continues the author, "if this regulation "should turn out favourably for Prussia, still we "shall have gained first, the independence of the "smaller German States; secondly, their financial "emancipation from Prussia; and thirdly, great "political influence for the Diet." Who are WE who thus speak, and to whom these three points are thus ascribed as gain?

But perhaps the original German may be supposed a fabrication. The only imaginable object of it would be to excite in Germany hatred to Russia, and especially to awaken in Prussia mistrust and suspicion of Russia. But then there would be too little skill in the arrangement, because this Document is wanting in all those marks which might assist in deceiving and making it pass for a diplo-

matic communication, emanating from the Russian Government. It is much more probable that the Memoir is really written, (it matters not by whom) in order to make the idea of a Russian Protectorate acceptable to the German powers of the second rank. But how far the views of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh are therein contained; how far the author and his work may enjoy the protection of that Cabinet, is a matter on which as Reviewers, we do not feel ourselves in any manner called upon to enter. It is however the duty of every German to devote his consideration to the star of political salvation, the new guarantee of German Liberty here presented to our notice.

First of all the Diet, or according to the spirit of the Memoir, all the States of the Confederation, except Austria and Prussia, are flattered with the importance into which they were raised, in their internal and external relations, by the decrees of the year 1832, after having so long endured oppression "from the physical preponderance of Austria "in the south, and from the moral influence of Prus- "sia in the north." When the decrees of June 1832 are eulogised as measures of safety, it is kept entirely out of view, that long previous to those

decrees, and before common measures and the military aid of the Diet were agreed upon for Governments in peril, order was everywhere restored in the hour of need *by the Bürgerguards.* When even the energy of the Confederation in its external relations is praised, the writer has nothing further to produce than the *supposition*, that the corps of observation on the Moselle was not sent without the previous approval of the Diet, and the vote of thanks in which the King of Prussia was further confidently entrusted with "the protection of the interests of "the Confederation on its threatened northwest "frontier, in order that the requisite constitutional "decrees of the Diet, which circumstances might "require, should be drawn up betimes."

From these premises then the conclusion is drawn that the Confederation will be in a condition "to "emancipate itself, as well from Austrian, as from "Prussian influence, and to form a new, more "powerful State (as a set off against Belgium which "will always be dependent on France) as in "reality it represents the interests of the whole of "Germany."

What developement is then to be expected for this new, more powerful State? (the German Confe-

deration a State!) A distinction is made between the event of Peace and of War; and in the former again between the principles of intellectual and material intercourse. With reference to the interchange of ideas, a difference is maintained and described between the principles of Prussia, and the more narrow policy of Austria. Is it really here a question of *principles*? The principle of suppressing unpalatable writings without *judicial cognizance*, is, as we are given to understand, common to both Governments.

The difference must lie in the application, and does not appear even here to be constant; at least we may read in all the Journals that not only all the past and present, but also all the future writings of the German literati will be prohibited. Then the writer has got together the notorious phrases of Protestantism and Intelligence. But has not Protestantism in the struggle with similar "principles of intellectual intercourse" made for its own-self a path, and did the reign of Frederick the Great fail in intelligence? This question has become necessary in consequence of the odious sidelook at Austria. But apart from measures which are already marked as transitory, there arises from the

peculiar tendency of the Memoir, a question which is not indeed handled with a single word: if indeed Russia is so much better adapted than Austria and Prussia to be the protector of the German Confederation, do perchance *Russia's principles of intellectual intercourse leave those of the Austrian and Prussian Governments so far behind in liberality?* What the author thinks of the German people, of the German Diets, and of the German Princes appears from the following extract.

"The Princes of the small constitutional German "States, oppressed by their ambitious Legislatures, "as Louis XVI. was by his National Convention, in "remembrance of this great warning example, "have now themselves acknowledged, that on the "further licentiousness of their Chambers depends "their existence, or non-existence. They now "offer a hand to Prussia, to curb the liberty of their "Chambers, whilst they willingly submit them-"selves to the general decrees of the Diet, and only "give way, in one common spirit of conservation, "to the necessities of the times."

Further, as regards the fate of the Constitutions, only the particular, local, and provincial interests may be admitted into the sphere of public discus-

sion. Perhaps the author (and perhaps also the Weekly Political Gazette of Berlin, which in other respects may not always sympathise with him) is served with the notice, that Elizabeth of England warned her Parliament not to meddle with *affairs of State*, and that, at a time when in German Countries, no *portion of territory could be alienated without the Diets, no alliance concluded, no regency instituted, no war could be carried on without the Diets.** So much for the assertion that in the Constitutions of Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Nassau, Baden, and Weimar, the English and French Constitutions were copied almost word for word, without reference to the ancient institutions of those German Countries.

We are here first of all edified at finding both English and French Institutions popped together into one stewing pan; then again we are told with

* The last indication of the vitality and independence of the German Diets was furnished by M. de Cetto. In allusion to the birthright of Prince Otho to the Crown of Bavaria, he states: "If His Bavarian Majesty were even disposed to prejudge these "rights, *he would be prevented by the Constitutional Charter of "the kingdom, which deprives him of the power, and which pre-"vents him from consenting to such an act.*"—Ed.

joyous naiveté that the English Constitution is somewhere put together in so compendions a manner, (probably in the Statutes at large) that one may copy it word for word; finally, *that the most original, the most important of all German rights, the one enrolled in all parchments, the right of granting and refusing supplies*, which was exercised before parchment came into fashion, is so thoroughly unknown. The writer, after having persuaded himself that the German Princes have learnt to distinguish their own interests from those of their people, shows the former also how to separate their interests from those of Prussia, as soon as that shall have gained that which induced them to stretch out a hand to Prussia. This refers to the principles of material intercourse; and in the above-mentioned manner is prophesied the dissolution of the customs union of Prussia which was calculated for political results.

Light is now thrown on the state of Germany in the event of war. A war can only be carried on by the German Confederation in common with Russia, and only against England and France. This is set down as already made out, and one sees

that it is the war of principles that Canning meant. The author is not without anxiety for the result. Principles, it appears, are a very dangerous matter. If it were necessary for the German Confederation to conciliate England by important commercial concessions, and France by surrendering up the left bank of the Rhine, this would be a less misfortune than the triumph of the French-English (!) constitutional principles; through these "the De-"magogues would become Kings and Regents of "Germany!" A pretty sort of a lecture indeed, an urgent motive for the German Princes, (for the people naturally are not even contemplated) to draw out their forces, and to drive England and France, together with the Demagogues, in couples. But, among the contemplations of the author with regard to the conflicts of States, there is still one which has great probability, viz. that Austria will again find in England her old ally. Now this would hardly be an alliance for war, but rather an alliance for the preservation of the peace of Europe.

But the revolution must in every way be combated in Germany. "Opinions are not shot down "by cannon balls, nor run through with bayonets."

This tone is new in the mouth of so legitimate a writer. He continues:

"Herein however lies the greatest mistake which "the Monarchical Governments have been guilty of "in our time. Nowhere, up to this time, has good "political instruction been given to the people. "In the universities, the professorships of politics "have been left vacant, in order to impede the "spread of false political theories, without reflecting "that, in the perusal of history, false political opi-"nions would be disseminated with the greater fa-"cility, if the minds of the students were not pre-"pared by profound and scientific views."

We recommend to the author the Manual of Dahlmann, wherein he may see how the affair of politics is treated in the different universities. One thing however appears really to deserve reflection: that the Germans love the Revolution for itself; for example the Polish Revolution. Is this really the case? The wish to see an independent Poland, cannot in itself, and for itself be so very revolutionary; Prince Metternich declared at the Congress of Vienna, that his Imperial Master ardently cherished this wish, and had only rendered it subordinate to other grand considerations. "L'Em-

pereur ayant de nouveau . . . . . *subordonné* ses veux en faveur de l'independance de la Pologne aux grandes considerations, &c. &c."

The last investigation finally treats of the developement of the German Confederation "under an "equal or unequal influence of Austria and Prus- "sia." An equal influence is not to be imagined, and immediately afterwards the startling prospect is brought to view, "that sooner or later the influ- "ence of both powers may be paralyzed." Austria will in every case be put in the back ground. But it is said of Prussia, "that it will have to expect in "time a much more powerful opposition from the "Diet, than from the Cabinet of Vienna; this circum- "stance may perhaps cause the Cabinet of Berlin to "attempt to weaken or to break the political power "of the Diet; but happily Austria will for the same "reasons strive to maintain the Diet in its import- "ance and existence."

And from this therefore we are to deduce, that the independence of the smaller German States can neither be guaranteed by Prussia nor by Austria; that consequently the guarantee of a great Foreign Power must be welcome to the Diet. We have really some difficulty in comprehending whence

this conclusion is drawn. In each of the two German Great Powers, lies the guarantee against the subjugation of the weaker States by the other of the two, and on this account the guarantee of a third foreign Power is necessary! Then it is said, England by her insular position, and being therefore a mere maritime Power, does not aspire to afford this guarantee; the choice then remains between France and Russia.

Undoubtedly so far as England is concerned, she would decline any German Protectorate. Already the connection with Hanover has given sufficient grounds of discontent to the nation, and annoyance enough to George the First, Second, and Third. England's policy is purely national, and as such, purely egotistical. What policy is not so? The German liberals would bitterly deceive themselves, were they to suppose that England would stir a finger to preserve their Constitutions. England is only so far interested in their maintenance, that in a war of principles, it could not be doubtful for which side the voice of the people in the Constitutional States would pronounce itself. But England's policy consists exactly in avoiding such a war! As regards also the independence of single

German States of the Confederation, England is interested only in a limited degree, as regards perhaps the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. But it is the interest of England in general, that the German States should not fall under the direct or indirect supremacy of a Foreign Power, and that Germany should remain intact; it is a matter of indifference in what limits and in what number of separate States. But in the interior, and indeed in the greater part of Germany, there is no confidence, no heart towards England, and no change will take place in this, no happy interchange of political relations will ensue between England and Germany, until England shall have purified her commercial system, and come to an understanding, on reasonable principles of reciprocity, with the German States. Such a disposition on the side of England will not appear (as the excited organs of the Customs' Union States imagine) as the forced result of necessity, but it will appear as founded on the true interests of England. Germany will accept with pleasure the hand so presented, but not with cordial warmth as the hand of a friend.

Furthermore, it stands to reason that the Germans will have as little fancy for a French guarantee of the constitution of their Diet, as for a Russian guarantee. The anonymous author of the Memoir knows indeed a number of services that Russia may enumerate as rendered to German freedom. If we were to acknowledge them all without inquiry, no necessity would follow for a Russian Protectorate. It would be useless therefore to waste words on the subject, if the Germans had not, at the same time, been reproached with ingratitude,—with the most despicable ingratitude. We must be allowed to offer a few words in reply to such an accusation.

The author goes back to the time of Catherine the Great, to her "guarantee of the Peace of Westphalia." Was the mode in which she supported the Bavarian proposal of exchange in the spirit of the Peace of Westphalia? It must have been unheard of, inconceivable blindness on the part of the German electors that they did not, in 1790, throw themselves in a body into the arms of Russia, as in the following year one of them (the Elector of Trier) did by his "remarkable declara-

tion." Are the Germans then considered as infants or superannuated dotards of the shortest memories, that they are spoken to on such matters in a tone like this? Are the writings of our time destroyed? Are the chronicles and the facts extinguished? On the contrary they are accessible to every man, and in a convenient form in a current work. Whoever will take the smallest trouble will find all the arguments on this subject in the 37th and 38th parts of Reuss' 'Staatskanzlei.' The Peace of Westphalia was, as usual, renewed and confirmed on the Peace of Teschen, (May 13, 1779). Russia guaranteed the Peace of Teschen, before the Emperor and the empire of Germany acceded to it, and without *being called upon on their part for the guarantee;* the Imperial decree on the accession contains (March 2, 1780) a protestation against disadvantageous consequences; in addition to this the ratifications of the guarantee do not appear to have been exchanged. On this was founded the pretension of the Russian cabinet to meddle with the affairs of the empire, a pretension which it thenceforward made good. Was it to be wondered at that the Germans did not welcome an interference of this

kind in their affairs from abroad? Johann Jacob Moser had warned them already on the occasion of the Peace of Teschen. "The more foreign "guarantees, the more will foreign powers have "occasion for mixing in our internal affairs, with "grounds, or, at least, with apparent grounds, of "right." How prudent, how mild was the language of Johannis Müller, after the Bavarian act of Exchange, with regard to Russia:

"If the Russian Government, as a preponderating "Power, will liberate Asia from tyranny and bar-"barism, and stand forth amongst Europeans as "the Protectress of the weak, and guarantee of "the good, Europe has a new and strong pillar "of strength. But princes are men, their maxims "are changeable; the cause of freedom is too "mighty, its dangers are too numerous to allow us "to be tranquillized by the hope that any Cabinet "whatever will at all times know its most glorious "and useful career."

It remains to be shewn how this conviction became more excited, more decisive, and by what circumstances. *Russia had guaranteed the Polish constitution as well as the Peace of Westphalia.* It was not

the enemies of Russia, but the Russian cabinet itself that drew the parallel in the Manifesto of May 18, 1792.

"C'est ainsi qu'ils ont eu la perfide adresse "d'interprèter l'acte, par lequel la Russie garantit "la constitution légitime de cette nation, comme "un joug onéreux et avilissant, tandis que les plus "grand empires, et entre autres celui de l'Alle-"magne, loin de rejetter ces sortes de garantie, les "ont envisagées, recherchées et reçues, comme le "ciment le plus solide de leurs proprietés et de "leur indépendance." (!)

This was considered ominous. Häberlin concluded his "Staatsrecht" (1797), after alluding to guarantees and their consequences, with the words. "*The first step to managing the German Diet, as "formerly the Polish Diet at Grodno, was hereby "taken.*" Complimentary writings and resolutions of the Diet (from Swabia and Franconia) of course ensued; to say nothing of the notes of Oct. 1799, on which the author sets great value, but which, however, did not proceed from *many*, but only from some (six), and those the Ecclesiastical, Diets. Then followed the mediation and plans of indemnity which were discussed by France, Prussia and

Russia (to the exclusion of the Emperor and the empire), and were then laid before the Imperial Deputations. The services done by Russia at that time are not forgotten by the Germans.

(*To be continued.*)

[Alarmed at the progress of the negotiations for the payment of the third series of the loan guaranteed to the King of Greece, by England, France, and Russia, we are induced at once to publish the following Despatch, although we are thereby compelled to break through the order which we had originally proposed to ourselves of developing from its origin, the complete system of delusion by which Russia has hitherto successfully cajoled every administration in England.

Our object in selecting this Despatch is not so much for the facts it contains, as for the developement of Russia's system of procedure. We here perceive two sets of Despatches, one secret and one ostensible; consequently a set of arguments and appearances distinct from the real objects; a knowledge of the instructions of all the other ambassadors; the committing of them with respect to their own courts, and the committing of their courts through them. Here also are most clearly revealed the grounds of the diplomatic success of Russia. She plays her double game with perfect confidence, from the consciousness of the absence of any duplicity, we may almost say, of any intention, in the minds of the British Cabinet.

This Despatch shows Russia's perfect acquaintance with the national character and feeling, with the position and interests of parties, with the feelings, qualities, and weaknesses of individuals. It shows her constant attention to every detail, her incessant communication of the minutest intelligence, and the bringing of all these to bear upon objects, invariable in their course through centuries; and, in addition to this, we must recollect that no favour, that no patronage overlies her diplomatic system, and that her first object is ability in the individuals charged with the execution of her policy.

The exposure here made of the means by which she has invariably succeeded in making use of us, even while appearing to oppose us, will, we trust, be considered by the opposition, if not by the Government, with reference to the actual negotiations respecting the Greek Loan.]

COPY OF A VERY SECRET DESPATCH

FROM

COUNT NESSELRODE TO M. DE RIBEAUPIERRE,

THE RUSSIAN ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

DATED ST. PETERSBURGH, JAN. 11, 1827.

In addressing to your Excellency the ostensible instructions which you will receive by the courier of to-day, we have fulfilled our engagements with the Cabinet of London, and taken advantage of a favourable occasion for exposing the general system of our policy towards the Ottoman Empire.

The more we have reason to believe that in spite of the noble moderation of the Emperor Alexander, and the principles which direct our august Sovereign, false opinions give rise to secret uneasiness as to our intentions with respect to this empire, the more it was necessary that we should make known with frankness both the grave interests that we can never abandon there, and the real advantages that will be offered to us by the order of things which is there established, as soon as we

shall see, on the one hand, the convention of Akermann executed with fidelity; and on the other, Greece, tranquil and flourishing, contribute as formerly to the prosperity of the Russian Provinces whose productions were taken off by her ships, and by the enterprise of her merchants. Such is the double aim of our preceding Despatch. It develops truths which we cannot too forcibly impress upon other powers, or upon ourselves.

But there are others which also demand your Excellency's particular attention.

You have perused the annexes of the confidential Despatch that we latterly addressed to M. de Minciaky, and you will doubtless have been struck with the difference that exists between the communication that the British Minister made to us concerning the Greek question, at the two periods very close to each other, between the instructions with which it furnished Mr. Stratford Canning the 4th Sept. 1826, and those which it sent to him in the month of December following.

The former, sent during the conference of Akermann, ordered him to push with vigour the negotiations destined to re-establish in Greece a happy tranquillity. The second enjoined him to remain

in inaction, to temporize, to wait till the other allied Courts should pronounce on the march that the English Government had formerly indicated as indispensable. The same contrast is re-produced in the overtures which he makes directly to those Courts. His language of September at least had been positive. In the month of December he is uncertain and timid.

Great Britain articulates the propositions which she had submitted to us, and which we had approved of, but she articulates them in a manner to let us perceive that their rejection will not provoke her displeasure. The Cabinets of Paris and of Vienna have also expressed in their replies (see the annexes A and B) new ideas, whose pure and simple adoption could only still more impede the progress of this affair in which so many difficulties unite themselves to so much importance. To explain the change, however, it is sufficient to consult the dates. Whilst England feared a rupture between Russia and the Porte, she equally feared to lose the rôle which the act of the 23rd March (4th April) had left to her in the affairs of Greece. As soon as the conclusion of the Treaty of Akermann offered to her the prospect of peace, she

returned to her former errors. She betrayed the desire of only half executing the protocol signed by the Duke of Wellington, of only thenceforward opening sterile negotiations with the Porte. Her secret leaning could not escape the other allied Courts, and their zeal to follow the impulse of English policy has no right to surprise us.

But your Excellency will perceive that it is not in a question to which great Russian interests are attached, that it is not at a moment when the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April) has already become known to all Europe, that it was possible for the Emperor to encourage attempts, the first result of which would be to expose us to all the prejudicial effects that our engagements may have for us in compromising us towards the Turks and the Greeks, without securing to ourselves the advantages that they ought to guarantee to us, in effecting the pacification of Greece. On this point our explanations with Great Britain have been categorical. To make them known to your Excellency we transmit to you (see annexes C. and E.) the ostensible and confidential instructions that we have been ordered to address to Prince Lieven. They will prove to you that we have neglected no

means of producing a strong impression on the English Government, and that M. de Lieven was authorized, if his first overtures did not obtain a favourable reception, to allow it to be understood that not being able to admit the indefinite prolongation of the troubles of the Levant, we should be obliged to terminate them separately, according to the very letter of the stipulations of the Protocol. Our language, however, is sufficiently positive to inspire us with the hope that this insinuation will be superfluous, and we call to mind that in all the periods of the long negotiations of which Greece is the object, as soon as Great Britain has seen in us the sole arbiter of the destinies of this country, she has never failed to offer us a co-operation which henceforth became zealous and sincere. We have grounds for flattering ourselves that the ambassador of his Imperial Majesty will succeed, either in signing with the Cabinet of London the treaty proposed by France, and accompanied by the clauses to which the Emperor renders the conclusion subordinate, or in arranging the decisive measures which the execution of the Protocol of 23rd March (4th April) requires, and will cause their adoption without further delay. But we will not

here revert to matters which we believe we had exhausted in our Despatches to M. de Lieven, and our task limits itself to defining well the attitude that you will take at Constantinople in order to favour the prompt realization of the wishes of our august Sovereign.

The Emperor desires to pacify Greece with the concurrence of England and of his Allies. Now, amongst the means which present themselves for engaging the Court of St. James's to pursue this enterprise, there can be no doubt, that placing it in a position where retreat would become nearly impossible, would be one of the most efficacious.

If the affair is once entered upon—if Great Britain plays in it a more or less active part by means of her ambassador at Constantinople, certainly, it will be difficult for her not to decide to terminate it in an honourable manner, and consequently *not to follow the only route which can lead to success.*

It is with this motive, and to this end that our ostensible Despatch authorizes you to seize the first opportunity of confidentially making known to the Reis Effendi that one of the principal objects of your mission will be to contribute to restore peace to the Levant.

In case Mr. Stratford Canning, profiting by a moment which he might judge propitious, and of the powers that we have given to M. de Minciaky should already have taken steps with the Porte, this opportunity will present itself *de facto*, and your Excellency will be, in a certain degree, obliged to declare that you have orders to support the overtures of the Ambassador of England, and seriously to invite the Turkish minister to take them into his mature consideration. Supposing, on the other hand, that Mr. Stratford Canning were to have changed his mind, or received instructions prescribing to him to remain silent, before M. de Minciaky should find himself authorized to support his propositions, it is not less true that at an anterior period he has made known to the Divan the existence of the Protocol, and that, according to all probability, the Divan itself possesses a copy of this act. It would neither be consistent with our dignity, nor our frankness to conceal from him our engagements.

Besides, the longer you remain at Constantinople without informing the Porte of the views of the Emperor as regards the pacification of Greece, and of the harmony on that point between Russia and

England, the more embarrassing would that communication become, the more it would be difficult to account for, the more would the Porte be *surprised** and alarmed at our policy. Nevertheless, as the Ambassador of England is not at liberty to quit Constantinople, as we do not even believe that he can in the present state of things have recourse to the declaration which would menace the Turks with an approximation, on the part of the allied Courts, towards the Greeks, your language with the Reis Effendi concerning the affairs of Greece should be purely confidential. In either of the suppositions above mentioned, you should avoid all eclat—avoid provoking a crisis, and content yourself with accustoming the Ottoman Ministry to hear you speak of the pacification, which is the constant object of our wishes, and to learn that we regard it not only as a good, but as a necessity.

In these two hypotheses also you may represent our insisting on this question as *the effect of our engagements with England;* remark that they are formal, that they preceded the convention of Akermann,

* Well might the Porte have been surprised, since only a few months previously M. de Ribeaupierre extorted from the Turks the signature of the Convention of Akermann, on the express condition that *Russia was to abandon the Greek Question for ever.*—ED.

that we are under an absolute engagement to fulfil them, that we cannot violate our faith with the Cabinet of London.

England cannot reproach us for the pains we shall take in executing stipulations concluded with herself, and will find herself compelled either to disavow us, which is impossible, or to explain herself as Russia does.

The Porte on its side will appreciate better both our position and her own. This will be to act on both these powers, at the same time to engage the one further in the question, and to warn the other that she should resign herself to allow the solution of it.

Since we require to carry into execution the protocol of the 23rd March (4th April), and since that act is known to the Greeks, it is assuredly important for us to gather positive information as to the internal state of Greece, as to its resources, and as to the means it possesses for realizing the arrangements we have agreed upon for its benefit.

Ever since the reign of the Emperor Alexander, of glorious memory, M. de Minciaky had been authorised to profit by the relations which he could renew in that country, after his long residence

there, in order to procure for us, secretly, information respecting the events of which Greece is the theatre, and respecting the dispositions by which it is animated. He managed to organise there a correspondence which has furnished us with useful information. You will continue it, and you will make use of all the powers granted to M. de Minciaky, and even of his personal co-operation, to render that correspondence more active and more regular. It may hereafter have a more positive object. It may turn upon the best method of carrying into execution the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April), and on the limits of the territory, as well as on the names of the islands to which the arrangements of peace shall be applicable; it may indicate the ideas of the men who are in most estimation among the Greeks, concerning the administrative forms which could be introduced into their country, and may enlighten us both on the operations of the armies and the movements of the fleets, and the foreign intrigues, which aggravate still more the misfortunes of these countries, already so unhappy.

It is of course understood that you will maintain the most friendly relations with Mr. Stratford Can-

ning. The interest of the affair which you will have to carry on together, and the ties which are formed between Russia and England, make this a duty on your part. Nevertheless, this task will not be exempt from difficulties.

Cold, reserved, and often punctilious, Mr. Stratford Canning is susceptible in the extreme. His character is somewhat sombre, and it is neither easy to gain his intimacy, nor to inspire him with confidence.

A great deal of frankness, united with a constant equality, in your behaviour with him, will, in our opinion, be the surest means of gaining your object. On your first arrival at Constantinople, you may submit to the perusal of the Ambassador of His Britannic Majesty the ostensible instruction with which you are furnished, and you may develope to him the principles it lays down for your guidance. Ulterior explanations, which we are about to enter into with Great Britain, are there spoken of. Your Excellency must not appear to be ignorant of their object; and, moreover, it will not be inopportune for Mr. Stratford Canning to be acquainted with them. Your Excellency will, therefore, have the goodness to communicate to

him our ostensible despatch to Prince Lieven, the sketch of the treaty we propose to conclude, and our instruction to M. de Tatistcheff.

We have reason to believe that our overtures, and the remarks which accompany them, will excite all the attention of the representative of the Court of London. If he observes at the same time that in all your confidential interviews with the Reis Effendi, you enter upon the affairs of Greece; if he sees that you are informed of what is going on in that country, and are determined to know well its real condition; if, lastly, with your characteristic ability, without ever speaking to him of the means of negotiation placed at the disposal of Prince Lieven, you make him divine them by your attitude, there is no doubt but he will hasten to communicate to the English Government these first impressions, always vivid, always eagerly received, and that they will produce a salutary effect at London.

You will thus have rendered an eminent service. Your relations with the Ambassador of France should be equally amicable, with a shade less of intimacy, and a shade which Mr. Stratford Canning may be able to perceive.

Count Guilleminot has received instructions (*see annexe F.*) which authorise him to combine with the representatives of Russia and England for the pacification of Greece. Consequently, you can extract from your ostensible instructions the passage regarding that negotiation, and allow him to read it, in order that he may not fall into a mistake as to the line of conduct you are commanded to adopt.

He is aware also of the proposition of the Court of the Tuileries, to change into a treaty the Protocol of the 23rd of March (4th of April), and probably of the opinions put forth by the Austrian Cabinet.

It is therefore necessary not to leave him in ignorance of those of the Emperor.

In order to make him appreciate them, your Excellency will communicate to him our despatch to M. de Tatistcheff. Your relations will be friendly with all the other ministers of the European States, with the internuncio of Austria, and the minister of Prussia, although the latter unfortunately can inspire no personal esteem. They will mark the ties which bind us to these two Courts. That of Vienna has transmitted to us the instruction she addresses to M. d'Ottenfels. You will

find it subjoined. (*Letter G.*) It will authorise you to make the same communications to the Internuncio as to the Ambassador of France, and you will neglect no means of profiting by his co-operation, and of giving to it the character most fit to ensure its efficacy.

Of all the capitals, Constantinople is perhaps the only one where the ancient policy still keeps up its traditions, and all its power. Numerous intrigues are carrying on there, secret agents are constantly employed there, mysterious insinuations are daily made there to the Porte, and we know that Russia is in general the object of them. But our intentions towards the Turkish Government are so pure, our rights so clearly defined by the treaty of Akermann, our position so evident in the Greek affairs, that obscure manœuvres can neither change the results of our recent conventions, nor long hinder our obtaining those which we have still need of obtaining.

A stranger to this movement, your Excellency will therefore content yourself with being an attentive spectator of it. Information will not fail you, but whatever may be its nature, it ought to have no influence upon your official relations with your

colleagues, but truth is always useful, and you will take care to make us acquainted with it.

The means which your situation affords you of often ascertaining the real policy of other Cabinets towards us, heightens the importance of your functions, and of your despatches.

Another field presents itself for your observations. You will arrive at Constantinople at a moment when the Sovereign is bringing about reforms there, which attack at the same time all the institutions of his states, the customs of his people, and the individual interests of many millions of his subjects. They cost his predecessor his throne and his life.

The present Sultan pursues them with more force, and his means are terror or death. But if a re-action ever takes place it will bear the same character. It will involve the extermination of the reigning dynasty, it will produce a frightful anarchy; and when one considers that the reforms have been commenced with the finances in a state of embarrassment, amidst symptoms of progressive decay, and that the Grand Seignior smothers in oceans of blood the projects of revolt, which nevertheless seem daily to revive,—it is difficult to

believe that his reign and his government will be of long duration.

Russia can on no hypothesis regard so vast an undertaking with indifference, and one of your chief duties will be to watch the different effects of it with the greatest attention. If the Sultan succeeds, this success may for a time retemper, so to speak, the Turkish Government, and give it a confidence in its strength *which Russia would immediately feel the effects of.*

This is an additional reason for accustoming the Turks from henceforth to show us a proper respect, to ensure for ourselves, by a scrupulous execution of our treaties, the consideration which ought always to be our appanage at Constantinople, and to hasten the pacification of Greece.

If this same undertaking fails, it may bring about the fall of the Ottoman Empire. We should then see the accomplishment of one of the greatest events of history, an event involving for us the gravest interests.

It is absolutely necessary that such a revolution should not take us by surprise, and your Excellency will have deserved well of your Sovereign, and of your country, if you inform us of the precur-

sive signs of this catastrophe sufficiently in time to enable the Emperor to prepare his measures, and to exercise an influence proportionate to the dignity, and to the wants of Russia, on the political combinations which might replace the empire of the Crescent. We shall take care to send your Excellency further instructions, as soon as we learn the results of our explanations with the Cabinet of London.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

THIRD INSTALMENT OF THE GREEK LOAN.

In one of our earliest Numbers we stated, that "in the East, and especially in Greece, Lord Grey's "Cabinet left Russia absolutely nothing to de-"sire." If any thing could add to our regret, that we should have been hitherto prevented from laying before the world the tragical history of that unfortunate country, Greece, it would be the rumour that the Governments of England and France are about to pay the third instalment of the loan guaranteed to King Otho, by the treaty of May 7th, 1832. Our first impression on hearing it was, that the anarchy and civil war to which Greece is a prey, had awakened in our rulers those feelings of generosity so peculiarly British, and that the Cabinet of England, with that ignorance and inattention to the past history of Greece, which has uniformly marked every act connected with that country, has again imagined that pecuniary means are really all that is requisite to restore to Greece order, security, and good government.

We assert, without fear of contradiction, that the main cause of all the miseries of Greece, since the battle of Navarin, has been our having, in the first place, given any money at all to the *Governments* of Greece; and, secondly, in having uniformly contrived to place the disposal of that money in the hands of a foreign, and anti-national faction in that country.

Our readers will be surprised at hearing, that not only the Greek nation has never applied to any foreign Government whatsoever for a pecuniary loan, but that the National Assembly, which confirmed the election of King Otto, expressly stated, that the previous recognition of the national debt, due to the British Capitalists, was the only step calculated to secure to Greece a true political existence, and that a British Minister, by one single act in opposition to that Assembly, destroyed the credit of Greece, and simultaneously committed his country to the irremediable sacrifice of three millions sterling.

The sagacity and financial intelligence of the Primates of the Morea, as exemplified in all the State Papers of that interesting people, enabled them at once to see the fundamental and fatal

error of the Statesmen of Europe, in assuming the right of interfering in the financial administration of an Independent State; for it must be clear to the meanest understanding, that the guarantee of the debts of one state by another, implies that the assisted state has no credit of its own; and, further, it entails upon both parties the subsequent misfortune that the cessation of that guarantee wholly ruins the credit of the poorer party, and, consequently, its means of paying its creditor.

The next extraordinary fact connected with the Greek Loan is, that it has never been accounted for either in Greece or to the British Parliament, whose sanction to the loan was only granted on the express condition that, in the December preceding every Session, an account should be made for both Houses of Parliament of the sums applied, according to the treaty, to the payment of the capital and interest of the loan.*

But the very stipulations of the treaty respecting this loan have remained a dead letter. It was stipulated "that the Sovereign of Greece and the "Greek State shall be bound to appropriate to the

* See 4th Volume of Hertstett's Treaties, under the head of "Greece," or Act of Parliament, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 121.

"payment of the interest and sinking fund of the "instalments of the loan, the first revenues of the "state, in such manner that the actual receipts of "the Greek treasury shall be devoted, *first of all*, "to the payment of the said interest and sinking "fund, and shall not be employed for any other "purpose, until those payments, on account of the "instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee "of the three Courts, shall have been completely "secured for the current year."

"And the diplomatic Representatives of the "three Courts in Greece, were specially charged to "watch over the fulfilment of the last mentioned "stipulation."

Now if this condition had been fulfilled, the Greek Government, according to the fundamental laws of Greece, must have been compelled to frame the annual budget within the revenue of the country, and therefore the non-fulfilment by the Representatives of the three Powers, of the duty which was part and parcel of the treaty, justified Count Armensperg in considering that the purse of England was inexhaustible, and that under every circumstance she would continue to pay as much money as Greece might choose to spend.

We do not say this in a captious sense, for we can easily conceive, that when our Representatives abroad are ordered to support any foreign statesmen whatever, whether they be Mendizabels, Palmellas, Capodistrias, or Armenspergs, such statesmen, sure of the support of England, are not only divested of all responsibility, but they throw that responsibility upon England herself, discredit her in the eyes of their own nations, and obtain all the support she is capable of affording them, while their policy is noxious to their country, or hostile to England; yet it is impossible for England, until she makes herself intimately acquainted with the character and condition of those countries where it is impossible for her to avoid interfering, nay, more, until she is right in her conclusions as regards those countries, it is impossible for her to do more than pin her faith on an individual, and suffer that individual to appropriate to himself the influence which is given to England by the respect which these countries entertain for her.

But the King of Bavaria, who, contrary to all the arrangements of the Treaty of May the 7th, has been continually suffered, if not instigated, to inter-

fere in the affairs of Greece, has naturally expected to share in the benefit of arrangements, to which, although not a contributor, he was a contracting party. Consequently the funds of the Alliance, instead of going out to the King of Greece, took the road to Munich, and in this manner the King of Bavaria became master of the destinies of the kingdom of his son.

Is it then to be wondered at, that the Greek nation, defrauded of that capital for the payment of which and its interest Russia may at any moment seize upon its first revenues, should look upon the Bavarians with the most hostile feelings, while at the same time means, so enormous for that country, are placed in their hands for the purpose of political corruption and partizanship?

But as if to fill up the measure of Russia's success in this transaction without a parallel, we find Russia from the moment that France and England consent to the advancement of this money, making objections to its payment!

Was ever a more ingenious method invented for confirming the delusion of the Cabinets, and leading them, in the very fulfilment of her wishes, to conceive that they triumphed over her policy?

And what are the conditions that she places to her consent to the advancement of the loan? Why that of re-uniting the Greek Church to the Patriarch of Constantinople, now completely under her control, and rendering the King of Greece himself subject to the same foreign religious supremacy. But how was it that the Church of Greece ever became detached from the Patriarch of Constantinople? Was it not by the act of M. von Maurer *whom England was led to eject from Greece, on the plea of his being a Russian?* If M. de Maurer's act then was in the Russian sense, how comes it that the abrogation of that act by which his name is and will be connected with Greece, is now the condition placed by her to the advance of the third series of the loan?

This important and remarkable question we shall treat in detail in the exposure which we propose to lay before our readers of the late events of that country. In the mean time we refer those who are anxious to inquire into the subject, to an article on Russian Policy in Greece in the *Foreign Quarterly Review* of January last.

If our voice can reach the Governments of France and England, we would conjure them to pause on

a measure that we conceive to be fatal, not only to Greece, but even to the Turkish Empire.—Events are threatening on so many points, that we cannot escape from the belief that the crisis is very near at hand. An indication of its proximity we read in the very conditions suggested by Russia for the advancement of the loan. In 1834 Russia attempted to separate Greece religiously from Constantinople, with the view of connecting it with St. Petersburgh. M. von Maurer fortunately interposed and established the Greek independent Synod. In 1836 Russia endeavours to reconnect Greece religiously with Constantinople. We cannot conceive that these observations can suggest a new idea to any one who has perused that condition. We cannot conceive how any one can doubt that, having so long convulsed Constantinople from Greece, she now thinks the time come when she will command Greece from Constantinople. Is our money and is our influence now for the last time to be made the means of insuring her success?

But the next unaccountable fact is the amount of the money which has thus been handed over for the use of Greece.

Under the Presidency of Count Capodistrias the

annual expenditure of Greece did not exceed £250,000. Now the whole personal expenditure of King Otho does not exceed £7000. a year, and yet Count Armensperg, the Arch-Chancellor of Greece, has managed, in the short space of three years, to exceed the revenue of Greece by an annual expenditure of more than £350,000.—that is to say, more than the sum total of the revenue under Count Capodistrias, which was considered by the Greeks as abusive and extravagant in the extreme—and yet, with all these resources at his disposal, what has been the state of Greece? One continued series of conspiracies, rebellions, civil wars, treason and anarchy.

The foreign loans have given to Greece a sum of money, which, calculating the population of the country at the various periods of transmission, gives to each individual man, woman, and child the monstrous sum of £10.* The reader must also take into account that the financial system of those countries is very different from ours, that the civil and financial organization has hitherto been almost wholly gratuitous, and that money goes at least

* What will the honourable and learned Member for Kilkenny say to this?

three times as far as in Europe. In proof of this assertion, we may quote the instance of Servia, which, after a struggle of much longer duration than that of Greece, but hitherto untortured by European diplomacy, issued from the contest for its independence, with a sum in its treasury exceeding half a million sterling, and where a population, exceeding by one-third that of the free state of Greece, is now administered for less than one-fifth of the expense of the Greek state.

Although we cannot devote more space to the subject at present, yet we should regret that any one should peruse these pages without carrying away a feeling of conviction of the melancholy truth which we have endeavoured to shadow forth, of our influence and our money having been devoted to the degradation of the Greek people in Greece, and to the furtherance of the projects of Russia throughout the East, by means of Greece.

In our last number, in exposing an unwarrantable assertion, and an unaccountable fallacy of the Right Hon. Member for Tamworth, set up as a defence for the miserable conduct of this Government in 1829, we showed how Capodistrias, by the employment on the heights of Roumelia of an army,

such as Greece never had during her struggle for independence, paralysed the action of Albania, enabled Diebitch to pass the Balkan, and thus made Greece, even after the affair of Navarin, contribute directly to the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople. The Greek army, which exercised by its peculiar position so fatal an influence upon the destinies of the East, and for the assembling of which not a shadow of a cause existed in Greece, was commanded by a Knight of the Guelph! This incident will bring home, we think, to whoever peruses it, two convictions, the first, that we must fail in every scheme where we pursue an object of detail, unless we have embraced the whole of the question with which we have to deal, that is to say, the whole of the policy of Russia. The second is, that the few Greeks who can penetrate into the labyrinth of the policy in which they are involved, are justified in the bitterest reproaches against this country for the cruel consequences of its best intentions, and in designating the gold sent from London as "chains sent from St. Petersburgh."

Amongst the effects of the most degrading and painful character, recently introduced into Greece by what has been termed civilization, there is one

which we have only to quote to show how powerfully acts upon the minds of so sensitive, so intellectual a people, the disappointment of hopes once so bright, and the realization of a condition so undeserved and so unexpected. We allude to suicide. The veteran Admiral Tombazi, and the son of Admiral Miaulis, lately destroyed themselves, and the reason assigned for both these catastrophes was the degradation into which they found their country plunged, and the hopelessness cast over it by the policy of England and France.

TO THE

INHABITANTS OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

However little we may feel ourselves justified in encouraging the Turks to believe in our support, disheartened as we are by the inconceivable apathy manifested by our Government, and viewing indeed with alarm, the consequences which may arise from the disappointment of the expectations hitherto entertained by the Ottoman Nation, still we cannot help imploring the Sultan and his people, first of all, not to underrate their own strength, and secondly, not to be deceived as to the character of the designs of Russia.

It is natural to expect that in consequence of their present disappointment, they may turn round with a feeling of self-destructive bitterness towards the very power which has reckoned on the present result, and which has formed but too correct an estimate of the torpor—or apathy—or insanity, which prevents the Government of England from attending to its own interests, and casting the shield and moral support of Great Britain, round our natural, commercial, and ever-faithful Ally.

To bring home to the Inhabitants of Constantinople, the true character of the friendship entertained towards their patriotic Monarch, by the Allies of Russia, we publish the following Extract, from the work of General Valentini, which appeared in 1822; at the very moment when the Russian Cabinet was endeavouring to enlist the support of the European Governments, to favour her plan of putting down the Greek Rebellion, which she had excited in Turkey.

We must bear in mind that no Prussian officer would be allowed to publish a political work without the sanction of his Government; and that every paragraph must have previously obtained the approval of Prussia, and by a natural consequence, that of the Protectress of Prussia. And, besides, the work is chiefly a compilation from Russian official documents.

VALENTINI

ON THE

MILITARY OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

THE study of the past is only truly useful in so far as we know how to derive instruction for the present and the future. Although the war that we have just described ought not to serve as a model, it teaches us at least the nature of the country and the means of penetrating into it, as well as the character of the people, and the best means of combating them; and we may thence draw conclusions as to the conduct that ought to be pursued by those whom Providence may select to emancipate these fair regions from the yoke of the barbarians.

Such a study ought not to be classed amongst the useless speculations, even if the execution of our plan should be reserved for future generations.

The road which leads to the centre, and which goes straight to the capital, must doubtless be preferred; however great the advantages that any less

direct route appears to offer for the safety of the enterprise. Nevertheless, there is one idea which naturally presents itself—it is that of effecting a disembarkation in Asia Minor before coming to the attack of Constantinople. Such a measure would produce the happiest effects in a military point of view, *besides hindering the Grand Seignior from quitting the seraglio and fleeing into Asia with his treasures, which must serve to indemnify the expenses of the war.*

At the same time, then, that the army by land advances by Adrianople, the fleet must follow its movement along the coast of the Black Sea, and must convey directly to the entrance of the Bosphorus the troops that will disembark in Asia, under the protection of the vessels of war, and whose first care will be to entrench themselves properly. Although the defence of the coasts is reputed to be ill organised amongst the Turks, one might fear that the points in the neighbourhood of the Euxine would be better defended than the rest; but the most recent descriptions speak only of the two castles constructed in 1773 by Baron de Tott, one on the coast of Europe and the other on that of Asia. These castles, which could not much

annoy the ships of war, would be easily reduced to silence by the superior fire of the latter, and the batteries beside them would soon be turned by the troops after having landed in sufficient numbers.

With regard to the old castles, known under the names of *Roumili and Anatoli Hissar*, built by Mahomet II. before the siege of Constantinople, they are situated two leagues from the entrance to the canal, at the narrowest spot, and consequently they could offer no obstacle to the disembarkation. Besides, they would not long resist a well-directed attack from the land side; and as soon as they should be taken possession of, the Turkish vessels which would oppose the disembarkation would find the passage absolutely prohibited; these vessels would also have to contend against the current which comes from the Black Sea, and against the winds of the North, which habitually prevail; circumstances which would favour, on the contrary, the manœuvres of the Russians.

As soon as a footing should be gained on shore, one would push forward the Cossacks and Chasseurs on foot to some elevated spot, whence they might discover the march of the Asiatic troops, who would arrive to succour the capital.

It will then be of the highest importance to get possession of Scutari, a kind of suburb of Constantinople, built like an amphitheatre, on the coast of Asia, opposite the Seraglio. This town, protected by a bad enclosure of great extent, would be an easy conquest, in spite of the seventy thousand inhabitants, most of them true believers. It is commanded from the neighbouring heights, and presents on the side of the hills a narrow point unprovided with walls, which the besiegers would surround with advantage. Masters of Scutari, the Bosphorus may be considered as a large wide river that one must pass to attack the capital.

Nevertheless, the latter must be straitened as much as possible on the side of Europe. It is important to establish oneself very near the walls, and to cut the aqueducts which conduct the waters from sources at the distance of two leagues. We have already seen above, that the most easy mode of vanquishing the Turks is by thirst. Thus a strict blockade will suffice to force the city to surrender, without the necessity of a formal attack, and without the effusion of blood.

It will be well to entrench strongly the posts

selected for investing the place, above all, the neighbouring villages, and other advantageous points on the roads which lead to the city, and to support these posts by troops encamped behind. By this means one may easily check the furious sallies of the Mussulmans, and they will be reduced to despair, without fatiguing the main body of the army which, encamped still further back, will enjoy perfect tranquillity.

The plan of Constantinople shows that the localities lend themselves to these plans. One finds there numerous suburbs extending as far as the wall, farms, villages situated at a short distance from the city, hills separated by marshy valleys; all the circumstances which contribute to form defiles, and give the means of opposing sorties. Beyond the Port, the walled quarter of Galata is hemmed in by the long suburb of Pera, which is at present entirely open, and which, even if the Turks were to fortify it, could not offer much resistance.

The besieged might also, on their side, take advantage of these localities for their own defence. The suburb of Eyoob, which extends for a considerable distance along the Port, leaning on

marshy ravines, presents a scite favourable for the formation of an entrenched camp, of which the elevated village of Topdschilerkoi would be the key. In front is the vast plain of Daoud Pacha, in which the Sultan reviews his troops when he assembles them to carry the war into Europe. This would be the rendezvous of the Spahis, whose great numbers would be an incumbrance within the walls. Some fortified points in front of this camp would leave wide passages for the sorties of this cavalry, and would protect its retreat.

In thus writing, I do not fear to give the Turks ideas which may serve for their defence, because in general they are not great readers; and besides, if ever good counsel were to come to their knowledge, they would follow it so badly, that, far from profiting by it, they would only give a surer game to the besieger.

Whether this height, however, which declines towards the city and the harbour, be disputed as well as the neighbouring suburbs, or be abandoned without resistance, it will be necessary, after gaining possession of it, to hasten to form an establishment there, in order to straiten the place.

Then the trenches would be opened against the works that the besieged will have raised without the walls, and they must be carried by a rapid attack under the protection of a hot fire of artillery.

But before pushing the capital to extremities, let us cast a glance on Asia Minor, to see what will be the measures to be taken to prevent the siege from being troubled from that side.

If the campaign has been short, and carried on actively, *the army should arrive before Constantinople before the bad season*, without having experienced great losses; so that by means of reinforcements of every kind that will join it, it will be in a state to make the blockade, and to convey to Asia Minor, by continual disembarkations, *an army of observation of fifty thousand men. This army will* ADVANCE AS FAR AS THE RIVER SAKARIA, above three marches, and will detach to the right a corps to drive the Turks towards Mount Olympus, without passing Isnik, excepting by parties of cavalry. Brusa, a considerable city, situated at the foot of Mount Olympus, and peopled in great part by Turks, would probably resist; if one chose to

advance further, it would prevent the possibility of a stand being made in its vicinity. One must, however, take possession of it in order to have tranquil winter quarters; but this expedition will be put off till the autumn, the period at which, if the fate of the capital is decided, it might be attacked in form, and with sufficient forces. With regard to the other towns between Isnik and the Black Sea, such as Ismid (the ancient Nicomedia), whose port may be useful, it must be taken possession of, no matter how; and, after having carried away the Turks as prisoners, one must establish there, for the Jews, Greeks, and Armenians, a sort of regular Government, under the protection of small garrisons, which will secure themselves by intrenchments.

Nevertheless, thirst will begin to be felt at Constantinople, and the people, in order to obtain water, will fight near the fountains, if they shall not be already dried up. At the same time, the magazines of provisions will be exhausted, the Janissaries will be reduced to horse flesh, *and every thing that is not Turkish will see itself condemned to die of starvation, or to perish at the hands*

of infuriated Mussulmans. But it will be proper, as well for *humanity*, as for the success of the enterprise itself, not to let matters reach this pass, but to permit the Ottomans to retire with their families and their effects; a proposition which they will probably accept. One must only agree that all the public riches, that is to say, those of the Sultan, shall be delivered up to the conqueror, or ransomed by a contribution, to be paid only by the Turks. Such an arrangement would be agreeable to both parties, and especially to the conquering one. It would employ the time of the evacuation, which will last for weeks and even months, in extending its conquests in Asia Minor. The half of the army at least will be immediately transported beyond the Bosphorus, and will form a camp at Scutari, whilst another corps will be charged with the expedition against Brusa. In order that the siege of this town may not be troubled by the Turks, who will evacuate Constantinople, a spot must be fixed in the convention whither they must retire, and they must be furnished on the route with provisions by magazines. The river Prusack (the ancient Thymbris), which joins the

Sakaria, at fifty leagues from Constantinople, and which waters Eskicheer (the ancient Doryleum), and Kutayah, the capital of Anatolia, might become *provisionally* the *new frontier of the Ottoman Empire*, with the reservation of placing it still further back, when it should be proper. Let us content ourselves with terminating this campaign by the conquest of Brusa and the occupation of the defiles of Mount Olympus.

It will, doubtless, be indispensable, in order to enjoy Constantinople in tranquillity, to remove the Turks still further off. We have seen by the example of Bosniac Aga, at Rutchuk, how they are disposed to re-appear before the places which they have lost, as soon as they see any chance of recovering them. We must, therefore, always expect their return, and fortify ourselves in all the conquered towns and provinces. As long as the standard of Mahomet shall wave on the Prusack, it will draw swarms of the faithful from the interior of Asia, and no Christian establishment will be safe in Asia Minor: but as it is necessary to occupy a part in order to cover the Bosphorus, another campaign must be made. If Russia executes it alone, she will naturally take as a basis, the southern

shore of the Black Sea. The Sakaria, on the route from Nicomedia to Khandek, must first be forced, and an establishment must be made at this spot as well as higher up, at about ten leagues near Souka. *At the same time a landing must be effected in the ancient harbour of Heraclea*, or in some neighbouring port, to march on Boli, of which an entrepot will be made; and thence one must take the Turks in the rear on the Prusack, by a manœuvre similar to that of Buonaparte at the battle of Marengo, in taking the Sakaria for the Po, and the mountains on the right of that river for the Alps. Whilst we seek the enemy in order to beat them, and drive them back beyond Olympus, another body of troops will keep itself on the bank of the Prusack, to amuse them and to cover the conquered country. This corps will then occupy, or besiege, the towns of Eskisheer and Kutayah. The defeat of the Turks in this situation, will bring about the submission of all ancient Bithynia, comprised between the coast and the mountains, of which Angora is the capital; a city renowned for its commerce. The Sublime Porte will then be obliged to take up its residence *either at Karahissar*, near the sources of the *Meander*, or even still further off, at *Conia*, (the an-

cient Iconium) in Caramania, where the Sultans formerly held their warlike court, before establishing themselves in Europe.

After the conquest of Constantinople, the subjugation of Asia Minor would become much more easy, if *other European Powers* were to take part in the war. An army coming from the West would disembark at Smyrna, which it would make the basis of ulterior operations. The caravans require only seven days to arrive from thence at Karahissar. Angora, then occupied by the Russians, not being at a greater distance from this latter place, it will be easy for the two Christian* armies to unite there, and to succeed, at length, in driving the Turks beyond Mount Taurus, whence they formerly came.

In this undertaking, the countries bounded by the sea will be the easiest to conquer, on account of the inferiority of the Turkish marine. Greece already emancipates herself; and if she is supported by *any important diversion*,† the Christian

* In default of procuring an auxiliary *Christian* army, Russia brought on the Mussulman army of Ibrahim Pacha. So much for the amiable delusions of those who imagine that Christianity is to be advanced by the Muscovite occupation of Turkey.—Ed.

† In these three words lies the gist of the Treaty of the 6th of July, and all its consequences.

Powers will only then have to concert about its future fate, as well as on that of Egypt and Syria. The task of destroying the pirates of Northern Africa, will be left to France, and it will be a means of making her throw off that superabundant growth which ferments in the interior.

If the Mussulmans, driven back to the banks of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and into the peninsula of Arabia, were to become again what they formerly were, shepherds and hunters: if they were to unite with the Persians, and to come to an understanding with them on the dogmas which divide them; and if, renouncing the indolence and the pleasure which have enslaved them, they were to educate their Sultan under the tent, and no longer in the Seraglio, then Europe would have to guard against a new invasion on their part.

The superiority of our military science, undoubtedly places us in a state no longer to fear what the Christian powers formerly experienced; but it would be a long time necessary to keep under arms and to keep up, by new contingents, the Colonies which we should have founded in the countries taken from the Turks. Perhaps it will also be necessary to re-establish the ancient orders of Knight-

hood, in giving to them a constitution conformable to the spirit of the age. The conquered country, whose military condition would hold to all the European Powers, far from being an apple of discord, would create amongst them new relations of amity. The superabundance of the population of Europe would there find convenient establishments, and the ardent youth would go thither to gain their spurs. This practical military school, at the extremity of the civilized continent, will be advantageous for all the states, and the nations of Christendom will no longer be obliged to make occasional wars against each other in order to keep alive the warlike spirit.

A military state, such as I propose, presents nothing extraordinary. The frontier of Austria, in Croatia and the Bannat, offers a similar establishment: it is the same with the military colonies, formerly founded in Southern Russia, and there would be nothing unnatural in the union of similar institutions, with an order of Knighthood, created for the defence of Christianity. When the Emperor Paul conceived the idea of uniting the Grand Mastership of Malta with his Crown,* perhaps he

* We recommend to those of our travellers who may be about to visit St.Petersburgh this season, to ask to see the Maltese palace:

entertained a somewhat similar project, and only wanted the opportunity of a war against the Turks to put it into execution.

But, it will be said, a war against the Turks, is, for the greater part of the European armies, a matter so far removed, that a dissertation on this subject can only be considered an object of idle curiosity. I answer, that it is not a century since the troops of Brandenburgh, and other parts of Germany, co-operated in the victories of Prince Louis of Baden, and Prince Eugene of Savoy; and who can foresee what the march of events may bring about for the future?

In general the soldier ought to know that not only is he made to defend the territory of his own country, but also to march to the combat to every zone whithersoever the will of his Sovereign calls him: too happy to be able to gather laurels without the soil of his native land being laid waste!

When a war is kindled, the soldier does not discover the advantage there may be in waging it. let them reflect on what can be the object of maintaining that costly establishment.

If these lines should meet the eye of Sir Frederick Ponsonby, he may recollect, and perhaps divine the meaning of, some conversations which passed between himself and General Marmont, whilst the Marshall was enjoying his hospitality at Malta.—Ed.

He does not separate the interest of the State from that of the Prince. With regard to the right and the justice of the war, it is a subject that must be left to the powerful on earth to settle with their consciences. Nothing great would have been done, no durable monument would have embellished the history of nations, if one had never acted but according to the previous decision of a Court of Justice, and in following the principles of equity which regulate civil life.

One sees, by numerous examples, that posterity judges, in this respect, very differently from cotemporaries. The war undertaken by Louis XIV. for the succession of Spain, was looked upon, at that period, as an evident act of injustice, and fifty years had scarcely elapsed when Frederick wrote to Voltaire, that it would have been cowardice in Louis XIV. not to have accepted the will of Charles II. As much might, perhaps, have been said of the war in 1740. With regard to the war of the French Revolution, if one admits that the Allies were the aggressors, one must, at least, agree that the final results have confounded the opinions of philosophers, who wished to avoid it, as contrary to the interests of certain states. It

was then the reign of those encyclopædists of France who dreamed of universal peace, and who called the soldier a mercenary executioner. They conceived they might secure the repose and happiness of nations, by giving to them institutions which did not permit them to make any but defensive wars: but one has well perceived, since that time, what may be gained for humanity by the adoption of a similar system! The proposed suppression of permanent armies, or, at least, their fusion into a national militia, would lead directly to ruin those rich and pacific nations, which, losing all habits of war, could no longer resist the enterprises of their neighbours; and, it is an ancient remark, that a people has never been formidable except when its military genius has been developed by civil wars.

When the nations are governed by Sovereigns who know how to respect their reciprocal rights—wars, with regard to their object and the mode of carrying them on, may be compared to those duels, which, in truth, neither philosophy nor morality can justify, but which, subjected to the laws of honour, were adapted in their age to preserve society from still greater evils.

Nations of dissimilar interests and dispositions, cannot regulate their relations by that virtue of the sage, which does not even prevail in the legal state of civil existence. We may, therefore, assume, and the experience of all ages proves, that the idea of a perpetual peace belongs to those amusing dreams which mankind is not destined to see realized.

ON THE NAVIGATION OF THE DANUBE.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM MR. BACKHOUSE.

"*Foreign Office, May* 5, 1836.

"GENTLEMEN,—In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, upon the subject of the obstructions offered by the Russian authorities to the free navigation of the Danube, I am directed by Viscount PALMERSTON to acquaint you, that his Lordship has called upon the law adviser of the Crown for his opinion as to the regulations promulgated by the Russian ukase of the 7th February, 1836; but, in the mean time, Lord PALMERSTON directs me to acquaint you, with respect to the latter part of your letter, that it is the opinion of his MAJESTY'S Government that no toll is justly demanded by the Russian authorities at the mouth of the Danube, and that you have acted properly in directing your agents to refuse to pay it.

"I am, Gentlemen, &c. &c.

(Signed) "J. BACKHOUSE.

"*To Messrs. G. Bell & Co., Fenchurch Street.*"

The interest, and we might almost say the commotion, excited amongst the commercial world by the posting of the above letter at Lloyd's, has been detailed and commented on by all the daily organs of the Press. The feeling which it has created has been at once decided and unanimous. It has been regarded at once as the most decided step that the British Government has yet taken,

and as an earnest of its intention to put a stop to the stealthy but unceasing aggressions of Russia on the territory and independence of all her neighbours. We sincerely trust that *this intention* will be more fortunate than good intentions generally are. We, however, see in this step of the British Government something more than an intention. We see in it a mode of procedure which we cannot help believing perfectly new in this country.

The import of the last paragraph of Mr. Backhouse's letter seems unaccountably to have escaped observation. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs officially communicates to a commercial House in the city of London, the approbation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the instructions communicated by that House to their agents in the province of Moldavia, to resist certain acts of the Russian Government executed by Russian officers. This is certainly a most anomalous predicament for one Government to be placed in with regard to another. The Russian Ambassador in London must surely have acquiesced in the injustice of the demand; if he had not, the letter of the Under Secretary of State was a most

uncourteous declaration of war; but acquiescing in its injustice, then this letter exhibits a want, on the part of the English Government, of confidence in the language held by the representative of Russia; it is in this latter sense that we understand this communication. We congratulate the Government on its escape from that state of mental delusion in which all the Governments of Europe have so long invariably lain, but much more do we congratulate it upon appreciating so well the strength of England and the power of Russia, as to feel that it could commit itself to sanction the practical resistance of an unprotected Merchant against an act of the Russian Government.

In 1823, when the Russian Government declared the North Pacific Ocean a *mare clausum*, and endeavoured to force the American Government into acquiescence in such a pretension, the merchants of all the cities in the Union at once resolved to arm their vessels trading to those ports, and whatever was the decision of their Government, to repel force by force. The question was immediately closed, and the sea remained open.

This letter is most important however, not merely as an indication, but as an event. It proves oppo-

sition on the part of England to Russia; and the demonstration of that opposition is a guarantee to all Eastern populations of their political existence. As the principal means of Russia's success has been the representing of England as allied with her, so now is the demonstration of opposition to her on the part of England absolutely necessary to sustain the resistance of Turkey, Persia, &c.

But again we ask, WHY are not British men-of-war in the Black Sea? The 'Blonde' has sounded it, and in the depth of winter, and yet she came back safe. The best information we have been able to collect on the subject assures us, that there is no danger for a British man-of-war in it. This is, really, from a question of the deepest interest, become one of ridicule.

MOLDAVIA.

FRANKFORT JOURNAL, *May* 1.

THE Frankfort Journal had admitted into its columns, by a natural sentiment of impartiality, all that has recently been published about Moldavia, but now it declares that, happily for it, in publishing every thing, it had guaranteed nothing. It has, however, now received most detailed information respecting this country, so interesting to Europe in its actual state.

"Ascending," it continues, "to the source of the evils that afflict Moldavia at this moment, we do not hesitate to expose it in its reality. The cause of the misfortunes of this country is according to our views to be found in the principle of election of the Princes, as it is sanctioned by the organic statute of Moldavia.

"In 1835 five candidates figured on the list, the junior of whom was Prince Michel Stourdza. His great capacity, his noble qualities, made to inspire confidence, pointed him out to the esteem of the

Courts to whom he was proposed as worthy of the preference. It is natural to suppose that his competitors and their creatures became his adversaries. These are the natural fruits of the elective principle. Ancient Poland remembers them!

"Happily doubts disappear and unjust murmurs are hushed before the firmness of legitimate authority. The courts, sovereign and protector, lend no ear to vain declamation, or to base calumny. That which they have established they know how to maintain, and it will belong to no one to attack with success the institutions and the persons that the country surrounds with its suffrage and respect.

"We understand that General Mouravieff, commanding the sixth corps d'armée, a portion of which garrisons Silistria, is expected at Jassy on his route to the Turkish fortress. The Prince has sent to the frontier his Aide-de-Camp to receive and compliment the General. The documents which have been published sufficiently explain the object of the mission of General Mouravieff to Silistria."

The Frankfort Journal has for several months been the channel of insinuations and accusations

against Prince Stourdza. Addresses against him were sent to St. Petersburgh, and the utmost publicity given to them by the organs of Russia. A commission was named to inquire into his conduct, or, in other words, to try him. This commission was composed of *three General officers*, to whom were to be added the Russian consul-general, Baron Ruckman (*formerly minister of Russia in Greece and at Constantinople!*) Now the Frankfort Journal has ascertained by "the most detailed information" that Prince Stourdza merited the esteem of Russia, and had been deservedly preferred to the other candidates. Here is another enigma propounded to the Œdipus of Europe!

The following facts may assist in the solution—

Prince Stourdza having been considered by Russia as hostile to her views, was excluded from the list of candidates presented to the Porte for her selection. The Porte resolved that it would elect no other individual as Prince of Moldavia. Russia flatly refused to admit his name as a candidate; on this the Porte declared, that unless his name was placed on the list she would make no election at all, and publish a manifesto to Europe exposing the conduct of Russia and her own motives; Russia

alarmed at this determination consented. Prince Stourdza was admitted as fifth, as "*junior*" candidate, and was immediately selected by the Porte. This will explain the meaning of the Frankfort Journal, when it says that the evil lay in the *elective principle;* an election also, be it observed, which by the stipulations between the two powers is strangely confined to "*cette seule fois-ci.*"

The consequences are natural. The Prince attempted to pursue an independent line of policy, received no support, was menaced, circumvented, driven perhaps into errors, conspiracies fomented against him, represented, of course, as Russian, and, now his resistance is overcome, he has made his peace.

To whatever side we turn our eyes what a labyrinth of iniquity—what a web of cunning and intrigue! Can the British Government really believe that all this trouble and expenditure is incurred merely to baffle its penetration, or to counteract its policy? It may be necessary to act on the mind of the British Government when sums of money are wanted to support the action of Russia, or when it is necessary to bring England (and this is the acme of her policy) into a real or appa-

rent concert with Russia, but it would be very erroneous to suppose that the multiplicity of means used against Turks, Persians, Servians, or Moldavians, has reference to any other combination than those contingent on the impossibility of her acting by force, and her succeeding by strength against the numerous bodies she has undertaken to disorganise. It is therefore by the combination of art, far more triumphant than her victorious arms, that these people are daily reduced lower and lower in the scale of political power. It is by dexterity rather than impulse that she introduces the two wedges which have prostrated so many crowns, so many charters before her—discontent and insecurity.—And all this while England is kept in perfect indifference as to what is going on—is firmly persuaded that these people are all wild savages, already at the mercy of Russia, and likely to prove a source of weakness if incorporated in her Empire!

In a former number we have said that the Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia offer in their natural resources, and in their financial system, which, *not yet* being civilized, allows the free importation of all the produce and manufactures of the earth—a field for commercial enterprise,

which, if protected from foreign violence, will equal in importance the commerce of Great Britain with her mighty neighbour, France.

We now say, that these provinces have the means of forming in peace, and as it were commercially, a barrier against Russia, on the West of the Euxine, not less effectual, and perhaps more galling to her than on the East the mountain barrier of the Caucasus. How curiously shall we inquire into all these points when the period of prevention shall have passed away!

Extracts from the Treaty of St. Petersburgh, 29th Jan. 1834.

"ART. II.—Par l'Instrument fait séparément à Adrinople, relativement aux Principautés de la Vâlachie et de la Moldavie, la Sublime Porte a pris l'engagement de reconnaître formellement les reglemens faits, pendant que les troupes Russes occupaient ces Provinces, par les principaux habitans*—sur leur administration intérieure; la Sublime Porte ne trouvant rien dans les articles de cette constitution, qui puisse affecter ses droits de Souveraineté, consent dés à present à reconnaître formellement la dite Constitution.

"Elle s'engage à publier à cet egard un Firman, accompagné d'un Hatti Sherif, deux mois aprés l'echange des ratifications et à donner une copie du même *à la Mission Russe* à Constantinople.†

"Aprés la reconnaissance formelle de la Constitution, les Hospo-

* Read General Kesileff.

† Not to any other Mission or to the Prince Hospodars, or to be formally announced to the rest of Europe.

dars de Vallachie et de Moldavie seront nommés, mais POUR CETTE SEULE FOIS-CI, et comme un cas tout particulier, de la manière qui a été convenue, il y a quelque tems ; entre les deux puissances contractantes, et ils commenceront à gouverner les deux provinces conformément à la Constitution, laquelle est une suite des stipulations dont il a été parté plus haut.

EVACUATION OF SILISTRIA.

The Russians are at length to evacuate Silistria. So then all the projects imputed to that power finally turn out to be unjust and malignant. Russia at the same time remits a portion of the debt as security for which Silistria was said to be held. Here is a new demonstration of the liberality of the Emperor, a new guarantee for the duration of peace; and as further guarantees for the continuation of that European peace, Austria is disarming and the Dardanelles are fortifying.

Not many months back the evacuation of Silistria, and the remission of the debt, would have led the simple-minded of this country to discredit any evidence that could have been brought forward, with a view to substantiate the reality of those designs which now no one questions.

Whether Russia's calculations will ultimately prove true or not, as regards the actions of Great Britain, it is perfectly clear that she has been mistaken in her estimate of the opinions of Great Britain.

The evacuation of Silistria, if it fails to prove the absence of the designs which have been imputed to Russia, does prove the reality of the alarms she entertains lest we should frustrate those designs. So far, therefore, we have reason for congratulation. But, on the other hand, as is natural in a question so complicated as this, there are grounds for apprehensions of the most serious character. It is notorious that during the last few months a great excitement has prevailed amongst the Turks, and great expectations have been raised of seeing some step taken by England, which will relieve them from the constant menace of the occupation or destruction of their capital. This excitement, unsupported in any degree, must in the nature of things be followed by reaction; and on the one hand the neglect of our interests, and on the other the contemptuous tone assumed by Russia towards us, and assumed with impunity, must gradually introduce a lower and a lower estimate of the capacity and intelligence of our country. Now it may be perfectly true that the attitude taken by England has forced Russia to this double concession of position and money. But will the Turks think of that? Will they not rather eagerly avail themselves of

such a pretext for closing their eyes against a danger which it requires no small degree of intellectual enlightenment to unravel and of moral courage to look steadily in the face. The advantageous position prepared for England, at a very recent period, by a combination of circumstances truly extraordinary, has not been occupied by her; whilst Russia proceeds by varying means but with an unchangeable mind, and with that firmness of purpose which always renders itself great, imposing, and successful, by the appropriation of every favourable chance that is offered by the mutability of fortune.

But after all, is Silistria evacuated? What means the term of five months? Why the accumulation of troops towards the very point from which a retreat is to be effected? What means the quarantine establishment at the mouths of the Danube? What means the visit of the Emperor to Odessa? What means the nomination of Paskewitz *Erivansky* to the command of the army in Bessarabia? What means the nomination of Mouravieff to the command of Silistria? If these things have any meaning, what *does* the *evacuation* of Silistria mean?

Perhaps that fortress will be evacuated in the same guise that the Principalities were evacuated,

viz. by the retreat of the general and the staff, while the troops remain. But General Mouravieff takes care to relieve us from all doubt on that head, and repeats to whoever will listen to him, that the military frontiers of Russia are not the Danube but the Egean, not Silistria but the Dardanelles.

The talk about the evacuation of Silistria is intelligible enough as regards the opinion of England, as regards opinion at Constantinople, as regards the obtaining of eighty millions of piastres from the Sultan. So far we understand it, and therefore so far do we believe it. We also can perfectly believe the evacuation of Silistria in the month of August, if the Dardanelles have by that time received a Russian garrison. We should also think that moment well calculated for such an operation, both from the season, which would then be too far advanced for military operations against her, and because the news of the event would arrive in England subsequent to the first of September, when the Commons of England, and His Majesty's responsible advisers will be engaged partridge shooting.

LETTER FROM ST. PETERSBURGH.

April 24.

THE orders given by the Emperor for the assembling in the port of Revel of all the ships of war in the Baltic begin to advance in their execution, which had been retarded by the badness of the weather. Every ship capable of being put into commission will repair to Revel during the month of May, excepting those which may be indispensable elsewhere as stationary guard-ships, or charged with correspondence. The sailors and artillery will be definitively organized there, and divided into separate crews, according to the arrangement proposed by Admiral Meller, which is already in active operation in the arsenals of the Black Sea, and from which the best results are expected. No one can flatter himself with knowing the object of the Emperor with regard to these two fleets, which at the present moment are stronger than they have perhaps ever been; but it is easy to comprehend, whatever may be the projects of the Emperor, that whether they be offensive or defensive will depend on many events.

An Aide-de-camp of his Majesty and other general officers have set out on missions relative to the army of the South, towards which nearly 30,000 men have been directed from the other governments. This arrangement especially refers to the line of the Pruth and that of the Dneister, and it is not supposed that it has any connexion with Ekaterinoslaw. It is certain at least that the cantonments and the garrisons of Bender, Kherson, Ismaïl are considerably augmented.

That which cannot be concealed by all the dissimulation of diplomacy and the employment of the means of which the Emperor alone really holds the thread, is the efforts to detach one by one from English policy all the secondary powers. The forms of government in Sweden, Denmark, and Holland are not those of this place; nothing there is so concentrated, and besides the spies of the Cabinet of London serve as well as those of the Cabinet of Petersburgh. It is consequently known that the neutrality of France has been promised to these three Courts, in the event of a conflict taking place between England and Russia, and that, whilst making every effort to guarantee it, it is insinuated in terms sufficiently intelligible, "that

"the resentment of Russia against those less power-
"ful states, which should not have taken her side,
"might have disastrous consequences on their
"future state, without any continental government
"being willing to defend them." The situation of Sweden gives room for reflection on these probabilities. As for Holland, the King is as stout a Russian as the Crown Prince of Prussia and the kings of the south of Europe, but he is differently situated.

UKASE RESPECTING THE ARMENIAN CHURCH.

An Ukase has lately appeared in the various journals regarding the Armenian church. A few weeks ago the announcement was made from Constantinople that the *Armenians of the Ottoman dominions had been placed under the religious supremacy of the Armenian Patriarch in the Russian dominions.* The statement of such a fact would seem of itself calculated to call forth the indignant remonstrance of this country, and the no less indignant remonstrance of a national opposition, if we had one, against the Foreign Diplomacy which does not perceive such monstrous conspiracies as these, or the Foreign Policy which does not assume such an attitude as to prevent their success.

After every element of discord has been cast over those unhappy countries, and when they are reduced to a state of convulsion or desperation, we of course shall say—Such is the decree of Fate, and Russia inherits by Right Divine. We will return to the political use made by Russia of Eastern creeds in our next Number.

OBSERVATIONS

ON

AN INTERCEPTED CARICATURE.

It may puzzle the uninitiated to understand how Caricatures can insinuate themselves among solemn State Papers. We confess we ourselves are at a loss to account for the existence among Russian documents of a Caricature of such a character as that which accompanies this number.

There are several able caricaturists, (we mean using the pencil), in the diplomatic service of Russia, but we doubt that their talents would be employed precisely in the representation of such features as these of Russian power: we, therefore, suspect that this Caricature has been bought up, dreading its effect on the public feeling of England. Certainly, never in fewer lines has the state of Europe been epitomized. Hideous and humiliating representation!

There is but one point on which we feel inclined to criticise it. Louis Philippe dances with energy and zeal, but he deserves promotion. He ought not to be placed in the Russian dance below the old Emperor of Austria; but, on the other hand, his position is well chosen, as enabling him to win into graceful motion the reluctant attitude of his English ally.

Prince Metternich once, to his cost, indulged in satire of this kind against the Emperor of Russia and his Court — when, at Paris in 1825, he was so unguarded as to allow to be seen there graphic sketches of his pen. They were communicated to the Russian Court, and produced the greatest indignation against the Chancellor of the Court and State. Who was guilty, it will be asked, of this violation of private confidence, of this sin against the political faith of this country, if not of France? Of course it will be said that it was the subservient cabinet of France. It was not. It was our gifted Canning! It was conceived by him to be a splendid hit at the system of the Holy Alliance. Such has been the lamentable policy of this country at all times, whether directed by a genius or an humbler mortal.

ARMENIAN CHURCH.

At the moment when the British Parliament and the public journals were exulting over the triumph of British influence at St. Petersburg, and the satisfactory result of our Policy in the arrangement for the evacuation of Silistria, we observed, in the very same letter announcing this intelligence, that the Porte had consented that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the Armenian population should be transferred from the Patriarch of Constantinople to the Patriarch of Utchmiadzin, the religious capital of Armenia, and extorted from Persia during the last war. This statement excited no attention, did not elicit a single remark; its object, character, and consequences were as completely incomprehensible as if Russia had never interfered in Greece, because commanded to do so *par toute sa religion.*

The following extract, from the January number of the Foreign Quarterly Review, strikingly illustrates our argument.

"The most powerful lever which had been placed in the hands of Russia, and which was perhaps one of the original determining

causes of her gigantic designs, was the identity of her religious creed with so large a portion of the population of Turkey. The first political agents that penetrated into the southern provinces of Turkey were apostles of a faith, not partisans of a government. The political influence of Russia spread from the altar, and the present degradation and future anarchy and subjection of Greece may be traced back, through heroic devotion and patriotic aspirations, to religious sympathies at the disposal of the wily cabinet in the far North, in whose hand the symbol of self-denial and of faith, the cross, has been converted into a dagger. The labarum of that faith had been erected in the city of Constantine; it was now to be transferred to the marshes of Peter. The patriarch of Constantinople, weltering in his pontificals on the threshold of the sanctuary, a splendid triumph of her diplomacy, had desecrated the ancient shrine; and, while this awoke an implacable hatred between the Crescent and the Cross, it led the adherents of the Eastern church to regard with a new feeling of respect that Northern, that inviolable, sanctuary of their faith. In Greece a new blow was struck at their ancient predilections by Capodistrias, who, severing the religious and hitherto inviolate dependence of Greece on the œcumenic patriarch, became himself the lay vicar of the national Greek establishment, as representative of a master, whose predecessor had equally replaced the pontiff of Russia in his supreme functions.*

Up to the present time, the religious propagande of Russia has been confined to the Greek Church and to the professors of that creed, subject to Tur-

* In Montenegrin, on the death of the celebrated priest and governor of that singular country, his nephew, a lad of twenty, was called to St. Petersburg; and the civil authority in his native land was there, as it were, conferred upon him through his consecration as archbishop by the Russian Patriarch! Russia has attempted, but not yet succeeded, in rendering the Armenian Church of Constantinople dependent on the Armenian Patriarch within her territories at Erivan. The late removal of the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople is another illustration.

key and to Austria. Now she has commenced a new *rôle*. The principal Christian churches throughout the East are—Firstly, the Greek, professed by the great proportion of the Greek race, by one-third of the Albanian race, by the whole of the Montenegrins and Illyrians, and by two-thirds of the Sclavonic populations of Roumelia, or by a population of between six and seven millions of souls, the head of whom was the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople. Secondly, the Armenian Church, embracing almost the whole of the Armenian population, which may amount to nearly three millions, scattered throughout the towns of the empire and the capital, but principally inhabiting the mountains of Armenia. This population is at present, next to the Turkish, the most influential in the empire; influential by their industry, their great wealth, and the control they have as bankers and agents of the finances of the state, and the whole administration of the empire. This population forms one vast corporation, subject to its spiritual chiefs, and their Patriarch is the bond which unites them to the Porte. There are four Patriarchs; the Patriarch of Armenia proper, formerly under Persia, now under Russia, still preserves a nominal

or a spiritual precedence, but the political head of the Armenian nation has of course been, up to the present time, the Armenian patriarch of Constantinople. Thirdly, the Catholic Church, the remnants of the crusades, or the recent proselytes effected by the Lazarists and the Jesuits. The principal object of French diplomacy seems to have been during several years the maintenance of the prerogatives and the propagation of catholicism, between which and the Greek and Armenian churches the bitterest animosity has been maintained, and which the actual results would lead one to suppose had been fostered through France by Russia. The Catholics consist of the Franks and Dragomans of Pera; of the Latin inhabitants of Scio, Naxos, Tinos, Syra, and other islands; of the Mirdites, and some other insignificant populations on the west of Roumely; of the Metualies, &c. in Syria; and of a portion of the Armenians at Constantinople, amongst whom the most extraordinary efforts have been made to obtain proselytes. With the exception of Syria, the Catholics of the Turkish empire cannot exceed 50,000 souls, 10,000 of whom are the recently converted Armenians. They have recently obtained the nomination of a Catholic Armenian patriarch.

Our readers may recollect the expulsion of the Catholics from Constantinople, at the instigation of the other Armenians. The Catholics had, however, brought upon themselves this disaster by a system of the most pertinacious insult, which they had held with regard to their brethren, at the instigation, it was said, of a European power. This animosity, from whatever source it arose, inspired the Armenians with dread and hatred for the European powers, regarding whom, from the absence of all intercourse, they were more at the mercy of Russian misrepresentation than any of the other races. It now appears how ably Russia had prepared events for the present contingency, but no one up to the present time suspected her of having any interest in this affair, because no one could have dreamt of her presuming to establish a religious control over this people, or could have conceived that England or France could for a moment tolerate so monstrous a pretension.

The intricacy, the complications, and the natural difficulties of the numerous questions connected with Russian policy, are indeed calculated to bewilder and dishearten. The reader may well throw down these pages in despair of arriving at

a satisfactory opinion upon any point on this vast subject, where all must be embraced before any can be comprehended. He may imagine that the views we have stated, as explanatory of a systematic policy, are reasons invented or discovered after the fact has taken place, and that it would be impossible to have anticipated those events before their occurrence, and to state beforehand what line of policy she would adopt. It is, therefore, with peculiar satisfaction that we refer to our seventh number, published on the 16th of January, where the circumstance which is the subject of our present remarks is thus treated:

One of the acquisitions made by Russia to the south of Georgia, and which no doubt she prized the most, was Erivan, which she conceived the idea of rendering the capital of, according to her method, an *independent* Armenian kingdom.

The philosophic Pallas had 60 years before pointed out to her the wealth and industry of the Armenians under the Turkish rule, and suggested the policy of drawing them within the sphere of the Russian Empire. The Russian Cabinet is a soil in which no good seed is lost, however long it may be in arriving at maturity; the mode of fructification is characteristic. From Persia she extorted Erivan, associated with so many Armenian predilections, and compelled many of the Persian Armenians to settle in the district ceded. In the Turkish war she depopulated the large city of Erzeroum, and her retiring armies drove before them Armenians like flocks, to the amount, as their church estimated, of 47,000 families. The monastery of Utchmiadzin has from time immemorial been the œcumenic seat of the Armenian Patriarch,

and though the Patriarch of Constantinople is the political head of the Armenian nation, still is he subordinate to the spiritual authority of a Patriarch of Utchmiadzin.*

This commencement of action upon the Armenians exactly tallies with the action on Greece. But, instead of a population of 3 or 400;000 souls, she has here two millions and a half of men, against whom she will exasperate the Porte, whom she will rouse to insurrection by the lever of religion, and whom, when she places them in opposition to the neighbouring Mussulman population, she will rally round herself as defenders of her own position in the south, while appearing amongst them as their defender and protector.

It must be recollected that this was merely an incidental notice of the Armenians, and that too as connected with the geographical district, without reference to the general position of the Armenian nation. The allusion to the spiritual authority of the Patriarch of Utchmiadzin was in anticipation of Russia's making use of that authority in the mode which has just been done, though certainly, at the time of writing that paragraph, we considered the event we anticipated as still remote.

The details into which we have entered will suffice to show that, while the influence she has acquired over the Armenians prepares geographically for her a footing between Persia and Turkey, it also opens for her new and powerful means of

* We take this opportunity of correcting the error of supposing that the monasteries of Utchmiadzin, a few miles from Erivan, had not been included in the Russian territory.

action on the Turkish government through the Armenian bankers and merchants at Constantinople.

We cannot better illustrate the importance of the Armenians than by extracting the following passages from Mr. Urquhart's work on Turkey.

Until the reign of Mahommed II, as already stated, the administration of the finances was wholly independent of the civil governors, and, until the reign of Murad III, the military fiefs, where they were not held by spahis, were principally in the possession of Sandjac beys, who governed Livas, or small provinces, and appointed for life. The two branches of the financial system were altered by the above-named sultans — the first converted the different branches of revenue into farms, the latter introduced or generalized the system of pashas yearly appointed. The precariousness of the office of pasha prevented men of property from aspiring to it while the Porte required security for the tribute: the pasha had, therefore, to give security before he could be installed, but, generally being without the requisite personal property, or credit, and his office itself being of a precarious nature, it was necessary for him to grant the most advantageous conditions to the capitalist who would engage to answer for him. Here we come to the secret and carefully concealed spring, which puts in motion the whole machinery of the Turkish administration.

The Armenians have been, and still are, the richest and most commercial people of the empire: by their wealth they are the surest guarantees the Porte could obtain: by their knowledge of the Turkish, by their intimate acquaintance with all commercial dealings, and by their condition of raya, they offer to the pashas every quality that can recommend them as active and able men of business, as bankers of solidity, and as docile creditors. The revenues being often collected in kind, their capacity of merchants, united to that of bankers, makes them doubly useful, and

gives them opportunities of rapidly acquiring wealth. The sultan views their prosperity with no unfriendly eye, as their wealth, like that of the pashas, is not squandered by extravagant habits, or expended in rebellious enterprises, but remains carefully hoarded in their strong boxes.

Considerable capital being required for carrying on this branch of business, the number of the sarafs is, I believe, under eighty, nearly the number of the pashas; and as, by their refusal to become guarantee, they can reduce any Turkish governor to the condition of a private individual, they, in fact, farm out the provinces at their pleasure and for their profit; they have even of late carried their authority so far, that no banker will consent to become the saraf of a pasha — raised, as I may say, to that rank by one of their body, without a note of hand from his former banker, declaring that all his demands have been satisfied.

The agent of the banker, who accompanies the pasha to his province, is generally a relative of the saraf; all money transactions pass through his hands; the agiotage and commission are very considerable. This agent receives the revenue of the province, for which his principal has become responsible, and trafficks in its produce, which he manages to obtain at a reduced price, as tribute by exaction, &c. Thus, to every pasha a steward is attached, who watches his movements and commands his resources. The pasha cannot throw him off, because his office depends on the guaranteeship, and he cannot possibly induce him to plot against the Porte, because the bulk of the Armenian's fortune, and the principal of the firm, are at Constantinople, where also his family are retained as hostages, and whence on no pretence they are suffered to depart.

The principal evil of this system is this: the sarafs naturally wish to conceal from the pashas the amount of their profits, which they most effectually do, by obtaining the order for collecting the revenue before harvest time. By anticipating the time of payment, the bankers receive two and a half per cent. interest per month on the money, which the peasant is obliged to borrow; depress the market after harvest by the necessity in which the

peasant is placed of realizing; bargain with the villages for the exclusion of all other competitors for their produce, and even for a reduction of the price below that of the thus depressed market. On a small scale, the effects of our indirect system are realized, the imitation originating in similar causes — the pretence of taxation for the benefit of monopolists, and the imposition of ruinous burdens for the sake of disguising a small profit.

By means of this body of bankers, Turkey surrounds her governors with a financial thraldom and espionage; at the same time the pashas are driven by them to such excesses, that enmity is placed between the province and its governor: let him amass treasure, levy troops, and put on the show of power and strength, he has no hold on his office, because the very means he has necessarily taken to maintain his authority have made him the object of hatred.

This picture was drawn in 1832, when every cause of evil was exacerbated by the general circumstances of the empire. The evils there pointed out have partially been remedied, both by the improvement of the material condition of Turkey and by measures of the Sultan, which exactly coincide with those pointed out in the work quoted. But it is to be expected that the worst results of that system will again re-appear, as a consequence of the control which Russia will establish over the Armenians.

RECENT PROGRESS

OF

COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

IN HUNGARY.

Pest, March 30th, 1836.

SINCE wants have so much increased in both hemispheres, it is natural that the desire to satisfy them should have equally increased. To remain stationary, whilst all the world marches towards this object, would be to go back. This is an incontestible truth, of which Hungary, in its turn, begins to be more and more convinced. Our journals, which occasionally give details of the Association for the Navigation of the Danube by steam-boats, have slightly alluded to the Protocol of the last general meeting, held on the 12th February. We hope that a few supplementary words on this subject will not be uninteresting to our readers.

It is to the indefatigable zeal and to the circumspection of its founders that the Society owes the happy results it has obtained, that is to say, in surmounting, in the interval of ten years, and with small means, the difficulties opposed to them by the elements and political relations—difficulties which might have appeared insuperable to limited understandings. The greater these obstacles were the more commendable was the modest tone in which the Report is pleased to allude to what yet remains to be desired and to be accomplished. It was only in 1835 that the Society assumed

the direction of all the vessels, now amounting to seven, all of them of superior construction, and provided with the best and most costly English engines; and still the funds of the Society only amount to 700,000 silver convention florins. The last vessel, of one hundred horse power, the Ferdinand I., which left Trieste on the 15th of March, is about to effect the immediate communication with Constantinople. The Maria Dorothea has already performed the voyage between that city and Smyrna. The Argo, as heretofore, will take charge of the service of the left bank of the Lower Danube beyond the Iron Gate, whilst the Francis I. is destined to do the same on the right bank, inhabited by Turkish communities of importance, where it will meet the Ferdinand I., for which destination they are now preparing her at the docks at Buda. Thus we shall succeed in removing the quarantine obstacles, which hitherto have been grievously felt, and which, last year, prevented also the steam navigation projected by Prince Milosch; for, by these two vessels taking always the Turkish side of the river, travellers will arrive, without delay, from Constantinople at the quarantine at Orsowa. These arrangements, which are in perfect conformity with the object and with other similar ones, will soon put an end to every just complaint, and will efface the unfavourable impression that Mr. Quin may have made on some persons, by his narrative of his voyage on this part of the Danube. Nevertheless, this impression can hardly have been made, if it be considered that Quin is utterly destitute of foresight, and that, in his naïve carelessness, he chose the most disadvantageous period of the year, that is to say, the late season of the year 1834, which was the driest season within the memory of man. Moreover, as the year 1835 was remarkable for singular changes in the elements, it was not a proper time to make, for an extent of 400 leagues between Presburg and Galatz, the arrangements necessary to expedite travellers and merchandize with rapidity, to take care of them in the vessels, and in the places of disembarkation, in spite of so many obstacles; and, in fine, to supply the magazines with a sufficiency of combustible matter. It appears, however, that the wishes of the patriots for the success

of so many efforts are about to be accomplished, since the service of the Argo, which, in 1834, showed a deficit of 18,745 fl. 56 kr. gave, in 1835, already an excess of 5,871 fl. 50 kr.

The results of the steam navigation are more favourable still on the Upper Danube, where, only last September, the Zriny joined the Pannonia, and where, in a few days, the last steam-boat, the Rondor, (a Hungarian word which signifies palatine) is about to be consecrated to the same destination, by the voyage which the illustrious consort of our palatine will make in her from Presburg to Buda. An eighth steam-boat, about to be constructed, will complete this service on the Upper Danube. In order to be able to make this acquisition, and then to enlarge the establishment by a greater number of steam-boats, 700 new shares have been issued, which will be distributed to the proprietors of the 1400 old ones, in the proportion of half a new one for an old one, so that the funds will be raised to 1,050,000 florins.

Hitherto, the shareholders have only received five per cent. annual interest, and no dividends, for they have wisely preferred putting into a reserve fund the greater part of the 4407 florins, which now make up the net surplus. Nevertheless, only a few days ago, the shares had already risen 30 per cent. which sufficiently proves the great confidence justly inspired in the administration of affairs.

Although the Zriny did not commence her first voyage until the 22d September, and the Maria Dorothea sustained a considerable injury, still 17,727 travellers had been expedited up to that period by the five vessels which then existed. A port, near Buda, which is perfectly adapted to guarantee the vessels of the Danube against the thaw, and the evacuation of which is now proceeding, has been assigned to the association by its august patron, the Archduke Palatine. A dock has been established in the neighbourhood, in an island of the Danube, under the excellent master ship-builder, who hitherto directed the construction of the vessels of the association at Trieste. In this school the natives will gradually be formed for the service of the steam-boats, on board which are now heard almost all the languages of the Tower of

Babel. As Prince Metternich, the powerful protector of all that is really useful, takes a lively interest in the affairs of the company, it may henceforth be certain of the most active support. That which has hitherto much impeded it has been the circumstance that goods sent by the Argo to the Black Sea have been very rigorously treated by the quarantine at Odessa. A second attempt is therefore being now made, by diplomatic means, to obtain for the merchandize subject to the quarantine, and which is addressed to the Russian ports of the Black Sea, the same favour which the vessels in the Mediterranean enjoy, in demanding permission to have them sealed, and furnished with a certificate delivered by the Russian authority residing at Vienna. The friendly relations subsisting between the Russian court and our's give reason to hope for a happy result on this point, in the same manner as the Turkish government lately rescinded the decree of last year, which forbade its subjects to travel by Austrian or English steam-boats. Some time ago, the steam navigation companies in Wurtemburg and Bavaria, having asked whether the Austrian company would be disposed to co-operate with them in good fellowship, in order to make Ulm the point of departure for the vessels which should occupy the whole course of the Danube, our administration has been authorised to make an agreement for this purpose, reserving to the Imperial and Royal government the right of ratifying it.

Thus, then, the road is cleared to realise what, ten years ago, did not appear possible; that is to say, a direct commerce between central Europe and the East. At present a great deal is said, although nothing official has transpired, of an iron railroad, to communicate from Vienna by Oedenburg as far as Raab. It is, however, to be presumed that the railroad will not be confined to this, but that it will, one day, be prolonged to Pest, and even by Stolack as far as Debretzin: at least, this idea would be worthy of the spirit of the age, so fertile in enterprise, and likewise the execution of this project would find no obstacle in the country, for a continuous plain extends from the Raab to Dotes, and, further on, there is only one river to be passed in order to enter into the valley

of Predium, and, passing by Zitzke and Bia, to travel towards the Danube, between Promontori and Buda. This iron railway would fulfil every expectation that can be formed of these kind of establishments; there never would be any dearth of merchandize or travellers, for, after breakfasting at Pest, one would set out for Vienna, and arrive there in time for the opera the same evening. This railroad being also practicable the whole year round, might very easily be maintained, together with the steam-boat navigation. For this, however, not only money and intelligence are required, but time, and a law for appropriating the line of road; and it seems at least very doubtful whether this law can be voted by the present Diet, because the closing of the Session is already fixed for the commencement of May. It is said, however, that the project of the law of expropriation looks a little like despotism, which vexes the great proprietors, so that it will be difficult to come to a result.

NARRATIVE OF THE AFFAIRS OF GREECE.

"La Russie ne sera jamais tranquille jusqu'à ce qu'elle ait établi un état Grec sur les débris de la Turquie. *Il sera donc facile à la France de détacher l'Angleterre de la Russie.*"

MONITEUR, 1800.

WE should be inclined to consider the Greek Revolution as one which, in its immediate explosion, was determined much more by literary than by political causes. The revival of the ancient Greek language, and the circumstance of the Modern Greeks being identified, through it, with that genius and history which have so deeply affected the character of European nations, told upon the dispositions of the Greek people in a manner truly wonderful. The language was their own, or nearly so; the theatre of the events of the classic ages was the country around them; the names were the same. But these associations, powerful in their direct effect, were rendered infinitely more so by their reverberation, as it were, from Europe. How galling must not have been to them a foreign and a so-termed barbarous yoke, when they found their country enshrined in the

classical devotion of the greatest nations of Europe, and when the names with which their infants were baptized were the models of virtue, genius, and heroism, which England, France, and Germany taught their children to imitate and revere!

It was a grave error to suppose that Greece was suffering under intolerable despotism prior to the revolution. This error it is which has led to misconception of all the phases through which Greece has passed, and this error we are anxious to expose in the outset of our narrative. We will not inquire what particular meaning is to be given to the words despotism and oppression, but we appeal to the circumstances in which Greece stood previous to the revolution, and we leave it to our readers themselves to bestow the appropriate epithets.

In 1756, a dreadful plague swept off one half of the population of Greece. Fourteen years afterwards, the fatal Russian expedition to the Morea subjected that devoted country to ten years of unceasing devastation and bloodshed. On the restoration of tranquillity, the population of the Morea was estimated at 190,000 souls. In 1781, a plague swept off a considerable portion of the inhabitants

of that and the neighbouring countries. In 1810, the population was estimated at 340,000; in 1820, at 458,000, exclusive of 42,000 Mussulmans, thus nearly doubling in thirty years.

In 1790, the first decked Greek vessel was built. In 1820, the Greeks were possessed of 600 brigs and corvettes, which, when armed for war, mounted 6000 guns.

In 1780, when the insurrection provoked by Russia had entirely subsided, Albanian hordes had swept over the Peninsula, occupied many of its most fertile districts, and effectually crushed every hope, or repressed every energy, among the Greek people. Their prescriptive rights, their national institutions, were swept away; the characters of their national administration were wholly obliterated; the immunities of their church were abolished; and, had the Supreme Turkish Government been any European Government, they would have been abolished for ever. After such provocations, such revolts, such complete subjection, no government with European notions of administration could ever have suffered that people again to organize the means of self-government and of independent action.

In 1820, the municipal organization of Greece existed upon every spot of its soil. A central municipal council, representing the municipalities of the whole country, was placed, if not as a censor, at least as an assessor, beside the delegated authority of the Sultan. Its intromission was legally requisite in the internal administration of the province, which had not only the means of appeal at Constantinople, but a regular delegation there, as representing the interests of the province at the capital.

The laws of Justinian were at the same time the code of Greece, and, although there were no native courts of justice legally established among the Greek people, they possessed the means of ready and instantaneous justice, at each man's door, in the decision of the municipal elders, from which appeal might be made to the Greek bishop, as expounder of the Pandects, when the question involved was of sufficient importance, the authority of the Turkish court being given to that decision. Besides these means of judicature, another lay in an organic statute of the Porte, that the decision of an arbitrator chosen by mutual consent is final judgment; and again, that the decision of a

village, as regards its own affairs, has the force of law.

The progress of the Greeks, indicated in these few remarks, in population, navigation, government, and judicature, in the interval of thirty years that occurred between the conclusion of one calamitous insurrection and the commencement of the revolution, is, we cannot help thinking, unparalleled in the history of man; and is, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, or countervailing realities, a triumphant proof of superior excellence in the character and dispositions of the Greek people, and in the principles of the Turkish administration. It is a proof that the institutions of Turkey were not ill adapted to progress and prosperity, even while subject to the abuses of the Janissary system, which were sufficient to excite the revolution, and which, but for European ideas and interference, the revolution would have contented itself with removing. It is sufficient to prove, in spite of the disastrous predicament in which Greece has been placed ever since she has been subject to European influence, that, in herself, in the energy of her mind, and the advantages of her position, resources truly wonderful did exist,

and were powerfully and peaceably developed up to the period when the policy of Russia had made such strides, both in Turkey and in Europe, as to be able to convulse every portion of the Ottoman dominions by the delusion she has been enabled to practise on the cabinets of Europe.

But the geographical position of Greece rendered its population essentially maritime. The extension of commerce leant necessarily to contact with Europe, and the progress of wealth, education, and enlightenment, tended more and more to associate the Greeks with the habits of Christendom.

Greece had also been the theatre of European contest. The conquest and possession of the Morea by the Venitians in the beginning of the last century, and the revolutionary expeditions and intrigues of Russia in 1770 and 1789, had kept alive remembrances of a connexion with the Christian powers, and had consequently convinced the Turks of the necessity of keeping the Greeks under subjection. They were destitute, however, of an organization calculated to do so with effect, and their arrangements irritated, without subduing, the national character of the Greeks.

The notions propagated in Europe respecting

the tyranny of the Turks have been so exaggerated, that we may safely designate them as altogether erroneous. The Turkish Government was haughty rather than oppressive at first, and afterwards erred in judgment rather than intentionally violated the dictates of humanity.

In endeavouring to preserve their power in a mountainous and maritime country, the Ottomans did only that which any other people would have done under similar circumstances, with this difference, that the Turkish Government, not having a standing army, a police, or a powerful administrative organization, could not carry through any specific purpose of despotism.

In 1814, a secret society was formed in Russia, with the view of revolutionizing Greece. Its ramifications extended throughout Europe, including several persons of exalted rank. The regulations of this society, called the Hetæria, commanded the sacrifice on the part of the Hetærist of every obligation to the one common purpose of attaining the independence of Greece. The Greeks, who were settled in various parts of Europe, became thus bound together by a sacred tie, and the intrigues of Russia, working on a highly excitable people,

prepared their minds for a change in their political condition. In 1819, most of the Primates of the Morea became members of the society, and Count Capodistrias, who at that period visited Corfu, promulgated a remarkable document with the view of directing their future operations, of fixing their hopes on Russia, and of founding the success of their efforts on their obedience to a scholastic hierarchy, devoted to the Emperor as head of the orthodox Greek Church. In the following year swarms of Hetærists, emerging from the southern provinces of Russia, spread themselves over every part of Greece, and, in the winter of 1820, the Primates of the Greek Islands joined the Hetæria, recalled their ships into port, and closed their commercial speculations.

Early in 1821, Wallachia and Moldavia were invaded from the Russian frontier by numbers of Greeks in the Russian service, under Prince Ypsilanti. But, no sooner had the war fairly commenced, than Russia, with the same duplicity with which she had excited it, denounced Ypsilanti to the Porte, and offered her active co-operation in punishing the rebels. Authentic documents fell into the hands of the Divan, showing not only the

treason of the Russian Government, but that of the Greeks, many of whom occupied the highest situations in the gift of the Porte. Thunderstruck at combinations which threatened the very existence of the Empire, the Porte found it necessary to arrest the conspiracy by the severest measures. The Patriarch of Constantinople, of whose collusion with the intrigues of Russia the Porte had convincing proof, was put to death. According to the constitution of the Turkish Government, he was responsible for the good conduct of the Greeks; and, in order that his responsibility should not be destitute of control, he was invested with the power of punishing any of his co-religionaries. His execution, however, was highly impolitic, and the manner of it was cruel and greatly to be condemned. The revolution had already broken out in the Morea, but this act of violence widened the breach. The clergy of Greece summoned the whole nation to avenge the insult offered to their faith, and the flame of patriotism kindled by religion immediately spread throughout the whole country. The violent character of Halet Effendi, the chief minister of the Sultan, unfortunately rendered conciliation impossible, and gave to Russian diplo-

macy the power of exciting the liberal spirit of the age in favour of a Christian people struggling for life against Mussulman exasperation.

The duplicity of the Russian cabinet in exciting the Greek revolution was further manifested in 1824, when she denounced it to Europe, and endeavoured to enlist the support of the Allied Powers to put it down. Her only aim was to acquire the right of interference between the Porte and her subjects. In her memoir to the European cabinets, she proposed erecting Greece into three separate principalities, under the government of native Greek princes, to be, in a certain degree, dependent upon the Porte, but under institutions analagous to those of Wallachia and Moldavia, to be arranged and guaranteed by the Allied Courts, or by such courts *as should be willing to contract the engagement to do so.*

These ingenious propositions could not be listened to by England. The guaranteeship of Russia to arrangements which she would have had the power of dictating would have enabled her to exercise a perpetual right of interference in the affairs of Turkey. The erection of three separate Hospodariats would have set the three divisions of

Greece in perpetual opposition to each other and to Turkey, and would have prevented their combining and understanding the designs of Russia. The very complication of the proposed diplomatic arrangements, over which Russia would have been enabled to exercise her powerful and exclusive control, in the same manner that she has done with every country that she has placed under her protection, to the exclusion of her own coadjutors, must have kept Greece a continual source of weakness to Turkey, without benefit to any party whatever. Hence interminable questions would have arisen, favouring Russian influence, and Russia would have been constituted, with the consent and even support of her European allies, absolute mistress of the destinies of the East, without firing a shot.

All these insidious proposals were declined by the Porte in the most dignified manner. On the part of the Greeks, they excited feelings of the deepest indignation.

This intellectual people, nurtured under a municipal system, which gave them a practical education, had already called together two National Assemblies. No difficulty had arisen with respect to

laws of elective franchise. Under the Turkish system, the whole political organization of Greece rested on the union of families. Once a year throughout the country, every village, town, and district had its representative assembly, in which the heads of families, meeting together in the church, selected their annual magistrates, examined the acts and accounts of the past year, nominated their own Demogerontes or Municipal authorities for the ensuing year, and apportioned out the contributions required by their Turkish governors. Under this natural form of government, the Greeks had attained, by the simple force of circumstances and by public opinion, customs which superseded the necessity of laws. The National Assemblies, therefore, of Epidaurus and of Astros were the natural representation of the whole country, and were only called together to concentrate the powers of the nation. Accordingly, we find the Greeks, aided by their practical good sense, forming a constitution calculated to draw forth a blush on the cheek of nations that call themselves civilized, and denounce the subjects of the Ottoman Porte as barbarians. Unlike the boisterous manner of conducting revolutions and reforms in Europe, the

assemblies of the Greeks, until European intrigue came to interfere with them, were conducted with calmness, steadiness, and unanimity.

The organic law of Epidaurus, framed in 1822, under the influence of Mavrocordato, with the view of arresting Russian influence and interference, founds the independence of Greece on the most enlarged basis of civil and religious freedom. Its provisions were calculated to draw populations from surrounding countries, to offer a refuge from political persecution to the oppressed of every country, and, when order should be restored, to give to all the inhabitants of Greece the blessings of prosperity, under a system of universal toleration, of equality before the law, of the independence of the Judiciary, and of a representative form of government, to which the elected executive should be responsible for the exercise of its trust

As it was the intention of Russia to render Greece her victim, and to hinder the resources of the country from being developed, for reasons which will be hereafter noticed, her first object was to sow dissensions among the Greeks. This was carried into effect by fostering a division of parties, which originated in the circumstance that

the Greeks, fearing at last that they should never be able to accomplish the object of their struggle of themselves, looked to foreign nations for aid, and chose, out of the different European powers, those that they thought were most likely to create for them independence. Thus there sprang up an English, a French, and a Russian party; but, after the publication of the Russian Memoir of 1824, the Greeks, as a nation, placed their confidence only in England. The Russian party was confined to Moreote Klephts and to some Corfiote refugees, who were discontented with England and her administration of the Ionian Islands. Austria and France had excluded themselves by being bound up with the Holy Alliance, and remaining loyal to their engagements; and Austria, in particular, had estranged herself from the affection of the Greeks by offering assistance to Turkey against them, which, however, Turkey refused.

But, in August 1825, the national feeling displayed itself unequivocally. The Primates of the Morea and of the islands, the Prince of Maina, and the most distinguished of the clergy, united in placing the political existence of Greece under the

absolute protection of Great Britain, and they sent a deputation to England with a declaration, called the Act of Protection, accompanied by a petition that Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg might be appointed Sovereign of Greece.

However gratifying to the national feelings was this spontaneous confidence reposed in England by the Greeks, the pretensions which they put forward to absolute independence, when the British Embassy passed through the Archipelago in January, 1826, were found to be so disproportionate to their fair claims, in the then state of the contest, that the British Ambassador found it impossible to present to the Porte the proposed basis of mediation, which it would have been derogatory to the honour of the Sultan to receive. To have done so, might indeed have given to Russia a pretext for proving to the Porte that it was England, and not Russia, that had been intriguing against the power of the Sultan.

As the embassy passed along the shores of Greece, it had an opportunity of judging of the nature of the contest. Our naval officers were unanimous in their admiration of the seamanship, enterprize, and deliberate valour of the Greeks.

Their squadrons of armed merchant-brigs and corvettes bade defiance to the frigates and line-of-battle ships of their enemies; and, notwithstanding the devastation of the Morea by the barbarous warfare of Ibrahim Pacha,* which had destroyed the olive trees, the vineyards, the villages, and towns of the interior, not a single district of Greece had offered its submission to the armies of Turkey, Albania, and Egypt. The wonderful energy of the Greek people in sustaining during five years so unequal a contest, when distracted also by party feuds, proves a strength of national character utterly inexplicable, excepting on the principle that the national system of government, based upon the municipal institutions granted by the Turks, had given them a moral consistency and habits of organization, which enabled them to arm every man in defence of their national and individual rights.

The reports of Sir Stratford Canning to the Secretary of State in England gave rise to the Protocol signed at St. Petersburg in February, 1826, which paved the way for the treaty of July, 1827, between England, France, and Russia.

* Ibrahim Pacha was the only person who pursued that system of destruction.

The celebrated Treaty of the 6th of July conferred such enormous advantages on Russia that it might almost be said to be the accomplishment of her projects with regard to Greece. By it one series of combinations was closed, and a new series commenced. Up to this period, however able, or successful, or extended her machinations, she acted but in her individual capacity, and had constantly to guard against chances that any moment might have frustrated her schemes, viz., concert of England and France as opposed to her, or, what was much more to be apprehended, an approximation between England and Turkey. By the act of the 6th of July, she was first relieved from these great dangers; Turkey was left without possible support from any European Power; Europe was placed, as it were, against Turkey, and Christianity against Islamism; and the moral influence and subsequently the arms of England and France were placed at her disposal. The process by which that treaty was more immediately brought about will be seen in the diplomatic papers which shall be given hereafter.

We may now generally state that, by causing it to be believed that she had the power of coercion

as regarded Turkey, and by allowing it to be perceived that she would exercise that power singly, she led England to become a party to that treaty, and thus to give her, who, by her superior intelligence directed the measures, and profited by the results of that alliance, the power of acting on Greece and on Turkey, as we have subsequently seen.

The short extract from the Moniteur of 1800, which we have placed at the head of this article, may well give rise to the most profound and humiliating reflections. In 1800, the organ of the French government deemed insupportable by England, and, of course, as wholly out of the toleration of the policy of France, the accomplishment of that event by Russia, which the treaty of the 6th of July binds England and France to assist Russia in accomplishing — a Treaty which was *supposed* to be dictated by the most distinguished man that either country had produced during the peace, and which has been applauded throughout Europe, not only during its operation, but after its disastrous consequences have been apparent to all the world. Such has been the progress of delusion! We may well inquire how it has

been brought about; but whoever places in strong contrast the clearness of vision of 1800 and the confusion of ideas and policy of 1827, will understand why Russia has spent such enormous sums on her diplomatic service.

In order to obtain the assent of the Porte to the treaty of Akermann in the preceding autumn, she had promised to the Turks to abandon the Greek question for ever. So much for Russian perfidy towards Turkey, towards England * and France, and towards the Greeks.

Under such circumstances, the exasperation of the Turks may easily account for their rejection of every proposal in favour of an arrangement with Greece, which would necessarily come under the guaranteeship of Russia, as the Protocol of St. Petersburg intimated that England could not guarantee such a treaty.

But, during the whole of the arduous negociations of the British Embassy at Constantinople, Prussia, as usual, under the character of an independent power, marred every prospect of conciliation between the Sultan and his subjects. Baron

* She tried to make England bear the blame of forcing her to forswear her oaths.

Miltitz took care to make secret overtures to the Porte, in a sense contradictory to that ostensible support which he lent to the offers of mediation made by the representatives of the Allied Powers.*

The catastrophe of Navarin, and the death of that Statesman, whose genius had been fully alive

* The situation of Sir Stratford Canning at Constantinople was without parallel in the annals of diplomacy. A British nobleman entered into an understanding with Prince Metternich to make the Greek question the means of overthrowing Mr. Canning, who had raised him to the Peerage. His coadjutors at Constantinople, in those negociations which procured for his lordship the most flattering encomiums from the Emperor Alexander, were Baron Miltitz, the Prussian Envoy, and a Dragoman of the British Embassy, whose brother was in the Austrian service, dependent on Prince Metternich at Vienna. Baron Miltitz subsequently received from England, through the hands of a gentleman who sailed with the new Embassy from Naples, a parcel, said to be a work on antiquities; and he thenceforth communicated to Vienna and to St. Petersburg, and afterwards to London, the results of his studies, which were the betrayal by the interpreter of every secret entrusted to him by the King's ambassador. What was the result? Baron Miltitz was disgraced for serving Austria unknown to his Court and to M. de Ribeaupierre. The successful progress of Prince Metternich was arrested by the news of Navarin, on the evening of his marriage. The diplomatic library of Baron Miltitz was burnt in the great fire at Pera, in 1831, but the work on antiquities may be restored to its owner, together with the notes and correspondence to which it refers. It is a copy of Crabbe's Synonimes, which, with a duplicate of the same edition, formed the cipher between the two patriotic diplomatists.

to Russian ambition, paralyzed the progress of the negociations; and Russia, taking advantage of the embarrassment of England during the changes of administration, went to war with Turkey, supported by the moral influence of England and France, bound up with her by the treaty of July, so far as regarded the necessity of pacifying the Levant.

During the spring of 1827, the hopes of the Greeks were revived by the arrival of Lord Cochrane and Sir Richard Church, to command their fleets and armies.

The latter had gained their affection by his gallantry and kindness, whilst commanding a batallion of Greeks at Zante, during our war with France. He had anxiously watched the progress of their struggle, and, on receiving an invitation to command them, he immediately abandoned a high situation at the Court of Naples, to devote himself entirely to their cause. A fourth National Assembly was now held. The Executive appointed by the Congress of Epidaurus resigned its authority; and the partizans of Russia, seeing a fit opportunity, proposed the nomination to the Presidency of Greece of Count John Capodistrias. The

fact of the Greeks not grasping at Capodistrias affords a proof of greater foresight than we had any right to expect from the Greek people. The islanders, at the mention of his name, murmured loudly in the Assembly. Their dealings and intercourse with the Russians in the Black Sea had enabled them to be fitter judges of the consequences of this appointment than any of their countrymen. The Moreote Primates looked on this nomination with equal distrust. Capodistrias' diplomatic circular of 1819, from Corfu, had awakened their suspicions with regard to the intention of Russia to make use of religion as a lever of ambition.

The reputation of Capodistrias, as the Minister of Russia at the Congress of Vienna, was well known throughout Europe. But, in addition to his diplomatic celebrity, he had contrived to acquire popularity and respect amongst the liberals. He was supposed to have renounced all the honours of the Russian Court, because it ceased, in 1821, to uphold the Greek cause with sufficient energy at Constantinople; and his retirement to the free Republic of Geneva, to become the friend and associate of Eynard, was looked upon as an

honourable sacrifice of ambition to liberal principles. The remonstrances of the Count with the British Government, for the alleged illiberality of its administration of the Ionian Islands, aided the belief which was industriously circulated that, under his patriarchal sway, Greece might enjoy the full benefit of the institutions consecrated by four National Assemblies.

The entire hopes of Greece were, at this moment, fixed on Lord Cochrane. They looked to him for union at home, consideration abroad, a fleet, pecuniary resources, maritime success, independence, and even the conquest of Constantinople. The whole population had been looking forward for months for his arrival, and it had become a habit to fix the marriages of betrothed lovers for the day on which Cochrane should anchor in the Grecian seas: and yet Lord Cochrane told them that, if they did not elect Capodistrias, he would instantly embark on board his vessel, sail away, and quit the shores of Greece for ever. General Church equally insisted on the nomination; and the Islanders, astonished at a Russian Minister being recommended by free-born Englishmen, supposed to be more or less in the con-

fidence of the English Government, unfortunately gave way. But they did not consent to the arrangement without the stipulation that a definitive constitution should be drawn up, which Capodistrias should be required to swear to. On no other condition was he to be admitted into Greece.

The injudicious support of Capodistrias by the liberals is the first intimation we have of our rivetting despotism round the necks of the Greeks. It affords an insight into the talent by which Russia can contrive to dupe the votaries of free institutions throughout the world, whenever she has an object to gain by so doing.

Capodistrias, on hearing of his appointment, quitted Geneva for St. Petersburgh, went through the farce of being absolved from the Muscovite service, and, after a stay of two months in the Russian capital, proceeded to London and Paris, and embarked at Ancona.

His Majesty's ship "Warspite" conveyed him to Greece in January, 1828. The country had fallen into a state of anarchy. The people were starving. Civil war was raging at Nauplia, the interior was overrun by brigands, the seas were covered with pirates. No government could be said to exist.

Cochrane had returned to England in disgust. The Egyptians still held possession of the fortresses, and the President had no organized force under his command. Yet such was the innate docility and love of order of the Greeks, that a simple proclamation, addressed to their good feelings, obtained instant respect. The whole country, as if by magic, immediately rallied round the new government. The Russian Minister in Greece, in his report to his government, thus expresses himself on the subject:—

"One cannot fail to be struck with the mildness, the subordination, and the spirit of order and justice, which characterize them during the last ten months and which merit the attention of the three Allied Courts.

"It is a most remarkable phenomenon to see a whole people resume, at the voice of a single man, after seven years of war and anarchy, the peaceful habits of labour, reject with indignation the counsels of the numerous agents who endeavoured to excite them, and submit to the laws, without being constrained by any force whatever.

"The tranquillity which reigns on the continent and in the islands of Greece, the safety of the

roads, and the absence of disorder and crime, so common to people who emancipate themselves from the double yoke of tyranny and revolution, prove incontestably that the Greeks are worthy of being governed wisely, because they already appreciate its benefits; and because they assist, by their submission and their attitude, the arduous labours, and the whole intentions of their President."

No language can paint the enthusiasm of the Greeks at seeing, after so hard-fought a struggle, their own flag waving in triumph over their native rocks, and saluted by the squadrons of the three greatest powers of Europe, in recognition of their national independence. They saw themselves suddenly saved from the horrors of war, and from the dreadful doom which must have attended its ill success. Blest in the enjoyment of peace, liberty, and independence, they found their country, after three centuries of subjugation, re-admitted into the community of Christian nations, their cause triumphant, and their arduous efforts crowned with unlooked-for success. The whole nation stood—like the shipwrecked mariner scarcely snatched from the waves — with the consciousness of safety, but with the image of destruction still before their eyes.

They turned with feelings of devotional gratitude to the Allied Powers, to which they owed salvation, and bowed down before the Russian emissary, who was made to appear amongst them as the representative, the organ, and the gift, of that alliance.

Europe, astonished at the spectacle, regarded as the work of the superior talent of Capodistrias that which was only the spontaneous action of a confiding and docile people, and of measures dictated by Mavrocordato and the patriotic leaders of Greece, to whom the President found it necessary to entrust himself at the commencement of his administration.

Capodistrias, however, soon indicated the real views with which he came to Greece. He observed to the first deputation that waited upon him on board the Warspite, "Beware of the masters of this house!" At the *dejeuner* given on his landing at Ægina, he observed to the members of the government, on the departure of the English captain and his officers, "*Ce sont de braves gens, mais ces collets rouges feront le malheur de la Grèce.*" To Admiral Miaulis, whom he visited on board the Hellas frigate, he said, whilst drawing him aside, "I have admirably managed the

simpletons of London and Paris. It is to the North alone that we must look; there are our only friends. It is from the young man (ἀπὸ τοῦ νεοῦ) that we must and may expect everything to make us rich and honoured." Similar confidences were made to others, and a dislike of England was carefully attempted to be infused into the minds of all whom he wished to have for his partizans. He now manifested a marked dislike to all the Primates, who had shown confidence in England and distrust of Russia.

The spirit of his government was shortly after displayed in the overthrow of the Legislative Council, which was attached to the former executive; and, in the institution of the Panhellenium, a council composed of twenty-seven members of his own selection, who were to share with him the labours and responsibility of the government, until the meeting of a National Congress.

His next step was to subvert the freedom of the municipalities; and, in violation of the oath which he had taken to govern according to the laws, he overthrew the whole system of popular election which had formerly prevailed; and appointed provincial prefects, and justices of the peace, and demogerontes, of his own.

The Primates soon discovered the hostility of the Count to their order, and murmured loudly at the change of system. In process of time their murmurs gave way to demands for the convocation of the National Assembly, the meeting of which, within three months after his arrival, had been promised by Capodistrias. Under various pretexts this measure was postponed.

The arrival of a French corps in the Morea, to effect the evacuation of the country by the Egyptians, and the presence again of the three ambassadors of the Allied Powers in the Archipelago, gave Capodistrias a pretext for diverting the public mind from domestic to foreign affairs.

The conferences of the three Ambassadors at Poros, in 1828, embrace almost every topic connected with the state and relations of Greece at that time. In allusion to its internal organization, the Ambassadors stated their opinion that, "in proposing to establish in Greece an hereditary government, they are far from pretending that the Greeks ought not to participate in the legislative power, for even under the Turkish regime they elected their own municipal magistrates, and their Primates were generally invested with the right of

apportioning the imposts exacted by the Porte. In fine, during eight years, the representative principle has prevailed in their different organizations, and is to a certain degree associated with their new (!) existence. The Representatives think that it would be unjust and dangerous to deprive them of it. But it is believed that, in combining this principle with that of the hereditariness of the Supreme Power, all the wishes of the Greeks would be fulfilled; and public order, the necessary condition of the continued interest of the Courts in favour of Greece, would thus be based on durable foundations." This Report is dated December 12, 1828.

Only two days afterwards, the Russian Resident in Greece transmitted to his Court a despatch, in a sense entirely opposite to that of Sir Stratford Canning and his colleagues, of which M. de Ribeaupierre was one. It was instantly forwarded by Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven in London, and attached to the Protocol of the Conference, as a luminous exposition of Russian views as to the organization of Greece on the principles of Capodistrias.

This important state paper was probably composed by Capodistrias himself. It is at least ac-

knowledged that it was drawn up under his eye. It commences with calumniating the Primates, "as possessing neither the virtues nor the talents on which well organized societies usually repose," as men who, in order to enjoy "the right of oppressing the people, had served as voluntary instruments to the ferocious tyranny of the Turks;" men, "for whom all regular government becomes only a cause of trouble and anarchy."

It then upbraids them with having associated themselves with the revolutionists and demagogues of Europe.

"It would be a strange illusion," continues Count Boulgari, "to think seriously of the possibility of organizing any government in Greece on constitutional principles."

"The sacrifices which the Powers have already made give them the incontestable right of *active intervention in the form of its government*, and of excluding every principle that may be deemed incompatible with the real social tendency of the Greek people and of the repose of Europe."

"It is important that the three courts should concert, without delay, respecting the form of government, and the mode of organization which they may judge fit to establish in Greece."

"All other questions, *without excepting that of the boundary*, tribute, &c., can only be considered as completely *secondary and subordinate to the form of government.*"

"By removing from Greece those elements which might trouble society, the Three Courts would not fail to render the transaction which would result from the treaty of July the necessary complement to the acts of 1814, 1815, and 1818, which secured the repose of Europe."

"*It is in this manner that the Powers would strike to the heart the demagogues of all countries, proving to them that no revolution can take place without being of necessity crushed to atoms by the union of the Allied Sovereigns, and that, even when revolts are reasonable and possible, they will find in the combined action of Crowns an insurmountable barrier, and a will ever prompt, either to destroy them, or to turn them to the advantage of social order.*"

Such are the principles termed "*Conservative,*"* which are recommended to the Conference of

* This is taking the erroneous principle of the Holy Alliance without its conservatism: for how was it that Russia acknowledged at all the Greek revolution? Austria alone acted consistently.

London by Prince Lieven. Count Nesselrode states that the question of the form of government to be established in Greece is a *vital* one for the Emperor, and declares that, "as soon as England and France agree on this point," "the Emperor will give his Allies a distinguished proof of his confidence." *He will furnish an English and a French delegate with full powers, in order to carry them into effect.*"

The insidiousness of this memoir has unfortutunately never yet been exposed.

It was intended to confound the cause of Greece with that of Spain and Naples, to entangle it in the minds of Europeans with the conflicting opinions respecting despotism and civil liberty, and to enlist the hatred of England and France against the leading men in Greece, as republicans and demagogues. They were neither the one nor the other. They had announced themselves as monarchists in asking for Prince Leopold. So far from desiring to exercise arbitrary power over the peasants, they had, at the assembly of Epidaurus, shown that they never wanted to enthrall the peasantry, by admitting all classes to an equality before the law, and by establishing independent tribunals.

We can state with the fullest conviction that there is no sympathy in Greece amongst any class of the population for revolutionary sentiments, movements, or parties elsewhere, and the reason of this is very evident, because the object of those revolutionary movements are not only not participated in by the Greeks, but are not understood by them. The movement in Greece, which was designated a revolution, was a movement not against internal principles, but against foreign authority, not against the powers of the state, but against the holders of the sceptre. The people had to complain of the haughty and proud bearing of the Turks as opposed to the Greeks, of the Mahommetan,* as opposed to the Christian. They had to complain, because they suffered from the anarchy resulting at once from the external difficulties of the Turkish empire, and from the internal abuses of the Janissary system. Against these causes of discontent they revolted; so have the Turkish empire and Sultan Mahmoud. But the Greeks had not

* We do not say this in disparagement of Turkey, but it was a natural consequence of the animosities of the East and West, between which Greece was placed. It was a natural consequence of the weakening of the central authority in Turkey, an effect principally brought about by the action of Russia on the Greeks.

to complain of those things which, whether right or wrong, have produced revolutions elsewhere. There were no men in Greece adscribed to the glebe. There was no aristocracy possessed of exclusive privileges, or emancipated from taxation. There were no companies or classes benefited by the oppression of the others. There was no church government, to interfere with civil rights, to persecute other creeds, to exact tithes from its own and from other professors. There were no fiscal regulations, which visibly injured the prosperity or negatively repressed the energy of the state, or any district of the state. There was no system of internal police, through which the discontent of most of the Continental states has generally been blown into insurrection.

It is not true, as M. Boulgari states, that the primates of Greece were destitute of virtue and talent. The very fact of their being the elected men of Greece implied the possession of both talent and respectability; otherwise they never would have been elected to administer the affairs of the community, as any one acquainted with the municipal organization will at once perceive. They participated with the clergy in the administration

of justice, and whatever abuses may have crept into the system under licentious Pachas were removed with the departure of the Turks.

It is true that some of the klephtic chiefs occasionally served as instruments of oppression. But a wide distinction is to be made between primates and klephts. The latter date their origin from the time of the conquest of Constantinople, and the extension of Mussulman dominion over Greece. The Turks, finding it difficult to subjugate the mountain tribes, instituted a national militia, called Armatoli, in order to maintain public order and repress brigandage. To the capitani commanding these Armatoli, and to their followers, called Palikars, the privilege was allowed of bearing arms, of not paying Haradsh, of receiving a small pay, and of exercising a correctional police.

Whenever these capitani felt their duty to be inconsistent with justice, or the rule of the Turks became oppressive, they retired to the mountains, and maintained their own independence, under the denomination of klephts, and levied a sort of black mail over the neighbouring districts.

The peaceful chiefs are a body which it was Russia's interest to confound with the klephts,

who were men habituated to deeds of blood and outrage. But it is essential to distinguish them here; and, though many of them, particularly of the Roumeliote chieftains, cordially co-operated with the constitutional primates, yet the majority of them are such as Count Boulgari would have well described as overbearing, violent, and anarchical. Now, had Capodistrias desired the establishment of good order, as this famous document of Count Boulgari pretends, he would have taken for his counsellors the constitutional primates, but these were attached to England; instead of doing this, he ranged on his side the Carbonari of Italy, outcasts from Corfu, and adventurers from other countries, who no longer possessed a country, and some of the Suliotes, whose passions had been excited by the perfidy of Ali Pacha, and who, being deprived of a home, were at the disposal of any arbitrary master that would pay them. Add to this, he linked himself by indissoluble ties with the infamous Colocotroni, further strengthening his power and adding to the wealth he had already amassed by the most unscrupulous means. This he did by a financial fraud. Under the Turks, the taxes were levied by the municipal chiefs, who

handed them over to the farmers of the revenue. The direct taxes, tithes, &c., after the communities had been destroyed by Capodistrias, were levied by the farmers of the revenue, who then came into contact with the people individually. The farming of the revenue was in general exposed to sale, the highest bidder obtaining the collection of the taxes. But in the different subdivisions of the province of Arcadia, Colocotroni managed to outbid every other rival, on account of there being a secret understanding between the President and himself; and, whilst he kept down the people by his armed retainers, the excesses and exactions that he committed were truly appalling.

Thus we see the consistency apparent between the words and the deeds of Capodistrias.

The President, after appointing agents of his own all over the country, instituted a Tariff, and imposed a duty of ten per cent. on foreign imports. The effect of this measure was to deprive Greece of the comparative freedom of commerce she had enjoyed under the Turks. It was a blow aimed at British industry, for under the Turks our manufactures were introduced into Greece at a duty amounting, in reality, to hardly two per

cent. The appointment of Custom House officers in the different ports necessarily increased the direct patronage of Capodistrias, and, therefore, augmented the number of Russian adherents in Greece.

On the arrival in England of the reports of the conferences at Poros, the allied powers issued a new protocol, on the 22d of March, 1829, with the view of constituting Greece into a monarchy, under a christian prince.

This would have been a deathblow to Capodistrias. Immediately, therefore, on hearing of it, he determined either to render it abortive, or to make himself the instrument indispensable for its execution, and, therefore, the master of the future prince.

For this purpose, he desired to surround himself with the favour of the Greek nation, and he therefore convoked a national assembly. Having already appointed demogerontes and justices of the peace, devoted to his own interests, it was easy for him to procure the return of deputies favourable to his own personal ambition. In some districts his agents persuaded the peasantry to elect him representative of all Greece, and it was endeavoured to

obtain this result everywhere; but the primates had had sufficient insight into the Russian and despotic tendency of the Count not to be deluded on this occasion, and, notwithstanding all his endeavours, a considerable number of legal deputies were returned, and in many parts of the country double returns invalidated the Capodistrian elections. The treble object of Capodistrias was to gain the favour of the liberals of Europe by an appearance of governing by constitutional forms, to puzzle and embarrass the Greek nation, by an organic law of franchise, and, finally, to secure to himself absolute power as apparently the spontaneous gift of the nation. In this he succeeded. He replaced the Panhellenium by a Senate of twenty-seven members, selected from a list of sixty-three individuals, presented at his own dictation by his subservient assembly. This band of partizans received regular pay. But their functions were entirely dependent on the pleasure of Capodistrias, who, jealous of any limitation of his power, only granted them the privileges of a council, consultative on other questions,* but deli-

* This was all the length Capodistrias could go. Count Armansperg has gone farther, by depriving the council of its deliberative character in matters of finance.

berative still on the question of finance. At the same time, however, he could not avoid admitting this important principle: "that no decree relative to the disposal of national domains, or affecting the fortunes or finances of the State, should be executed without the consent of the Senate."

This body was called into existence until the re-meeting of the assembly at Argos, which was to be convoked immediately on the conference coming to a determination respecting the sovereign of Greece, when this body legally expired. By his extending the prerogative of this body, contrary to his own constitution, in the subsequent affair of Prince Leopold, Capodistrias contrived to prevent that prince from coming to Greece, and to deprive that country of a monarch whom the Greeks would have accepted with joy and gratitude.

The protocol announcing Prince Leopold's election to the sovereignty reached Greece in March, 1828.

Capodistrias submitted it to the Senate, whom he now brought forward as representing the national will. Tutored by their president, they drew up a memoir at the dictation of the count, which

was accompanied by sundry private and confidential letters from Capodistrias to His Royal Highness Prince Leopold, the whole tendency of which was to urge his highness's immediate arrival, and to make such a measure appear utterly impracticable. This correspondence is a master-piece of state jesuitry.

The most plausible objection to the Protocol of February the 3rd, was the exclusion of the warlike province of Acarnania from the limits of the new Greek State. Sir Richard Church, who had conquered that province from the Turks, at the very moment when their forces, engaged against the Russians on the Danube, were to decide on the independence of Turkey, and therefore of Europe, now published an able pamphlet on this question, which the opposition in Parliament eagerly took up as a ground for attacking the government. So that the liberals again accomplished the views of Russia, by opposing obstacles to a settlement, which would have been completed by the bare acceptance of the crown by Prince Leopold, since the improvement of the frontier by negotiation might have been effected with as much or greater facility with Prince Leopold in Greece, than it was after his highness's renunciation of the crown.

But the triumph of Count Capodistrias was not to be limited by the complete defeat of the wishes of the Greek nation and of England. He contrived, from the very embarrassment of the Conference of London at the resignation of Prince Leopold, to derive new arms for securing his own supremacy, and for trampling under foot the institutions and friends of England in Greece.

The most respectable Primates, aware of the important crisis, had signed addresses to Prince Leopold, stating "that they had learnt the nomination of his highness with tears of gratitude and joy, considering it as a gift from Heaven," and urging his highness to repair to Greece immediately, offering their unconditional submission to any institutions he might wish to give them. So much, therefore, for the Primates being republicans and demagogues.

Alarmed at the general expression of public opinion, Capodistrias issued circulars to his provincial prefects, denouncing these addresses as *illegal*, and insisting that none should be sent which did not pass through his own hands or those of his agents in the provinces, to whom a particular form was sent for signature.

This form expressed the unanimous confidence of the nation in the system by which Greece was destined to be governed, viz: *that of Count Capodistrias,* who upon this denounced the Primates to the Conference of London, and solicited the effective aid of the troops and squadrons of the alliance to repress disorder, or, in other words, to extinguish the friends of Prince Leopold and of England.

In his letters to Prince Leopold, and to the residents of the Allied Powers in Greece, Capodistrias stigmatizes the whole party devoted to England as "malignant spirits,*" "a handful of intriguers, on whom an evil conscience imposes the necessity of seeking out of their own country the influence and credit which they have lost in the opinion of the great mass of their fellow citizens"—"a band of plotters, composed of some foreigners, who, from want of judgment and good conduct, have failed in every thing which they imagined they could undertake in this country." "These unhappy men are encouraged," &c. Does not this more clearly describe Capodistrias, and his own anti-national faction?

* A Greek wrote a private letter to a friend, congratulating the

The names of these persons were: Mavrocordato, Tricoupi, Church, Petro Bey, Ipsilanti, Condouriotti, Miaulis, Delyanni, Coletti, Masson, and the whole of the independent Primates of Greece, who, in 1825, had placed the protection of their country in the hands of England. And these are the persons whom Capodistrias now endeavours to ruin in the estimation of Europe, for having dared to write to Prince Leopold that the objections of the Senate and himself to the arrangements of the alliance "would not have the national assent."

The news of Prince Leopold's nomination to the sovereignty had excited an interest amongst the Greek subjects of the Porte, which it is hardly possible to describe. In Asia Minor, the whole Christian population became inspired with an enthusiasm which seemed to animate and change the whole current of their thoughts. During a visit of Sir Robert Gordon's to Brusa, the Greeks sang their national airs in a procession with the Turkish guards who accompanied the Ambassador; and to the inquiries in what mode the civilities of the

country on the speedy arrival of Prince Leopold. This was sent by the post, opened by the police, and the writer was imprisoned for this crime, thus detected.

different Greek families could be returned, their only reply was a secret entreaty for a passport to Greece.

It may easily be imagined that the resignation by Prince Leopold of the Crown of Greece filled the Eastern world with the utmost astonishment. The mystery which enveloped the whole transaction, when, on the disclosure to Parliament of the dangers Prince Leopold had been led to apprehend from Greece, no single statesman had been able to unmask the fraudulent deceptions of Capodistrias, was inconceivable.

This want of information, even on the part of government, on a question of vital importance to Russia, and of the deepest interest to England, if she would but know her interests, was the more surprising, since, in the Gazette of Smyrna, then edited by Mr. Blacque, whose services have since been invaluable to the Ottoman Empire, the whole history was minutely detailed, and the English who were in Greece had exerted every nerve to enlighten public opinion on the subject. Their letters never reached their destination.

Those who had an opportunity of visiting Greece at this period, and of witnessing on the spot the

effect of Capodistrias's system, describe its situation in the most lamentable colours.

The country had fallen into a state of paralysis. Commerce had been obstructed by the Tariff, and by absurd regulations, interruptions of communications, and the discountenancing of foreign capitalists. The agricultural interest, equally depressed by the Tariff, was suffering from disturbances in the interior, which had been purposely excited by Capodistrias and Colocotroni to alarm Prince Leopold, and the odium of which Capodistrias had imputed to the "handful of intriguers."

A general system of espionage and violation of epistolary correspondence destroyed all confidence between man and man. The only persons in possession of power were the family of Capodistrias, and his Senate, his own nominees, men who for the most part did not bear a character for even respectability.

Colocotroni and the Metaxas were the provincial governors, and the centralized system of Capodistrias was as perfect in its organization as Russia could desire.

Of the English adherents all were suffering persecution. Church had been exiled by a decree of

Capodistrias. Mavrocordato was living in Nauplia in destitution, not choosing to accept office under the President. Tricoupi dwelt in poverty at Argos, and, to English travellers who visited him, he complained of not being allowed to visit Nauplia without a passport; a regulation, perfectly contradictory to Eastern habits and manners. Admiral Miaulis had written to Sir P. Malcolm, to excuse his not visiting him at Nauplia, alleging that his feelings prevented his coming to a town which held the President within its walls.

Nothing whatever had been done for the improvement of the country. With regard to England and Englishmen, Capodistrias manifested on every occasion the most marked dislike. In his progress to ruin the Primates, and secure his own power, he had been indirectly aided by the French government, which, on withdrawing a portion of the French troops, had expressly intimated its abandonment of all desire to exercise any influence in Greece, and had thus given up the whole of that party which, under Coletti, had once looked to France for protection. A number of French officers were, however, employed in disciplining the Greek army; and it was singular to see French

generals, with their staffs, caressed by Capodistrias, and organizing his troops.

The news of the French revolution of July was an event all-important to Greece, for it foreboded the downfall of Capodistrias, as he himself declared. The interest taken by France, at the instigation of Russia, in support of the President, was naturally turned against him from the moment the fleur-de-lis was replaced by the tricoloured flag: and thus, by one of those turns of fortune which on every important occasion have so miraculously favoured Greece, the President suddenly found himself surrounded by a host of French employés, whose sentiments, veering with the national opinion of France, were now naturally in harmony with the national feeling of Greece.

We owe it to the party then in power to observe here that their views respecting Greece were of the most liberal character. The Ambassadors at Poros had declared, that it would be unjust to deprive Greece of the constitutional freedom which it had been prepared for under the system of the Turks, which they expected, and which it would be unfair and inexpedient to deny them. Subsequently, the Cabinet of the Duke of Wellington

had endeavoured, on every occasion, to oppose the antinational system of Capodistrias; and so well aware was the President of this, that he pointed out England as his real foe and obstacle: and yet the Duke of Wellington was environed by many and grave difficulties. England was in a minority in the conference. Russia and France, under the dynasty of the elder branch of the Bourbons, held together in all questions of international policy, as is seen from the removal from office of Prince Talleyrand, down to the capture of Algiers.

On the accession of Lord Grey, England found herself in a vastly improved position, both by the influence of Lord Grey's liberal character in Europe and throughout the East; and by England gaining by the revolution of France a majority in the Conference—an influence which, by the non-intervention principle, a novel incident in the history of England, instead of being made use of to counteract the designs of Russia, was placed at her disposal for the furtherance of her views.

Men are naturally more easily led by names than by facts, and it requires more calmness and impartial sagacity than is generally found when the popular mind is in a state of strong excite-

ment, to discover that the liberal party has supported the designs of Russia from the affair of Oczakow to the nomination of Capodistrias, the resignation of Prince Leopold, the complications occasioned by the boundaries; and, as this narrative will show, down to the present day.

The French nation, which was to be henceforward governed by liberal principles, rejoiced at seeing England also governed by a ministry that called itself liberal. Louis Philippe had been placed on the throne by a development of the national will, and it then appeared that he could only maintain himself by conducting his policy, both at home and abroad, in accordance with that national will; as the then existing relations between France and Russia showed that he could then hope to receive no support from that Cabinet. However liberal might have been the intentions of the Tories, revolutionized France would never have placed as much confidence in a Tory Ministry in England as in one which professed liberal principles; and, however the Cabinet of Lord Grey may boast of having accomplished a great triumph in cementing a union between England and France, it was not the result of diplomatic skill, but the necessary

change of circumstances. We have yet to see how the new Cabinet turned to account this happy conjunction of events, how this union profited us on the sole point on which it could be useful, viz. "by striking to the heart those revolutionists and demagogues" that prowl about every country under the name of Russian envoys, ministers, agents, &c., showing to them that they would find in the combined "action of these two Crowns an insurmountable barrier" to the realization of their unprincipled designs, power to neutralize them, or even "to turn them to the advantage of social order," which they had endeavoured to disturb, and *thus* "to establish the peace of Europe on a durable foundation."

We now have England, that was before in a minority of the Conference of London, in a triumphant majority; whilst Prince Talleyrand, whose powerful mind had penetrated through the depths of Russian intrigue, was sent to assist with his intelligence the labours of the Conference.

Capodistrias, it is true, holds in his hand the reins of power in Greece; but the moment the news of the "three days of July" reached him, he exclaimed that his hour was come; and, by a happy

combination, at that moment, the views of Capodistrias had been unmasked, and the eyes of the Greeks opened; the evils of his government had become, at length, insupportable, and Greek forbearance had reached its utmost bounds. The changes that had taken place in Europe had operated favourably for us upon this excitable and susceptible nation: and it is curious to remark, in tracing effects to their causes, that the first intimation any of the English residents in Nauplia received of the Reform Bill, as proposed by Lord Grey's Cabinet, was communicated in the first number of a Gazette, that had been established at Hydra, which had just detached itself from the government of the President.

We shall now follow this revolution through its different phases.

(To be continued.)

[Representations having reached us from various quarters of doubts having been cast upon the authenticity or the accuracy of our translation of the Despatch in the last Number, we give the original. We had omitted in our latter Numbers the original French despatches, in consequence of the simultaneous appearance of the "Portfolio" at Paris; and we really had believed that suspicions such as those to which we allude were now entirely out of the question. This is a curious illustration of an observation of a recent writer, who, in commenting on the ignorance that prevailed in Europe respecting Russia and her projects, says "that Nesselrode would be treated as an impostor, if he revealed the views of his Cabinet."]

ORIGINAL OF THE SECRET DESPATCH IN Nos. XX. AND XXI.

COPIE D'UNE DEPECHE

TRES RESERVEE A MR. DE RIBEAUPIERRE,

ST. PETERSBOURG, LE 11 JANVIER, 1827.

En adressant a V. Exc. l'instruction ostensible qu' Elle reçoit par le Courier de ce jour, nous avons rempli nos engagemens avec le Cabinet de Londres, et profité d'une occasion favorable pour exposer le systême général de notre politique envers l'Empire Ottoman.

Plus nous avons lieu de croire que, malgré la noble modération de l'Empereur Alexandre et les principes qui dirigent notre Auguste Souverain, des opinions fausses accréditent encore de secrètes inquiétudes sur nos intentions à l'égard de cet Empire, plus il nous importait de faire connaitre avec franchise et les graves intéréts que nous ne pourrons jamais y abandonner, et les avantages réels que nous offrira l'ordre de choses qui s'y trouve établi, dès que nous verrons, d'un côté, s'exécuter fidèlement la Convention d'Akerman, et de l'autre, la Grèce tranquille et florissante contribuer comme autrefois a la prospérité des provinces Russes, dont les produits s'ecoulaient à bord de ses vaisseaux et par l'entremise de ses commerçans. Tel est le double but de notre précédente dépêche. Elle développe des vérités dont nous ne saurions trop convaincre les autres Puissances et nous pénétrer nous mêmes.

Mais il en est d'autres qui appellent aussi Mr. votre attention particulière.

Vous avez pris lecture des annexes de la dépêche confidentielle que nous avons dernierement adressée à M. de Minciaky et Vous aurez été frappé sans doute de la différence qui existe entre les communications que le Ministre Britannique nous a faites concernant la question de la Grèce, à deux epoques très rapprochées, entre les instructions dont il a muni Mr. Stratford Canning, le 4 Septembre, 1826, et celles qu'il vient de lui envoyer au mois de Decembre suivant.

Les premières, expediées pendant les conférences d'Akerman, lui prescrivaient d'entamer avec vigueur les négociations destinées à rétablir en Grèce une heureuse tranquillité. Les secondes lui enjoignent de rester dans l'inaction, de temporiser, d'attendre que les autres Cours Alliées se prononcent sur la marche que le Gouvernement Anglais avoit naguères indiquée comme indispensable. Le même contraste se reproduit dans les ouvertures qu'il fait directement à ces Cours. Son langage au mois de Septembre avoit été positif. Au mois de Décembre il est incertain et timide. La Grande Bretagne articule les propositions qu'elle nous avoit soumises et que nous avions approuvées. Mais elle les articule de manière à laisser entrevoir que leur rejet ne provoquera pas son mécontentement. Aussi le Cabinet de Paris et le Cabinet de Vienne ont ils exprimé dans leurs reponses, (voyez les annèxes A et B,) des idées nouvelles dont l'adoption pure et simple ne pouvait qu'entraver encore davantage les progrès de cette affaire, ou tant de difficultés s'unissent à tant d'importance. Au reste, pour expliquer le changement, il suffit de consulter les dates.

Pendant que l'Angleterre a craint une rupture entre la Russie et la Porte, elle a craint également de perdre le rôle que l'acte du $\frac{\text{23 Mars}}{\text{4 Avril}}$ lui avoit laissé dans les affaires de la Grèce. Des que la conclusion du traité d'Akerman lui a offert la perspective de la paix, elle est revenue a ses anciens erremens. Elle a trahi le désir de ne plus exécuter qu'à demi le protocole signé par le Duc de Wellington, de ne plus ouvrir avec la Porte que des negociations stériles. Sa tendance secrète ne pouvoit échapper aux autres Cours alliées, et leur empressement à suivre l'impulsion de la politique Anglaise n'a aucun droit de nous surprendre.

Mais vous sentirez Mr., que ce n'est pas dans une question à la quelle se rattachent de grands intérets Russes, que ce n'est pas dans un moment où le Protocole du $\frac{23 \text{ Mars}}{4 \text{ Avril}}$ se trouve déjà connu de l'Europe entière, qu'il étoit possible à l'Empereur d'encourager des tentatives dont le premier résultat serait de nous exposer a tous les effets préjudiciables que nos engagemens peuvent avoir pour nous, en nous compromettant envers les Turcs et les Grecs, sans nous assurer les avantages qu'ils devaient nous garantir, en opérant la pacification de la Grèce. Sur ce point nos explications avec la Grande Bretagne ont été catégoriques.

Pour les faire connoitre à V. E. nous lui transmettons (voyez les annexes C. D. E.) les instructions ostensibles et les instructions réservées, que nous avons eu ordre d'adresser au Prince de Lieven. Elles vous prouveront, que nous n'avons négligé aucun moyen de produire une impression forte sur le Gouvernement Anglais, et que Mr. de Lieven est autorisé, si ses premières ouvertures ne recevaient pas un accueil favorable, à laisser comprendre que, ne pouvant admettre la prolongation indéfinie des troubles du Levant, nous serions obligés de les terminer separément d'après la lettre même des stipulations du Protocole. Au reste, notre langage est assez positif pour nous inspirer l'espoir que cette insinuation sera superflue, et si nous nous rappelons que, dans toutes les périodes des longues negociations, dont la Grèce est l'objet, aussitôt que la Grande Bretagne a entrevu en nous les seules arbitres des destinées de ce pays, elle n'a jamais manqué de nous offrir une co-opération qui devenait dès lors empressée et sincère. Nous avons lieu de nous flatter que l'Ambassadeur de sa Majesté Imperiale réussira, soit à signer avec le Cabinet de Londres le traité proposé par la France et accompagné des clauses auxquelles l'Empereur en subordonne la conclusion, soit à convenir des mesures décisives que réclame l'execution du protocole du $\frac{23 \text{ Mars}}{4 \text{ Avril}}$ et à les faire adopter sans nouveau delai. Mais nous ne reviendrons pas içi sur des matières que nous croyons avoir épuisées dans nos Dépêches à Mr. de Lieven, et notre tâche se borne à bien définir l'attitude que vous prendrez à Constantinople pour favoriser la prompte realisation des vœux de notre Auguste Souverain.

L'Empereur désire pacifier la Grèce avec le concours de l'Angleterre et de ses alliés. Or, parmi les moyens qui se présentent d'engager la Cour de Londres à poursuivre cette entreprise, nul doute que celui de la placer dans une position où la retraite lui devienne à peu près impossible, ne soit un des plus efficaces.

Si l'affaire est une fois entameé, si la Grande Bretagne y joue un rôle plus ou moins actif par l'intermédiare de son ambassadeur à Constantinople, certès, il lui sera difficile de ne pas se décider à la terminer d'une manière honorable, et par conséquent *de ne pas suivre les seules voyes qui puissent conduire au succès.*

C'est par ce motif et dans ce bût que notre dépêche ostensible Vous autorise, Mr., à saisir la première occasion de faire connôitre confidentiellement au Reis Effendi qu' un des principaux objets de votre mission sera de contribuer à rendre la paix au Levant.

Dans le cas, ou Mr. Stratford Canning, profitant d'un moment qu' il jugeroit propice et des pouvoirs que nous avons donnès à Mr. de Minciaky, auroit déjà fait des démarches à la Porte, cette occasion se présentera d'elle même, et V. Ex. sera en quelque sorte obligée de déclarer qu'elle a ordre d'appuyer les ouvertures de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre et d'inviter sérieusement le Ministère Turc a les prendre en mûre consideration. Supposé, d'autre part, que Mr. Stratford Canning ait changé d'avis, ou reçu les instructions qui lui prescrivent le silence, avant que Mr. de Minciaky ne se trouvât autorisé à soutenir ses propositions, il n'en est pas moins vrai qu' à une époque antérieure il à fait connaitre au Divan l'existence du protocole, et que, suivant toute probabilité, le Divan possede même une copie de cet acte. Il ne serait donc ni de notre dignité ni de notre franchise de lui dissimuler nos engagemens. D'ailleurs, plus Votre sejour à Constantinople se prolongerait, sans que la Porte fut informée par vous des vues de l'Empereur quant à la pacification de la Grèce, et de l'accord existant à cet égard entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, plus cette communication deviendroit embarrassante, plus elle serait difficile à motiver, plus la Porte devrait être et surprise et allarmée de notre politique. Toutefois, comme l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre

n'a point la latitude de quitter Constantinople, comme nous ne croyons même pas que dans l'état actuel des chôses, il puisse recourir à la declaration qui menacerait les Turcs d'un rapprochement entre les Cours Alliés et les Grecs, Votre langage avec le Reis Effendi sur les affaires de la Grèce doit être purement confidentiel. Dans les deux hypothèses dont il a été question plus haut, vous devez éviter tout éclat, ne pas provoquer une crise, et vous contenter d'habituer le Ministère Ottoman à vous entendre parler de la pacification, qui fait le constant objet de nos désirs, et à savoir que nous la regardons non seulement comme un bien, mais comme une nécessité. Dans ces deux hypothéses aussi, Vous pourrez, Mr., présenter notre insistance comme l'effet de nos engagemens avec l'Angleterre, observer, qu' ils ont précédé la Convention d'Akerman, que nous sommes dans l'obligation absolue de les remplir, que nous ne pourrons manquer de foi au Cabinet de Londres. L'Angletérre ne pourra nous faire un reproche du soin que nous montrerons a exécuter des stipulations conclues avec elle, et se verra dans l'alternative, ou de nous désavouer, ce qui est impossible, ou de s'expliquer comme la Russie; la Porte à son tour appréciera mieux et notre position et la sienne. Ce sera donc agir à la fois sur ces deux Puissances, engager l'une plus avant dans la question et avertir l'autre qu'elle doit se résigner à la laisser resoudre. Puisqu' il s'agit d'exécuter le protocole du $\frac{\text{23 Mars,}}{\text{4 Avril,}}$ et que cet acte est connu des Grecs, il nous importe assurément de recueillir des informations positives sur l'état intérieur de la Gréce, sur ses ressources, et sur les moyens qu'elle posséde de realiser les arrangemens dont nous sommes convenus dans son intérêt.

Dés le régne de l'Empereur Alexandre de glorieuse mémoire, Mr. de Minciaky avait été autorisé à profiter des rapports qu'il pourrait renouer dans ce pays, à la suite du long séjour qu'il y a fait, pour nous procurer secrètement des notions directes relatives aux événemens dont la Grèce est le théâtre et aux dispositions qui l'animent.

Il est parvenu à y organiser une correspondance, á la quelle

nous devons des renseignemens qui ne manquent pas d'utilité. Vous la continuerez et vous userez de tous pouvoirs accordés à Mr. de Minciaky, et même de sa co-operation personnelle, pour rendre cette correspondance plus active et plus régulière. Elle pourra désormais avoir un objet positif. Elle pourra rouler sur le meilleur mode d'éxécution dont le protocole du $\frac{\text{23 Mars}}{\text{4 Avril}}$ soit susceptible, et sur les limites du territoire, ainsi que les noms des îles auxquelles les arrangemens de paix seront applicables, indiquer les idées des hommes les plus considérés parmi les Grecs, touchant les formes administratives qui pourront être introduites dans leur patrie, et ne laisser ignorer ni les operations des armées, et les mouvemens des flottes, ni les intrigues etrangères qui aggravent encore les infortunes de ces contrées déjà si malheureuses.

Il s'entend de soi même, que vous entretiendrez les relations les plus amicales avec Mr. Stratford Canning. L'intérêt de l'affaire que vous aurez à conduire ensemble, et les liens qui se sont formés entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, vous en font un devoir.

Cette tâche ne sera neanmoins pas exempte de difficultés. Froid, réservé, et souvent minutieux, Mr. Stratford pousse la susceptibilité jusqu' à l'extrême. Son caractère est un peu sombre, et il n'est aisé ni d'acquérir sa confiance ni de lui en inspirer. Beaucoup de franchise, jointe à une égalité constante dans votre manière d'être à son égard, seront a notre avis les plus surs moyens d'atteindre votre but. Vous pourrez dès votre arrivée à Constantinople mettre sous les yeux de l'ambassadeur de S. M. Britannique l'instruction patente, dont vous êtes muni et lui dévelloper les principes qu'elle vous invite à suivre. Il y est parlé des explications ulterieures, que nous allons avoir avec la Grande Bretagne. V. E. ne sauroit paraître en ignorer l'objét, et il ne sera d'ailleurs pas inopportun que Mr. Stratford Canning le connoisse. Vous voudrez donc bien, Mr. lui faire part de notre dépêche ostensible au Prince de Lieven, de l'esquisse du traité que nous proposons de conclure, et de notre instruction à Mr. de Tatistcheff.

Nous avons lieu de croire que nos ouvertures et les remarques dont elles sont accompagnées exciteront toute l'attention du re-

presentant de la cour de Londres. S'il observe, en même temps, que dans vos entretiens confidentiels avec le Reis Effendi vous abordez les affaires de la Grèce, s'il vous voit informé des évènemens de ce pays, et décidé à en bien connoitre le véritable état; si enfin, avec l'habilete qui vous caractérise, sans jamais lui parler des moyens de negociation mis a la disposition du Prince de Lieven, vous les lui faites deviner par votre attitude, nul doute qu'il ne se hâte de communiquer au gouvernement Anglais ces premières impressions, toujours vives, toujours avidement recueillies, et qu'elles ne produissent à Londres un effet salutaire. Ce sera un éminent service que vous aurez rendu. Vos relations avec l'ambassadeur de France doivent être également amicales, avec une nuance d'intimité de moins et une nuance que Mr. Stratford Canning puisse apercevoir. Le Comte Guilleminot à reçu des instructions (voyez l'annexe F.) qui l'autorisent à se joindre aux demarches des représentans de la Russie et de l'Angleterre pour la pacification de la Grèce. Vous pourrez par conséquent extraire de vos instructions ostensibles le passage qui concerne cette negociation et lui en donner lecture, afin qu'il ne se meprenne pas sur la ligne de conduite que vous avez ordre d'adopter. Il connoit aussi la proposition de la Cour des Tuileries de convertir en traité le protocole du $\frac{\text{23 Mars,}}{\text{4 Avril,}}$ et probablement les opinions émises par le cabinet Autrichien. Il est donc nècessaire qu'il n'ignore pas celles de l'Empereur.

Pour les lui faire apprécier, V. E. lui communiquera notre dépêche a Mr. de Tatistcheff. Avec tous les autres ministres des etats Européens vos rapports seront bienveillans. Avec l'internonce d'Autriche et le ministre de Prusse quoique celui-ci ne puisse malheureusement inspirer d'estime personnelle, ils attesteront les sentimens, ils marqueront les liens, qui nous unissent à ces deux cours. Celle de Vienne nous a fait parvenir l'instruction qu'elle adresse à Mr. d'Ottenfels. Vouz la trouverez ci-jointe. (Lett. G.) Elle vous autorisera à faire à l'internonce les mêmes communications qu' à l'Ambassadeur de France, et vous ne negligerez aucun moyen de profiter de sa co-operation et de lui imprimer le caractère le plus propre à en assurer l'efficacité.

De toutes les capitales Constantinople est peut-être la seule, ou l'ancienne politique ait encore conservé ses traditions et tout son empire. De nombreuses intrigues s'y poursuivent, des agens secrèts ne cessent d'y être employés, des insinuations mysterieuses y sont faites tous les jours à la Porte, et nous savons que la Russie en est le plus souvent l'objét. Mais nos intentions envers le gouvernement Turc sont si pures, nos droits si clairement définis par le traité d'Akerman, notre position si evidente dans les affaires Grecques, que d'obscures manœuvres ne peuvent ni changer les résultats de nos conventions récentes ni longtems entraver ceux que nous avons encore besoin d'obtenir. Etranger à ce mouvement, vous vous contenterez donc, Monsieur, d'en être spectateur attentif.

Les informations ne vous manqueront pas ; quelle qu'en soit la nature, elles ne doivent pas influer sur vos relations officielles avec vos collègues. Mais la vérité est toujours utile et vous aurez soin de nous la faire connâitre. Les moyens que vous offre votre poste de signaler souvent la vraie politique des autres cabinets à notre égard, relèvent l'importance de vos fonctions et de vos dépêches. Un autre champ s'ouvre à vos observations : vouz allez arriver à Constantinople dans un moment où le souverain y opere des réformes qui attaquent à la fois toutes les institutions de ses états les mœurs de ses peuples, et les interêts individuels de plusieurs millions de ses sujéts. Elles ont couté le trône et la vie a son prédecesseur. Le Sultan actuel les poursuit avec plus de force, et ses moyens sont la terreur ou la mort. Mais la réaction, si jamais elle a lieu, portera ce même caractère. Elle entrainera l'extermination de la dynastie regnante, elle produira une effroyable anarchie, et si l'on considère que les réformes ont été commencées avec des finances délabrées au milieu des symptomes d'une décadence progressive, et que le Grand Seigneur étouffe dans les flots de sang les projéts de révolte qui semblent néanmoins renaître tous les jours, il est difficile de croire à la longue durée de son regne et de son gouvernement. Dans aucune hypothèse, la Russie ne peut considerer d'un œil indifférent cette vaste entreprise, et un de vos premiers devoirs sera d'en observer les divers

effets avec la plus grande attention. Si le Sultan réussit, ce succès peut retremper, pour ainsi dire, le gouvernement Turc, et lui donner une confiance dans ses forces, dont la Russie éprouveroit aussitôt les suites. C'est une raison de plus d'accoutumer dès à présent les Turcs à nous temoigner un juste respect, de nous assurer, par l'éxécution scrupuleuse de nos traités, la considération qui doit toujours être notre apanage à Constantinople, et d'accélérer la pacification de la Grèce. Si cette même entreprise manque, elle peut amener la chute de l'empire Ottoman. Nous verrions alors s'accomplir un des plus grands événemens de l'histoire, un événement auquel se lient pour nous des intérêts majeurs. Il est de toute nécessité qu'une telle revolution ne nous prenne pas au dépourvu, et vous aurez bien merité, Monsieur, de votre souverain *et de votre patrie*, si vous nous faites connôitre les signes precurseurs de cette catastrophe, assez à temps, pour que l'empereur puisse preparer ses mesures et exercer une influence analogue à la dignité et aux besoins de la Russie sur les combinaisons politiques qui remplaceroient l'empire du Croissant. Nous aurons soin d'adresser à V. Ex. des instructions ultérieures dès que nous connoîtrons les resultats de nos explications avec le cabinet de Londres.

Recevez, &c. &c. &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

ADMIRAL HEYDEN AND ADMIRAL DE RIGNY.

THE trait of Russian frankness in one of our late numbers, where a French writer represents Admiral de Rigny as listening to the most gross and brutal threats of the Russian admiral against the English squadron, at a period not only of alliance but of intimate concert—this singular exhibition has indeed awakened some slight indications of shame in that country which was once so jealous of its national honour.

M. Michaud has published in the *Quotidienne* the following letter, addressed to M. Laurentie.

"In a letter written in 1831, and dated from the lazaretto of Malta, I repeated some energetic expressions used in the presence of Admiral de Rigny, by the commandant of the Russian station at Nauplia. The question then was not concerning the prejudices of the French and English against Russia, but the haughty defiances which English policy was throwing out against the French and the Russians. The collection, entitled *The Portfolio*, in its 17th number, quotes a passage of the *Correspondance d'Orient*, in which the very words of the Russian admiral are recorded; but as this detached quo-

tation tends to alter the true sense of my account, and seems to associate me with the paper war which has been for some time carried on against the Russian cabinet—a war with which I wish to have nothing to do—I have thought it right to give a correct statement of facts, and therefore I request you to insert, in the columns of the *Quotidienne*, my letter, just as it was written and published.

"Though a great deal has been said about the affairs of the East, and events have proceeded very rapidly, I do not see that we have got much further than we were in 1831. What was true then is still true at this day, and the way in which enlightened persons view things has not changed during the last five years. I hope then that my ideas have not become too obsolete, and that I shall again find myself very nearly on a level with all the questions of the day: but I am determined not to mix myself up with the passionate quarrels which have lately arisen, and, happen what may, to remain neuter between the Thames and the Neva.

"Passy, April 26." "MICHAUD."

We did not quote the passage for the purpose of exposing the doublefacedness of the French

admiral, or of the French cabinet, to whom such language must have been communicated. We did not think it worth while to speak of honour or honesty as regards the pitiful policy of France, the subservient tool at her own expence, no less than at the expence of others—of that cabinet which may have equally misled the intelligence, but, thank God, has never yet corrupted the integrity, of this country. Our opinions of the policy of France under the restoration have been so repeatedly expressed, and illustrated by so many extraordinary facts and documents, that this new and characteristic instance required no comment. We quoted that incident for the purpose of showing to our numerous naval officers, who, in the frankness of their own character, have not dreamed of suspecting others, how erroneous their estimate had been of the character of the "frank old Dutchman," Admiral Heyden. Not indeed that Admiral Heyden did not personally deserve, and fully deserve, all the respect that was paid him, but he was a servant of Russia. He was chosen, no doubt, for the purpose of conciliating the good will of the English officers on the station; and, while full latitude was therefore allowed

him for the expression of feelings and affections wholly English, any, the slightest indiscretion on his part was carefully guarded against by a censor's being placed over him in the person of M. Catacazy, who never quitted his side on occasions of importance, and without whose presence he could conduct none of the political business connected with his station.

The gallant and distinguished Admiral, then Captain Hugon, in the heat of the action of Navarin, seeing the "Talbot" in imminent danger from the fire of a Turkish seventy-four, by a no less bold than dexterous manœuvre, ran the "Armide" between the "Talbot" and the Turkish line-of-battle ship, and thus rescued the former, to the admiration of the English squadron. After the action, on calculating the loss of his men and the direction of the shot that had hit the "Armide," the French officers found, to their amazement, that their principal loss had been caused by the fire of the Russians, which had been directed upon the "Armide" at the moment in which she placed herself in this perilous situation. This may serve to illustrate the caricature which accompanies this number.

LETTER FROM CONSTANTINOPLE.

May 5, 1836.

It seems, then, that at home they are determined to maintain the *status quo* respecting Turkey and Egypt, which they twist, by some sleight of hand requiring no small dexterity, into something about the peace of Europe. The *status* cannot be maintained, and can only be maintained at the expense of Turkey—maintain the *status*, you suffer Turkey to be occupied by the moral force of Russia, (immoral would be better). The ministers of Turkey must fall under the influence of Russia, and she has already made alarming progress in what I call *moral* occupation. Mehemet Ali has overcome resistance in Syria, and he now begins to utilize this most magnificent country. He had anticipated his revenue, and in a short time he will not only be out of debt, but will have a disposable revenue for offensive purposes. His attitude will soon again be one of aggression, and not either of submission or defence.

The loss of Egypt and Syria palsies the operations

of the government here. Checked on one side by Mehemet Ali, on the other by Russia, they are placed between a cross-fire, which does tell, and must in a short time bring the whole mass, which already totters, to the ground. If Mahmoud would be Sultan of Turkey, he must destroy Mehemet Ali. The ignorant declare that the peace of Europe is endangered; and this is the last, the only, means of preserving it. Will Russia, if she attacks Turkey, which she must do, if Mehemet Ali lives and rules, be content till she is so secure that she may laugh at the protests of England, and the force of England? "The British lion has grown old — he dotes — his teeth and claws must be drawn and cut!" such was the expression of a Russian. I have seen a paper, sent to some mountaineers of the Caucasus. "Do you not know," it says, "that we have conquered England and France? Have you not seen their flags in Anapa (not pennants)? Let us be friends—enter the service of our Emperor, whom the world obeys."

[The ability with which the cabinet of St. Petersburg derives arguments from the conservative policy of the Court of Vienna, to support her "destructive" policy as respects the East, is admirably shown in the following Despatch, especially when contrasted with the manner in which the Greek question was to be treated at Constantinople, as exemplified in the Despatch to M. de Ribeaupierre, under the same date, published in Nos. 20 and 21 of the Portfolio. The Despatch of Prince Lieven, referred to, will be found in Nos. 18 and 19.]

COPY OF A CONFIDENTIAL DESPATCH

FROM

COUNT NESSELRODE

TO

M. DE TATISTCHEFF,

Dated St. Petersburg, Jan. 1827.

I HAVE hastened to lay before the Emperor your Excellency's interesting Despatches, dated the 27th December (8th January); and I have delayed, for a few days, the departure of the present messenger, for the purpose of making known to you the intentions of his Imperial Majesty, relative to the overtures contained in them.

First of all, the Emperor charges you to con-

Copie d'une Dépêche confidentielle à MR. DE TATISTCHEFF, *en date de St. Petersbourg, le Janvier,* 1827.

JE me suis empressé de mettre sous les yeux de l'Empereur l'intéressante expédition de V. Ex. en date du 27 Decembre (8 Janvier) et j'ai différé de quelques jours le départ du present Courrier, afin de pouvoir vous faire connôitre les intentions de S. M. Imperiale relativement aux ouvertures qu'elle renferme.

Avant tout, l'Empereur vous charge de faire parvenir à l'Em-

vey to the Emperor of Austria the expression of his most lively gratitude for the frankness with which this Monarch has entered into personal explanations with you on questions of importance, which assuredly claim the most anxious attention of the Allied Courts. In requesting permission to hand over to his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty the original, and the copy of the answer, which his Majesty addresses to him, you will be able to execute this commission.

Our August Master had, to a certain degree, provoked the explanation in question, by a letter remitted to the Prince of Hesse Homburg, and his Majesty has been infinitely pleased at seeing the Emperor of Austria return this pledge of

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pereur d'Autriche l'expression de sa plus vive reconnoissance pour la franchise avec laquelle ce Monarque a bien voulu s'expliquer lui-même avec vous sur des questions graves, qui réclament assurément toute la sollicitude des Cours Alliées. En demandant à déposer entre les mains de S. M. I. et R. Ap. la réponse ci-jointe en original et en copie que S. M. Lui adresse, vous pourrez vous acquitter de cette commission.

Notre Auguste Maître avoit en quelque sorte provoqué l'explication, dont il s'agit, par une lettre remise au Prince de Hesse Hombourg, et il Lui a été infiniment agreable de voir l'Empereur d'Autriche donner suite à ce témoignage d'amitié et de confiance,

friendship and confidence. The wishes he has announced to you relate, first of all, to the general situation of affairs, and then to a particular case, on which the Allied Courts, and that of Vienna especially, are obliged to give their opinions. Seeing that the questions which interest all Europe are becoming complicated, and are taking an unpleasant turn; and that the spirit of anarchy is gaining ground, and preparing a crisis in more than one country; the Emperor of Austria points out to the solicitude of the other monarchs these alarming symptoms, insists on the necessity of strengthening the bonds which unite them; and desires to know to what degree he might count on the co-operation of our August Master, if new revolutionary

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Les vœux qu'il vous a énoncés se rapportent d'abord à la situation générale des affaires, et ensuite à un cas particulier, sur lequel les Cours Alliées, et nommément celle de Vienne, sont obligées d'emettre leurs opinions. Voyant les questions qui interéssent toute l'Europe se compliquer, les événemens prendre une tournure inquiétante, l'esprit d'anarchie se fortifier et préparer des crises dans plus d'un pays, l'Empereur d'Autriche signale à la sollicitude des autres monarques ces alarmans symptômes, insiste sur la nécessité de renforcer leurs liens, et désire savoir jusqu' à quel point il pourroit compter sur la coopération de Notre Auguste Maître

intrigues were to require fresh efforts on his part.

His Majesty does not hesitate an instant to reply to this appeal. His principles and his intentions are known. The engagements that the late Emperor Alexander contracted in the great epochs of his reign define the obligations which Russia will glory in fulfilling. They are sacred in the eyes of the Emperor, both from the respect which he bears to the memory of his august brother, and from being intimately persuaded that the scrupulous execution of the treaties and acts whence they flow can alone preserve Europe from the evils and the convulsion which threaten it. Ever since his accession to the throne, the very day on which Divine

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si de nouvelles menées révolutionnaires exigeoient de sa part de nouveaux efforts.

Sa Majesté n'hésite pas un instant à répondre à cet appel. Ses principes et ses intentions sont connus. Les engagemens que feu l'Empereur Alexandre a contractés dans les grandes époques de son régne définissent les obligations que la Russie se fera gloire de remplir. Elles sont sacrées aux yeux de l'Empereur, ces obligations, et par le respect qu'il porte à la mémoire de Son Auguste Frère et par le sentiment intime, que l'exécution scrupuleuse des Traités et actes, dont elles découlent, peut seule préserver l'Europe des maux et des bouleversemens qui la menacent. Dès son avènement au trône, le jour même où la Divine Providence Lui a

Providence granted to him the happiness of destroying a hideous conspiracy hatched in the bosom of Russia *, his Majesty has addressed to his Allies declarations which could leave no doubt as to the maxims which he would adopt as the guide of his policy. From this moment more than one circumstance has furnished him with the means of applying them, and if to-day he again insists with such force on the necessity of restoring peace to the East, it is because he perceives there one of those questions which the revolutionary spirit has taken possession of, and which keeps up everywhere a dangerous agitation. Certainly such antecedents speak loudly

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accordé le bonheur d'anéantir une hideuse conspiration tramée au sein de la Russie, Sa Majesté a fait adresser à Ses Alliés des déclarations, qui ne pouvoient laisser aucun doute sur les maximes qu'elle adopteroit pour diriger sa politique. Depuis ce moment, plus d'une circonstance lui a fourni les moyens d'en faire l'application, et si aujourdhui encore elle insiste avec tant de force sur la nécessité de rendre la paix à l'Orient, c'est parcequ' elle y trouve une de ces questions, dont l'esprit révolutionnaire s'est emparé et qui entretiennent partout une agitation dangereuse.

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* How insidiously this event is put forward, to prove to Austria that Russia had really an interest in curbing the revolutionary principle!

enough, and such solemn guarantees may be judged sufficient. Still your Excellency is authorised to add to them the positive assurance that in the day of peril the Emperor of Austria and his Cabinet may count on the moral support of Russia; and even, according to the nature of the events and the treaties which have foreseen them, on his material support, that the Emperor will never deviate from the line traced for him by the great transactions of 1814, 1815, 1818, 1821, and 1822; that he only wishes the maintenance of the state of things established by them; that the preservation of the general peace will be the constant object of his desires and of his efforts; that this declaration fulfils, in his opinion, everything required by the exi-

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Certès, de pareils antécédens parlent assez haut, et des garanties aussi solennelles peuvent être jugées suffisantes. Cependant V. Ex. est autorisée à y joindre l'assurance positive, qu' au jour du péril l'Empereur d'Autriche et son cabinet peuvent compter sur l'appui moral de la Russie, et même, suivant la nature des evênemens et des Traités qui les ont prevues, sur ses secours matériels, que l'Empereur ne déviera jamais de la Ligne, que lui tracent les grandes transactions des années 1814, 1815, 1818, 1821, et 1822, qu' il ne souhaite que le maintien de l'état de choses établi par elles, que la conservation de la paix générale sera le but constant de ses vœux et de ses efforts, que cette déclaration remplit à son

gencies of the moment; and that, if new incidents call for more particular combinations, the Cabinet of Russia would not hesitate to take part in the deliberations of which they would be the object.

As a consequence of these dispositions, the Emperor has not failed to devote a sincere interest to the delicate situation in which the desire, lately expressed by the Emperor of Brazil, places the Infant, D. Miguel. Called upon to reply to the communications of France and England on the affairs of the Peninsula, we have fully treated this question, in the despatch, of which a copy is subjoined, which we address, by order of his Majesty, to Prince Lieven, and which you will have the goodness

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avis tout ce que les nécessités du moment exigent, et que si des incidens nouveaux réclamoient des combinaisons plus spéciales, le Cabinet de Russie ne balanceroit pas à prendre part aux délibérations dont elles feroient l'objet.

Par une conséquence de ces dispositions, l'Empereur n'a pas manqué de vouer un sincère intérêt à la situation délicate, ou le désir exprimé en dernier lieu par l'Empereur du Brésil place l'Infant D. Miguel. Appelé à répondre aux communications de la France et de l'Angleterre sur les affaires de la Péninsule, nous avons traité à fond cette question dans la Depêche ci-jointe en copie, que nous adressons, d'ordre de S. Majesté, au Prince de Lieven, et que vous voudrez bien mettre sous les yeux du Minis-

to lay before the Austrian ministry. They will see that we lay great stress, both on the motives which ought to prevent the Infant, Don Miguel, from complying with the invitation of his brother, and on the considerations of right, which authorize him to decline it; that we even engage the Cabinet of London to use its influence at Rio Janeiro, to convince the Emperor, Don Pedro, that this project is not admissible, and finally to place the Infant, Don Miguel, in the situation which the interests and repose of Portugal and of Spain so imperiously demand. In explaining our views, on this point, with such energy to the British government, the Emperor flatters himself with having fulfilled the wishes of the Emperor of Austria, and supported, at

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tère Autrichien. Il verra que nous appuyons avec force, et sur les motifs qui doivent empêcher l'Infant D. Miguel de se rendre à l'invitation de son frère, et sur les considerations de droit qui l'autorisent à s'y refuser, que nous engageons même le Cabinet de Londres à faire usage de son influence à Rio Janeiro, pour convaincre l'Empereur Don Pedro que ce projet n'est point admissible et à placer enfin l'Infant D. Miguel dans la situation que réclament si impérieusement les intérêts et la tranquillité du Portugal et de l'Espagne. En nous expliquant à ce sujet avec tant d'énergie envers le Gouvernement Britannique, l'Empereur se flatte d'avoir exaucé les vœux de l'Empereur d'Autriche et appuyé tout ensemble

the same time, both the cause of the Infant, Don Miguel, and the refusal which this Sovereign will counsel him to give to the demand of Don Pedro. According to us, it was the only step to be made, the one which might conduct us most promptly to the end proposed to themselves by the Infant and by his Imperial and Royal August Majesty, in his just anxiety for this Prince. To make this step only the result of the deliberations alluded to in your report, No. 172, and of which Vienna would have been fixed as the centre, and to impress on it a more collective character, would have been not only to lose invaluable time, but would have added to the difficulties inherent in the nature of the affair, all those which would have arisen from

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la cause de l'Infant D. Miguel et le refus que ce Souverain lui conseillera d'opposer à la demande de D. Pedro. C'étoit, selon nous, la seule démarche à faire, celle qui pouvoit nous conduire le plus promptement au but, que se proposent l'Infant et S. M. I. et R. Ap. dans sa juste sollicitude pour ce Prince. Ne faire résulter cette démarche que des délibérations dont parle votre rapport No. 172, et dont le centre auroit été fixé à Vienne et lui imprimer un caracterè plus collectif, c'eut été non seulement perdre un tems précieux, mais ajouter aux difficultés inhérentes à la nature de l'affaire toutes celles qu'auroit fait náitre l'amour-propre blessé.

wounded amour propre. It would, in a word, have rendered almost impossible the success of our negociations, on a question in which motives, which it is superfluous to recall here, assign to England the first role. Without her, no combination, tending to favour the Infant, could succeed. It was essential, therefore, to obtain her assent to *our views*, and to lead her to accelerate the realization of them. The Austrian Cabinet is too enlightened not to appreciate considerations of this importance. Your Excellency will be good enough to lay this despatch before Prince Metternich.

Our attitude resulting from the treaties and the principles bequeathed to our august master

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C'êut été, en un mot, rendre presqu'impossible le succés de nos négociations dans une question, ou des motifs, qu'il est superflu de rappeler ici, assignent à l'Angleterre le premier rôle. Sans elle, aucune combinaison tendante à favoriser l'Infant ne sauroit réussir. L'essentiel étoit donc, d'obtenir son assentiment à nos vues et de la porter à en accélèrer la réalization. Le Ministère Autrichien est trop éclairé pour ne pas apprécier des considérations de cette importance.

Vous voudrez bien, M. L'Ambassadeur, mettre la presente sous les yeux de M. le Prince de Metternich.

Notre attitude est telle, que les Traités et les principes légués

by his predecessor of immortal memory, is such as the Court of Vienna would desire.

We are ready to combat the spirit of disorder, if it brings about new explosions. My circular despatch of to-day, to the Russian legations in Italy, is the best proof of our intentions.

We already combat that fatal spirit, by the firm resolution of depriving it of the nourishment it derives from the troubles of Greece. Our despatches, dated the 9th and 10th of this month, offer the incontrovertible proof of this.

In fine, in the affairs of the Peninsula, we support with equal warmth and frankness the opinions that we believe to be founded *in right*, and conformable *to the interests* of Europe. The

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à notre Auguste Maître par son prédécesseur, d'immortelle mémoire, peuvent la faire désirer à la Cour de Vienne.

Nous sommes prêts à combattre l'esprit de désordre, s'il amène de nouvelles explosions. Ma circulaire de ce jour aux Legations Russes en Italie en est la meilleure preuve.

Nous combattons déjà cet esprit si funeste, par la ferme résolution de lui arracher l'aliment, que lui assurent les troubles de la Grèce. Nos dépêches en date du 9 et 10 de ce mois en sont l'irrecusable témoignage.

Enfin, dans les affaires de la Péninsule, nous soutenons avec autant de chaleur que de franchise les opinions que nous croyons fondées *en droit* et conformes *aux intérêts* de l'Europe. L'Empereur

Emperor rejoices that these same opinions are those of his august friend the Emperor of Austria.

In order to make you better acquainted with the entire thoughts of his Imperial Majesty, I transmit to you a copy of a confidential memoir, which his Majesty has himself remitted to the Prince of Hesse Homburg, and which serves as an answer to a rescript of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, which the Prince of Hesse had communicated to the Emperor.

It is almost useless to add here, that the documents which the Austrian cabinet has communicated to us on the subject of an obscure intrigue, which had for its object to lead the

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s'estime heureux que ces mêmes opinions soyent celles de son Auguste Ami, l'Empereur d'Autriche.

Pour mieux vous faire connoitre la pensée toute entière de sa Majesté Impériale, je vous transmets copie d'un exposé confidentiel, qu'elle à remise elle-même au Prince de Hesse Homburg, et qui sert de réponse à un rescrit de sa M. I. et R. Apostolique, que le Prince de Hesse avoit communiqué à l'Empereur.

Il est presqu' inutile d'ajouter içi que les documens, dont le Cabinet Autrichien nous a fait part au sujet d'une obscure intrigue, qui avoit pour but d'égarer l'Infant D. Miguel, ont été accueillis

infant Don Miguel astray, have been received by our august master with all the sentiments that the conduct of the young prince on this trying occasion must inspire.

Receive &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

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par notre Auguste Maître avec tous les sentimens, que doit inspirer la conduite du jeune Prince dans cette occasion difficile.

Recevez &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

NARRATIVE OF THE AFFAIRS OF GREECE.

PART II.

"L'Angleterre et la France empressées de trouver un moyen de terminer à la satisfaction de L'Empereur les troubles de la Grèce —." POZZO DI BORGO.

COUNT Capodistrias had wholly mistaken the character of the people he went to govern. In violation of the principle of the constitution, he had appointed judges removeable at pleasure; and, whilst he defended this transgression of the constitution, by saying that there was no Greek sufficiently conversant with the practice of European law to emancipate himself from its chicanery, and it was true that there was no one capable of judging according to any other principles than those of common sense and custom, the laws he produced were so complicated, so perversive of every principle of justice and rectitude, that we cannot characterize them in any other language than that used by an eminent French jurisconsulte, at that time at Nauplia, who being asked to inspect them, returned them labelled with this remark:—"Digne d'un Juris-

consulte Venitien du 15me Siècle." Thus, Capodistrias, whilst by his own confession he introduced laws which none of the judges of his selection were able to comprehend, and which were useless, because all the relations between man and man in Greece were of the simplest nature, rendered the property of every individual in Greece dependent upon his dictum. The following specimen of one of his enactments will show their character:—"Any person owing a debt to government, no matter how small its amount, stood responsible to government with his whole property." And it was further enacted, that confiscation was perfectly legitimate for the smallest debt; for, if a debtor to the government could not satisfy the claim against him at any moment when the government chose to demand it, his whole property might be put up to public auction at a certain amount. If the first day no bidder offered himself, it was exposed the second day, the price being reduced 5 per cent., and it went on decreasing 5 per cent. each day until a bidder offered. An extraordinary exhibition of justice was this, and this was merely to terrify any

government debtor from rendering himself obnoxious to the President. But the President had another way of terrifying his enemies by means of judicial chicane. Any man that rendered himself obnoxious to the government might be cited before the courts by any individual of the Capodistrian faction, and his property was held in abeyance by the most vexatious delays. Sentences were never pronounced, but lawsuits were suspended over the head of almost every proprietor who was even suspected of having an Anti-Capodistrian bias. Independently of the spirit of litigation introduced by Capodistrias, according to the system he now adopted, every man's life and fortune were held by his will alone, and he pushed matters as far as he dared.

The next innovation of Capodistrias was directed against the freedom of the press. During the first two years no enactment had taken place on this subject, because the President did not choose to remind the Greeks that the press was free. They, on their side, refrained from publishing, out of regard to the High Protecting Powers. But the long-suffer-

ing of the people gradually gave way to complaint. At length a Cretan, of the name of Antoniades, published a newspaper criticising the administration of the President. The document that was so obnoxious to Capodistrias was simply a letter from the distinguished patriot and litterateur, Coraï. Antoniades was imprisoned and his press was seized. But, on his trial, several months afterwards, he was acquitted. This trial was brought on when Capodistrias feared that he had pushed matters too far, but it proved that he had acted unconstitutionally in the proceeding, although that was not declared.

Shortly afterwards, Polizoïdes, a Constitutionalist, wished to set on foot a journal, merely to establish the fact that the press was free, and to show that the Greeks, as a nation, were not contented with Capodistrias. The intention of the party was not to attack him personally, and also to avoid every subject or observation that could give grounds for complaint or animadversion. Their object was to publish an account of the Polish struggle, not indeed for the purpose of communicating those events to

the Greeks, but by the exhibition to Europe of the sympathy of Greece for Poland to disprove the insidious impressions which had been so industriously spread of predilections in the Greek people for Russia, and as an indication to the statesmen of Europe of the destinies of Greece, as well as of so many other countries, being ultimately bound up in the existence of Poland.

Capodistrias proceeded against Polizoïdes in the same manner as he had acted against Antoniades, but the former fled with his press to Hydra, and, under the sanction of the islanders, established a journal called the "Apollo."

The President now published a *loi organique*, regulating the freedom of the press. In this it was enacted that the press was perfectly free according to the constitution, but that every editor establishing a journal was obliged to hand into the Treasury a guarantee in money, besides finding two securities among respectable householders, that he would not transgress provisions which neutralized in every respect this pretended freedom of the press. It was first enacted that the editor must not attack either religion or morals, and, secondly, a very vague

law of libel was promulgated, to the effect that no one could censure the acts of Government, which was rather implied than expressed, and, thirdly, that nothing could be published that should hurt the feelings of any of the August Protectors of Greece, or any other foreign power. Thus the press was free, whilst every topic either of home or foreign policy was expressly excluded by law, nor could they publish any thing extracted from a foreign paper that militated against these conditions.

This, however, did not prevent the organs of the Government from extracting from foreign papers, and from the parliamentary debates of England and of France, whatever favoured Russian projects, or tended to confuse and to misdirect public opinion. Thus, whilst the official paper published at length a speech of Lord Holland in support of Russia and against the Turks,* and another of General Lamarque, inveighing bitterly against English policy and the English nation, an editor who merely recounted facts that were occurring in Poland was exposed

* This speech was quoted by Lord Mahon in the debate on the motion of Mr. Patrick Stewart.

to being dragged before the Tribunals, which were constituted as we have described. On account of the publication of this "Apollo," communication was broken off with Hydra by means of—quarantine regulations!

About this time, Petro Bey, the aged Prince of Maina, who had been kept in detention at Nauplia, under the honourable title of a Senator, attempted to escape; but he was seized and thrown into prison, under the pretext that he was going about the country without a passport, being on board the yacht of an English gentleman. He was confined in a dungeon, without ever being informed of the accusation against him. His brother, son, and nephew, were, at the same time, also detained under surveillance. Upon this Maina revolted. Hydra and the Cyclades also threw off the yoke, and Caratasso, a Macedonian chief, took up arms in Livadia. The whole country demanded the meeting of the National Assembly, and Capodistrias, finding it impossible to stem the current of public opinion, convoked it for the 15th of October.

It must be observed here, that the Assembly

of Argos had been prorogued, and not dissolved. But it is a curious fact that this Assembly, which had before shown itself so pliant to the will of the President, was composed of men who no longer were disposed to be the subservient friends of Capodistrias. He, therefore, insisted that there should be new elections, and resorted to the same means by which he had gained his nominees before, viz. force, intimidation, and corruption.

In the mean time he had persuaded the Residents of the Allied Powers to represent to the Conference of London the unanimous confidence of the nation in his own system; and, counting upon the effective support of the Conference, he sent secret orders to equip the national marine at Poros, for the purpose of attacking the islands.

On the arrival of this intelligence at Hydra, the Municipality immediately authorised the seizure of the shipping * at Poros. Miaulis and

* This sudden and energetic decision is a singular illustration of the habits of self-government so deeply rooted in Greece. Hydra ventured thus to act in face of the whole power of Capodistrias, that is to say, of the whole influence, diplomacy, and marine of Europe placed at his disposal. It is to be observed, that this municipal body, which acted with

Mavrocordato and the island chiefs combined their efforts, and the Hydriotes, suddenly crossing the promontory opposite to their island, took possession of the "Hellas" frigate and the rest of the fleet, as well as of the town of Poros.

Upon this the Russian Admiral, who was senior in command, proceeded thither with his squadron and an English and French frigate, to enforce the authority of Capodistrias. It was given out, at first, that this was to be effected merely by persuasion. The Hydriotes, understanding that the "Hellas" had been secretly sold to Russia by the President, determined that the navy of Greece should not fall into the hands of the Russian Admiral. The Municipality, therefore, ordered Miaulis to set fire to her, in the event of his being attacked. They did not wish to engage in hostilities against one of the protecting powers, fearing that they should thereby compromise themselves in the presence of Europe.

so much vigour, was constituted with such perfect order and tranquillity, that the Europeans in the country at the time had no previous knowledge of its existence; and, while persecuted and outlawed by Capodistrias, it did not render itself guilty of a single excess.

In this critical state of things the Russian admiral, by overland communications and concert with the President, contrived to effect the departure of the English and French commanders, who returned to Nauplia for fresh instructions, and during their absence he attacked the Greeks with cannon-shot.* Miaulis, on the approach of the Russian boats, blew up the "Hellas." An action ensued on shore and on board the fleet, which terminated in the destruction of the Greek navy, and the capture and pillage of Poros.

Capodistrias now claimed the support of the Russian and English Residents, who hastened

* While Ricord was in the bay of Poros, he wrote a very insolent letter to Admiral Miaulis. Miaulis answered it in firm, dignified, and temperate language, informing him that he was Lord High Admiral of Greece, and that he did not understand what right a Russian Rear-Admiral had to interfere with him. Admiral Ricord sent his flag-lieutenant on board the "Hellas," ordering him to call out Admiral Miaulis upon the quarter-deck, and in the presence of his crew to show him his own letter, tear it up, and throw it in his face. The Russian officer executed his orders in the spirit in which they were conceived. The indignant Hydriotes were going to fall upon this officer and tear him limb from limb. Miaulis interposed. He threw himself between them and the officer, crying out "Comrades, before you touch a hair of his head, you will have to tear me in pieces," caught him in his arms, and conveying him through the infuriated sailors, placed him in his boat.

in a public letter* to denounce the Island Primates.

Proclamations were issued by the President, stating that the commanders of the Russian, English, and French squadrons were in pursuit of the armed vessels of the insurgents, and that Hydra was blockaded by them.

The news of these transactions excited a painful interest in England, in the minds of all who had been connected with Greek affairs. Travellers of education and intelligence described the indignation with which Englishmen in Greece witnessed the prostitution of our national character, on finding that British authorities sup-

* "Napoli, Aug. 1, 1831.

"Sir,

"We hasten, comformably to the application of your Excellency, to declare that our respective governments attach the highest importance to the preservation of order and tranquillity in Greece, and to the maintenance of the provisional state of affairs that is introduced there.

"We lament and highly disapprove the insurrectionary movements at Poros, and hope that, in the absence of the French Resident and of the Commanders of the French and English Squadrons, this declaration will suffice to recall to their duty the chiefs who have taken part in the revolt. We have taken this opportunity to offer your Excellency the tribute of our profound respect.

"BARON VON RUCKMAN.
"DAWKINS."

"To His Excellency
"Count Capodistrias."

ported our enemies against our friends; and that, with the public approval of the British Representative, acts of attainder had been issued by Capodistrias against Miaulis, Mavrocordato, Condouriotti, and the Primates, by which acts they were proscribed as traitors and rebels, and were made collectively and individually responsible for the national losses at Poros, although the municipality had made itself responsible for whatever losses might be incurred by the execution of the orders they had given to Admiral Miaulis. They could not but imagine that the British government was not correctly informed of the character of the country.

The English minister, as is well known to everybody in Greece, had encouraged this revolt, and had given private assurances that, whatever the Greeks did to subvert the abused power of Capodistrias, English influence would not be used against them. What then were the feelings of these men, when they found the public acts of the English Resident in direct contrast with his private intimations, and when he hastened, together with the Russian Resident,

to disapprove of, and to denounce, the acts of the Hydriotes! The French Resident was absent at the time on a tour in the Morea, but when he was informed that the majority of his colleagues had decided thus publicly against the Hydriotes, he wrote a note in a similar strain. These notes were carefully published. Mr. Dawkins, in his circle at Nauplia, asserted that he acted according to the instructions that he had received, which enjoined him to give moral and effective support to the President. He lamented that he could not act as he wished, blamed the apathy and ignorance of the Government at home, and requested several English gentlemen to transmit accounts of the proceedings at Poros, either to their parliamentary friends, or else to be inserted in the public prints. These letters did reach their destination.

The naval officers on the station blustered and boasted of what they would do with the Russians if they presumed to interfere, and thus compromised the character of England in the eyes of the Greeks, who compared their words with their actions. How the Russians were allowed to act in this way, when they were in a

minority in the Conference, it is difficult to determine. The representations at home of the strength of the Anti-Capodistrian party must have been very erroneous, otherwise the Government would never have thought of supporting an anti-national faction. Plenty of time had been allowed for their deliberations, for Hydra had detached itself from the government of Capodistrias in January; the affair of Poros occurred in August. Professor Thiersch does not scruple to say that the English Representative neglected his duty towards his nation, to serve the interests of a party; that, in fact, he was a Tory Representative of a Whig government. If this was his motive, he may have hoped to subvert the party that employed him, seeing formerly that the renunciation of Prince Leopold, to whom he had not sent the addresses of the Primates, had given the liberals a signal triumph over the Duke of Wellington's Cabinet. This was the impression throughout Greece, whether it be true or false;* and Englishmen assert that the British Minister spoke openly of the Reform Bill in a manner very unusual for a diplomatic function-

* See Letter from Athens, quoted in the "Globe" of Sept. 16th, 1835.

ary to speak of the conduct of his employers, and that he constantly allowed it and other measures of Lord Grey's Cabinet to be publicly stigmatized and ridiculed at his own table.

Meantime, the Greeks, who had patiently borne with the system of Capodistrias so long as they conceived that constitutional means would suffice to control his abuse of their institutions and of his own trust, finding that not only every law in Greece had been trampled upon, but that Capodistrias, after thwarting their hopes of King Leopold, had gained over the whole power of the alliance in support of his own tyranny, that he had destroyed their national resources, and directed Russian arms and English support in such a manner as to render redress impossible, were reduced to despair. They felt that they must have been grossly misrepresented in England, and feared that further misrepresentations were on their way to the Conference of London, and that they must be ruined in life, fortune, and character, by a system so atrocious.

However deeply, therefore, they deplored the act which liberated their country, the only safety

for Greece was in the removal of Capodistrias. He had destroyed the freedom of all representation. By the overthrow of every fundamental institution, he had left no barrier between himself and popular discontent. Each family, village, and district, considered him as answerable for its separate wrongs; and, having concentrated on his own head the despair of all, he naturally was looked upon as the only impediment to national redress.

The determinating cause of his death was a paragraph in the London Courier. An article appeared, at that time most extraordinary as contrasting with the ignorance prevalent in England on the state of Greece, and the wonderful delusion as regarded the character of Capodistrias. But upon Greece it produced an effect to which there is no parallel. As it may not be uninteresting to the reader, we copy it at length from the "Courier" of 3rd September, 1831.

Three years ago we heard of nothing but Greece. *Now* the existence of such a country would almost seem to be unknown. Important events in nearer countries have absorbed all our interest, and men talk now much more of a new volcanic island in the Mediterranean than of Capodistrias and Greece. This is natural enough; but it is not altogether wise. Greece of itself is nothing; but, as one of the talons of the Northern Eagle, it may be a great deal. Some recent advices from Greece have attracted our attention, as they must that of the public.

We shall give them, but, we will first indulge in a few observations as to the means which have been adopted to regulate the affairs of the Greeks.

The intervention of the triple alliance in the case of Greece was a premature emanation of that class of opinions which has now gained the ascendency in the two great nations of Europe. The spirit that has since called into existence the Reform administration of England, that supports the throne of Louis Philippe, was the cause of the intervention in favour of Greece; but the direction of that interference was confided to legitimacy. The last injunction that Charles the Tenth laid on Capodistrias was, "*Mefiez vous des carbonari,*" and the first address Capodistrias made to his expectant council was:—"We must preserve the forms of the Constitution, that we may flatter the people of Europe; but we must allow that Constitution to sleep, that we may conciliate the good-will of its rulers." At this moment a despotism of the most anomalous and antinational character is established in Greece, neither by the will nor through the agency of the alliance, but as a consequence of the alliance, of the apathy of England and France, and of the mischievous activity of Russia. It was with the utmost surprise that we read in Letters from Greece and Paris that orders had been sent to the French General to support by French bayonets the rule of the Russian Proconsul. Nor can we account for so culpable a complacency, even by supposing it the price of a reconciliation with Russia for the attempt to excite the Porte to fresh hostilities—an attempt first made, then disavowed, but perfectly understood. But the fact can no longer be doubted. The Hydriotes, who, for some months have seceded, as it were, from the administration of Capodistrias, sent in the commencement of July deputies to treat with him. They exposed their wrongs, and demanded that the Constitution should be put in force. The President answered:—"You are not fit for a Constitution:" "And who is it who tells us so?" asks one of the deputation. "The man who was selected under that Constitution, who was brought here to put it in force, and who swore to observe it, and it is he who tells us we are not fit for a Constitution." The proces-verbal of the interview between the Residents and the Hydriotes, drawn up by Mr. Dawkins, may inform the ministers of Louis Philippe of the character of the government they have sent orders to support. The three Residents presented each a note to the Provisional Government. Baron Rouen laconically offers to his

Excellency the support of the French troops. Baron Ruckman anxiously embraces the opportunity of crushing such turbulent revolutions. Mr. Dawkins declares *that he cannot interfere in their internal dissensions; that he is far from being convinced that the convoking of the Assembly would be an improper measure, or the operation of the Constitution* * *dangerous to Greece.* This conduct of our Representative revived the hopes, and called forth the warmest commendation, of the Greeks, who thus already feel and ardently hail the influence of the Reform administration.

The Deputies of Hydra, in the exposition of their griefs, were obliged to restrict themselves to violations of the decrees of the Congress of Argos—that is, to decrees dictated by Capodistrias's ministry to an assembly of his choice, and surrounded by his armed satellites. That Assembly prohibited the President from coming to any conclusion with the Alliance before the negotiations were laid before the Assembly. He not only refuses to communicate these negotiations to the Assembly, but he refuses to convoke it. This decree was passed in apprehension of Prince Leopold, but the biter has been bit. The President of Greece has violated every right, and imprisoned, confiscated, and banished without form of process. For instance:—"The exiles (from Egina) are Captains Apostolidi, Monarchides, Alexandri, and six other captains; Prince Cantacuzene, (formerly exiled from Russia), Condostarlos, Morousi, Beuthetos, and Farmakides, celebrated for his imprisonment and persecution, inflicted for having congratulated a friend on the nomination of Prince Leopold." He has gagged the press, and confiscated and suppressed, by armed men, every paper that has yet been attempted—he has abolished the tribunals established by the Assembly of Argos — he continues to exact thirty-three per cent, on the produce of the national lands, a tax abolished by the Assembly, (besides this, cattle, &c. &c. are taxed; all imports and all exports paying twelve per cent). The vessels, the earliest and best resource of the islanders, are laid up and rotting through vexatious taxation. He endeavoured to introduce the Russian commercial system of classing and licensing merchants, but his agents were pelted at Syra, and the project was abandoned.

* Was not this interference on the part of Mr. Dawkins? Here we have an English Representative rousing a nation to defend its rights, and then in a public letter supporting Capodistrias against them! Were these the instructions of Lord Palmerston?

Instead of affording security to foreign capital and attracting foreigners, he has employed his pen, his talents, and his influence, to vilify and discredit the people and the country. Alarmed at a loan which some landed proprietors were desirous to obtain, he said to the supposed agents:—"What! do you wish to furnish Greece with arms of rebellion? If, now that they are poor and dispirited, they resist me, what would they do if they were rich and flourishing? I will promise no security, no protection of the law to any one who is mad enough to lend money to a Greek." Offices of government are filled by adventurers of the worst description from Smyrna, Constantinople, the Ionian Islands, and the Black Sea, spies of the Turks, agents of Russia, or domestics of Count John Antony Capodistrias; at one period he had one thousand foreigners and fifty Greeks in the civil service. No Greek of reputation supports the government by accepting office. Troops, disaffected, have seceded from the government, for rebellion it cannot be called.

They have committed no outrage, sought no influence, but patiently await the effect of their moderation on the Cabinets of Europe: but moderation has its limits, and tyranny will work its own reformation. The expenditure is enormous. Two years of peace have cost more than seven of war. By accepting eleemosynary contributions from the Alliance, when the resources of Greece were more than sufficient for its legitimate expenditure, the President disgraced it in the eyes of Europe. The discontent arising from these and similar causes was aggravated by the resignation of Prince Leopold, which they attribute to the president's intrigues, and by the persecution and incarceration of the family of Mavromichalis, forty-one individuals of which have shed their blood for the cause of freedom and of Greece. The crime of Petro Bey, the chief of the family, is, *having left Napoli without a passport.*

No sooner did this article arrive in Greece than it was translated,* and numerous copies were distributed throughout the country. One of the first persons to whom it was communicated was George Mavromichali.

* It was attributed in Greece at the time to Mr. Urquhart.—EDITOR.

"At length then," he exclaimed, "England has awoke to a sense of our state and our danger. Now Capodistrias is the sole obstacle between Greece and independence."

In two days the tyrant was no more.

Yet the immediate authors of his death, impressed with the idea that it was only requisite to remove this cause of evil, had formed no plan, communicated their project to no coadjutors, came attended by no retainers, shot him in the midst of his guards, and contemplated neither resistance nor flight.

However criminal the deed, their crime, if we may so say, was placed by them, together with their lives, as an offering on the altar of their country's freedom, and the last selfish expression that lingered on the lips of the survivor was that his name might be associated with the two Athenians of old, whose swords were wreathed with myrtle.

It is most unaccountable that no narration has yet appeared of this deeply interesting event. It is a crime of a more heroic character than any which the public annals of Europe have had for many years to record. George

Mavromichali, although he could not be classed amongst the most influential men of Greece, still stood foremost amongst the Greeks as the representative of its most distinguished native family. He had never mixed in political intrigues, but he was distinguished for his bravery in the field, for his amiability of disposition, and his remarkable elegance of mind and person. It was his devotion to his country that prompted him to this deed; it was his simplicity of mind that prevented him from utilizing the removal of Capodistrias, and from organizing a party which, in the first instance, would have screened him from the consequences, and which then might have given Greece a national administration.

On his apprehension, and on the succession of Augustine Capodistrias to his brother, during the period of suspense that ensued, the doom of Mavromichali seemed fixed. Immured in one of the fortresses of Napoli, surrounded with all the military and other means of the Capodistrian government, and under the guns of the vessels of the Alliance, there seemed no chance watever of his being rescued by any move-

ments throughout the country, or of his being protected by the sympathies of the Greek people. Still the government did not venture to entrust his trial to the ordinary tribunals. A military packed tribunal was instituted, and before it an Englishman dared to appear as his defender. Nor was it without great difficulty that a capital sentence was obtained against him, so moved were the judges and the assistants by the intrepid eloquence of Mr. Masson. The day of his execution will for many a year be remembered in Greece. He was shot on the glacis before the ramparts of Napoli, where he addressed the assembled multitude. He spoke not of himself, or of his fate; but of his country, her wrongs, and her peril; and so true was the expression that "his words had melted the hearts of his enemies," that, when he fell, Admiral Ricord, who had stood by to direct the execution—the Russian for the moment lost in the man—rushed to the body to protect it from the insults of his creatures, exclaiming, "Never did man die so gloriously!"

In England, people considered this event as the entire overthrow of Russian influence in

Greece, and that, so far as the lessons of history can be instructive to mankind, the experience by the Greeks of a Russian system had been cheaply purchased by four years of suffering.

The conferences of London on Greek affairs were now resumed; and the first Protocol drawn up by the Grey Cabinet, on the 16th of September, appeared.

The following extracts from its provisions are the part which refers to Greece.

With respect to the pecuniary advance solicited by the Greek Government on account of a loan, the Conference is of opinion that each of the three Courts should reserve to itself the power of weighing, separately, the reasons which the Greek Government puts forward in support of its application, and of acting upon them so far as it shall itself think necessary or expedient.

At the moment when the Conference was adopting the resolutions which have been herein set forth, it was informed of the events of Poros, which it has learnt with the deepest concern.

The principle of the Conference will continue to be to support the Provisional government established in Greece, until such time as the election of a Sovereign, which will take place at a very early period, shall render it possible to establish a settled government in that country; and this principle cannot fail to lead the Residents of the three Courts, the commanders of their naval forces in the Archipelago, and the commander of the French troops in the Morea, to employ all their influence to discourage attempts at disturbance and revolt.

It is accordingly indispensable—1°. That the Residents of the three Courts in Greece, and the commanders of their naval forces, should concert with the Greek government as to the best means of employing their influence, in order to put an end to the state of insurrection of the island of Hydra; and to prevent the disturbances from extending to other slands in the Ægean sea.

2°. That, in the execution of this task, they should avail themselves of every means of conciliation, and exert to the utmost the moral influence of their united authority.

3°. That they should consider of the measures necessary for preventing the renewal of piracy; and that for this purpose Greek vessels must be provided, as heretofore, with commissions, or patents, from the government of Greece.

4°. That they should, in like manner, contribute, as far as may depend upon them, to the observance of the regulations of the quarantine service, for preventing the introduction into Greece of the contagious diseases which prevail in the Levant.

But that which the Conference of London cannot sufficiently recommend to the Residents of the three Courts, and to their naval and military officers, is the invariable maintenance of a perfect unity in their language and in their decisions.

No separation from the Alliance can be allowable in affairs which interest all the parties. There is no case in which it ought either to be announced or to take place.

This fundamental principle is deduced from the very union which exists between the three Courts. The observance of it is, therefore, essential; and the *Conference of London cannot avoid pointing out once more to the Residents of France, Great Britain, and Russia, in Greece, as well as to the commanders of their naval and military forces, the absolute necessity of abstaining from acting separately, and of causing a perfect unanimity to govern all their decisions and all their measures.*

Accept, &c.

(Signed) TALLEYRAND.
PALMERSTON.
LIEVEN. MATUSZEWIC.

The effect of this Protocol on any one acquainted with the state of Greece must have been the most perfect amazement. The mystery, if any there was, beyond the walls of the Conference, might have been cleared up by the

handwriting in which the original draft was drawn, namely, that of Count Matuszewic; but, indeed, little did the handwriting signify. The dictation of Russia has been seen invariably as far as we have proceeded, and will be seen in the sequel in characters undeviating and not to be misunderstood, and yet one organ of the press in England seems to have had some foreboding of the policy of the government. The Morning Herald of Oct. 19, 1831, in alluding to the events at Poros, and the demand of Capodistrias for succour from England, thus expresses itself:

We hope no such assistance will be given him. What! after interfering in Greek affairs for the professed object of saving the effusion of blood, are we to turn our arms to the massacre of the Greeks, to serve the barbarous policy of Russia? Have we struck the exterminating sword out of the hand of Turkish despotism only to allow it to be wielded by the Satrap of the Northern tyrant? Shall we, who repressed the desolating vengeance of one barbarian, allow ourselves to become the instruments to do the sanguinary work of another? If scenes of civil fury, of ruthless havoc, and of barbarous devastation, are renewed in Greece, under that government which we have allowed to be erected on the ruins of the Ottoman authority, of what advantage has our interference been? If we have failed in serving the cause of humanity, let us not add crime to error, and, from being the dupes of the circumventing policy of Russia, become the accomplices in her guilt.

The opportunity offered by the death of Capodistrias to form a national government had

not only been entirely neglected by the Representatives of the Alliance, but they had allowed, sanctioned, and recognized the introduction of a state of things which even Capodistrias's ambition could hardly have aspired to. The Senate, on the death of Capodistrias, had expired legally, if such an epithet can be applied to any provisions of the Russian proconsulate in Greece; and, in order to provide against the demise of the President, it had been enacted that, in such a contingency, the prorogued National Assembly should immediately meet.

Instead of this taking place, in the confusion which followed the assassination of the President, the Senate usurped an authority which had been expressly prohibited by the power which called it into existence, and assumed the functions of a Supreme body. It selected an administrative commission, consisting of Augustin Capodistrias, Colocotroni, and Coletti, and even fixed the attributes of this government; and, from being simply a consultative council, it arrogated to itself a complete control over whatever provisional government might subsequently be formed in Greece. Thus the Russian

Hydra, supposed to have been annihilated in the person of Capodistrias, re-appeared in triumph with seven-and-twenty heads in the Senate, and the Residents, by admitting it as a de facto government in defiance of the laws of Greece, entailed on that country a series of the most disastrous calamities.

To this illegitimate faction the whole support of our diplomacy and marine had been given, in virtue of the Protocol of September 26th, the obvious effect of the application of which was to sacrifice the friends of England. The consequence was, that Hydra remained blockaded; Russian cruizers intercepted the communications with the islands; and the Senate, interfering in the elections, assumed on the meeting of the deputies at Argos the right, which belonged to the National Assembly alone, of scrutinizing the qualifications of the representatives, and of rejecting all those who would not previously sign a document electing Augustin Capodistrias sole head of the executive.

The deputies opposed to the system of Russian interference had come to Argos, accompanied by their armed followers. They none of

them chose to recognise the pretensions of the Senate, and consequently a schism took place, during which the Russian faction elected Augustin Capodistrias President. After this, Colocotroni and Metaxa recommended a coup d'état, and Augustin attacked the Roumeliots with the regular troops of the late government. This atrocious proceeding was renewed during three days. Several of the Constitutionalists were massacred. The Residents who had recognized, or who had rather usurped for the Senate its illegal authority, ought at least to have held it responsible for its acts. And the preparations of Augustin to attack the Assembly were no secret; for cavalry, infantry, and artillery passed along the road, within view from their windows. The Constitutionalists had even sent to the Residents to ask for protection. They were informed that, if they would only remain at Argos on the defensive, the troops of Count Augustin would not be allowed to attack them; and that the forces of the Alliance would, in such an event, interfere. After the conflict was over, the Residents sent a messenger professedly to both parties, but he only went to

Capodistrias, who, being too glad to get rid of his rivals, allowed them to retire with their lives, and the Residents then excused themselves to the Deputies, by stating that any interference would infringe upon the independence of Greece.

It was about the period of the arrival of the deputies at Argos, that Sir Stratford Canning, his Majesty's Ambassador to the Porte, visited, for a third time, the shores of Greece. During a stay at Napoli of little more than a fortnight, which, in the nature of things, and which, through the false medium in which everything was represented, did not afford the material time for coming to conviction on so complicated a state of affairs, still did Sir Stratford Canning arrive at conclusions which really surprise us in looking back at them from the present moment. He had, however, the singular advantage, that the Residents were so alarmed at the crisis that had overtaken them, and also at the presence of a man of his reputation and judgment as the representative of England, that they were disconcerted, and let out the secret, with an *abandon*, which, on the part of the French minister, was at least sincere.

We give the major part of this paper, not merely on account of its value as an historical document, and its importance to us as a powerful testimony, but also because it is a pleasure, which may not often recur amidst the voluminous diplomatic papers connected with the Greek drama, to find such a document as this, signed by an English diplomatist.

Copy of a Confidential Memorandum upon the state of Greece, communicated to Count Augustin Capodistrias, by his Excellency Sir Stratford Canning, on the 28th of December, 1831.

To establish peace in Greece and in her seas, and to establish it in such a manner as to secure to the Greeks a tranquil and happy future—this is the idea of the Allies, this is the real object of the Treaty of London.

The entire separation of Greece from the Ottoman States was the means adopted for the accomplishment of this great end. It had been imagined that the Greeks, restored to independence, would devote themselves to the peaceful occupations of commerce and of agriculture; that the din of arms would no longer resound in their country, when wrested from the Turks; in short, that they would occupy themselves in repairing the devastation which war had spread over their soil.

Such are the results alone capable of compensating the prodigious efforts and sacrifices made by an Alliance, which is without parallel in the history of the world.

But the present state of Greece is very far from realizing these just expectations. Anarchy is breaking out again in the very bosom of peace; adverse parties, with arms in their hands, are disputing the authority of the State; Greek blood has just been shed by Greeks, under the eyes of the Representatives of the Allied Sovereigns; and war, in its most appalling form, civil war, is taking the place of that which the horror felt for an insupportable yoke could scarcely legitimate.

What the Sultan was not permitted to disregard, Greece, established by the Alliance, is called upon by every possible motive to respect. If, on the one hand, the Sovereigns, who are in a manner the guarantees for her conduct as well as for her happiness, have chosen to throw their protection around her, and to load her with favours, it follows that, on the other, Greece has contracted towards them the obligation of fulfilling religiously all the conditions of her new existence. In becoming again the focus of troubles, and the bloody theatre of a civil war, she would seem to choose to proclaim herself, in the face of Europe, incapable of maintaining the position in which it had been studied to place her.

These are truths so palpably evident, that they need only be stated to strike every mind not inaccessible to the feelings of duty and of gratitude. It is believed that deep meditation upon the consequences which they involve is not necessary in order to make them felt by the Greeks of all parties. Is it to be supposed that the Representatives of the Alliance can remain indifferent spectators of circumstances which threaten with immediate ruin the benevolent work of their Sovereigns?

It is well known that, after the battles fought in the streets of Argos, while the deputies of the nation were assembled in that city, the Roumeliot chiefs withdrew themselves. But it would seem that the war so unfortunately excited does but change its scene, and it is impossible not to be convinced that, to put an end to the disorders of the country, and to preserve its tranquillity till the arrival of a Prince, it will be imperatively necessary to have recourse to arrangements which, without excluding what now exists, would nevertheless be founded upon a principle of a more comprehensive and conciliatory character.

The mere prolongation of a provisional state of things is a misfortune for Greece. The Conference of London itself acknowledges that it is so; and is endeavouring to apply a remedy, by removing the difficulties which have for so long a time beset the country. But it is not the less true, that the interest of the Greeks and the honour of the Allies require, in the mean time, *a system of provisional administration calculated to conciliate the public mind*, and to preserve the country from the anarchy with which she is at present threatened.

The most influential island of the Archipelago, and the most warlike province of the Morea, are separated from the rest of Greece: the deep

importance of the question would seem to require that the means of re-uniting them should again be taken into consideration.

Several of the Roumeliot chiefs, powerful by their reputation and by a numerous following, have established themselves in an armed body near Corinth: it must be the interest of their adversaries not to drive them to despair.

The arbitrary acts of the police have induced some individuals of note, against whom the government has not thought fit to bring any direct accusation, to take refuge in Hydra: let them be permitted to return to their homes.

The state prisons are crowded with persons arrested on suspicion. It is revolting to the principles of justice to keep any one whatever imprisoned for an indefinite period, without bringing him to trial according to legal forms.

In short, the Assembly of Deputies does not appear to be constituted in such a manner as to answer the wishes of the nation: it is of the utmost importance that that body should not persist in remaining in a position so equivocal as to encourage the malcontents to form themselves into a distinct Assembly. The sight of two National Assemblies, painful as it would be to the friends of Greece and of public order, would not be the less embarrassing to the authorities assembled in this place.

In order to effect these different objects in the most suitable manner, it is to be desired that the Government should name some persons in its confidence to confer with the Residents. Local experience is the only sure guide in a case of this kind; and there will be no want of intelligence among men capable of feeling how essential it is to their country to exhibit to the Porte and to Europe, especially at the present moment, some appearance of good order and harmony.

With respect to the Assembly, let one of two courses be pursued: either *let there be new elections, or let the excluded deputies be invited to join the Assembly. In the latter case, Hydra and Maina must be enabled to take part in the arrangement;* and, in any event, it would be a most conciliatory measure to put again to the vote the return of any deputy whose election may have been accompanied by circumstances calculated to throw doubts upon its legality.

The only circumstance which forms a real obstacle to the deputies of Hydra repairing at once to the general Assembly is the absence in that

island of all authority emanating from the President. The difficulty of remedying this deficiency would not be insurmountable, if an agreement could be made that the government should appoint its functionary from a list of individuals previously presented to it by the inhabitants of Hydra. Maina would not be disposed to persevere alone in a separation which could lead to no useful end.

The object of these propositions being to reunite all the parties in Greece around the central authority, it is evident that, in order to restore confidence, without which it would be in vain to look to the attainment of the object in view, some change of the individuals composing the *nucleus* of that authority becomes indispensably necessary. The change which has just taken place, much as the disastrous loss which was the cause of it is to be deplored, *has nevertheless the effect of rendering such a measure less difficult than heretofore, at the same time that it unquestionably increases the necessity for it.*

The answer of Count Augustin Capodistrias to this memorandum was remarkable for its insolence and perversion of truth; and so little effect did the enlightened counsels of the Ambassador produce on this vindictive and shallow upstart, that, only a week after the Ambassador's departure, he published a decree, declaring Coletti and the Roumeliote deputies guilty of high treason, as having committed the atrocities of Argos, and proscribing them as rebels, traitors, and outlaws. At the same time, all the odious acts of the late government were declared to be in force; so that all the patriotic primates who had remained true to the inde-

pendence of Greece were under acts condemning them to death.

Shortly after the next arrival from England, the squadrons of the Allied Powers and the batteries of Nauplia proclaimed the recognition of Count Augustin Capodistrias as President of Greece. The day was considered by the Russian faction as a jubilee, and celebrated as the Fête du Protocole.

Amidst these rejoicings, General Church and other Englishmen alluded to passing events in terms of bitterness and deep indignation. Their fears were painfully excited for the fate of the constitutional leaders, which hung upon a thread, at Hydra.

The activity of the Russian Admiral was such, that, whilst he remained with his own frigate at Nauplia, his flag was at the same time flying at Poros and at Hydra; and his presence seemed multiplied wherever the national party was to be awed into submission to Russian influence.

One of his brigs, the "Themistocles," cruizing in the Gulf of Lepanto, and interfering to prevent the passage across of some of the Con-

stitutionalists, was brought to action by some Greek gun-boats, and returned to Nauplia, having been worsted; but their loss was so great, that the matter was hushed up, as it did not tell very well for Russian seamanship.

Our Mediterranean squadron was at this time stationed in the Bay, under the command of Vice Admiral Sir Henry Hotham; and, after the recognition of Augustin Capodistrias, the "Belvidere" frigate was despatched to Hydra and Perachora, with an amnesty, framed by the provisional government, in concert with the Residents.

Captain Dundas returned from Perachora, reporting that neither the Hydriotes nor Roumeliotes would allow the amnesty to be read to them.

The news of the nomination of Prince Otho of Bavaria to the sovereignty arrived shortly afterwards; and, in the embarrassing state of things, with the Roumeliotes threatening to march to Nauplia as soon as the winter broke up, the eyes of all were turned to M. Thiersch, a Councillor of State of the King of Bavaria, who had made a pilgrimage to Greece to prepossess

the public mind in favour of his royal pupil, Prince Otho.

The Residents and the Admirals had reason to be satisfied with the zeal, humanity, and liberal opinions of Professor Thiersch, who, to a European reputation as a scholar, added great powers of penetration, and was of a persevering and conciliatory character. Considered by all as representing the interests of the future Monarch, he was despatched to Perachora, with the view of preventing the march to Nauplia of the Roumeliotes.

Previous to his departure he visited all the state prisoners, and promised relief on the arrival of the future Sovereign, whose reign he proclaimed would be characterized by a very different system of government. He promised to return within a fortnight with the olive branch of peace. The French troops had been simultaneously ordered to occupy the Isthmus, and prevent the irruption into the Morea of the National Army.

To the astonishment of every one unacquainted with the strength and determination of the Patriots, the first news of M. Thiersch's

proceedings was an address of his own to the French commander to suspend his march to Corinth, stating that the measures of the Resisidents, if persisted in, would be the ruin of the Morea; and announcing that the legal deputies of the nation, accompanied by their guards, were in full march to Nauplia. A few days afterwards, M. Thiersch arrived as their herald; and the Constitutional army, under the banners of King Otho, encamped within view from the town.

We pause here to point out the extraordinary nature of the influence exercised over Greece by foreign diplomacy, and to call the attention of the reader to the character of this Conference of London, which, upon data furnished to it from various sources, decided on the fate and destiny of that country; and has succeeded in maintaining it in a state of prolonged convulsion, destroyed its character, repressed its energies, and entailed upon it evils, of which, we fear to say, the least portion only has been realized. To whoever casts a glance on the map, it must be evident that Greece, by the smallness of its population and territory, by its insular character

and position, must be wholly at the disposal of the maritime force that commands its seas. Its long and exhausting struggle with Turkey—its dependence upon foreign money, upon foreign direction—its emancipation effected by a naval action between foreign powers on its coast—deprived it of all idea of existence in itself, or of existence independent of the good-will of the foreign powers, by whom it had been preserved. The Protocols, therefore, which manifested the conjoint will of those powers, and which directed the action of their representatives in that country, and of their squadron in its seas, were absolute law to Greece, which it was impossible for her to resist, even when their enactments were too preposterous to be practicable. These Protocols were the result of Conferences between the Representatives of England, France, and Russia, the Representative of Russia alone, of course, understanding the question which was treated; the information by which it was guided being again in the Russian sense, from the superiority of her agency in Greece; and the decisions, when they came back to Greece, being by the same organization turned dexterously to

account for her ends—the whole of this being a continuation of the system established by the treaty of the 6th of July, by which act England and France had bound themselves to concert measures for the emancipation of Greece, with the power who had already made use of that concert for attacking Turkey *.

Through this system of Protocols, therefore, the whole of this enormous, irresistible power over Greece was placed at the disposal of Russia, who, in realizing through it the lamentable consequences which we now see, might legitimately reckon upon a future and much greater advantage, viz. an aversion in England, when it saw what its handiwork had been, for all interference in foreign interests, which, indeed, has been, in a great measure, realized; and thus might she expect that England, after powerfully exerting her influence and her arms to establish

* To what a degree this deception was carried may be inferred from the fact that Russia had at this Conference two Plenipotentiaries, who played separate games; and who, in one instance, when they could not resist a stipulation which was not palatable to Russia, affected to quarrel, one agreeing with the Representatives of England and France, the other protesting against him. The one refused to sign the Protocol, because he disapproved of it; the other, because he could not sign it without his colleague.—Ed.

the predominance of Russia in Greece, Turkey, Egypt, &c. would then retire from all further intervention; and, disheartened by complications which she could not unravel, appalled by results which she had unconsciously brought about, would then leave the field entirely in the hands of Russia. So that nothing could be more literally true than the words of Count Pozzo di Borgo, which we have placed as our motto. England and France were not merely subservient, but zealously officious, in settling the affairs of Greece according to the will of Russia.

The Protocol of the 7th of January, which had been celebrated with such éclat, was in the following words.

PROTOCOL 38.

London, January 7, 1832.

1°. By the time when they [the Residents] will receive the present instruction, the National Assembly of Argos will no doubt have terminated its deliberations, and have acknowledged or confirmed a provisional government. The government thus constituted with all legal forms must be recognised as the National Provisional Government of Greece, as well by the Residents of the three Courts as by the commanders of their naval and military forces.

2°. The Residents of the three Courts, and the commanders of their naval and military forces, will set the example of the respect and consideration which are due to such government.

3°. As, on the one hand, the three Courts have the right to require that this government should rule the country according to the laws, with mildness and impartiality, and that they should aim at effecting the

extinction and oblivion of the dissensions which have latterly agitated Greece; it is, on the other hand, requisite that the Residents of the three Courts, and their naval and military officers, should contribute by their general conduct, by their language, and by the influence which they derive from their functions, and from the character with which they are invested, to the maintenance of tranquillity and public order throughout the whole extent of the Greek State; that they should divest themselves of all personal feelings, and that they should, so far as may depend upon them, endeavour to secure to the provisional government that respect which it is necessary that it should enjoy.

4°. They must constantly bear in mind, that, in order to preserve peace in Greece, and to prevent the return of that anarchy which, previously to the intervention of the three Courts, had nearly caused its ruin, it is indispensable that a perfect union should prevail among them; and that, in moments of danger and difficulty, such union alone can enable them to execute the services which the three Courts expect from their zeal and abilities.

5°. One of the first objects which the three Courts proposed to attain by the Treaty of London of the 6th of July, 1827, was the extinction of piracy in the seas of Greece.

It must be repressed with all possible energy, if it should show itself there again.

The commanders of the naval forces of the three Courts will not allow any *Greek vessel whatsoever to navigate, which shall not be furnished with the proper register and papers from the competent authorities, which authorities must, of course, furnish the said papers conformably to the laws and regulations of Greece relating thereto.*

6°. The Conference has had under consideration the application for a subsidy, which has been addressed to it in the name of the provisional government of Greece, such subsidy to be furnished on account of the loan which the three Courts have reserved to themselves to guarantee to Greece.

It has been decided, that this application should be submitted direct to the three Courts; and it has been agreed, *that each of the three Courts should be left at full liberty to make such advances,* if it should think proper to do so, either making an arrangement to this effect with its two Allies, through the medium of the Conference of London, or simply announcing to the Conference the fact of *its having sent such a subsidy as it may have deemed expedient* to grant to the government of Greece.

7°. In communicating the present Protocol to the provisional government of Greece, the Residents of the three Courts are authorised to announce that the Conference is already engaged in the choice of a Sovereign Prince, and that it hopes speedily to be enabled to come to a decision thereupon.

(Signed) TALLEYRAND.
PALMERSTON.
LIEVEN. MATUSZEWIC.

Now the National Assembly of Argos had never met, and therefore the hypothesis on which the Protocol rested did not exist. Every legal form had been violated in the election of Augustin Capodistrias. But without the Conference of London having even alluded to the Senate, whose usurpations we have above described, the Residents applied the provisions of the Protocol to Augustin Capodistrias and this body.

But, moreover, they cast the odium and responsibility of this step on the Conference of London, thus compromising England herself towards the Greeks, who were naturally excited and embittered against England, from the mere fact of the Conferences being held in London.

We believe the acts which followed to be wholly without parallel in the history of diplomatic duplicity.

The Protocol stated, "The Residents of the three Courts will set the example of respect and consideration which are due to such government,"—viz. one constituted by *legal* forms.

This respect and consideration was given by the Residents to the *illegal* and usurped government.

"The three Courts have the right to require that this government should rule the country *according to the laws* with mildness and impartiality."

What were the laws?

All the laws of Greece had been violated in the constitution of the government. The existing laws of the usurping faction were acts of attainder and outlawry against Mavrocordato, Miaulis, Condouriotti, Coletti, and all the leading primates of Hydra, and the chiefs of Roumelia and Maina.

The Protocol continues, "And that they [the Residents] should aim at effecting the extinction and oblivion of the dissensions which have lately agitated Greece."

The Residents, after manifesting the respect and consideration of the Alliance to the as-

sassins of Argos, concerted with them the following measure:

PROCLAMATION OF COUNT A. CAPODISTRIAS.

Nauplia, January 25, 1832.

The Allied Powers recognize the National Assembly, and the government which it has established, and they call upon the citizens to *respect its acts* and to fulfil their duties.

We decree as follows:

1. Full and entire amnesty is granted to every citizen, civil or military, of all ranks and degrees, who has taken a share in revolutionary meetings. Nobody shall be responsible for any actions or sentiments he has manifested during the revolt, if, in ten days from the publication of the present decree, he lays down his arms and adopts a peaceful life.

From this amnesty are only excluded the accomplices in the assassination of the late President, of eternal memory; those who are accused of being such, and proofs of whose culpability are deposed in the office of the minister of justice, *as well as all persons already accused before the tribunals, or definitively condemned.*

An act of amnesty means an act of oblivion of political offences. If, therefore, exceptions are made in it, it becomes an act of *record* of political offences, and is a jesuitical mode of disguising revenge under the mask of clemency.

On whom, then, was the revenge to fall? Who were excluded?

The primates of Hydra and Roumelia, who had been "accused and definitively condemned," though unheard and untried; and all those who were confined in the State prisons.

The mode in which the Residents support the

Provisional Government is by issuing a proclamation to the Greeks in the following words:—

Nauplia, Feb. 26, 1832.

A Protocol, signed on the 7th of January, 1832, by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers, was communicated to us on the 27th of the same month.

The Alliance, by this act, orders us to recognize and support *the government actually established at Nauplia as the National Provisional government of Greece.*

It recommends to *this* government a march *conformable to the laws*, and calculated to bring about the *extinction and oblivion* of the discord which has for a long time agitated the country, and it announces the speedy nomination of a Prince Sovereign.

On the receipt of the above-mentioned Protocol, the Greek government has suspended all judicial proceedings, and has granted an amnesty for political crimes, only excepting the accomplices in the assassination of the late President of Greece, against whom the acts of accusation exist with the Minister of Justice, or who are already pursued by the tribunals, or definitively condemned. *It is to the Primates of Hydra and to the Chiefs united in continental Greece* to give an example, on their side, of respect and submission.

The government offers them the example of deference to the wishes of the Allied Powers, and of a desire to re-establish harmony and concord; and they cannot fail to respond to it without incurring the gravest responsibility towards their country, their Prince, and the Allied Powers, who desire, above all things, to see order and tranquillity reign in this country.

We invite them, *in the name of the Allied Powers, in their own interest, and in that of Greece,* to which many among them have formerly rendered important services, to lay down their arms, and to return peaceably to obedience. This example will not fail to be immediately followed by those who surround them.

Now it happens that these Chiefs, who were excited to set this example, were the very Chiefs who were excluded from this amnesty.

On the presentation of the amnesty to the Hydriote and Roumeliote Chiefs, Captain Dundas, who had remonstrated with the British Minister for sending him on such a mission, was fully enlightened as to the true character of the amnesty.

"What!" said the Greeks, "can the British government have already heard of the atrocities at Argos, and have ordered the Residents to recognize and support such acts, by supporting the faction that committed them? And can England mean that we, the innocent and suffering party, the legal representatives of Greece, are in our own interest to submit to be executed with a suitable acknowledgment of the 'mildness and humanity' of a faction which imputes the murder of our friends to us: which, in the name of our protectress, England, excludes us from mercy, and holds out to our followers an incitement to assassinate us as outlaws?

"Is it really the interest of Greece, and of our Prince, and of the Alliance, and our own interest, that we should forfeit our characters, fortunes, and lives, by taking upon our heads the crimes of the guilty, and falling a sacrifice to an

illegitimate government denounced by the whole nation?"

"But," said Mavrocordato in his letter to M. Thiersch, "who will resume hereafter the responsibility of affairs, if we even do abandon our followers, and leave them, infuriated as they are against the assassins of Argos, to spread themselves over land and sea as robbers and pirates?"

The universal indignation caused by the proceedings of the Residents had given rise to the national movement against Augustin Capodistrias, which, as we have seen, early in April, brought the Roumeliotes to the gates of Nauplia. Every artifice which the Russians could employ was made use of, in order to provoke hostilities; and, on one occasion, they succeeded in their object. At a moment when the adverse forces were arrayed against each other, the Constitutionalists were reminded by M. Thiersch and Mr. Masson, who was endeared to all Greece by his defence of Mavromichali, of the character for humanity and moderation which had hitherto gained them the respect and admiration of Greece. This appeal to their high sense of

honour restrained their impetuosity within the limits of justice and prudence.

The only hope the Greeks had entertained of the salvation of their country was in the effect to be produced in England by the representations of Sir Stratford Canning.

At this critical moment, with an exasperated faction in the capital, supported by Admiral Ricord with money and marines, and incited by the support of England and France, an English frigate sailed up the Bay with despatches from Constantinople. The Ambassador had received the copy of a new Protocol, and, in the hope that it might reach Nauplia in time to spare the effusion of blood, he had instantly sent the "Actæon" with it to Nauplia.

Never was an arrival more opportune. The messenger sent from England with the original Protocol lingered in Italy, and, but for the arrival of the "Actæon," the fate of Greece would probably have been sealed, since the overthrow by violence of a government recognized by the Residents of the Allied Powers, however unjustifiably, would have compromised Greece in the eyes of Europe, and have extinguished all hope of a Sovereign.

Augustin Capodistrias, seeing that he would be overthrown by a government formed of a fusion of parties, which had been recommended by Sir Stratford Canning, fled at midnight on board a Russian brig; and, with M. Mustoxidi, and some other of his obnoxious partizans, took refuge at Corfu. Upon this, Miaulis and the Island Primates, Mavrocordato and the Moreote Primates, and the Roumeliote Chieftains, all flocked to Nauplia. The venerable Prince of Maina emerged from his dungeon; the Deputies of Maina, who had been impeded by Colocotroni from repairing to Argos, joined the throng; and, in a short time, all the national leaders returned to Nauplia, whence the greater part of them had been excluded during nearly two years.

But the unceasing activity of Russian diplomacy, and the strict alliance which prevailed between the British Minister in Greece and Baron Ruckman, brought about new and distressing complications. M. Tricoupi and M. Mavrocordato had been placed by the English Minister in a cruel position.

A short time after the proclamation of Capodistrias, Tricoupi and Zaïmi, formerly the most

conspicuous of the party devoted to England, had been invited by Mr. Dawkins to accept the insidious amnesty, from which all their political friends were excluded, and to acknowledge the government of Augustin Capodistrias. In an evil hour they acceded to the invitation, and thus lost the confidence of the whole of the Constitutionalists, who thenceforth considered them as deserters from the national cause. Thus they were compromised with the Constitutionalists, and, of course, as there was no neutral ground, they from that time became members of the Russian party.

(To be continued.)

CIVILIZATION IN EGYPT.

Civilization and Taxation have long been considered as proceeding hand in hand. The virtues of a simple people, we are every day told, are not to be expected in our complicated state. That complication which we consider as a portion of civilization, those who have seen and studied the East, in its present state of transition, feel to be an unhappy aberration of the Western mind, which is now spreading to the East, and is there attended with all the worst symptoms which we consider as incident to civilization. There these symptoms are now making progress enormously rapid, in consequence of the fiscal regulations not taking two or three centuries for their establishment, as they have done in Europe, but being the growth of a month or year, and enforced by the great instrument of despotism hitherto unknown in the East, and now imported from the West, viz. standing armies.

The dependence of the Arab on the date-tree has been the theme of every traveller in Egypt, Africa, and Arabia.

In *Egypt*,

The soil upon which the date-tree stands is taxed.

The tree is taxed.

The fruit is taxed.

The branch which holds the fruit is taxed.

The Lift made from it is taxed.

The branches are taxed.

The fibre of the trunk is taxed.

The cutting of the branches is an excise.

The leaves of the branches are taxed.

The makers of Lift are taxed.

The makers of Couffan are taxed.

The makers of the date-rope are taxed.

The makers of date-baskets are taxed.

The baskets, ropes, &c. on exportation pay duty.

REPLY TO THE FRANKFURT JOURNAL.

THE Frankfurt Journal, of May the 9th, contains a communication of a very extraordinary nature, dated Pera, Constantinople, May the 8th; an atmosphere where it is certainly most natural to feel extreme surprise at the journals of Europe entertaining their readers with "projects of Russia against the Ottoman Empire." "They even assure us," continues the single-minded writer, "that the Emperor Nicholas had thought of profiting by the victories gained over the Turks in 1828, to take and to keep Constantinople; but that the menaces of some Ambassadors, addressed to Count Diebitsch, have sufficed to stop the Russian army at Adrianople, and to oblige that general to make peace.

"Accustomed as I have long been to place full confidence in the assertions of the journals, especially when the ambition of the Russians was the subject, I should perhaps have hesitated this time to believe them implicitly, if I had not found the same assertions in various works,

the authors of which being highly respectable men, could not be suspected of having wished to mislead the public."

The writer consequently expects, with much impatience, "that the '*Portfolio*' would favour the world with some documents which would show, in all its lustre, this splendid episode of the diplomacy of Pera. But their hopes had been disappointed, and the disclosures of the 'Portfolio' have told them nothing on a subject so interesting."

The disclosures of the "Portfolio" not proving satisfactory, the archives of the Russian Mission are ransacked for documents, which are, of course, to expose to ridicule the diplomacy of England. Is the time then really come when Russia ventures to answer the exposure of her duplicity and fraud by the confirmatory exposure of our ignorance and weakness? The circumstances of 1828 and 1829 we have repeatedly alluded to, not merely in connection with the secret documents of Russia referring to that period, but also in connection with a far more important question on the real state of the Russian army at Adrianople.

It would be ridiculous, now-a-days, to call forth any testimony to prove the views of Russia, especially after the publication of the memorable despatch of Count Pozzo di Borgo, in our seventh number, which revealed the object of Russia in that war, namely, to repress the ameliorations which were effecting in the Turkish Empire; the opportunity of doing which was afforded her by that deplorable treaty, through which, to use the words of the Quarterly Review, "we not only lost the power of preventing a rupture, but found ourselves contributing to the aggrandizement of our rival, and hastening the subjugation of our ally." In the quotation above given, it is implied that menaces were made by France and England, while the Russian manifesto from Pera publishes the letter of the Ambassador of England and France,* in

* Constantinople, Sept. 9, 1829.

Monsieur le Comte,—In the present circumstances there is an imperative duty which we cannot dispense ourselves from fulfilling; it is to inform your Excellency of the infallible consequences which would ensue from the march of the Imperial armies against Constantinople.

The Sublime Porte has formerly declared to us, and we do not hesitate to confirm the truth of its declaration, that in this case it would cease to exist, and that the most terrible anarchy, destroying its power, will give up indiscriminately, and without defence, to

which they addressed the Russian general in terms of intreaty, if not of supplication.

In the various despatches of that period that we have published, drawn up by the Ambassadors of Russia at Paris and London, it will be seen by what means and how far Russia had misled and overreached the Cabinets of France and England. Having received the subserviency and inaction of those Cabinets, menaces were certainly not to be expected on the part of their Ambassadors, although the Ambassadors both of England and of France, Sir Robert Gordon*

the most unfavourable chances the existence of the Christian and Mussulman population of the empire.

By concealing from you this state of things, we should have taken upon ourselves a responsibility to our Courts, to his Imperial Majesty himself, in a word, to all Europe, which we must decline with all the energy of which we are capable. We now fulfil this duty, by writing to you the present letter. We have henceforth only to adopt all those means which may depend on us to endeavour to preserve the Christians of this capital from the imminent danger which now hangs over them.

* Sir Robert Gordon treated with contempt the idea of an Empire being lost, in consequence of an unsuccessful campaign. He was very near being recalled by his own brother, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the language he used on the occasion. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had a despatch recalled and disavowed by the Prime Minister in consequence of the strong line he had taken on this subject. The disgrace of General Guilleminot is known to the whole world, and the silence which was subsequently imposed upon him in the Chamber of Peers by the foreign minister of France.

and General Guilleminot, were indignant, and strongly remonstrated against the ignoble part they were commanded to play. Still, it is not the less true, although the fact has escaped the scrutinizing inquiries of the Russian writer, and was disavowed in the House of Commons by Sir Robert Peel, that an English squadron anchored with springs on their cables, cleared for action, their guns double-shotted, alongside of the Russian blockading squadron off Tenedos, and two vessels were placed behind that island to intercept the Russian Admirals if they attempted to escape.

This squadron was commanded, not by a diplomatist, but by an English Admiral, prepared to take upon himself the responsibility of destroying the Russian squadron, if Constantinople were endangered, he being led into the common error that the Russians could at that time march to Constantinople. The story of Admiral Heyden's leaping out of bed, to embrace the English officer who brought him the news of peace being concluded, is well known, and requires no comment. But, this is not all. Fatal as the effects on Russia must have been,

not merely of the destruction of her squadron, not merely of an act of hostility on the part of England against her, but of the cessation of that ill-omened and disastrous co-operation of England with her, there was still an infinitely greater danger which she had to apprehend, and this was the passage of the English squadron up the Dardanelles. That danger has hitherto been averted, as it now is, by some species of fascination practised in the saloons of London; but, the English Admiral, as before said, not being a diplomatist, might have taken upon himself to break that spell, and in that case we venture to assert that, if Russia had had at Adrianople, not five or six thousand men in marching order as she only had, but one hundred thousand men, she never would have ventured to march to Constantinople, if that march would have determined Sir P. Malcolm to pass into the Black Sea. Of his having the resolution to do so, Count Diebitsch had himself the testimony. Sir P. Malcolm wrote to the English Consul at Adrianople, informing him of his resolution to pass the Dardanelles if the Russians ventured a step beyond Adrianople.

The letter was intercepted, and was delivered by Count Diebitsch himself to the English Consul open, as if to seize the opportunity of allowing it to be believed by England that her menace had arrested the arms of Russia, and not her own impotency.

And now a Russian statement is put forth, with a boldness only equalled by its depth of falsehood, drawn from these very circumstances, when Russia's last aggressive effort had been expended; when, in ignorance of that extreme weakness, an English squadron lay prepared for action alongside of a Russian squadron; and, when the English Admiral had intimated to the Russian General the fearful menace that the English flag would appear in the Euxine, these very circumstances are quoted as a proof of absence of all aggressive designs on the part of Russia; now, after all the exposures have taken place, and are published in the European organ of Russia, to prove that she has no designs upon Constantinople, and no hostility to Turkey. "If," says the Russian paper, "the instructions of the Emperor Nicholas had been to seize Con-

stantinople and overthrow the Ottoman power, the Russian General, after the receipt of such a letter, (the letter of the Ambassador, not of the Admiral,) would not have failed to take advantage of the circumstances, which had pointed out to him to strike the last blow at the Ottoman empire."

The writer conclusively observes, "These, sir, are facts, hitherto unknown; which I am happy in having discovered, in order to do homage to the truth. I, therefore, leave it to those who reflect and judge without prejudice, to decide what degree of credit is due to publications, the constant object of which is to ascribe ambitious projects to Russia."

"How is it," he naïvely asks, "that the Russian Cabinet has not contradicted the assertions of these journals, by publishing documents, which might prove the truth?"

"*Without pretending to explain this enigma,* it seems that we cannot but see in it an act of indifference, which the press, it must be owned, has abused, and still abuses, with the utmost effrontery. * * * * Should the Russian Cabinet still be silent, and should the

journals continue to publish their lying assertions, I shall endeavour to procure, and send to you some more documents, which will dispel all doubts ! !"

There is a facetious story told of two Persian naturalists, who were examining a bear; one, who never had seen such an animal before, inquired whether that animal dropped its young alive, or laid eggs; to which the other, better acquainted, replied, "That animal is capable of any thing."

But in what publication is the assertion to be found that European diplomacy arrested the arms of Russia? On turning to the pamphlet, "England, France, Russia, and Turkey," which has given rise to most of those articles which have called forth the Muscovite rancour, we find these circumstances alluded to in the following words :.

"The war is at length concluded, Russia's *material* means being at the last ebb, and the Porte's *moral* means totally exhausted. Still Russia wears a menacing aspect, after the passage of the Balkan, till she extorts a threat from England of capturing her fleet at Tenedos. She, consequently, leaves the impression of the Turkish empire having been within her grasp, and to England the pride and confidence of reflecting that a menace of her's

sufficed at any hour to arrest the progress of Russia. Our Ambassador, newly arrived, and the other diplomatists, hurried, by their alarms, a treaty which, if postponed a few weeks, would never have taken place; for the Russian corps was fast melting away, and the Turkish troops were beginning to recover from their terror, their delusion, or their expectations, according to the motives which influenced them, or the means by which they had been practised upon."—p. 23.

But the Russian Mission at Constantinople are anxious that the public opinion of Europe should be still further enlightened on the subject of the campaigns of 1828 and 1829.

Towards the close of 1825, Mr. Canning obtained secret information that the journey of the Emperor Alexander to the Crimea was preparatory to a declaration of war against Turkey.

No sooner had Nicholas mounted the throne of Russia, on the mysterious death of his brother, than the Duke of Wellington was sent to St. Petersburg, in the depth of winter, with the important mission of offering to the new Sovereign the mediation of Great Britain in its differences with Turkey *. Notwithstanding the

* The secret information obtained by Mr. Canning, in England, was confirmed by an incident, trifling it is true, which shortly before occurred at Pera. A Russian attaché, incensed at some

high compliment paid to the Court of St. Petersburg in the selection for this object of so distinguished a person, the conduct of the Russian Cabinet was beyond measure indecorous; for, while the Duke was courting explanations of the intentions of Russia regarding the East, a messenger was sent to Constantinople with a Russian ultimatum, without any intimation of it being given to the Duke. In his interviews, however, with the Emperor Nicholas, his Grace had ample means of judging of his superficial information on every matter connected with mi-

allusions to Turkish bravery, and thrown off his guard by the convivial nature of the society in which he found himself, hinted that, had it not been for the death of the Emperor Alexander, a Russian army would have already been before the walls of Constantinople. The peculiar character for secresy and severe discipline in the whole system of Russian diplomacy caused great importance to be attached to this expression, and it became immediately known to the chiefs of the various missions. Austria, at that time, believed herself to be on a footing of the most confidential and unreserved intimacy with Russia, in consequence of the opposition between England and Metternich, by Mr. Canning's policy regarding the Holy Alliance. It may well, then, be conceived what the effect must have been of such a communication to the Austrian Minister. He called upon the Russian Chargé d'affaires for an explanation, and Baron de Rückman, then Secretary of Legation, did not hesitate to assert that the words had never been used. We may just here remark, had Mr. Canning understood Russia and Turkey, what an opportunity!

litary operations; and we assert that the failure of the first Russian campaign in the principalities was faithfully predicted in the Duke of Wellington's despatches, although two years intervened before the march of the Russian armies; and, in consequence of the most perfect contempt entertained at that period by the Duke of Wellington for the means which Russia could bring to act against Turkey, in all probability did Great Britain remain improvident and indifferent as to the consequences. The opinion of the Duke may have been correct in 1826, but, between that period and the opening of the campaign, England herself had become the ally of her antagonist and the enemy of her friend.

With regard to the details of the campaigns of 1828 and 1829, we are fortunate in possessing an account of them, drawn up by a distinguished British officer for the information of the Duke of Wellington, which we propose to lay before our readers at an early period.

We wonder if, in the next communications which are promised from Constantinople on the subject of the remission of the indemnity from Turkey, the Russian mission there will be found

to possess a copy of Lord Aberdeen's Despatch to Lord Heytesbury, respecting the reservation which the King of England emphatically made to himself regarding the right of interfering in, and judging of, the war indemnity which Turkey should pay to Russia.

Regarding this reduction, so much vaunted, of course the Correspondent of the "Frankfurt Journal" says, "We who are on the spot know, however, that this arrangement was practicable only because Russia generously consented to deduct, for the remainder of the debt, the sum of ninety millions of piastres; and it is through this reduction that the Sultan is enabled to exonerate himself entirely, *without being obliged to any foreign power*. It will be curious to see whether the Russian Cabinet shall resolve to publish anything on this occasion."

It would, indeed, be curious, if Russia were to reveal that she remitted the debt, because she feared the good-will that might have arisen between England and Turkey, if the latter had accepted a loan from the former.

We now anxiously await the next communi-

cation of Russian disclosures, but we cannot conclude these remarks without expressing our lively satisfaction at the tone here assumed by Russia. It is not long since the "Frankfurt Journal" transferred to its columns the major part of an article which appeared in an English Review, and which we consider to be the most decisive exposure that has yet been made of the character of her institutions and her policy. The picture transferred to the columns of the "Frankfurt Journal" assumed even a bolder tone, and displayed deeper shadows. It boldly avowed the necessity of the occupation of Constantinople, the individualization, so to speak, of the whole of the energies of the mass of the Sclavonic people, and the necessity of their being devoted to the subjugation of Europe. Now, Russia falls back again on denegations, moderation, magnanimity, and innocence. Falsehood on her lips is the expression of her own alarms, and homage to the power of England.

LORD DURHAM AND THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.

Copy of a Letter from Lord Durham to Mr. Consul Gisborne, St. Petersburg, 5th May, 1836.

Sir,

I am not surprised to hear from you that the late proceedings in parliament have attracted the serious notice of the British merchants resident here.

The importance of their interests, and of the trade with which they are connected, naturally demands their anxious care. As the Representative of His Britannic Majesty at this Court, it is my duty also to pay the most unremitting attention to all events which could justify those apprehensions which it seems are entertained in some quarters. I am not, however, conscious of the existence of any rational cause for them.

No one event has occurred since my arrival here which could indicate the remotest chance of a rupture between the two countries. The most amicable communications have ever taken place between His Imperial Majesty's government and myself: every representation on behalf of British subjects has been promptly attended to; inquiry ordered where investigation was necessary; and ample redress promised when proved to be justly due. As to the political aspect of affairs generally, I may refer you to facts which, after all, far outweigh declarations and opinions from governments or individuals. The late convention with the Porte, and the evacuation of Silistria, are most important events and convincing indications of the intention of the Russian government to join spontaneously and cordially with us in the maintenance of the general peace of Europe. *It is my firm conviction that this desirable object will now be effectually secured*; and I can have,

therefore, no hesitation in assuring the gentlemen who have addressed you, that they may, without fear of interruption, apply themselves to the cultivation of that commerce which is the natural bond of union between England and Russia; and of which the encouragement and extension must be the anxious desire of the governments of both countries.

(Signed) DURHAM.

Copy of a second Letter from Lord Durham to Mr. Consul Gisborne, St. Petersburg, May 8, 1836.

Sir,

I cannot deny myself the pleasure of requesting you to inform the gentlemen composing the body of British Merchants resident here, that His Imperial Majesty has been pleased more than once to express to me his high approbation of their conduct on all occasions and in all circumstances. You may easily imagine that this notice of my countrymen was as gratifying to me as it is honourable to them; and that I am, therefore, anxious to communicate to them this proof that their proceedings are justly appreciated and *graciously* recognised.

(Signed) DURHAM.

— Gisborne, Esq.

Our desire to make these pages the faithful and complete record of what we consider the great question of the present age, and from which we apprehend consequences that, at a no very remote period, will convulse the state of Europe, and affect every portion of the globe, induces us to give a place to the two foregoing letters. We dispense ourselves from the painful

task of commenting upon them. They have been judged already. We believe that they have not been misunderstood.

One expression, however, we beg to direct our readers' attention to, not because we find it here in the mouth of Lord Durham, but because it is a common fallacy which Russia is in the constant habit of reproducing, and that is, "the union of England and Russia to preserve the peace of Europe." If union existed between England and Russia, it could be no object to preserve peace, since no danger could exist of war. If England united with Russia in her ambitious projects, there is no other state whose opposition, whatever character it assumed, would deserve the name of war. If Russia coincided in the pacific and conservative dispositions of England, no cause of collision throughout Europe could exist. But, as neither of these hypotheses is admissible—as Russia does not coincide in the conservative views of England—as England will not admit of the aggressive projects of Russia—no union can exist between them; far less can that union preserve the peace of Europe, which only is endangered by their

opposition. A state of cessation of hostilities can only be preserved by the assumption by England of such a position as will deter Russia from subjugating her weaker neighbours, and as will strengthen her neighbours to resist her attacks.

The appearance or the reality of union between England and Russia, which only can exist by the ignorance of England of the game which Russia is playing from Drontheim to Pekin, is the surest means of hastening results which it will be no longer possible for her to disguise, or for England to brook.

It is through the real or apparent union, during forty years, of English with Russian policy, that the present position of Russia on the Bosphorus has been obtained. But, within the last few months, England has happily assumed a wholly different position. The increase of our naval force—the decided and universal expression of opinion in the House of Commons—the admission by the Foreign Minister of the Crown of the general correctness of the ample exposures there made of her policy and designs—the universal feelings of the Bri-

tish nation—the opinions of its Monarch—form a remarkable contrast with the circumstances of the last few years, as detailed and exulted over by the agents of Russia. We have consequently seen, as our tone became decided, that that of Russia was lowered; and, in the mind of no calm spectator of events, can it now be doubtful, that England has it still in her power to stay, by a word, the progress of Russia towards that position, the acquisition of which is admitted by all to be the signal for a general European war.

Although England has, as yet, taken no one step, as regards the independence of Turkey, yet the mere knowledge, as affecting the mind of Russia and of Turkey, that neither the people nor the government of Great Britain are any longer the dupes of Russia, has led already to the most important results—the promise of the evacuation of Silistria, for instance —the remission of a portion of the Turkish debt —the abandonment of the position assumed at the mouth of the Danube.* These, it is true,

* These things will all be brought to a conclusion if Russia sees the necessity of throwing them into the opposing scale of the

may be valueless, if England relapses into her state of previous subserviency; but, as it is, they have been gained; and no more trouble would it have cost to have secured every point connected with the independence and prosperity of the Ottoman empire. Prince Lieven and Count Pozzo di Borgo can no longer obtain speeches in the House of Commons, or Protocols in Downing Street, to demonstrate to Prussia, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Poland, Greece, (we might go further,) the fascination of Great Britain by Russian delusion, or her co-partnery in Russian injustice.

These potent facts and considerations will, we think, leave little profit to the triumph, of which the Emperor may boast, in having got an English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, not "punctilious," "susceptible," or "mistrustful," to proclaim "the union of England and Russia, for the purpose of preserving the peace of Europe."

public opinion of England. The very mention of the evacuation of Silistria has done her most material injury upon her own most immediate frontiers, to whatever advantage she may turn it at Constantinople and in London. To these two points now, of course, all her attention must be turned, and London soothed till Constantinople is occupied: Silistria, the provinces, the Caucasus become objects of no importance at all.

OFFICIAL NOTE OF LORD PONSONBY,

TO THE

TURKISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

RESPECTING MR. CHURCHILL.

We insert the note handed to the Porte by Lord Ponsonby, on the occasion of Mr. Churchill having been thrown into the Bagnio. This outrage will surprise no one that is aware that its author, the Reis Effendi, is the known, avowed, and paid agent of Russia. However we may regret what this respectable merchant has had to undergo; however we may feel for the individual, in a national point of view, considering the spirited manner that our representative at Constantinople has taken up the matter, we look on it as a most fortunate occurrence. An opportunity is hereby afforded of retrieving the character of England, of disproving the assertions so sedulously disseminated by Russian agency, that her power is on the decline; and of removing from office in

Turkey those men who are maintained in place by Russia, because they are hostile to us.

As every event, however favourable, (as long as we are indisposed to act) must be turned against us; so, if we display energy, every thing must tell in our favour. We trust, therefore, that government will support Lord Ponsonby's vigorous conduct.

The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, has the honour to acquaint his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the information of the Sublime Porte, that his Excellency, Akif Effendi, having violated the rights of a British subject — rights conferred by the Sultans of glorious memory, and most particularly respected by the illustrious Sovereign now reigning, for the happiness of his subjects — the undersigned is obliged to declare to the Sublime Porte that the undersigned will not any longer hold official communication with his Excellency, Akif Effendi; and the undersigned respectfully submits to the Sublime Porte, and emphatically to the Sultan himself, his just complaint against the Minister who has dared to violate the laws of his own Sovereign, and insult the British nation.

The undersigned has the honour, &c.

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Therapia, May 10, 1836.

DISTURBANCES IN GREECE.

Accounts have just reached us that great apprehensions are entertained of serious disturbances in Greece, soon after the King's departure. Emissaries are going about every where to stir up the people: and never was Greece in such a state as it is at the present moment; but great pains are taken to conceal the truth from Count Armansperg and his Royal Master, to whom the most varnished accounts of it are given.

[The following Despatches offer an interesting illustration of the aggressive policy of Prussia, of the absolute despotism of its government, and of the utter insecurity of persons and property in those states of Germany which are subjected to her dictation.

We trust that the example here displayed of the infraction by the Cabinet of Berlin of every principle of international justice will have its due weight in preserving those portions of Germany which have hitherto escaped the snare of the "Customs' Union," from surrendering their national rights and independence at the dictation of a power which derives its sole importance in the balance of Europe from being the subservient instrument of Russia.

We hope there is yet time for the minor Cabinets of Germany to see the error into which they have been beguiled, and that they may yet work out their deliverance from a system of which they have not yet tasted the direful consequences. We are happy to perceive that the "Hannöversche Zeitung" has taken up the cause we advocate. The fact of the authenticity of the documents in the Portfolio being acknowledged as self-evident, and placed beyond a doubt by a journal which bears the character of a semi-official German paper, is important as regards the public opinion of Germany, and as an indication that the government of Hanover appreciates the utility of exposing designs which threaten such disastrous consequences to every European interest.]

PRUSSIAN OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

RELATIVE TO THE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN AGAINST THE REPRESENTATIVES AT THE GERMAN DIETS AND THE LIBERALS OF GERMANY.

GENERAL VON BORSTELL TO GENERAL THILE, ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

Trier, 14 *June*, 1832.

ALLOW me to express one more opinion in confidence. If it must be left to the Sovereigns of Germany to treat their demagogues and insensate agitators as they please, and to condemn them to punishment according to the so-called French laws, the weakness of the governments will be increased, and the malignant strength of the revolutionary party will be increased both in Germany and abroad, and the evil will spread on every side.

The safety of the state, firmly established on

Jetzt noch eine vertrauliche Aeusserung. Wenn es den deutschen Souveränen überlassen werden muss, ihre Demagogen und tollen Aufwiegler nach Gefallen zu behandeln, und nach den sogenannten französischen Gesetzen zur Strafe zu ziehen, so wird der Schwäche der Regierungen und der bösartigen Kraft der revolutionären Parthei in und ausserhalb Deutschlands Vorschub geleistet, und der Krebs frisst um sich.

Staatssicherheit, nach moralischen Grundsätzen festgestellt, ist

moral principles, is the most important duty of a government; it can never be secured by representative forms, or by popular usurpations; on the contrary, whithersoever we turn our regards, we behold it exposed to insult and danger. The stream which has burst its bounds does not return of itself to its original bed; it must be led thither.

If the diets of the German Constitutional States, which grant to the representatives of the people a right of veto and a power over the Regents, cannot be led back to what has been proved by experience to be advantageous, viz., its usefulness as a *deliberative* assembly; it then would appear that danger threatens the safety of all states and especially of those which are governed wisely and moderately, entirely ac-

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die wichtigste der Regierungspflichten; sie wird durch repräsentative Formen oder Volksvertretungen nirgends gesichert, vielmehr durchweg, wo wir hinblicken, gemissbraucht und gefährdet. Der ausgebrochene Strom fügt sich nicht von selbst wieder in sein ursprüngliches Stromgebiet; er muss dahin geleitet werden.

Können die konstitutionellen deutschen Staatenverfassungen, welche den Volksrepräsentanten ein Versagungsrecht und eine Macht über den Regenten anweisen, nicht auf das aus der Erfahrung sich ergebende Nützliche einer berathenden Stände-Auswahl zurückgeführt werden, so erscheint die Sicherheit aller und auch der Staaten gefährdet, welche weise und gemässigt, ganz nach

cording to the noble tendency of the Prussian system of rendering the people happy.

I see the difficulty of carrying this into execution; it can only be urged by the force of arms on those German principalities which delight in the freedom and audacity of their people, and which recognize therein a means of protection against the arbitrary power, severity and oppression of their princes. And still every other consideration which I have proposed in my despatch to the King, viz., arrests, deportation into a fortress of the confederation, and the punishment of those who excite the people against the safety of the German states by the sentence and cognizance of a decree of the Diet, will afford no radical cure.

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der würdigen preussischen Tendenz der *Volksbeglückung*, regiert werden.

Ich sehe die Schwierigkeit dieser Durchführung ein; sie kann nur durch Waffengewalt den deutschen Furstenländern aufgedrungen werden, welche sich in ihrer Volksfreiheit und Frechheit gefallen, und in selbiger ein Schutzmittel gegen Willkühr, Härte, und Bedrückung ihrer Fürsten erkennen. Und dennoch alles Andere, worauf ich in meinem Schreiben an den König angetragen habe, Arretiren, Abführen in eine Bundesfestung, und Bestrafung der Volksfrevler gegen die Sicherheit der deutschen Staaten durch Spruch und Erkenntniss eines deutschen Bundesgerichts, wird keine radikale Hülfe gewähren.

DESPATCH FROM LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THILE,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA,
TO HIS EXCELLENCY M. VON BORSTELL, GENERAL OF CAVALRY, &c. &c. &c.

I have the honour to communicate herewith to your Excellency, for your information, a copy of what has been written by me to-day. to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with regard to the proposal contained in your report of the 14th of June, 1832, of seizing, on the breaking out of troubles in the smaller German states, on the agitators and disaffected, and confining them for safe custody at Mayence.

Berlin, the 26th of June, 1832.

(Signed) THILE.

An den königl. General der Cavalerie, u. s. w.
Hrn. von Borstell Exc.

Ew. Excellenz beehre ich mich, zur gefälligen Kenntnisnahme hiebei in Abschrift ganz ergebenst mitzutheilen, was in Beziehung auf den in dero Immediat-Berichte vom 14 Juni 1832 enthaltenen Vorschlag, die in den kleineren deutschen Staaten bei ausbrechenden Volksunruhen verhafteten Unruhestifter und Aufwiegler zur sichern Aufbewahrung nach Mainz zu schaffen, heute von mir an den Minister der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten geschrieben worden ist.

Berlin, den 26 Juni 1832.

(Gez.) THILE.

LIEUT.-GEN. THILE TO HIS EXCELLENCY M. VON ANCILLON, HIS PRUSSIAN MAJESTY'S MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

In a report laid before His Majesty, with regard to military aid to be afforded by us to the smaller German neighbour states, on the breaking out of popular discontents, General von Borstell has particularly drawn my attention to the fact, that the smaller states in general possessed neither strong places of arrest, nor a positive sufficient guard of protection for securing the arrested agitators and radicals; that therefore a safe place of custody must be chosen, and, if possible, not in these our own states, for fear of exciting public attention; and the Confederation Fortress of Mayence, already occupied, would be entirely appropriate for this object.

An den königlichen Minister der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, Hrn. Ancillon Exc.

In einem Sr. Majestät dem Könige vorliegenden Berichte wegen der den Regierungen der kleineren deutschen Nachbarstaaten diesseit zu gewährenden militärischen Hülfe bei ausbrechenden Volksunruhen, hat der Herr General der Cavalerie von Borstell besonders darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass die kleineren Staaten gewöhnlich weder feste Arrestlokale noch eine zuverlässige und hinreichende Schutzwacht zur Festhaltung der verhafteten Unruhstifter und Aufwiegler besässen, dass also ein sicherer Aufbewahrungsort, und zwar wo möglich des allgemeinen Eindrucks wegen nicht in den diesseitigen Staaten zu bestimmen sey, und die zuverlässig besetzte Bundesfestung Mainz sich wohl ganz für diesen Zweck eignen würde.

His Majesty the King is not disinclined to give effect to the proposal, and I am to move your Excellency with the most devoted confidence to be pleased to cause this matter to be brought by His Majesty's Envoy at Frankfort before the Diet for deliberation.

In immediate connection with such a measure, the question appears to me to arise, whether it might not be possible to judge the disturbers of the public peace carried away to Mayence, on the spot, by a sentence of the Diet? This is a question, however, which I only allow myself to touch upon, and which I must refer to your Excellency's enlightened consideration.

Berlin, the 26th of June, 1832.

(Signed) THILE.

Des Königs Majestät sind nicht abgeneigt, dem Vorschlage Folge geben zu lassen, und ich soll Ew. Excellenz davon mit dem ganz ergebensten Anheimstellen Mittheilung machen, gefälligst veranlassen zu wollen, dass der Gegenstand durch den Herrn von Nagler bei der Bundes-Versammlung zur Berathung komme.

In direktem Zusammenhang mit einer solchen Maassregel scheint nach meinem Dafürhalten auch die Frage zu stehen: ob nicht über die so nach Mainz geschafften Störer der öffentlichen Ruhe dort durch ein Bundesgericht zu urtheilen seyn möchte? Eine Frage, welche ich mir jedoch bloss anzuregen erlaube, und die ich Ew. Excellenz erleuchtetem Ermessen anheimgeben muss.

Berlin, den 26 Juni 1832.

(Gez.) THILE.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL VON BORSTELL.

Wisbaden, the 31st July, 1832.

Now, if the sending a force is made to depend *sub a.* on the events of the three days of July at Paris, and in the provinces of our frontiers, and the excited parts of southern Germany, I venture to intreat your Excellency to communicate to me, not only every thing from the commencement of these events, but your enlightened opinion on the instruction regarding the propriety of sending a strong first echelon, either altogether or by divisions; whereby we should certainly have in view, besides those events, the state of ferment and revolt in the interior of the states of the Confederation, and against the

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Aus einem Brief des Generals v. Borstell, aus Wiesbaden, vom 31 Juli 1832,

Wenn nun die Absendung abhängig gestellt ist, *sub a*, von den Ereignissen der Julitage in Paris und in den Provinzen unserer Grenzen, und dem aufgeregten Theile von Süddeutschland, so erlaube ich mir, Ew. Excellenz zu bitten, mir, gleich nach Eingang dieser Ergebnisse, nicht nur solche mitzutheilen, sondern auch dieser Benachrichtigung Ihre erleuchtete Ansicht über die Zulässigkeit der Absendung dieses starken ersten Echelons, ganz oder theilweise, mitzutheilen; wobei allerdings auch ausser jenen Vorgängen, der Zustand der Gährung und Auflehnung der deutschen Bundesstaaten im Innern und gegen die Beschlüsse der

decrees of the German Diet; and whether after this it is to be expected that, within a short period, a Prussian auxiliary corps of two or three thousand men might not be requisite?

LETTER FROM THE KING OF PRUSSIA TO GENERAL BORSTELL.

In the event of the necessity arising, according to the decree of the Diet, of a claim of military aid in Prussian troops in favour of the neighbouring states of the Confederation, in addition to the troops of the 8th corps of the army, the 32nd, 37th, and 5th Regiment of Reserve

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deutschen Bundes-Versammlung zu berücksichtigen seyn dürfte, und ob es hiernach zu erwarten steht, dass binnen Kurzem eine preussische Hülfsleistung von einer nahmhaften Stärke über 2 bis 3000 Mann erforderlich werden dürfte?

An den General der Cavalerie von Borstell.

Für den Fall, dass nach Bundesbeschluss das Bedürfnss eintreten sollte, noch preussische Truppen zu militärischen Hülfsleistung für die benachbarten Bundesstaaten in Anspruch zu nehmen, sind Ihnen zwar für diesen Zweck, nächst den Truppen des 8ten Armee-Korps, noch das 32ste und das 37ste Infanterie-Regiment (5te Reserve-Regiment), so wie das 6te Uhlanen-Regiment zur Dis-

Infantry Regiments, as well as the 6th Regiment of Lancers, are placed at your disposal. If, in the mean time, a larger force should be necessary, you are authorized to take it from the troops of the commander-in-chief quartered nearest to the destined point; and, in so far, as in consequence of this regulation the garrison of Cologne must be so disproportionally weakened as to require a reinforcement, the General of Infantry, von Müffling, is ordered by me to detach at your demand a part of the 14th division to garrison Cologne.

Berlin, the 22nd August, 1832.

(Signed) FREDERIC WILHELM.

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position verblieben. Sollte indess auch eine grössere Truppenzahl gebraucht werden, so haben Sie solche immer von den dem Bestimmungsorte am nächsten stehenden Truppentheilen Ihres General-Kommandos zu entnehmen, und sofern, in Folge einer diesfälligen Anordnung, die Besatzung von Köln unverhältnissmässig geschwächt werden musste, dergestalt, dass das Bedürfniss eines Ersatzes eintrete, ist der General der Infanterie, von Müffling, von Mir angewiesen, auf Ihre Requisition einen Theil der 14ten Division zur Besatzung nach Köln zu detachiren.

Berlin, den 22 August 1832.

(Gez.) FRIEDRICH WILHELM.

OPINION OF GERMANY ON THE INFLUENCE OF RUSSIA.

[We are happy to be able to contrast with the preceding documents the following Letter from an eminent German writer.]

To the Editor of the Portfolio.

Banks of the Elbe, June 22, 1836.

SIR,

IN looking over a recent number of Blackwood's Magazine, I perceive an article entitled "Foreign Results of Democratic Ascendency." Whenever any palpable error has been committed, or a mistaken course of foreign policy has been adopted, it is natural enough for one party to shift the blame from their own leaders, and fasten it if possible upon their opponents. In the present instance, as far as the alarming progress and ulterior plans of Russia are concerned, it must be clear to every unprejudiced observer that the question at issue has been hitherto very little understood by any party, and that, as soon as its merits began to be at all appreciated, it was brought forward as a question not of political party, but of national and European interest. It is not my intention, nor would it be worth your while, to dwell on this subject after your repeated declarations, which will not fail of giving satisfaction in the quarters for which they may have been intended. But, in the article in question, I meet with a strange misconception of German affairs, which I cannot leave unnoticed. The domestic policy of the Reform administration is there described as having been instrumental in alienating the affections of the German people, and compelling them, from an instinctive dread of "revolutionary principles," to throw themselves into the arms of Russia. It would surely be a work of supereroga-

tion if I were as a foreigner to meddle with this charge as brought against the principles of the English Reformers; but, I may be allowed to offer a few remarks as far as regards the disposition of the majority of the German people. And since the writer in Blackwood treats (or affects to treat) Germany as "the most effectual barrier against Moscovite ambition," it may be presumed that the Conservative party in England will not consider the actual extent and real motives of Russian ascendency in the German States as a matter of indifference.

It is of no use to talk of Germany in the aggregate, in the same way as the names of England or France are familiarly introduced to denote the system of government or the interests of the nation. These States, however distracted they may have been by domestic parties, have at no time experienced any thing like the provincial division, which is part and parcel of our political existence. It is necessary before all things to advert to the distinction which cannot but strike even the most superficial eye. There are on the one hand the two leading States, in which there exists no *visible* opposition to the government, or in which the *police* has as yet been sufficient to put down any thing that may have threatened to assume that shape—Austria and Prussia; and on the other, the Constitutional (or minor) States, in which the existence of a body of opposition more or less compact is legalized by the representative form of government, and manifested in spite of the restrictive regulations of the censorship by the tendency more or less pronounced of part of the public press.

With regard to the people of the latter, the Constitutional States, it may safely be asserted that, far from betraying any inclination towards Russia, they have upon one or more occasion exhibited most unquestionable symptoms of the contrary. I need but allude to the deep sympathy manifested

in the fate of Poland, and to the enthusiastic reception which the Polish exiles met with in their progress through the country. These are matters of public notoriety: they need no proof. But the addresses are upon record, respectably and numerously signed, which were presented to the German Diet in 1831, praying the diplomatic interference of the Diet in the murderous struggle which appeared intended for and seemed likely to terminate in the annihilation of a generous people.

It is true that the spread of a pestilential disease was at the same time apprehended from the Russian invasion; but this step of *addressing* was so uncommon and so little to the taste of the addressed that any pretext would have been welcome to give a more plausible occasion and a more pointed bearing to the prayer. The Diet thought fit, not very consistently with their former declarations, to pronounce such addresses *illegal*.* In the Representative Chambers the name of Poland was introduced on every suitable occasion, though the blank looks and extreme uneasiness of ministers seemed to intimate that such a course might prove exceedingly dangerous.

And, when all was over, the generous remnants of the Polish army were every where received with those honours which are due to the representatives, though vanquished for the time, of a noble and heart-stirring cause. The triumph of physical force seemed to be forgotten in the consciousness of indefeasible right; the day of retribution was confidently spoken of, and the acts of the Autocrat were denounced in no very measured terms. These ebullitions again were severely commented upon by the writers of a more moderate or more timid disposition, and the progress of the Poles was

* We have seen the same line adopted in Greece, when the Primates of the Morea drew up loyal addresses to Prince Leopold, which were pronounced by Capodistrias to be *illegal*.—EDITOR. See Narrative of Greek Affairs, Part ii.

gravely said to be the progress of revolution. Yet the motives were unimpeached, from which material assistance was tendered where it might be wanted, by the combined and willing exertions of thousands. Committees were established at Leipsic, Dresden, Altenburg, Frankfort, Nurnberg, Heidelberg, Carlsruhe, Manheim, Stutgard, Ulm, Darmstadt, Cassel. The Germans have no reason to boast of what they may have done in this way; what nation, not unmindful of the laws of honour and hospitality, could have done less? But, it is a little curious that, while on the one side the political excitement of those days had given rise to apprehensions and imputations which, though intelligible from the novelty of the thing, have not been justified by the event, the Germans should on the other hand be charged with an inclination to throw themselves into the arms of Russia.

It cannot be said that the actual position of Russia is well understood by the Germans. The German liberals are either too much occupied by the struggle at home, which demands their unremitting attention, or they are too flighty to descend to particulars; and in neither case are they likely to apply themselves seriously to a comprehensive and matter-of-fact study of European politics. But, in the Constitutional States, a notion is prevailing that the growth of Russian power must be somehow or other associated with the fall of the Constitutions. The plans actually pending have probably been little attended to; many symptoms may have been altogether overlooked; but they can hardly be far from the mark, *in reading the trace of Russian influence in whatever quarter they may turn to; since we know that it is everywhere.* There is one view of the subject peculiarly adapted to the German mind. There are those who compare the present with the past, and from thence anticipate the return of military despotism. In this they busy them-

selves but little with the immediate agent—*the ambition of the Russian Cabinet*—but they discern the primary cause in the revolving course of human affairs. They anticipate something like the better days of the Roman empire. Not despotism in its brutal form, arrayed in its native horrors; but despotism in its fictitious attributes, displaying the perfidious lures of peace and prosperity; despotism prepared and distilled with preternatural subtleness of purpose. They say that we have witnessed the last efforts of national valour, the expiring struggle of national independence; and that the world is ripe for that general calm which despotism may bestow; the calm and repose which, in Schiller's phrase, Philip II. promised to give to the Netherlands—*die Ruhe eines Kirchhofs.* * Further, to prove the similarity of the present state of things to that period of the Roman world, they appeal to the fact that the golden age of literature has gone by; that the age of Sophists and Rhetoricians, of Grammarians and Scholiasts, of Encyclopedias and Manuals of Science, has succeeded, a species of literature not so much in itself contemptible, as brought into undue relief by the absence of original efforts; they speak of the depravation of the national taste, of utility, without any generous aspiration, and luxury without elegance, as the presiding deities of social life. Others again, more resolute or more sanguine than the rest, would continue the historic parallel, and lead us on from despair to some faint and distant hope, that, when all shall have been swept away, they of the Don and the Ural may be destined to obey the instinct of civilization; and that, after ages of barbaric darkness and anarchy, through the self-taught efforts of a healthier race, Europe may in the end recover that beacon of light and liberty, from which her depraved sons had once been led astray.

* The repose of a Churchyard.

These are dreams; why should I dwell upon them? Because, in the disposition of those dreamers, I discern the elements of a latent opposition, which may yet be roused from passive speculation; a sense of danger, which needs only to be pointed by the mention of a definite object, instead of being weakened by vague apprehensions; a sympathy contracted by long habit, and a consciousness of what we are on the point of losing, and what their waking, well-directed exertion may still preserve.

So much for our alleged Russian predilections. Let us proceed to the impression which the domestic policy of England has produced on the more active and sober portion of the German Constitutionalists. It is a fact that by a popular speaker in the Chambers of Baden the failure of the first Reform Bill has been identified with the fall of Warsaw, and described as a matter of triumph for the aristocrats of all Europe. I believe that such was, upon the whole, the popular feeling in the Constitutional States. There may be prejudice in this view, or want of tact, or both; but I think, even to a Conservative eye, it cannot be displeasing to perceive that the German Constitutionalists would look to reforming England rather than to revolutionary France. And such, in spite of the *jealousy occasioned by the restrictive systems of commerce* adopted on both sides, I may affirm to be the case. When it is asserted that we made up our minds to the belief that the representative system is but a delusion, I think I may, in some future letter, follow this notion to its source. For the present, I shall content myself with extracting the opinions of some popular writers belonging to the moderate party on the merits of the Reform Question. In a work, which is understood to be from the pen of Professor Hegewisch of Kiel, (Politische Freiheit, von F. Baltisch, Leipzig, 1832,)

the writer, in a very characteristic manner, expresses his admiration of the Constitution of England. He almost triumphantly appeals to the fact that not even such a signal amelioration as he considers the first Reform Bill to have been could have been carried against the constitutional opposition of the Lords. Rather die in the *sella curulis*, than approve of that which, if carried by the mere desire of the multitude, would be the signal of anarchy and violence. "The whole nation, the whole of the enlightened part of the nation, desire reform; there are but some fifty votes against it, and the Bill does *not* pass into law. What spell, then, is it that imparts to these few opponents the power of opposing millions? It is their *right*, it is the indubitable right of the Lords, and the innate reverence of constitutional right, which, with a few exceptions, imposes silence upon the ardent desire and the passions of the multitude." I think this trait highly illustrative of the temper in which those affairs were discussed in Germany. Again, it was the settled opinion of the German Constitutionalists that the passing of the Reform Bill alone could have preserved the country from a violent revulsion. One of our esteemed veterans, Rehberg of Göttingen, concludes his notes to Lord Porchester's observations on Spain with the following sentence: "How great is the obligation, not of England alone, to King William IV., and to his Ministry, must be clear to any one who will take the trouble of reflecting what consequences a violent revolution in Great Britain must have produced on the continent of Europe. This danger has been happily averted by Parliamentary Reform; and thus no one may, in fact, have more occasion to be thankful to Lords Grey, Althorp, and Brougham, than those very Cabinets which have been suspected of secret intrigues for the expulsion of those Ministers."

GERMANICUS VINDEX.

THE CROSS AND THE CRESCENT.

Our attention has been attracted to a very able article in the January number of Blackwood's Magazine, in which the writer, after sketching the progress and designs, and describing the preponderating power of Russia, in terms which we are inclined to think somewhat exaggerated, arrives at the startling conclusion that the extension of that power is desirable, as it would promote the views of the Divinity in the extension of the Christian faith.

Such views are common to a great portion of England and of Europe.

It is strange to see, first, differences of political opinion, then matters of religious dogma, contributing to the furtherance of the ambitious schemes of that power whose strength is really in our own weakness of mind, and who succeeds in all her projects merely by the support she derives from the prejudices and ignorance of those most interested in opposing her. It is singular that, notwithstanding the complete exposure that has taken place with respect to her designs, she has, up to this moment, scarcely lost one of the means by which she has acted on the minds of men. We still imagine, in this country, that interference in foreign policy is intervention between discordant domestic principles. We still believe that we can oppose the projects of Russia only by going to war. We are still convinced that her supremacy is actually established in Eastern countries, and there are millions of the devout and pious of Europe, who imagine that the progress of Moscovite hordes is the advancement of civilization and the triumph of Christianity. To this last fallacy we will, for the present, more par-

ticularly address ourselves, and we commence by quoting the passage to which we refer, which has called forth these observations.

While the naval strength and colonial dominions of England have steadily and unceasingly advanced in Western Europe, and its influence is in consequence spread over all the maritime regions of the globe, another, and an equally irresistible power has risen up in the Eastern hemisphere. If all the contests of centuries have turned to the advantage of the English navy, all the continental strifes have as unceasingly augmented the strength of Russia. From the time of the Czar Peter, when it first emerged from obscurity to take a leading part in continental affairs, to the present moment, its progress has been unbroken. Alone, of all other states, during that long period, it has experienced no reverses, but constantly advanced in power, territory, and resources; for even the peace of Tilsit, which followed the disasters of Austerlitz and Friedland, was attended with an accession of territory. During that period it has successively swallowed up Courland and Livonia, Poland, Finland, the Crimea, the Ukraine, Wallachia, and Moldavia. Its southern frontier is now washed by the Danube; its eastern is within fifty leagues of Berlin and Vienna; its advanced posts in the Baltic are within sight of Stockholm; its south-eastern boundary, stretching far over the Caucasus, sweeps down to Erivan and the foot of Mount Ararat—Persia and Turkey are irrevocably subjected to its influence: a solemn treaty has given it the command of the Dardanelles; a subsidiary Moscovite force has visited Scutari, and rescued the Osmanlis from destruction, and the Sultan Mahmoud retains Constantinople only as the Viceroy of the Northern Autocrat.

Now it is false to assert that this is the state of Turkey. There is apparent submission, but that submission ceases the moment England chooses to assert that it has ceased. The fact is not so, and therefore the consequences have not yet followed. No doubt the time will arrive when submission will take place, but that will come as the result of the artifices which appear to have been so often successful, and of

the extension of such opinions as those we have just quoted. This passage would exactly suit the columns of the Journal de Frankfort, and puts the question exactly in the light in which Russia has lately been putting it herself. Having passed the point where collision is practicable between Turkey and herself, it is now her policy to discourage us from supporting Turkey by establishing the belief that her power there is all supreme, whilst, at the same time, we are prevented from being alarmed at the consequences of her real occupation, by being led to believe that we have already incurred all the evil, and even all the risk, that such an occupation can entail upon us.

We proceed with our extracts.

The politicians of the day assert that Russia will fall to pieces, and its power cease to be formidable to Western Europe or Central Asia. They never were more completely mistaken. Did Macedonia fall to pieces before it had subdued the Grecian Commonwealths; or Persia before it had conquered the Assyrian monarchy; or the Goths and Vandals before they had subverted the Roman empire? It is the general pressure of the north upon the south, not the force of any single state, which is the weight that is to be apprehended; that pressure will not be lessened, but on the contrary greatly increased, if the vast Scythian tribes should separate into different empires. Though one Moscovite throne were to be established at St. Petersburgh, a second at Moscow, and a third at Constantinople, the general pressure of the Russian race upon the southern states of Europe and Asia would not be one whit diminished. Still the delight of a warmer climate, the riches of long established civilization, the fruits and wines of the south, the women of Italy or Circassia, would attract the brood of winter to the regions of the sun. The various tribes of the German race, the Gothic and Vandal swarms, the Huns and the Ostrogoths, were engaged in fierce and constant hostility with each other: and it was generally defeat and pressure from behind which impelled them upon their southern neighbours; but that did not prevent them from bursting the barriers of the

Danube and the Rhine, and overwhelming the civilization, and wealth, and discipline, of the Roman empire. Such internal divisions only magnify the strength of the northern race, by training them to the use of arms, and augmenting their military skill by constant exercise against each other; just as the long continued internal wars of the European nations have established an irresistible superiority of their forces over those of the other quarters of the globe. In the end, the weight of the north, thus matured, drawn forth, and disciplined, will ever be turned to the fields of southern conquest.

The moving power with these vast bodies of men is the lust of conquest, and a passion for southern enjoyment. Democracy is unheeded or unknown amongst them; if imported from foreign lands, it languishes and expires amidst the rigours of the climate. The energy and aspirations of men are concentrated on conquest; a passion more natural, more durable, more universal, than the democratic vigour of advanced civilization. It speaks a language intelligible to the rudest of men; and rouses passions of universal vehemence. Great changes may take place in human affairs; but the time will never come when northern valour will not press on southern wealth, or refined corruption not require the renovating influence of indigent regeneration.

This, then, is the other great moving power which in these days of transition is changing the destinies of mankind. Rapid as is the growth of the British race in America, it is not more rapid than that of the Russian in Europe and Asia. Fifty millions of men now furnish recruits to the Moscovite standards; but their race doubles in every half century; and before the year 1900, one hundred millions of men will be ready to pour from the frozen plains of Scythia on the plains of central Asia and southern Europe. Occasional events may check or for a while turn aside the wave; but its ultimate progress in these directions is certain and irresistible. Before two centuries are over, Mahometanism will be banished from Turkey, Asia Minor, and Persia, and a hundred millions of Christians will be settled in the regions now desolated by the standards of the Prophet. Their advance is as swift, as unceasing, as that of the British race to the rocky belt of Western America.

There are, at the present time, two great nations in the world,

which seem to tend towards the same end, although they started from different points; I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and, whilst the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly assumed a most prominent place amongst the nations, and the world learned their existence and their greatness at almost the same time.

But peaceful Christianity, urged on by democratic passions, pierced the primeval solitude of the American forests; and warlike Christianity, stimulated by northern conquest, was fitted to subdue Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The Bible and the printing press converted the wilderness of North America into the abode of Christian millions; the Moscovite battalions, marching under the standard of the Cross, subjugated the already peopled regions of the Mussulman faith. Not without reason then did the British navy and the Russian army emerge triumphant from the desperate strife of the French revolution; for on the victory of each depended the destinies of half the globe.

Arbitrary institutions will not for ever prevail in the Russian empire. As successive provinces and kingdoms are added to their vast dominions—as their sway extends over the regions of the south, the abode of wealth and long established civilization, the passion for conquest will expire. Satiety will extinguish this, as it does all other desires. With the acquisition of wealth, and the settlement in fixed abodes, the desire of protection from arbitrary power will spring up, and the passion of freedom will arise as it did in Greece, Italy, and modern Europe. Free institutions will ultimately appear in the realms conquered by Moscovite, as they did in those won by Gothic, valour. But the passions and desires of an earlier stage of existence will long agitate the millions of the Russo-Asiatic race; and after democratic desires have arisen, and free institutions exist in its oldest provinces, the wave of northern conquest will still be pressed on by semi-barbarous hordes from its remoter dominions. Freedom will gradually arise out of security and repose; but the fever of conquest will not be finally extinguished till it has performed its destined mission, and the standards of the Cross are brought down to the Indian Ocean.

What! has England no interest in Hindostan? Can *we*

not be the means of extending Christian influence in that country? Is not the larger and the richer portion of that country already Christian, in as far as a Christian power can render it so? Is the knout of the Russian Spravnick to succeed where the crozier of the Anglican prelate has prevailed? Is it, above all, the dogmas of the Eastern church and the practices of the Eastern church that the pious reviewer would wish to see extended there?—or is it bayonets that are required, when the labours of the missionary have failed? But Russia has her missionaries in India. She there preaches a creed and teaches lessons which may be worth our knowing. As her missionaries in Greece preached the independence of the Cross against the despotism of the Crescent, so do her missionaries in Hindostan preach the independence of the Crescent from the despotic thraldom of a merchants' company of a distant and infidel island.

But can such assertions be really intended? "Warlike Christianity, stimulated by northern conquest, is fitted to subdue Central Asia and Eastern Europe!" The expression should be, northern conquest, supported by Christian fanaticism, will succeed in subduing Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

Politics, certainly, is no less a science, in its intrinsic character, than any other of those branches of human inquiry which have been reduced to more or less systematic form, and present more or less certain results, in consequence of the greater or less degree of accuracy with which information has been collected, facts classified, and laws established. If politics has not the character of an exact science, it is not in consequence of the impracticability of reducing it to fixed rules, but because as yet the observations have not been of such a character as to exclude the vague theorization which has always characterized the infantine period of every

science. In all those questions which affect the general position of Europe, the most accurate data on the state of Europe itself would be insufficient to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, unless the state of Asia is equally well understood. Now it is notorious that we are lamentably deficient in information regarding every point of eastern institutions, habits, thoughts, religion, and power. This applies equally to Turkey, which is more than half European; and yet, generally speaking, men never are conscious of ignorance; they only know that they have been ignorant after the information has been acquired. As regards Turkey, the question of religion is of the most vital importance, but not so much so from its agency in Turkey itself as from the effects produced upon the religious sympathies of Europe by the manner in which the religious state of the East is represented to it. Mahommetanism is actually the cause of the political depression and the political dangers which weigh down that much injured country, because the animosity of Christians against Mahometanism has placed the prejudices and the power of Europe at the disposal of Russia.

The writer of the foregoing extracts found it no doubt very easy to pen, in his closet, such phrases as those we have quoted, and, ignorant himself of the subject he was treating, was of course perfectly unconscious of the effects which the emanations of such principles were likely to produce, or of the guerdon he might have received at the hands of Russia, if he had known how invaluable to her are such effusions of ill-directed animosity.

God knows we have enough of reasoning on all such subjects. It is facts we want, and on no point are we more deficient in facts than with regard to the character of Islamism. We have had no travellers in the East for many years, whose minds and whose labours have combined to

place them in a position to examine into the state of those countries and to rectify the erroneous views entertained in Europe, whilst we have had a very numerous class of travellers, scarcely one of whom has attained mediocrity even in literary fame, who have disseminated throughout Europe the party spirit of rival creeds in the East, or who have returned to reprint the tales or repeat the impressions they learnt in their nurseries. With the exception of M. Lamartine, none have been able to cast away the contemptible leading-strings which are attached to the embryo traveller in the East at the moment of his appearance on this new stage of existence, never to quit him whilst he remains upon it. But we have fortunately had in M. de Lamartine a traveller who, though a bigotted Catholic, was a man of genius. M. Lamartine walked alone, saw with his own eyes, judged with his own mind; and, though he has committed errors of the gravest description, in reasoning upon a subject which was not his own, he at all events saw, and hailed with enthusiasm, the elevated and devotional character of that religion so reviled in Europe, and the simple, patriarchal, and moral character of the people who lived beneath its sway.

Had M. Lamartine sat down to reason in his closet, instead of making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, we should have had from him reasonings in the tone and spirit of the Northern Reviewer; brilliant, discursive, historical, and conclusive. But, having gone to the East, though overwhelmed with facts contradictory to all his previous impressions, he has the conscience not only to admit, but to admire. A review of his work has recently appeared, said to be written by a gentleman long resident in the East, and which we refer to from the additional corroborative testimony of long observation which is thus afforded to those points which appear the most strange, and are the most startling to Europeans. We will extract some passages from that review to

contrast with those already quoted, and in doing so we cannot refrain from expressing our surprize and our delight that, at a moment when so much is at stake, upon a just appreciation of the state of the East, and particularly of Turkey, so much light has been thrown, and so unexpectedly, upon that portion of the inquiry which seemed to give to our enemy the strongest hold upon our feelings, upon which we had least reason to expect information of any description, and none for anticipating views at once so contradictory of convictions which it was painful to entertain; and so surprisingly satisfactory to our feelings, not less as Christians than as men.

"The information of the people," says M. de La Martine, speaking of the Maronites, "though limited to reading, writing, arithmetic, and the catechism, is so far universal.—I can compare them only to the peasants of Saxony and Scotland."—(P. 182.)

Again, speaking of the Druses, "Their maxim, like that of the gospel, is, that all men are brothers; but they observe it better than we do; our dogmas are evangelical, our laws pagan."—(Vol. ii. p. 167.)

"The most admirable police (the result rather of religion and morals than of legislation) reigns throughout the whole extent of territory inhabited by the Maronites *. The traveller may there pursue his journey alone, and unguarded by day or by night, without fear of theft or violence; crime is almost unknown."—(P. 160.)

"'The Jesuits,' he tells us, 'after having attempted to erect establishments in these mountains, and in the midst of the Maronites who were Catholics, have never yet succeeded, and have little prospect of success, for a very simple reason

* We suppose he means all the territory under the domination of the Enai Beshir, including the Druses and Metuales.

—there are no politics in the religion of the East; perfectly distinct from the civil power, it confers neither influence nor state employment.' "—(Vol. ii. p. 175.)

This latter observation, we think, may startle some, who had regarded Turkey under some mystic name, doomed in the prophecies. But, when we find in Turkey the absence of any organization, militating against religious freedom, and the impossibility of such an organization gaining ground in these countries—*we may doubt whether the term anti-christian may not be with more justice applied to any, the most, Christian government of Europe, than to the Ottoman Porte*, which, while it does not itself persecute, affords a refuge to the victims of persecution elsewhere—*where no man contributes from his substance to the ministers of a faith to which he does not belong, and* WHERE CHRISTIANITY IS QUITE AS MUCH A STATE RELIGION AS MAHOMETANISM *.

Alluding to the young slaves of the Sultan, M. la Martine says, "We conversed with them for a long time respecting their studies, the politics of Europe, and the destiny of the Turkish empire. They shuddered with indignation at their present condition, and prayed for the success of the Sultan in his reforming enterprises. I never witnessed greater ardour for the regeneration of a country than that which animated these young men. The oldest of them might be about twenty or twenty-two, and the youngest about twelve or thirteen. Except at the Naval Asylum at Green-

* The chief of the Christians possesses civil power, because he is their chief priest. The Sultan owes his authority to the hereditary rights established before the title of Calif was added to that of Han. The Christian *church* possesses in Turkey prerogatives not possessed by the *church* of Islamism. The Mahometan Imaun, or parish priest, (Islamism has no higher *religious* functions), has no civil or judicial character. The priesthood of the Greek church have both. This originates, not in a legislative preference for Christianity, but in the absence, among the Turks, of an organized priesthood. The Ulema are no more priests than the Peers of Great Britain.

wich, I never saw finer looking lads than some of these young Turks."—(Vol. iii. p. 72.)

Speaking of a conversation with some of the first men of the empire—Halil Pacha, Achmet Pacha—"Our conversation could not have been more unrestrained, or more elegantly kept up, in a drawing-room in London or Vienna. These young men, who were eager for information and improvement, spoke of their situation and of themselves in a tone of noble and interesting modesty."—(Vol. iii. p. 61.)

But, reverting to the article under our notice, what definite idea is conveyed to the mind by the expression of the extension of Christianity by Russian conquest? Do the Protestants who use such an expression wish to see the faith of Christ extended by the sword? Is this their meaning?—because the destruction of the Ottoman dynasty, and the supplanting of it by the Imperial House of Romanow, would not convert the Mahometans to Christianity, unless it is to be supposed that the civil arm was to be employed in the extension of proselytism, and the inquisition transferred from the Tagus to the Bosphorus. This we say, admitting the faith of Russia to be Christianity, and admitting in the Mussulman religion the same antipathy and animosity against us that we entertain against them. But how different does the question become when we look at things as they really are, and that there exists a greater degree of animosity in the bosom of the Greek church against Protestantism than exists in Islamism against Protestantism. The struggle in the East is wholly political, but the two parties are ranged the one under the head of the Greek church, the other under that of the Mahometan Caliph; and it is but natural in the former to substitute terms of religion for the language of nationality, because, first, many of the subjects of the Mussulman Caliph are of the Greek faith; and, secondly, because the powers of Europe are Christian.

He, therefore, secures the unwary support of the religious feelings of both for his political projects, and, consequently, after being duped by her into supporting Russian aggression, we dupe ourselves with the conviction that that aggression has been the triumph of religion.

But what renders this, however deplorable, a more perfect specimen of delusion is that, as the Christians are very unwarlike in Asia, and stupidly, much more attached to a Turkish ruler * than to a Christian spoiler, Russia has made use of the arms of Mussulmans, disciplined by her, and formed into regiments, to act against the peaceful Christian population, who, to fill up the measure of this iniquity, are rapidly becoming Mussulmans, by the joint effect of Christian violence and Turkish toleration.

But, as we have before said, if Christianity is to be extended to Asia, why do the anti-national prejudices of the writer above quoted turn to Russia as the Apostle of this holy work, and forget, as we have already said, that England reigns over thirty millions of Mussulmans and seventy millions of Pagans; but then, to be sure, England does not

* We cannot refrain from quoting a remarkable observation of M. la Martine on the difference which he observed between the Greeks of the Morea and those of Asia Minor, together with the observations of the Reviewer:—" 'The Greek genius everywhere exhibits the principle of activity which is in the very blood of that lively European race; but the activity of the Asiatic Greek is valuable and fruitful; whereas that of Greece and of the Morea is only a sterile agitation. The air of Asia softens the blood of the Greeks; there they always exhibit a people admirably civilised—elsewhere they are frequently barbarians.' But the Greek peasantry of Europe were equally industrious, equally sober-minded, with the Asiatic Greeks; and it was not till the Europeans interfered—till European institutions, and European civilisation, which our author is so anxious to inflict on all the Eastern populations, was sought to be introduced into that now distracted country—that society was convulsed almost to its very lowest foundations; for this convulsion an able power has long and successfully laboured; yet, all these causes would have been insufficient without £5,000,000 (four-fifths of it English) applied for the consolidation there of Russian power."

satisfy his zeal. She does not propagate religion by the sword. She does not, like Russia, perhaps to soothe the bigot and conciliate the fanatic of Europe, revile the faith, insult the prejudices, and desecrate the holy places of Eastern worship; but, while she respects that worship and those prejudices, she sends instructions to teach the ignorant, and Missionaries to preach the faith, that can bear no fruits of righteousness and piety, save when offered by love and charity, and accepted by conviction and repentance. The fact is that Russia has insulted the religious feelings of Mussulmans when she has got them under her power, but she has never most remotely attempted their conversion to Christianity—she has sent Missionaries to no Mussulman country with the view to the extension of Christianity—whilst she has formed connections with the religious fraternities of the Indian Mussulmans, with a view of disturbing at present, and finally upsetting, our Indian dominion. She appears as the protector of religious conscience, wherever the religious oppression of a foreign nation opens to her the means of forming partizans* and awakening dissatisfaction in neigh-

* It is not only in Europe that Russia thinks it worth her while to spread the notions of her religious zeal. Some years ago, a Russian envoy at Washington addressed M. John Quincy Adams, President of the United States, in the following terms: "Is your Excellency aware that the Russian government has had the Bible translated into Georgian?"

"Yes, Sir," said Mr. Adams, and, turning round with that peculiar jerk so well known to his countrymen, and measuring him from head to foot, he sarcastically added, "Did you get it from the Bible Society in London?"

Subsequently, Mr. Adams, who well knew Russia, from his diplomatic residence there, repaid the Russian minister in his own coin, by unexpectedly proposing, at a fête given in honour of the Emperor's birth-day, "The cause of the Cross," to the great and visible embarrassment of the Russian Envoy. This anecdote does great credit to the discrimination of Mr. Adams, and we shall have more occasions than one to exhibit the sagacity of our transatlantic brethren in respect to Russian policy, on which subject we might naturally expect them to have been infinitely more liable to deception than ourselves.

bouring states; while, in her own, the Catholic Church and the Greek Protestants, if they may be so called, have been the object of the most ruthless and exterminating persecution—that persecution not even excused by the error of conviction, but used as conducive to the political end of the state, the union of the civil and religious authority in the Czar.

A remarkable instance has lately been afforded us of the feelings of the Eastern Church towards ourselves and Russia, in a most singular and unparalleled proclamation of the Persian Mussulman Church to the Persian nation, which we shall soon have an opportunity of laying at length before our readers. It was drawn up three years ago, before the influence of Russia had acquired the predominance it has since attained in that country; and this circumstance ought to render it the more interesting, as showing, day by day, the advantages we are losing by suffering Russia to act, not only as if She were alone in the world, but by allowing her to cause it to be believed throughout those countries of such vital importance to us that she already has triumphed over the genius of England.

This document first establishes that Persia is too weak to stand by herself in presence of two such potent nations as Russia and England, each gradually extending its dominion, and drawing all men and affairs within the one or the other of those two influences; that it therefore becomes them to examine into the character of the two systems, which then exercised balanced influence over Persia, and to ascertain which of the two it was most important for Persia to have for a protecting and a sovereign power. It then enters into the character of Russian aggression and administration, and compares it with the mode of acquisition of England in India, and her administration there. It shows that Russia has succeeded by violence; and, when its pos-

session has been obtained, that a military despotism has been established, which destroyed the native administration and the popular rights, while England has been invited by circumstances, or placed under the necessity of extending her influence, which has been based upon the existing institutions, and has been accompanied by an equal administration of the laws; and on this, the political part of the question, it decides that the supremacy of England is preferable for Persia than that of Russia. It then turns to the religious question; it shows that, wherever Russia had established her dominion, She had insulted the faith of Islamism; that, in the Mussulman Provinces to the south of the Caucasus, the mosques had been, in many instances, taken from them; that funds appropriated to education and to charitable foundations had been appropriated by the Government to itself; that their libraries had been carried off or destroyed; and that, in wanton insult, their places of worship had, on several occasions, been converted into wine-taverns; that, on the other hand, the English government had invariably respected their places of worship, their schools, colleges, libraries, and charitable institutions; that She had caused their feast-days to be observed, respected their laws; that She had even had books of their's translated into her own language; and had herself endowed colleges and schools; and it concludes with pronouncing the anathema of the Church against any Mussulman who should favour Russian designs in opposition to England. What can be added to this?

We will quote a few more passages from M. de Lamartine, whit the observations of the Reviewer.

I have conversed with a great number of truly religious Turks and Arabians, who admitted nothing but what is reasonable and human in their creed. Their reason had no efforts to make to accept dogmas from which it revolted. Their's was practical

and contemplative deism. Such men are not easily converted; it is natural to descend from marvellous to simple doctrines, but not to remount from the simple to the marvellous.— vol. ii., p. 176.

Here is an observation of the most striking truth, "conversion from Mahometanism to Christianity is unheard of." M. de Lamartine fairly avows that portion of the cause which he had penetrated with the discrimination which is the prerogative of genius. And, as a Catholic, he could have penetrated no further. They have never had an opportunity of seeing Christianity unalloyed with idolatry, and they naturally conceive that all Christians must be idolaters. We were acquainted with an Arab Emir of the mountains of Lebanon, who had renounced Christianity and become a Mahometan, on account, as he said himself, of his not being able to bear the idea of creature worship; and this, at a time when there were numerous Protestant missionaries in Syria that were sending home volumes of reports and researches.

We cannot here help quoting an expression which we heard from the lips of a worthy and most useful American Missionary, addressed to some fellow Missionary, who had arrived from America, ready to make an *Auto-da-fé* of all Mahometans— "You will see practised by the Turks the virtues we talk of in Christendom!"

Nobody, of the commonest information, is ignorant of the fact that Mahometanism reckons the Old and New Testament as inspired writings and as *their* law; no one is ignorant that, though Mahomet is the last and greatest of the prophets, Christ to them "the spirit of God," and that the Koran, in all its excellent parts, is a transcript of the Testament, the remainder being wild and inoperative fancies: *but how few reflect on the different character which this state of mind gives to the Mahometan's regard for Christianity, and the Christian's regard for Mahometanism!* The Mahometan, (strange as it may seem to the religious animosity of Christendom, which reflects itself to its own eyes in the dispositions of the East), though he may not inquire particularly into the dogmas of our various churches, denies not the prophetic character of Jesus; and the expressions of contempt which many have misapplied to Christianity, are called forth by the symbols and externals of those sects which, to him, are the only personification of Christianity. A Protestant feels and expresses more

loudly the same, without being set down as an Infidel. Islamism does despise the external practices and the church government, and even some of the dogmas of the sect to which M. de Lamartine belongs; it rejects an organized and bachelor priesthood—saints' worship—auricular confession—the adoration of the Virgin—and revolts at the idea of transubstantiation. But, from the pride and rites of the Romish Church, where can it turn to form to itself a correct estimate of Christianity?—solely to its Eastern rival, where all its faults are displayed without the veil or palliation of its riches, dignity, and instruction. When, however, Mahometans have had opportunities of observing the forms of Protestant worship, and have entered a Christian Church—where no crucifixes—no images—no exhibitions of religious witchcraft or priestly fraud—no revolting display of a malefactor's tortures as a personification of the Deity—they exclaim, and naturally, too, "*This* is *not* Christianity, *this* is our own worship!"*

We shall now quote a passage in which the Reviewers describe the extent of conversion from Christianity to Islamism.

M. de Lamartine has ventured to inform his *co-religionists* that proselytism to Christianity does not take place; nay, that it is impossible. This is much, but not all. Proselytism is now rapidly going on from Christianity to Islamism. We state from our own observation the fact of proselytism among Greeks, Bulgarians, and Georgians; we have conversed with individuals of all these races, who have become Mussulmans. The extent to which this goes it may be impossible to state with any degree of accuracy, but it is considerable.

This is not of to-day. A century ago there were no Albanian Mahometans—there are now above a million; the Sclavonic populations were all Christians—they now reckon two millions of Mahometans. The Greeks of Europe have been subject to less change, yet considerable numbers, though no large bodies that we are aware of have embraced Islamism. Not so the Asiatic Greeks; the district of Off, which contains a large portion of the remnants of the Greek empire of Trapezuntium, have all become

* The Mahometan can only perform his adorations in a holy place, (that is, not polluted). The Mahometan freely performs his religious rite in a Protestant Church.

Mussulmans. They speak Greek still, (while, strange to say, the *Haichrum*, or Armenian Greeks, the Greeks, of the Greek Church of Asia Minor, *speak Turkish)*; and, preserving the scholastic temperament of their race, have all of them applied themselves to the study of the Mussulman law, and are to be found all over the empire, as doctors, judges, and scribes. In each village they tell you the year when it pleased God to enlighten them and deliver them from idolatry and licentious habits. The Curds and many Armenians passed in a large mass from Christianity to Islamism, on the refusal of the Patriarchs of the Armenian and Greek Churches to permit them to use milk and curds during the long fasts, and these pastoral people have often no other means of subsistence. Even the Jews have been converted to Islamism. A body of them, a hundred and fifty years ago, at Salonica, passed from the faith of Abraham; but they still remain a distinct though wealthy and respected class, under the title of Dunme. The Georgians in the Turkish territory have, within fifty years, begun to abandon Christianity; their conversion is now almost complete. We extract from a recent traveller in that country some cursory observations on the subject.

"Russia introduced disorders into this province, and fomented them; the Dèrè Bey system sprang up, and this, with the discredit attached to Christianity by the neighbouring administration of Russia, has led to the apostacy of the Lazes. Russia, in separating them administratively from the Porte, has brought about their religious union to the Sultan — she has, moreover, raised their character; for it must be observed that the difference here is not between the Bible and the Koran, between Christianity and Islamism, but between the superstition and idolatry of the Greek church and the simplicity of the Mussulman practice — between two systems of which *the apparent differences are religious, but of which the material differences are political and social.*

"The Georgians are proverbial for drunkenness and debauchery; they are not brave, they are superstitious. Those who have become Mussulmen seem to have entirely abjured the characteristics of their race; they have become sober, chaste, and hospitable; these are habits of their new faith. Their character has acquired dignity by belonging to the honoured class. *In confir-*

mation of this change of spirit, the establishment of their schools in each village dates from the epoch of its conversion to Islamism."*

Having introduced a subject which is calculated to shock the convictions, and unfortunately the prejudices of so many of our countrymen, we must naturally have felt not only that we had strong grounds to stand upon, but also that we had decisive facts and irrefragable testimony to which to appeal. Having commenced this subject, we shall studiously pursue it. We believe it to have been the original source of the errors of opinion, which have led to errors of policy, and that therefore in dispelling antipathies, which are unworthy of us still more as Christians than as men, we are contributing more effectually to the substitution of political friendship for political animosity, with the Empire on whose permanency the peace of Europe hangs, than by any possible exposure of the designs of Russia, or of the interests of our own country, or of Europe.

Our task is rendered easy by the corroboration which we can so forcibly appeal to of the opinions of many who have made this subject their study, and by the common efforts of other influential organs of the public press.

We have quoted the authority of one Review of recent birth, but of high standing. We now quote from another at once to support ourselves by the corroboration of its views, and to expose the religious tactics of Russia in another quarter. We refer to the Foreign Quarterly Review of January last.

The most powerful lever which had been placed in the hands of Russia, and which was perhaps one of the original determining causes of her gigantic designs, was the identity of her religious creed with so large a portion of the population of Turkey. The first political agents that penetrated into the southern provinces of Turkey were apostles of a faith, not partisans of a government. The political influence of Russia spread from the

* England, France, Russia, and Turkey, p. 100.

altar, and the present degradation and future anarchy and subjection of Greece may be traced back, through heroic devotion and patriotic aspirations, to religious sympathies, at the disposal of the wily Cabinet in the far North, in whose hand the symbol of self-denial and of faith, the Cross, has been converted into a dagger. The labarum of that faith had been erected in the city of Constantine; it was now to be transferred to the marshes of Peter. The Patriarch of Constantinople, weltering in his pontificals on the threshold of the sanctuary, a splendid triumph of her diplomacy, had desecrated the ancient shrine; and, while this awoke an implacable hatred between the Crescent and the Cross, led the adherents of the Eastern Church to regard with a new feeling of respect that Northern, that inviolable, sanctuary of their faith. In Greece a new blow was struck at their ancient predilections by Capodistrias, who, severing the religious and hitherto inviolate dependence of Greece on the œcumenic Patriarch, became himself the Lay Vicar of the National Greek Establishment, as representative of a master, whose predecessor had equally replaced the Pontiff of Russia in his supreme functions.*

The next step was, of course, the positive recognition of the Emperor of Russia as chief of the National Church of Greece. Nesselrode, in a letter to Colocotroni, with a view of pushing him into a conspiracy against the Regency of Greece, which consequently occurred, and for which, having failed, this Brigand Chief was tried and sentenced to death, had impressed upon him the necessity of preserving the unity of their fathers' faith, which was "*altogether the condition and guarantee of their national prosperity.*" The Russian Resident had twelve ecclesiastical *attachés* of different grades, imposing by their appearance and costume. A man-of-war, especially despatched from Odessa *through the Dardanelles*, had conveyed to Nauplia all the paraphernalia of ecclesiastical representation,—ornaments, pictures,

* In Montenegrin, on the death of the celebrated priest and governor of that singular country, his nephew, a lad of twenty, was called to St. Petersburg; and the civil authority in his native land was there, as it were, conferred upon him, through his consecration as Archbishop, by the Russian Patriarch! Russia has attempted, but not yet succeeded, in rendering the Armenian Church of Constantinople dependent on the Armenian Patriarch within her territories at Erivan. The late removal of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople is another illustration.

music, choristers. Besides the mansion of the Russian Mission, in front of King Otho's palace, arose a chapel of equal dimensions, where alone the Russian proclaimed, the orthodox could worship, and by which alone Greece could be connected with the unity of the faith. But these well-laid schemes were frustrated by the determination of M. von Maurer, (the Member of the Regency of Greece, entrusted with the affairs of religion, jurisprudence, and national instruction.) He was not sufficiently informed on Eastern politics to conceive the re-annexation religiously of Greece with the Patriarch of Constantinople, and even if he had, the project would at that period have been impracticable; he therefore adopted the middle course of an independent Greek Synod, and instantly the Russian minister and the Russian party proclaimed the apostacy of Greece from the faith of her ancestors: while Metaxa prompted the revolutionary spirit of Maina, by telling the simple peasantry that the Panagia of Tinos had been seen to shed tears of blood on hearing of the infidelity of the King of Greece.*

But, while Turkey and Islamism are casting aside their former prejudices and antipathies against Christianity and Europe, are we, who aspire to such superiority of philanthropic views and of *information*, to remain behindhand in casting away prejudices and antipathies, which are not in our national character, which are not in our religious feelings, and which can have existence solely in ignorance of facts, for which there is now no longer any excuse?

We cannot conclude without quoting the sentiments, on this subject, of the Moniteur Ottoman.

A fact occurs to-day, which has occurred once before in the history of Europe. The fact is, a violent animosity against Mahommedans changing suddenly into contrary sentiments, and

* The chapel did not come out till two months after the deed of separation, but this is only an additional illustration of the whole scheme, because M. von Maurer's promptitude had anticipated, by a sudden and unexpected decision, the long discussions which Russia, of course, expected on so knotty a question.

seeking, with all the good faith of real regret, to discover its errors.

The early times of the Crusades, that long *cauchemar* of the Christians, was a period of bitter hatred, of infuriated passions, rejecting all inquiry, and exercising a despotical action over the masses of men that passed over to Asia. To hate and to fight, such was the only thought of the Crusaders, during the eleventh century. But, in the succeeding, opinion changes. The struggle between two systems, religious and social, loses its character of blind fury. It continues, because begun; but the spirit of inquiry had taken the place of passion; fanatical prejudices are effaced. The Crusaders study the character and habits of their enemies; sympathies arise; and from this moment commences that movement of civilization, which was the final result of that vast irruption of the West on the East.

The crusade of civilization of the nineteenth century commenced precisely as the religious crusade of the eleventh—in prejudices, blind hate, and condemnation without reason. It finishes, like that of the thirteenth, in inquiry, sympathy, and justice. Ten years have sufficed to operate this re-action, which in another age required two centuries. The diffusion of knowledge, facility of communication, and the immense power of the press, explain the difference. Thanks to those whose high intelligence raises them above the prejudices of their day, to whose investigations we owe this return to impartiality, fraternity; this return to the true spirit of civilization.

REPLY OF GENERAL HENRY DEMBINSKI

TO THE ARTICLE OF

M. PAGES DE L'ARIEGE,

ON THE OCCUPATION OF ALGIERS.

I read yesterday, with a lively interest, in the Journal "*Le Temps*," an article of M. Pagès de l'Ariége on the question of Algiers. I venture to put forward a few lines in reply to it. I shall not follow the author in his arguments, however lucid and profound they are, with regard to the internal question, that is to say, the question of details by which Algiers must belong to France, or of those who, actuated by the same motives, might advise its being abandoned. I only wish to take up the political side of the question. The article says: "*But Algiers, a French colony, with its influence on the Mediterranean, with its present and future importance, Algiers ceasing to belong to Pirates, Algiers no longer being able to belong to a rival nation which would convert it into a military arsenal, a commercial entrepot, a grand field for cultivation. Such is the political view of the question.*"

I must here beg to express my dissent from the author. I believe I do not err in saying that the political question of Algiers is not at Algiers, but at Constantinople, at Cairo, at Alexandria, at Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco — every where, in a word, where Mussulman nationality exists. The commercial world, as well as that portion of mankind which follows the progress of civilisation, has its eyed fixed on the

Eastern question; on its solution depend the future destinies of the world. In order that this important question may be solved in a manner favourable to humanity, it is essential not only that we should see Turkey strong, but, above all, that she should confide in her allies. Now, the battles fought by Abd-el-Kader cannot be indifferent to every good Mussulman, that is to say, to every good Turkish patriot; for the more they have been unfortunate in the wars waged during the last century, the more easily are they excited to admire the warlike renown of every disciple of Mahomet, whoever he may be. Yes, I doubt not that the eyes and wits of every Mussulman follow with attention the struggle which is engaged on the territory of Dziezzar — the invincible, for this is the appellation given to Algiers in Turkey. What do they see there? The French, their most ancient allies, delighting in the destruction of their brethren in God. Is this the mode of gaining their confidence?—Is this, above all, the way to strengthen the power of the Grand Seignor, to assist him in his reforms?

I may affirm, with a full knowledge of the facts acquired on the spot, that this occupation of Algiers by France creates discontent in the populations of the empire against their Sovereign. I know I shall be told that the power of the Grand Seignor was incapable of repressing the piracy committed with the cognizance of the Regency of Algiers, but justice requires that we should go back to the time when the expedition of Algiers was prepared. What was then the power of the Grand Seignor? Nothing! The incessant revolts of the Janissaries hindered him from being master in his capital; how could he then become master at Algiers? At the present day, when the regularity of the service is secured, Algiers, in the hands of the Porte, would no longer be dangerous to merchants; and with regard to the interests of commerce and the colonists, treaties may stipulate them,

and make them more advantageous to France than those of a colony protected by the range of cannon.

I shall not dilate upon the grave nature of the Eastern question, upon the immense results that its solution will have on the commercial world; but it is then, more than ever, that we may appreciate the incalculable advantages which would be acquired by the power which could act towards the Turkish nation with the justice which is due to her. France, more happily situated in this respect than England, would see her southern shores attain prosperity hitherto unrivalled, since the merchandize which follows the route of the sea, in going round the Cape of Good Hope, might reach the Mediterranean directly in traversing Syria, and take back by the same route the productions of the manufacturing industry of France.

This is the state of the political question. In this instance, as M. O. Barrot, one of the most conscientious orators of the Chamber of Deputies, said on the subject of the amendment on Poland, "It is, by a rare coincidence, in harmony with honour and strict justice." Yes, I repeat, strict justice: the true interests of France require that Algiers should be restored to its nationality. In regard to civilization, indeed, every thing appears to indicate that the result will be more prompt when the reforms shall proceed from that quarter which speaks in the name of force?

It may, perhaps, excite astonishment that a stranger should take so deep an interest in this question; but, as a Pole, I cannot remain a stranger to any thing which interests the Ottoman empire. It is because our ancestors did not sufficiently well understand their mutual interests, that we are one and all of us fallen into misfortune. Ever since a perfidious and subtle enemy meddled with our affairs, our sufferings have never ceased. This day, at least, Poles and Turks, we must employ every effort to repair the

evil which has been committed, to stop that which threatens the rest of mankind! Turkey can be saved, and must be saved: otherwise the fate which we suffer will be (with a slight difference) that of all Europe. Turkey has in her hands strength sufficient for her conservation, but she must not be weakened. We have no strength; but we are dispersed throughout the world to bear witness of the truth! to serve as a living example of the fate which attends those who for a single moment put faith in the promises, oaths, or treaties of Russia;—the moment Catharine had sworn to guarantee our territory, we ceased to exist.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF RUSSIA WITH THE COURT OF PEKIN.

PART I.

WITHIN the last few years, the increasing interest attached to our relations with China has given rise in many of the commercial cities of the Empire to petitions to Parliament in favour of some decided step on the part of the executive, to protect our Chinese trade, and to place our interests and national dignity, in those remote regions, beyond the reach of injury and insult.

We are not aware that any English publication has hitherto touched upon the diplomatic relations of Russia with the Celestial Empire; yet, during more than a century, the most intimate relations have subsisted between the Chinese government and a Russian Mission in disguise at Pekin, to the influence of which, judging from the character of Russian diplomacy in every other country, may probably, in

a great measure, be ascribed the various annoyances to which our merchants at Canton have been so repeatedly exposed.

But the commercial projects which Russia is at this moment carrying into execution are of a character to deserve the immediate and most serious attention of this country. In reviewing, in a former number, the work of Dr. Nebenius, on the "Customs Union," we expressed our alarm at the connection between that extraordinary confederacy, and the policy of Russia. We were convinced that the Customs Union, however admirably contrived for the aggrandisement of Prussia on the ruins of the constitutional freedom of the German States, and of the independent Sovereignty of the German Princes, was in reality the western bulwark of a far grander design, of a League, the object of which is to annihilate the commercial and manufacturing prosperity of England, and to strike a death-blow at our maritime supremacy, by placing the markets of Europe and Asia under the supreme and exclusive command of Russia.

Our latest intelligence from Vienna comes to confirm our worst apprehensions. In the Frankfort Journal, several articles have lately ap-

peared, announcing that Prussia is actively engaged in negotiations at St. Petersburgh and at Vienna; and that we may daily expect to hear of the ratification of a convention, having for its object the facilitation of the transit trade to China through the heart of Russia, by which means the manufactures of Germany may find their way to our Indian frontier, and supplant us along the whole line of markets through Central Asia.

Whatever course his Majesty's Government may think proper to pursue, in order to secure our interests, so directly endangered by these designs, it cannot but be matter of deep humiliation to every Englishman to perceive that these projects are not even kept a secret by the Cabinets of Europe, but that, owing to our supineness, our ignorance, and our apathy, even the petty States of Germany encourage their promulgation, for the purpose of exciting a National feeling in favour of designs, the very object of which they do not hesitate to own to be inimical to the interests of England, and favourable to those of Russia; two interests which are not termed opposed, as, for instance, those of France and England, or any other

interests which may be at variance, but which are opposed in the sense of distinct, positive, and implacable hostility.

If any thing could rouse the government of this country to a sense of the necessity of prompt action, it surely would be the progress of this system, which is of infinitely deeper importance than the continental system of Bonaparte. It has been preparing for some time, and Dr. Nebenius conceives it will be fully accomplished within eight years.

The vital importance of the Black Sea must now be manifest to every class of our readers. It is the high road to India, and, if we do not occupy it, Russia will occupy it, to our exclusion. We consider the present designs of Russia to be fraught with equal danger to us, as was to Venice the discovery by Vasco di Gama of the passage to the East Indies, round the Cape of Good Hope. When the news of that event reached the inhabitants of Malamocco, the consternation was universal. It required no peculiar commercial intelligence, no administrative sagacity, to point out its fatal consequences to the fortunes of the Republic,

and every citizen of the State felt, equally with the Doge himself, the national calamity.

The following is the article from the Frankfort Gazette:

Berlin, May 29, 1836.

Amongst the strangers of distinction who were presented on Monday to the Emperor Nicholas, at St. Petersburgh, was M. Westphal, Privy Councillor of Finance to the King of Prussia. It may be regarded as auguring well for the commerce of Prussia, that her finance department is at present represented both at St. Petersburgh and Vienna by two of her ablest statesmen. For M. Kühne, councillor of state, is at Vienna, and if the activity of this distinguished financier were not to obtain, during his present mission, the same advantages for the commerce of Germany which he procured during the negotiations for the union of the customs, we may still hope for a more exact acquaintance with certain relations, which Germany may call an unknown field, although they are of the deepest importance for her commerce. The connection between Vienna and Constantinople by steamboats, which promises so great a profit to Austrian industry, will be useful also to the rest of Germany. In general, our reviving commerce ought now to seek, above all, to secure to merchandise routes of transit. The middle ages, in which the great communications by sea were still unknown, principally made use of the free cities of the German empire as depots of commerce. *The more England, after becoming powerful by sea, carried away the commerce of the world, the more did these cities lose their splendour and their riches.* But certain indications prove that the great continent of Asia, which is not accessible by sea, prefers drawing its immense supplies from Germany. We refer those who doubt this assertion to the great number of Orientals who make their purchases at every fair at Leipzig, even on account of Trebizonde and Teheran, and to the colonies of Walachian Jews and Turks who reside at Vienna, and keep up

commercial relations with their countries. It is well known also, that a great quantity of German cloths, especially of those manufactured in Silesia and other parts of Prussia, have entered China, through the vast territory of Russia, before this road was closed to our commerce. In order to indemnify us for this loss, we have sought to communicate by sea with Canton, but in vain; still we may presume that the Chinese continue to feel the want of our cloths. It is true that the south of China does not require cloth for wearing apparel; but the road from Canton to Kiachta is so long and so inconvenient for Chinese routine, that a formal change is necessary in the condition of that country, in order to substitute a direct communication with the Hong merchants of Canton for the passage through Russia.

It is precisely with this view that the negotiations of Mr. Westphal, at St. Petersburgh, may be very important to us. At present, it is especially necessary to engage Russia to abandon her principle of interdicting the passage of all merchandize, a principle which does not belong to her commercial policy, and which does not enter into any prohibitive system of the greater part of the European states; and in reality it is the real interest of Russia which prescribes the abolition of this interdict; for this country is at present deprived of the great advantages which it would derive from a flourishing transit trade, whilst its own fabrics and manufactures are not yet in a state to satisfy the wants of Asia, which touches her frontiers.

We shall exert our best efforts to warn the public of the impending danger, and we cannot better commence our articles on China than by giving a copy of the treaty concluded between that Empire and Russia, in 1727.

The definitive treaty between Russia and China was signed and proclaimed on the frontier the 21st of October (old style) 1727; but, having been drawn up in the name of the Empress Catherine

Alexeiewna, whose decease was not at that time known, its ratification did not take place till the 14th of June, 1728, in the name of the Emperor, Peter the Second. It was exchanged near the banks of the Kiakhta. In Mandchou, the original of this treaty is called "*Dchouwan emou Rhatsin-ni-bitkhe,*" or the *Writing of the Eleven Articles.* In Mongol it is called *Namats*, or *Namits.* This last word appears to have been introduced into this language by the Nestorian priests, for it closely resembles the Syriac *Nomôus*, and the Arab *Namôus*, which signify *law.* This treaty was originally written in Mandchou, and subsequently translated into Latin and Russian. These two translations are in many parts inaccurate, but the following one may be depended upon as correct.

By order of the august Emperor of the kingdom of Daitsing,* there met in order to conclude a treaty of peace, and to fix the frontiers,

Tchabina, Privy Councillor, President of the Tribunal of the Mandarins, and Assessor of the Ministry of the Interior;

Tegout, Privy Councillor, President of the Tribunal which governs the External Provinces,† and Grandee of the Red Banner;

Toulichin, Vice-President of the Ministry of War; and

The Ambassador of the Empress of the Empire of the Oros,‡ the Illyrian Count, Sawa Wladislawitche.

These Plenipotentiaries of the two empires met at Nibtchoo,§ to conclude a treaty of peace, and to determine the frontier: the following are the articles, which they drew up with exactness.

* This is the name of the Mandchou dynasty at present reigning in China. In Chinese, Thai-thsing.

† Toulorgi golo be dasara dchourgan, also called *Monggo Dchourgan*, or the Mongol tribunal; in Chinese, Li Fan Youan. He governs the provinces situated beyond the Great Wall. One might also call it the tribunal of foreign affairs, because he is charged with the negociations and the communications with foreign powers, and with their embassies.

‡ Oros is the name that almost all the Asiatic nations give to the Russians.

§ Name given by the Mandchoux to the town of Nertchinsk.

ARTICLE I.—The present treaty has been concluded for the perpetual maintenance of peace between the two empires. It is, therefore, agreed, that, from this day forward, each empire shall govern and carefully watch over its subjects. In virtue of the peace concluded, the two empires shall rigorously maintain and keep their own subjects in order, to avoid all occasion of disputes.

ARTICLE II.—This treaty of present peace, renewed and concluded between the two empires, requires that there should be no farther question of what has previously taken place between the two powers. Former deserters shall not be demanded again, and they shall remain in the empire where they are at present; but those who shall henceforth pass the frontier shall not on any pretext whatsoever be retained. On the contrary, they shall be sought for without delay, to be taken, and delivered up to the authorities on the respective frontiers.

ARTICLE III.—The Grandees of the Central Empire, and the Illyrian Count, Sawa Wladislawitche, Ambassador of the Oros, have determined that the principal object of their labours was to fix the frontier of the two empires; but that it would be impossible to determine it with accuracy, unless the ground were minutely inspected. To this end, the Illyrian Count, Sawa Wladislawitche, Ambassador of the Empire of Oros, went himself to the frontier with Tsereuf, Adjutant-General of the Central Empire, Doroi Giyonwang,* of the Dehasak, and son-in-law of the Emperor, Beszuge, Commander of the Imperial Guard; and Toulichin, Vice-President of the Department of war.

They agreed in the following manner upon the points by which the frontier was to pass:—The country situated between the guard-house of the empire of the Oros, near the stream of Kiakhta, and the signal (obo) of the Central Empire, situated on the summit of Mount Orkhoïtou, is to be equally divided; and a signal (obo) is to be erected there, which shall serve as a mark for the frontier. The staple of commerce shall be established in the

* The Doroi Giyonwang were, at that time, Princes of the second class; at present they are only of the third class.

same place, and commissioners (kamisar) shall be sent thither. From this place, towards the east, the frontier passes over the crest of the Bourgouteï to the guard-house of Kiran. After the guard-house of Kiran are Tsikteï, Arou Kidoure, and Arou khadangsou; the frontier runs by these four guard-houses in a straight line, along the river Tchonkon (Tchikoï), from Arou khadangson to the mark of the guard-house, Eber khadangsou; and from Eber khadangsou to the mark of the Mongol guard-house, Tsagan Oola (the White Mountain). The desert between the country inhabited by the subjects of the empire of the Oros, and between the marks of the Mongol guard-house of the Central Empire, shall be equally divided as at Kiakhta. Where there were mountains, summits of mountains, and rivers, in the neighbourhood of the country inhabited by the subjects of the Empire of the Oros, they served to determine the frontier: and where the mountains and rivers were in the neighbourhood of the Mongol guard-house, they were in like manner chosen for the frontier; but, where there were only extensive plains, without mountains or rivers, they were equally divided; and marks were placed in the centre to fix the frontier, which was thus established from the mark of the guard-house at Tsagan oola to the banks of the river Ergoune (Argoun.)

The envoys of the two empires for the inspection of the places situated beyond the mark of the Mongol guard-house of Tsagan oola, decided upon drawing the boundary from the two marks in the centre erected at Kiakhta, and over Mount Orkhoitou, to the west, by the following places:—Over Mount Orkhoitou, Tournen Koudchouhoun, Bitsiktou, Khochogo, Bouïlesoutou oola, Kouke Tsilootou, Khonggor obo, Yonggor oola, Bos Anyga, Gondyan oola, Khodahhaitou oola, Koï Moulou Bougoutou dabagan, Egonden dchoo-i Moulou Dositou dabagan, Kisenektou dabagan, Gorbi dabagan, Nouktou dabagan, Ergik dargak-daigan, Doros dabagan, Keudche Madan Khonin dabagan, Kim kinitsik bom, and Chabinai dabagan.

The centre of this chain of mountains, equally divided, was admitted as the frontier. Where mountains and rivers were in

the middle, they were also equally divided; so that now, from the Chabinai dabagan to the borders of the river Ergoune, all that is to the south of the new frontier belongs to the Empire of the Centre, and the northern side to the Empire of the Oros.

After having completed the division of the country, and made a very exact description and map of it, the two parties reciprocally exchanged these descriptions. They were placed in the hands of the Grandees of the two empires. The subjects of the two empires who were without permission beyond the frontier agreed upon, and who had taken up their abode there, were sought for and conducted back again to their own country. The same course was pursued in regard to vagabonds, so that the frontier was thus entirely cleared of them.

The Ouriagangkhai on each side, who gave five sables as tribute, remained under their former masters; but those who till that time had only paid one sable were exempted from it for the future, from the day upon which the treaty was concluded. A report was drawn up on both sides for the confirmation, which was reciprocally exchanged.

Article IV.—Now that the frontier of the two empires is fixed, and that no deserter can be any longer received, it is agreed with the Illyrian Count, Sawa Wladislawitche, ambassador of the empire of the Oros, to establish a free commerce between the two states. The number of merchants who may go every three years to Pekin is not to exceed two hundred, as it was previously agreed upon. When they are only traders they are no longer to be maintained as formerly, but no tax is to be exacted either from the seller or from the buyer. When these merchants arrive at the frontier they shall give notice of it in writing; after the receipt of this notice an officer shall be sent to receive and accompany them, for the sake of the trade. If during their journey they purchase camels, horses, and provisions, or if they hire workmen, they are to purchase and hire them at their own expense. The merchants are to be under the orders of a chief, charged to superintend their affairs, and, if differences arise between them, he is to settle them. If this chief of the merchants

is a man of high rank, he shall be received and treated conformably to his rank. All kinds of merchandize may be sold, excepting what is forbidden by the laws of the two empires. No one whatsoever shall be allowed to remain secretly, and without the permission of his chief, in the foreign country. If any one dies, all his goods, of whatever kind, shall be given to the people of his own country, as has been agreed upon with the ambassador of the Oros empire, the Illyrian Count, Sawa Wladislawitche. Besides the commerce carried on by the caravans of the two empires, houses for ordinary trade shall be established on the respective frontiers, near Kiakhta, on the Selengg, and Nibtchoo (Nertchinsk), which, according as it shall be judged necessary, shall be surrounded by hedges and palisades. Those who go to these places to transact commercial business shall keep strictly to the direct route. If any of them quit this route to carry on trade in other places, all his merchandize shall be confiscated for the benefit of the government. An equal number of officers shall be appointed on both sides, who shall be under the orders of chiefs of an equal rank, and charged with the protection of these places. All differences shall be arranged in the manner agreed upon with the ambassador of the empire of the Oros, the Illyrian Count, Sawa Wladislawitche.

Article V.—*The habitation of the Oros, in the capital (Pekin), shall serve henceforth to lodge the Oros travellers.* On the demand of the Illyrian Count, Sawa Wladislawitche, ambassador of the empire of the Oros, and with the assistance of the grandees of the Central Empire, who have charge of the affairs of the Oros, *a temple (Miaio) has been erected near this habitation. The priest* *

* It is singular to trace the extension of the political influence of Russia through the medium of religion. At Munich, at Port Mahon, at Ragusa, in America, wherever her influence is to be established, it is through the symbol of the Cross. The disastrous results to Greece from her influence over Bavaria on this point we shall hereafter point out. It is stated in M. Thiersch's work, "*Sur l'Etat actuel de la Grèce,*" that the King of Bavaria, at the solicitation of the Greek committee at Munich, addressed a letter in 1829 to the Emperor of Russia, for the purpose of procuring the sacerdotal vestments, and sacred vessels, &c., necessary for the service of a chapel which His Majesty had ceded to the Greeks established at Munich. Shortly afterwards there arrived at Munich a magnificent testimony of imperial

(lama), who resides in the capital, shall lodge there, with three other priests to assist him; when these latter shall arrive, they shall be treated like their predecessors, and employed in the before-mentioned temple (Miaio). The Oros shall be permitted to perform their worship, with all its ceremonies, and to say their prayers. Four Oros boys, acquainted with the Russian and Latin languages and writing, and two other older ones, whom the Illyrian Count, Sawa Wladislawitche, ambassador of the empire of the Oros, has left in the capital, to learn the Chinese language, shall reside in the same place: their maintenance shall be paid by the government, and, when they shall have finished their studies, they shall be at liberty to return whenever they are summoned.

Article VI.—With regard to the correspondence between the two empires, it is very necessary that letters should be secured by a seal. The tribunal of the affairs of the exterior provinces is charged with expediting to the senate, sanat yamoun, of the empire of the Oros, the letters from the Central Empire to the empire of the Oros, after having placed its seal upon them. The letters of the empire of the Oros for the Empire of the Centre shall be sent to the tribunal of the exterior provinces, and furnished with the seal of the empire of the Oros, or with the seal of the Governor of Tobolsk (Tobol Khotou-ni da). All papers relating to the frontiers, or to the entrepôts of commerce, and concerning deserters or thefts, are to be signed and sealed by the Tousiyetou Khan Wajal dordzi, and the Wang Dandzin dordzi, if they come from the empire of the Centre; and by the commanders of the border towns if they come from the empire of the Oros. The reciprocal correspondence between the Tousiyetou Knan, Wajal dordzi, and the Wang Daudzin dordzi, with the Oros, shall be carried on by means of men sent express, and only by the route of Kiakhta. However, it is allowable to take the

munificence in the most splendid decorations for the Greek church. M. Thiersch, in conveying to the Emperor the grateful acknowledgments of the Greeks and Bavarians, unfortunately made use of expressions to which we trace the greater portion of the delusions since practised by the Russian Mission at Munich on the Court and Cabinet of Bavaria.—See Thiersch, vol. i., p. 314.

shortest way, if it relates to a matter of great importance. Should this regulation be contravened, the Wang of the frontier and the commandants of the towns of the Oros are respectively to take cognizance of it, and, having inquired into the offence, each party is to punish its own culprits.

Article VII.—With regard to the frontier places situated near the river Oud and others, they have been already the subject of a negociation between Sounggoutou, the grandee of the interior, and Fioo-dor Alyeksiyei, Count Feodor Alexiewitche Golownin. These countries shall for the present remain undetermined between the two parties, but they shall be hereafter regulated by ambassadors, or by correspondence. On this occasion it was said to the Illyrian Count Sawa Wladislawitche, Ambassador of the empire of the Oros; "Since thou hast been sent as the plenipotentiary of thy empress to settle all affairs, we must also determine something on this point. At present your subjects often pass the frontier, to go to the country called Khinggan Tougourip, and, consequently, if we do not come to a decision upon it during this negociation, it is to be feared that differences may arise upon it between the subjects on the borders. Such differences being hostile to the purport of the treaty of peace between the two empires, we ought instantly to arrange this matter." The Ambassador of the empire of the Oros, the Illyrian Count Sawa Wladislawitche, replied, "My empress has not empowered me to negociate upon the affairs of the countries situated towards the East. We have not an accurate knowledge of these countries; all then must remain as it was formerly settled; but, in order to prevent any of our subjects from passing the frontier, I will for the future forbid it." Our people replied: "If thy empress has not empowered thee to negociate upon the Eastern countries, we will speak no more about it, and things must remain as they are. But, after thy return, strictly forbid any of thy subjects to pass the frontier: for, if any one coming into our territories were seized by our people, we should punish him. Then, you could not say that we had violated the treaty of peace. If, on the contrary, any of our subjects passes your frontier, you will have the same right to

punish him; in short, since nothing is decided upon the river Oud and the neighbouring districts, they shall remain as before. But your subjects shall not establish themselves nearer than they are at present."

As soon as the Ambassador of the empire of the Oros, the Illyrian Count Sawa Wladislawitche, shall return, he shall notify all this to his Empress. People who have local knowledge of all these places must then be sent to inspect them: for, it were well to be able to come to a decision upon it, seeing that, if this affair, trifling in itself, be not adjusted, it might injure the cordiality subsisting between the two empires. Besides which, another report has been made on this subject, which has been sent to your Senate.

Article VIII.—The commanders of the frontiers of the two empires are to decide according to the laws of justice, and without delay, all affairs, and, if they delay them for their own interest, each empire shall punish them according to its laws.

Article IX.—If, on either side, either high or low commissioners are sent, they shall first repair to the frontier, and give notice of their mission and of their rank. They are not to be detained long on the frontier, and some one shall be sent thither to receive them. After the receipt of a letter of invitation, *they shall be furnished with provisions at each relay, and they shall be received with respect. On their arrival, they shall be lodged, and their expenses be paid.* If they come during a year when commerce is not permitted, they shall not bring any merchandize. If, on any important business, one or two messengers be sent, they are to present their papers to the officers of the frontier, who will provide them with relays of horses, with guides, and provisions, without their being obliged to give previous notice — the whole as it has been agreed upon with the Ambassador of the empire of the Oros, the Illyrian Count Sawa Wladislawitche.

The correspondence, by letters and by messengers, between the two empires being of the highest importance, shall not be liable to any delay: if then in future the letters which are sent remain unanswered, and if the messengers be needlessly detained, this will be acting in opposition to the purport of the treaty of peace.

In this case, neither ambassadors nor merchants shall be received till such difficulties are ended, and then only will their passage be permitted.

Article X.—The subjects of the two empires who shall henceforth abscond shall be punished with death, upon the spot where they are apprehended. Armed subjects who pass the frontier without committing murders or robberies, but without passports, shall likewise be punished in proportion to their crime. Soldiers who desert and rob their master shall have their heads cut off if they are subjects of the Empire of the Centre. If they are of the empire of the Oros, they shall be strangled, and the stolen things shall be restored to the commander, or to his government. Those who pass the frontier, and who steal camels or other cattle, shall be delivered over to their natural judges, who shall condemn them to pay ten times the value of the stolen goods; in case of a repetition of the crime, twenty times as much; the third time, they shall be punished with death. He who passes the frontier to hunt for his own profit, in the neighbourhood, shall be punished conformably to the offence, and the booty shall be given up to the government. The lower orders of people, who pass the frontier without a passport, shall likewise be punished as it has been agreed upon with the ambassador of the empire of the Oros, Count Sawa Wladislawitche.

Article XI.—This treaty of peace concluded between the two empires has been exchanged in the following manner: — the ambassador of the empire of the Oros, Count Sawa Wladislawitche, delivered a copy in the Oros and Latin languages, sealed and confirmed, to the grandees of the Empire of the Centre, and the grandees of the Central Empire delivered to the Illyrian Count, Sawa Wladislawitche, ambassador of the Empire of the Oros, another copy, in the Mandchu, Oros, and Latin languages. The treaty has been accurately printed and distributed to all the officers on the frontier, in order that its contents may be generally known. The seventh day of the seventh moon of the fifth of the years Khôwaliyasoun tob.*

* This is the translation of Youngtching, which signifies *perpetual rectitude*. This date is the 21st of October, 1727.

It had been supposed that the conclusion of this treaty would terminate all discussions between the two empires, but new ones frequently arose, caused by their respective subjects passing the frontier without being punished for it; in truth, the treaty of peace was extremely vague on this head. It was this that determined the great Empress Catherine, in 1767, to order the Commissioner Kropotow to examine and to reform the treaty of peace, conjointly with the Chinese Plenipotentiary, who had gone for the same purpose to Kiakhta, in order to put a stop to all complaints. In consequence they made and added a supplement to the treaty of peace, the tenth article of which was entirely changed.

We give this document, translated from the original Mandchu.

By order of the great Emperor of the Empire of Daitsing, the following persons have assembled to settle the affairs of the frontier:

The first adjunct of the President of the tribunal which governs the exterior provinces Karatsin;

The Gosai Beise of the Dchasa; Khoutonrinkgga.

The adjunct of the left side of the President of the tribunal which governs the exterior provinces Kinggoni;

Watsirai batow Tousiyetou Khan Tchendon dordzi, officer in waiting in the guard of the interior of the palace; Adjutant-general and Commandant of the left wing of the Kahlas; and

The Sub-inspector of the Mount Khanoola, member of the Dchasak, and relative of the imperial family, of the sixth class, Sandob dordzi; with

The Commissioner Kropotow, sent by the reigning Empress of the empire of the Oros.

These, after having deliberated together, have agreed upon what follows:—

Though the eleven articles of the treaty of peace are to be maintained for ever invariable, it has, nevertheless, been found necessary to remove the (Khaskhan) Oros Chevany de Frise, from the neighbourhood of Mount Bourgoutai, at Bisitkton, Khochoo, and other places, in order to carry the frontier over the back of mountains; but every thing shall remain as previously

fixed near the two depots of commerce at Kiakhtou and Tsouroukhaïtou (Tsouroukhaitou), where no entrance is paid. Errors having crept into the Latin and Russian copy of the treaty of peace, and several essential points having been forgotten, it has been judged fit to rectify and correct them. Furthermore, the discussions which have arisen between the two powers shall be consigned to oblivion, and deserters shall not be required to be delivered up.

The enactment in the tenth article of the first convention, with respect to the mode of preventing thefts and desertions amongst the respective frontier subjects, appeared too equivocal and undetermined: the tenth article, therefore, has been cancelled. It has been revised and made into a law, that is to be observed in the room of the former one. According to the present convention, each party shall henceforth watch over its subjects, to prevent the recurrence of such things. If the annual meeting, which is to take place on the frontier, notice is given of any traces which have been discovered, and of other similar occurrences, the commanders of the frontiers shall be bound to examine into them without delay, and with good faith. If, on the contrary, guided by their private interests, they should neglect their duty, each party is to punish them according to its laws. With respect to the search after and the apprehension of robbers, and the punishment of those who illegally pass the frontier, the following clauses have been made and decided upon:

Article X.—Armed men who pass the frontier, avoiding one of the guard-houses for the purpose of robbery, whether they commit murder or not, shall be apprehended, and strictly guarded, until they own from what guard-house they came, and whether alone or in company. After they have undergone a rigorous examination at the guard-house itself, the names of the robbers who have not been seized are to be written down, and to be notified to each guard-house; and especially to the first Taidsi, principal of the Dchasak, and the Commandants of the Oros. The Chiefs of the Dchasak are immediately to repair to the spot, to examine scrupulously into the affair with the latter; and to

make immediately a report, which is to be sent without delay to the place where the affairs of the frontier are decided upon. From thence a man of integrity and consideration must immediately be sent to the guard-house, who shall jointly with the Chief of the Dzinsank reinvestigate the affair in question; after which he shall send his report to the spot where the affairs of the frontiers are judged. The subjects of the Central Empire, who shall have committed robberies, shall be delivered, without distinction of persons, to the tribunal which governs the exterior provinces, to be punished with death: and the Oros subjects shall be given up to the senate, to undergo the same punishment. Murderers shall be brought to the frontier, to be publicly put to death there. The horse, saddle, arms, and all the accoutrements of the robbers, shall be given as a reward to the person who shall have apprehended them. Those who steal horses, cattle, and other things, for the first time, shall be punished by paying ten times the value of the stolen goods. If the thief is not seized, the commanders of the respective guard-houses shall meet to investigate the crime, and to inspect the wounds and the bodies of those murdered persons, in order to make a report on the subject. The commandant of the guard-house shall be bound to apprehend the thieves at the latest within a month. If the thief be not seized within that space of time, a report must be made to the respective places where the affairs of the frontier are decided. Then the commandants and soldiers who have not done their duty in searching for the horses and stolen goods shall be themselves punished, by paying ten times the value of the stolen goods. If unarmed men be arrested, who have passed the frontier to commit secret thefts, they shall be punished, according to the laws, with a hundred blows. The horse of the thief, with the saddle, shall be given as a reward to those who shall have apprehended him. The stolen goods shall be restored. The first time the thief shall pay five times the value of the things, the second ten times, and the third he shall be treated as a robber. If such thieves are not apprehended, an authentic report shall be drawn up at the guard-house, near which the offence has been committed; and the commander

and soldiers of the guard-house shall be ordered to apprehend the criminal within a month. When he shall be seized, he shall receive publicly one hundred blows; and the horses, and the other stolen goods, shall be restored without delay. If the commanders of the guard-houses, and the soldiers, do not find and arrest the unarmed thieves within the prescribed time, the value of the horses and stolen goods shall be restored five-fold by those commanders and soldiers who have not done their duty.

When horses, or other beasts, are found, which have strayed across the frontier, they shall be immediately restored to the nearest guard-house. If they are not found, a report shall be drawn up on the subject, in which they shall be accurately described. Stray horses and cattle are to be restored within five days; after that time, if the cattle which have been found have not been restored; and if they have been concealed any where, the place where any of these stray horses or cattle are being known, the commanders of the respective guard-houses shall make their report upon it, and send it to the place where the frontier affairs are decided upon. On the restitution of these objects, they shall be obliged to restore double the number.

Men armed, and not provided with a passport, who pass the frontier without committing thefts or murders, shall be apprehended. Their horses, saddles, and accoutrements, shall be given as a reward to those who seize them. If such persons have passed the frontier to hunt, they shall, according to the law, be publicly punished with a hundred blows. Their booty, arms, horses, and equipage, shall be in the same manner given as a reward to those who apprehended them. If unarmed men be apprehended who shall have passed the frontiers, the commander of the guard-house is to examine them strictly. If they mistook their way, they shall be forthwith released, and sent without delay to the post on the other side. If people be found concealed in the inaccessible forests and mountains, and if they be seized, they shall, according to the law, be publicly punished with one hundred blows; their horses, saddles, and accoutrements, shall be given, as a merited reward, to those who have secured them.

All the criminals of the Central Empire condemned to corporal punishments shall be flogged with whips; and those of the Empire of the Oros shall be beaten with canes.

The convention now concluded has been exchanged in the following manner:

The grandees of the Central Empire delivered a copy of it in Mandchou and Mongol, sealed, to the plenipotentiary commissioner of the Oros, and the latter delivered to the grandees of the Central Empire another copy in the Oros language, and confirmed in the same way, with a seal.

In order to make it generally known, printed copies of the transaction shall be distributed among the frontier subjects on both sides.

The thirty-third year of Abkai Wekhiyekhe,* the nineteenth day of the ninth moon. (October 18, 1786.)

The immense line of demarcation which separates the two greatest empires in the world commences on the West, at the river Bouktourma, and finishes on the East, on the shores of the sea of Okhotzk. Its breadth is five, ten, or thirty toises, according to the nature of the ground which it traverses. It belongs properly to neither country, and forms their true limit. This frontier is to be protected by the two powers, and can only be crossed at the places fixed for passing it.

Guard-houses have been established at greater or less distances, according as required by the number of inhabitants. The same circumstances regulated likewise the number of soldiers stationed there.

The respective guard-houses are all placed opposite to one another, at such a distance as permits them mutually to observe each other. They are generally not more than five, ten, or at most twenty wersts from the frontier itself. The line of demarcation is carefully inspected every day, not only to prevent it from being passed, but also to prevent all communication between the

* In Chinese Khian Loung, a term of honour given to the years of the reign of the Emperor Kaotsoung chun houang, the grandfather of the present emperor, who reigned from 1736 to 1795.

frontier people. In the wild and mountainous districts, where the distance between the guard-houses is greater, heaps of earth and stones have been raised upon the heights and rocks, and in the plains and forests, to mark the direction of the frontier: in places where it is crossed by rivulets, stakes have been set up on each side, between which cords of horse-hair were stretched, the ends being fastened to the stakes, so that no one could pass the frontier without being aware of it.

The members of the congress in 1727 went all along this line, and agreed that each post should be guarded by mounted Mongols well armed: their number is from twenty to thirty men, with a commandant, who is obliged to see that the frontier is daily visited as far as the next guard-house. In desert countries, this inspection is not made every day, on account of the great distances which must be traversed. The advanced posts are close to the frontier: they are composed of several men, and are at some distance from the guard-house. Their horses remain always tied up, to prevent them from crossing the frontier. The chief duty of the commandant of the guard-house is to survey in person every day the line of demarcation, to examine if no traces are apparent on the turf or on the sand of men having crossed the frontier. The Mongols, like all the inhabitants of the steppes, have such acute sight, that, even on horseback, the slightest trace does not escape their eye. As soon as any trace is discovered, they dismount, and endeavour carefully to follow it on the neutral line, without effacing it. If the trace is that of a horse, or of any domestic animal, they place little pieces of wood, stones, or turf round it, in order not to lose it. After having placed a sentinel on the spot, they advance towards the opposite post as far as the first vidette, calling out to him to send the commandant with an escort. The two parties go to the place where the traces are, to examine from which side they come, and whither they lead. Then the respective commandants surround the ground they have trodden upon during the search, with stakes with small cords fastened between them, in order to prevent other thieves or runaways from taking advantage of these traces to pass the

boundaries. The party to whose territory the traces lead is obliged to follow them to the spot where they end, in order to ascertain exactly whether any stranger has arrived, or whether any thefts or robberies have been committed there. If the deserters are discovered, they are conducted to the guard-house, whither the commandant of the opposite side is summoned to take charge of them. Matters of this kind are judicially treated, and the jurisdictions of the frontiers respectively inform each other of the result, in order to give all possible satisfaction.

In this manner the frontier is protected and preserved inviolate: illicit intercourse between the frontier people is prevented. It is by this care, which may appear trivial, that the line of demarcation has been preserved as it was fixed by the Congresses of 1727 and 1768.

The first and principal entrepot of commerce was established on the rivulet of Kiakhta, which falls into the Boro, ninety-one werstes from Selenginsk; and the second near the Gan, which joins the Argoun at Tsouroukhaitou. All private trade ceased at the Ourga and other places on the new frontier, as well as the intercourse between the Bouriates and the Mongols.

(To be continued.)

[The large space we have lately allotted to the affairs of Greece may appear to some of our readers as requiring an apology. The motives we are about to state will, we trust, suffice to justify our doing so. Greece we conceive to be the only country where England has taken an active part. Spain and Portugal we do not refer to, as her acting in these countries has to do with party, not national, interests. Greece is, on the contrary, a power of the greatest weight in its connection with Russian policy. We have felt it to be so, as the long labours of our diplomacy, the thunders of our cannon, the millions of our money, sufficiently tell. We have asserted, and we maintain, that these labours and this expenditure have brought about, through Greece, the very state of things which we intended by these means to prevent. A charge of so serious a nature—a charge implying consequences so grave and so gratuitous, even though not refuted, requires substantiation; though not contradicted, stands in need of explanation. Greece, moreover, by the diplomatic combinations which centering in it have extended to the whole of Europe, and engaged the attention of every statesman of the present period, is a field of inquiry essentially European. Poland, Circassia, Persia, even Turkey itself, are questions as it were in the air; because, whatever their importance, they have not been reduced to specific and practical questions. Greece has, and the character of every distinguished diplomatist of the present day is more or less involved in this question. Two important consequences thus result from the exposure of the mismanagement of the affairs of Greece; first, the rectifying of a question so important in its bearings on Russian policy; secondly, the exposure of the weakness of our whole diplomatic system, by the exhibition of its incapacity on a field to which its whole energies and its chief ability were directed. We may also add that, the state of Greece being the key to Turkey and the East, and to the objects pursued in those countries by Russia, through the influence she exercises over Greece, a statement of the events of that country is more than any thing else necessary to the just appreciation of the documents revealing the policy of Russia.]

NARRATIVE OF THE AFFAIRS OF GREECE

PART III.

"Impartial History will one day brand their acts more openly than is permitted now."

MANIFESTO OF THE GREEK NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.—1832.

To continue our Narrative.—The Protocol of March the 7th recommended the pacification of Greece on the bases of the memorandum presented in the preceding December by Sir Stratford Canning to A. Capodistrias. The Residents had at that time written to the Conference, stating "that they had invited the government to enter into confidential relations with them, in order to concert measures for putting an end to the disastrous conflicts which had just taken place."

We have seen the mode in which they had concerted with the government in inducing it to publish a *fraudulent* amnesty. A new opportunity now presented itself of pacifying Greece.

The Protocol of March was evidently framed by the Conference, under the supposition that hostilities had not commenced, and had been

prevented by the confidential relations between the Residents and A. Capodistrias; or, at least, that they had not arrived at such a height as not to be easily put down. It certainly could not have been contemplated by the Conference that so speedy a triumph would have been obtained by the national party. So much for the sagacity of the Residents, their knowledge of Greece, and the accuracy of the representations they transmitted to the Conference. But the Protocol arrives at a time when the nation is triumphant, and the Russian faction is dissolved. But the Residents must act up to the letter of their instructions. Their instructions told them that they were to prevent civil war, anarchy, and disorder; that the means to this end was the formation and support of a mixed government, on a coalition of parties. Did it never occur to the Residents that they were to look to the end; and that to resuscitate a party which had expired was literally to kindle civil war, anarchy, and disorder? This was the effect. But not only did the Residents give to the Russian party a share in the government, but they insisted on its having a predominant voice, and

on the usurpations of the senate being allowed to control it.

It was into the hands of this body that was consigned the task of instituting a new government, consisting of the five members, four of whom were of the Russian party, and Coletti, in refusing to take his place as a fifth, was denounced by the Residents as "opposing violence to the only constituted authority in the state." This constituted body was the Senate, and yet we cannot find either in the laws of Greece, the Protocols of the Alliance, or any other official documents, the constitution of this body so often talked of by the Residents. When the commission of five failed, the Residents tried whether the number seven would not do better. The triumphant constitutional party was still in the minority, and not only this, but Coletti was called upon to act with a man with whom the constitutionalists would have no further transactions, because they considered him a political renegade. This was Tricoupi. His name was then changed for another of the Russian faction, whose only recommendation was that he had been consistently Russian. When this succeeded no better, although sixteen days had

been consumed in this struggle, during all which time Russian designs were working well, because the country was without any government whatever, the Residents agreed to allow the constitutional party to have a predominancy, which was counteracted by a proviso insisted on by the Russian minority, that for every decree it was necessary to have a majority of five, so that, as the Russians always acted in concert, the government was wholly at a stand. No decision could be come to. The troops were unpaid, because there was no one to collect the revenue, and, consequently, they became mutinous and committed excesses for which the country has a debt of gratitude to the Residents.

Subsequently we shall see how the Residents acted up to their instructions even to the letter, when we observe on the proceedings of Colocotroni, who left Nauplia about the time of the arrival of the Protocol of March, vowing that he would return to take vengeance on the constitutional party with his klephts, asserting that he had a right to do so, because the Residents in the name of the alliance had allowed them to be proscribed as rebels, traitors, and outlaws:

and Colocotroni naturally concluded that the conference would support their own agents. In the meantime there arrived a new Protocol of April 26th, which the Residents hastened to communicate to the mixed government. This Protocol stated that the conference "*had seen with real satisfaction*" the first act of Augustin Capodistrias, because "he had fully comprehended the *motives* of the Alliance" in issuing a general amnesty. The conference was also delighted that the general amnesty was not a general amnesty, because "it did not enter into their views to afford to acts of violence an impunity which must necessarily lead to civil war." They also congratulated Augustin Capodistrias on giving a triumph to no party except his own party, namely, a Russian party, and added that no one was to be allowed to avenge himself excepting the Russian party, who had tried to do so at Argos, and subsequently attempted to do so under the cover of legal forms, by a *general* amnesty. This, however epigrammatic it may appear, was actually the state of the case, and it is an act of justice that we owe to the Russian Plenipotentiaries and to Count

Matuscewitz in particular, to say that they, at least, had received correct information of the past and had reasoned rightly on the future.

At the time that Colocotroni had left Nauplia, his kinsman and partizan Zavellas determined to seize the citadel of Patras; and the Provisional Government, in order to prevent the reign of complete anarchy, appealed to the Protocol of March, and petitioned the Residents to allow the troops of the Alliance to garrison Patras, Corinth, and Nauplia, until the arrival of King Otho, at whose disposal they had been already placed by the treaty of May the 7th.

The Residents acceded, and General Gueheneuc, the French commander, marched accordingly to Patras, the inhabitants of which, consisting mostly of Ionian merchants, had implored the protection of the British Minister.

On the arrival of the French general, he found that the Residents had written to the Consuls at Patras to summon Zavellas to evacuate the fortress, but to intimate to him that if he refused, he would not be compelled.* Accordingly,

* *Extract of a Letter from the Residents to the Consuls at Patras.*

"You will declare to General Zavellas that, in case he should persist in his refusal to surrender the citadel to the French

Zavellas laughed at the troops of the Alliance, pillaged the town, compelled the Ionian and British merchants to take refuge on board the frigate under command of Sir John Franklin, where they remained for weeks, and destroyed a quantity of British property, for which *who* is to be accountable, no one having been made responsible yet?

We may well conceive what were the feelings of the French officers at being treated in such an unworthy manner. To show the feelings of the Greeks, which is more important, we quote from the journal of an English traveller the following passage.

"At this period I met Mavrocordato in the street. He was accompanied, as were all the Ministers at that time, by an armed body of retainers for his personal security. His countenance was worn with grief and disappointment, and, on my inquiring after his health and the state of affairs, he exclaimed, 'What is the use of all our efforts? We should not have undertaken the task of Government without the promised support of the Residents, and here the first act of rebellion is in point of fact encouraged

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troops, he must be convinced that we shall exert *all our efforts to divert the Government from employing coercive measures against him*, which would be contrary to the pacific and conciliatory directions that we have received from the Conference of London; but, at the same time, that *we shall hold him responsible for his resistance* and the consequences that it may bring about!" — *See Thiersch, vol. i. p.* 180.

by them. What else but anarchy can result to this unfortunate country?' "

According to law and to the express instructions of the Conference, founded on Sir S. Canning's basis of pacification, the National Assembly was now to meet. So important did the King of Bavaria consider the Assent of the Nation to the election of Prince Otho, that the Residents received special instructions to meet this contingency.

The special objects for which the convocation of the Assembly was indispensable were. 1. The ratification of the choice of King Otho. 2. The recognition of the Provisional Government formed by the Residents, which, as constituted by the Senate, had not yet received the sanction of legal forms. 3. The guaranteeing of the loans raised in England whilst the independence of Greece was not yet recognized, and which it was the business of the nation to acknowledge, and not King Otho, who was appointed subsequently. 4. The passing of a real act of amnesty for all political offences, in order to promote the oblivion of all party dissensions.

The Residents opposed the meeting of this

Assembly with all their influence, and even expressed their opposition in a public letter to the Secretary of the very government which they had been expressly ordered to support, and whose decree they now contravened; and in this letter they said that no changes could be made, excepting by the Senate; thus informing the Greeks that the national will was not to be respected, that the nation could not make changes, but that a body could make changes, whose authority was not recognized by any public act whatever.

It was about this time that the Diplomatic Papers connected with Greek affairs were laid before both Houses of Parliament, by his Majesty's command. We have seen that hitherto, whatever may have been the intentions of the English Minister, his actions had been the warmest support that Russia could have desired to receive in Greece. They were, indeed, a support which neither her own diplomacy nor her own arms could have obtained; since the Greeks had over and over again shown that they dreaded no contest in arms with Russia, and that, in civilization and in the scale of political morality,

they were infinitely superior to their powerful co-religionaries.

But what was the astonishment of the Greeks at discovering in the Parliamentary Papers that not only the information on which the Protocols were framed was not appended to them, as had been the case with the Protocols drawn up on the reports of the Ambassadors at Constantinople and Poros, but that the affirmations contained in the Protocols were contradictory to the truth of the documents and events which they professed to characterize. They could not but perceive that during the lapse of time no effort could have been made to undeceive the Conference, since errors and misstatements expressed in some of the Protocols were months afterwards repeated in a manner to prove the unwearied and consummate artifice of the Russian Plenipotentiaries, and the complete concord between the Residents in Greece, to leave the Russian party in the exclusive direction of Greek affairs.

We leave to our readers to imagine the effect that this must have had on a people so sensitive as the Greeks, on finding themselves so per-

severingly misrepresented in Europe, into whose family they had aspired to be admitted, and in the eyes of an assembly which they had been taught to look upon as reformed; and, therefore, in the purest manner representing the generalized opinion of that nation, to whom alone they had been willing to entrust their destinies at an early period of their revolution.

The triumph thus secured to the Russian faction lent new strength to the intrigues which we have left working in that unhappy country.

The National Assembly, in spite of the Residents, met at Pronia. It acknowledged with acclamation Prince Otho as their Sovereign, and appointed M. Thiersch to convey the ratification of their choice to Bavaria. The Prince of Maina, notwithstanding the sufferings to which he and his family had been exposed, was the first to propose a real act of amnesty, which was unanimously carried.

The Protocol of April 26th had been accompanied by a Proclamation of the Conference to the Greek nation, enjoining them "to aid the King in forming a definitive Constitution," and the National Assembly proceeded to lay down

the basis of such a Constitution, and to define the principles on which the foreign and domestic debts should be liquidated. But it was not the intention of Russia that Greece should be connected to England by pecuniary engagements, and accordingly every artifice of diplomacy was put in motion to prevent the recognition by the Greeks of the obligations contracted by them towards the British nation, in the hour of their utmost need. On perusing the valuable work of Professor Thiersch, we find the manœuvres of the Russian Admiral thus graphically described:—

Among the opponents of the Assembly, the foreign Admiral (the Russian Admiral) was seen in the first rank; he, as was well-known, had taken too much interest in the affairs of Argos, and had connected himself with Count Augustin, not to regard as dangers personal to himself those which menaced the reputation and interests of his friend. Like a skilful negociator, he began to seek for partizans in the ranks opposed to him. There was no influential man, whether political or military, to whom he did not address messages or invitations. If they were inclined to lend an ear to him, promises and brilliant hopes were given, in order to excite the heads which it was thought easy to turn. The Mainotes, and among them the family of Mavromichalis, were more especially among those towards whom his manœuvres were directed. He had at different times shown to them in their adversity an interest and benevolence, which undoubtedly does honour to the heart of this Russian sailor. Relying on the gratitude which all this family expressed towards him, he tried to gain

Elias Mavromichalis, named Kazacos, son of John, named Razis, without being repelled by the admiration which the young man manifested for his uncle Constantine, and for his cousin George, who had killed the President. Finding him far from docile, and but little accessible to promises, he sent his aide-de-camp to the chief of the family, Petro Mavromichalis, an old man equally venerable from his virtues and from his sufferings, and who, with the deputies from Maina, was residing at Argos, among the other members of the National Assembly, who were arriving there from all sides and in great numbers.

His project was to detach the Mavromichalis from them, and to persuade them to return home, because it was certain that they would be followed by all the Representatives of their country. Were this to take place, the confidence of the other Deputies would be shaken; and, by persuading some to go away and others not to come, it was hoped to limit the meeting to less than two-thirds of the number required by law to constitute the Assembly. The Admiral's messenger, furnished with a letter of recommendation, represented to the Prince of Maina every thing calculated to shake his constancy and convince his reason. "Since the time of the great Catherine," said he, "our Sovereigns have taken a great interest in your influential family, because they have appreciated the services which it has rendered to our common cause, and the virtues which you have always exhibited in defending and governing your country. The reigning Emperor is ready to repeat his sense of them, by benefits and gifts, suited to your wants and to your dignity, if you will follow his counsels. Neither he nor the father of your King choose that this assembly should take place. They consider it hurtful to the welfare of Greece, and hostile to its Sovereign; because they see that it is composed of *mauvais sujets*, and that it will interfere in the affairs of Greece, in order to foment the revolutionary spirit, and to render impossible the establishment of the monarchical principle. The friends of good order and of their Sovereign have arrayed themselves on our side, determined not to suffer this re-union of demagogues and brigands. You owe it to your dignity, to your

country, and to your family, to second our proceedings; and be assured that by so doing you will have deserved well of the government which will come to establish itself, and that you will occupy one of the first stations in it." He then begged him to retire to his own country, and offered him a brig, and even the Admiral's frigate, to convey him thither. The old Prince of Maina, still suffering so much from the effects of his long confinement as not to be able to walk without support, replied: that he had never doubted the paternal sentiments of the Emperor towards his family, and that, if his Majesty had permitted it latterly to be persecuted, the fault was entirely that of his agents in Greece, who, having been deceived themselves, must have deceived their Sovereign with respect to the sentiments of men born and brought up in the attachment due to his august family. "I am even now disposed," continued he, "to conform myself to the views and counsels of his Imperial Majesty, but first of all I must learn them in a positive manner. Surely, if such are the intentions of the Emperor and the King of Bavaria, they will address them directly and officially to the Greek Government which they have recognised. Then we shall know what to think. Until such a communication shall take place, we must place faith in the communication made from another quarter, which states that his Majesty the King of Bavaria does not wish to impose his son upon the nation, but wishes, on the contrary, that this choice should receive their assent. This assent would be neither complete nor valid, if it were not given in the forms prescribed by law; and in Greece these legal forms do not exist out of the Assembly which is to meet; it can then only be given by the decree of recognition, with which we have promised to commence our legislative labours. Besides, I cannot separate myself from the cause of my friends by whom I am surrounded at Argos. Yes, sir, these men whom you designate as *mauvais sujets* are my friends. I know them as persons worthy of esteem, and devoted, like my family, to the cause of Greece. We have together borne the adversities of our country, together shall we conquer the obstacles which are incessantly raised up against us on all

sides, in order to prevent us from preparing for her a happier futurity."

In vain did the Admiral's messenger endeavour the next day to place himself on a better footing with the "*Mauvais sujets* and brigands" assembled at Argos. Having been introduced into one of their meetings, which became every day more numerous, he declared that he had been deceived with respect to them; that, seeing himself surrounded by fathers of families, merchants, proprietors, and sailors, who enjoyed the confidence of their fellow-citizens, he could not doubt but that all these respectable men were interested in the maintenance of good order. He added, that, having this conviction, he must desire to see them work together, in order soon to re-establish the harmony which formerly existed between Greece and Russia. To which they answered, "that he deceived himself strangely, if he imagined Greece to be an enemy of Russia." "The Greeks," said a Psarriote Deputy, "have never been forgetful of what they owed in their late struggle to Russia and to the intervention of her Emperor. They are only displeased with her agents, who, by a strange mistake, devoted their services to the late governments, participated in the pernicious plans of these governments, and cease not to support, with all their influence and all their means, measures which will bring ruin upon us. Let these gentlemen change their conduct, and the sentiments of the Greeks will change towards them. But we require deeds; since protestations and promises have lost all their power during two years in which we have been so often and so cruelly deceived. The opportunity of showing yourselves is favourable. Second by your efforts the meeting of the Assembly, instead of raising obstacles against it. Lead those men to recognize the government, who, leaning on you, either oppose it, or are preparing to oppose it. Assist us to confirm the public tranquillity, sole aim of our efforts, and protect us, when we prepare laws and institutions for our country, and you will then see how differently you will be regarded in Greece. We know what you fear; but be at ease with respect to our intentions. *The laws and institutions we are pre-*

paring for our country shall be strongly monarchical. They shall contain nothing revolutionary or dangerous. We know and we love our country too well to wish to procure for her any thing but lasting order, and we are sufficiently taught by expeperience and misfortune to know that this order must coincide with the strong laws of a royal power, capable to command submission and to enforce obedience. Trust, then, to us, and to our proceedings; and I repeat that, in a short time, the past will be forgotten, and harmony perfectly re-established between Greece and her old friends."

The messenger had no authority to enter upon such a discussion; he turned the discourse to the late President, and to the pretended insult offered to his memory: but, overwhelmed by the mass of facts opposed to him with respect to this man, and moved even to tears, he broke off the interview in haste and departed to return no more to Argos.

What the Russian Admiral failed in bringing about was accomplished through the more dexterous zeal of the Residents, who contrived to introduce a schism between Mavrocordato and Tricoupi, the former self-styled English party, and the National Assembly, by representing the Constitutional Deputies as *revolutionary* and *republican*. The result of this was, that Mavrocordato, Tricoupi, Zógraphos, and others, proclaimed their dissent from the Assembly, and thus by detaching themselves from the constitutional party increased the distractions of Greece, and thereby gave still greater power to the Russian faction.

The Residents pronounced the recognition of the National Debts due to England to be incompatible with the financial arrangements of the Conference, and thus the English Representative committed his country to the sacrifice of more than three millions sterling.

The National Assembly were incensed at this proceeding, and in a declaration they stated that the setting apart of public lands for the payment of the national debt was "*the only measure capable of giving to the Greeks a real political existence, and of contributing, at the same time, to the extinction of the public debt, and in general to the establishment of the national credit.*"

In this they only followed out the principle laid down by Sir Stratford Canning and his colleagues in the conferences at Poros, where, in a Protocol addressed to the Alliance, they had stated that in any financial arrangements for the Greek State, "*the Alliance must first bear in mind the imprescriptible rights of the capitalists who had taken part in the loans made in England by the Greeks.*"

The Assembly now seeing that the Resi-

dents persisted in declaring that there was no constituted body but the Senate, and furthermore that they had acknowledged in it functions contrary to its original constitution; seeing that the Residents had declared that whereas a National Assembly could not operate changes in the constitution of the country, the Senate could, passed an act in order to dissipate the illusion and to show to the Residents that the Senate was legally defunct. This measure was immediately followed by an act of brutal atrocity on the persons of the national deputies. Armed irregulars were let loose upon the Assembly; the representatives of the nation were dispersed and fled; the aged Notara, President of the Assembly, was forcibly carried into the mountains, whence he was not released until he had paid a heavy ransom.

The particulars of this tragedy are detailed in the manifesto of sixty-two deputies, in which they vindicated all the acts of the Assembly as being in conformity with the Protocols, and terminate in the following words: "They protest before the nation, before the King of Greece, and in presence of the civilized

world, against the authors of such evils; against those who have made this unfortunate country the prey of passions. Impartial history, in unmasking the names of these men, will one day brand their acts more openly than is permitted now. Perhaps, also, the laws, in obtaining that vigour which belongs to them, will one day avenge crimes still unpunished*."

During these events Colocotroni advanced with his army. Yet no single effort of the Residents is made to oppose him. Was it because the name of Colocotroni served as a guarantee for his love of order? The Residents had accused Coletti of having revelled in anarchy. Colocotroni was always on the side of peace, justice, moderation, and a national government. Mr. Dawkins had been ready enough to issue a proclamation, the effect of which was gradually to extinguish the hopes of all the friends of

* We regret exceedingly that the want of space prevents our taking more copious extracts of the Greek official documents which we have in our possession. We do not know of any papers that are so interesting, not only as illustrating the circumstances in which the country has been placed at different epochs, and the national character under its various trials; but as evincing a political sagacity which will not lose by comparison with that of any other nation.—Ed.

England in Greece, but now that he was ordered to support a really national government, composed of that party, he gave his whole influence to the anti-national and illegitimate Senate which opposed it.

The primates of the Morea, in answer to the proclamations of the rebel chief and his partizans, conclude their dignified appeal to the world in the following words: "These men of falsehood and corruption, blind and base instruments of tyranny, who had drawn the President, called in the hope of common safety, into a career fatal to Greece and to himself, at length designed to raise on the tomb of liberty and of the rights of the nation the despotic throne of a tyrant. Hearts hardened by vice directed Greek hands to shed the blood of their brethren, and to sign acts of proscription, persecution, and terrible vengeance."

The Senate now endeavoured to elect the Russian Admiral President of Greece. He obtained the signatures* of most of the senators,

* A document was transmitted to Admiral Ricord urging him to assume the office. He took it with him to St. Petersburgh, to show that at any time when designs were sufficiently matured, he might assert his right to the Presidency of Greece.

and satisfied with this demonstration he declined the honour, and a government was then instituted by the Senate, consisting of Zaimi, Metaxa, and Colocotroni.

After this, hearing that King Otho was on his voyage to Greece, the Senate named a military government composed of Colocotroni, Zavellas, and five other Capitani, who assembled their forces with the view of imposing laws on the Regency and the new Monarch, as was the intention of Capodistrias in the event of Prince Leopold having accepted the crown.

Greece now witnessed the last act of perfidy committed by those governments which had been nominated by the Senate.

In order to do honour to King Otho on his arrival, the provisional government had obtained through the Residents that a regiment of the French Brigade should cross the Morea to occupy Argos.

Upon this Colocotroni and his associate Capitani laid a snare to destroy them in the mountains, but as they disputed about the passes where they were to be attacked, the project failed, and the French wholly unconscious of

their danger reached Argos. The following morning they were attacked, in the absence of their officers, by an irregular army which had made a forced march in the night. They rallied and a conflict ensued, which terminated in the destruction of many innocent people in the town, from whose houses the fiends of anarchy had fired upon their protectors.

Amidst the lamentations of widows and disconsolate mothers, the squadron appeared in the Bay with the King and the Regency.

In looking back at the past transactions, we find the Residents never acting according to their instructions, excepting when those instructions were construed so as to favour the Russian party, and at last we find a body not recognized in any one of the Protocols, supported by the Residents in appointing a government which, far from preventing anarchy in Greece, far from doing any thing by which Greece could present herself to her new sovereign "in a peaceful attitude, united and worthy of independence," as the Protocols had enjoined, had organized a conspiracy against the French troops, who were marching to preserve the fortresses from jarring

factions, to hold them at the disposal of the Prince, until he came, according to the arrangements of the quadruple treaty.

Professor Thiersh thus forcibly describes the conduct of the Residents.

"Mistaking their own means, their mission, Greece and its parties, they had undertaken to conduct, through obstacles and distractions, the affairs of a nation which would have nothing to do with them; and, imposing upon the conquerors a government of discord, abandoning it afterwards, and encouraging sedition against its authority, combating the Congress and opposing the Senate to it, they had seen Greece in their hands fall into a state of anarchy and misery into which neither the Turks nor the Arabs had been able to plunge it."

But whilst Professor Thiersh reprehends the conduct of the Residents when acting collectively he exonerates the French Minister individually, because, though he was a party to the measures of his colleagues, he was always in a minority. On one occasion the horror inspired by his being compelled to sign a document which he looked upon as the ruin of Greece produced a fit of apoplexy, and his life was despaired of.

The French Cabinet seems to have been alive to the necessity of opposing Russian influence in the Morea, as the services of the troops on every occasion evinced.

We are not aware of the secret instructions that the English Representative may have received. His actions, however, were contrary to the spirit and letter of the Protocols, which, in other respects, were contradictory to themselves; and it is a remarkable fact, that every Protocol as it arrived gave renewed efficacy and strength to a faction which would otherwise have been long since extinct, thus proving that the information transmitted to the Conference of London must have been systematically untrue, or indicative of an absence of all political foresight and sagacity.

The Protocols enjoined the Residents to preserve perfect concert in all their measures and to support and concert operations with the Provisional government.

Now, if the Provisional government was exclusively Russian, the English and French Residents might have found it difficult to act counter to the Russian Resident and the Government. But, if the Provisional Government at the death of Capodistrias had been constituted according to "*legal forms*" by the National Assembly, as had been enjoined by the Protocols,

it could not have been Russian; and the moment it ceased to be so, and became a national government, the English and the French Resident must have compelled the third party, viz. the Russian Resident, to support a government in harmony with the national will. But, if a government had been really formed on a fusion of parties according to Sir Stratford Canning's recommendations, Russian supremacy must have been equally extinguished, because two-thirds of such a government must have inclined to England and France; and, therefore, England, France, and the Provisional Government, would have been a majority of three to one, which must have forced the Russian Resident either to act according to the commands of the Conference, or to declare himself against England, France, Greece, and the obligations by which his own Government professed itself to be bound.

On examining the actions of the Constitutional, or National party, under the guidance of their steady, patriotic, and consistent leader Coletti, we find from the death of Capodistrias that every one of their acts was in conformity with the fundamental laws of Greece, and with

all the public Protocols, and the basis of pacification laid down in the Memorandum of Sir Stratford Canning. If they had only received the support of the English and French Residents, they must have succeeded in restoring to Greece order and tranquillity; for even the pretensions of the ultra liberals (if we are so to designate them) only went to secure—1, the independence of the judiciary; 2, security of persons and property; 3, the existence of some sort of national representation. Therefore, King Otho is indebted to the Residents who supported the senate, which in their turn gave vitality and permanence to the Russian faction, for the anarchy in which he found his new kingdom.

But it is necessary that we should now turn to Bavaria, and trace its connection with Greece.

After the Protocol of January 7th recognising the government of Augustin Capodistrias, the Bavarian Minister in London was introduced to the Conference, and he was requested to convey to his august Master the knowledge of a new Protocol of February 14th, which was framed on the information that had been received in London subsequently to the attempted massacre

of the deputies at Argos. It was to state that the government that had attempted this massacre "was to be respected and obeyed as the Provisional Government indispensable to the country until the Prince could arrive, and that the Residents and Admirals were to support this government."

We have before remarked that thus the influence of Great Britain was strenuously exerted to support an anti-national faction, for the reply to this Protocol was the marching of the Constitutional deputies upon Nauplia, and the subsequent flight of Augustin Capodistrias. We have also remarked that this Protocol was perverted, by the sustaining of an unconstitutional senate, which the King of Bavaria was taught to consider as the only constituted body in the state. When, therefore, this body sent an address to Munich acknowledging the King of Bavaria as the "Representative of all Greece," the King was gratified, as he had been given to understand that this body expressed the national feeling, and he ordered them in a special rescript "to surround the Regency with their counsels." We allude to this circumstance

merely to show at what an early period the ignorance of the King of Bavaria was taken advantage of to impede the march of affairs, and to produce further and hitherto unknown complications.

It was agreed upon all hands that it was better for the King of Bavaria to select the persons who were to wield the royal functions in Greece until the majority of the young Prince, as He was the most interested in the introduction of stability and good order to the monarchy of his Son, and that thus there would be greater chance of the Regency being composed of men who were united in their opinions. He agreed with the Conference that it was necessary to choose men whose opinions were moderate, but constitutionally inclined. His choice was judicious, and he evinced great sagacity and penetration of character during the negociations for the organization of the council of the Regency.

The first person the King of Bavaria selected was General Heideck. He was a moderate man, without any particular pronounced political opinions whatever, attached to no particular party, and who had the infinite advantage, from his

previous services in Greece, of being considered by the Greeks as interested in their prosperity and their welfare. He had recommended himself to his Prince by his administrative talent. The economy that he had introduced into the war department had given his Sovereign satisfaction, and gained for him his confidence. Further, he was an enthusiastic Philhellene. Attached to the Greeks from old associations, he had served with them, and had succeeded in the arduous task of introducing discipline among their troops. This nomination was not unsatisfactory to Russia, because, as the General had served under Capodistrias, She imagined him to be in her interests.

When the King of Bavaria was looking out for colleagues for the General, Baron Gise, the new Secretary for Foreign Affairs, recommended Count Armansperg. It is curious to remark that the Baron should have recommended the Count, after having supplanted him in his office, and being opposed to him in political principle. Count Armansperg had been Secretary for Foreign Affairs up to 1832. When the liberties of Germany were destroyed at the Diet at

Frankfort *, Count Armansperg was removed from office, and Baron de Gise, the nominee of Russia, placed in his stead. The King of Bavaria was particularly hostile to Count Armansperg's appointment, as he disliked him personally for his intriguing disposition, and for his having, as he said, deceived him. Baron de Gise, nurtured in the school of Russian diplomacy, found means to overrule the Monarch's scruples, and General Heideck accordingly was sent to break the matter to the Count. He replied that it would be impossible for him to give a definitive answer before he had consulted with the leaders of his party, for the Count had risen into notoriety as the organ of the liberal party, who had put him forward on account of his eloquence in the Chambers, and had procured for him his office and peerage. He immediately went and conferred with M. von Maurer and M. d'Abel, stating that he could not go without their assistance, and asking them whether they would not accompany him. In consequence of this, M. d'Abel was sent for by the King to make arrangements and settle preliminaries.

* For this important change in the Germanic organization, we must refer the reader to the early numbers of the "Portfolio."

In the course of the negotiations, Count Armansperg, fearing that the king should set him aside altogether, on account of his personal dislike, proposed that the three, viz: himself, M. de Maurer, and M. d'Abel, should solemnly bind themselves not to accept the appointment, one without the others. In the mean time these negotiations transpired, and the French Cabinet who had more communication than our own with Bavaria, and therefore were better acquainted with the leading individuals in that country, lent the whole of their influence to support Count Armansperg, and also showed our Cabinet the importance of their having a person such as Count Armansperg, who had become as it were a martyr to the Constitutional cause. By this means the Count was placed in a position both by his engagements with his colleagues and by the influence of France and England to be in a certain degree necessary to the formation of the Regency and able to make his own terms. Count Armansperg then aspired to be nominated President of the Regency and to have a *deciding* voice in the Council.

In this he was opposed by M. von Maurer,

who showed him that it would be inconsistent with the Protocols, so that the Count repented of his bargain, and proposed to M. d'Abel to get rid of a man of M. de Maurer's independent spirit. M. d'Abel said that he had bound himself as a man of honour and he should not be the person to break his engagements, although the bait was thrown out to him of his becoming thereby a member of the Regency. This disagreement became known to the King, who was so extremely disgusted that all negotiations on the subject were for some time broken off. But, at last, news arriving of the anarchical state of Greece, the king feared, that if he delayed, the opportunity would be lost for his son being ever able to seat himself on that throne, and, seeing that the Count had managed so that the Regency could not be appointed without him, he consented to the renewal of overtures. At first it was proposed by the King that each member of the Regency should enjoy in turn monthly the title and representation of President, thereby to prevent any mistake with regard to their equality in the Council. But this was overruled, and it was then agreed that the Count might be

allowed to enjoy the title for the sake of facilitating business, and in the Convention that was drawn up by the King himself, it was stipulated that though the Count was to communicate verbally with the diplomatic body, he could decide upon nothing without the concurrence of the majority of the Regency. He was given clearly to understand that the title of President was merely titular; *that according to the basis of the Quadruple Treaty and the explanatory documents, the decision on all state matters was vested in the majority.*

With regard to M. von Maurer and M. d'Abel, it is sufficient to remark in addition to what we have said before that M. von Maurer was considered one of the ablest jurists in Germany, and the King of Bavaria had such confidence in his acquirements, and such respect for his personal character, that, notwithstanding his prejudices against liberal ideas, he committed to him the charge of instructing the young monarch in the various branches of administrative and legislative science. M. d'Abel, who was nominated as a supplemental and consultative member, was considered as an accession of strength from his

firmness, energy of character, intense application, and diplomatic knowledge. It was arranged that if a vacancy occurred in the Regency by death or other casualities, he was to supply the vacant place. Before leaving Munich, Count Armansperg and M. von Maurer stipulated with the King for their pensions. General Heideck and M. d'Abel volunteered to go, without making any conditions whatever.

On the road between Munich and Naples, the Count and Countess d'Armansperg behaved in such an indecorous manner towards the other members of the Regency, affecting to consider them only as their dependents, that the three Counsellors began to feel, that the objections of the King to the Count were not because he entertained particular opinions, but because His Majesty had understood better than they the Count's personal character. They saw that there would be necessity for great prudence and great forbearance on their part, and they began to be apprehensive that a man of such vanity and ambition as the one we have described would be a convenient tool in the hands of any one who wished to sow dissensions in the

Regency and thus impede its march. But we willingly escape from these minor details to return to the subject of our narrative.

In reflecting on the past, and looking to the future, all the friends of Greece found the bitterness of their reminiscenses absorbed in their hopes; and they hailed with satisfaction the arrival of new men to take possession of the kingdom, and to exercise the supreme functions.

In consequence of systematic representation operating upon ignorance of the Greek character, the English Cabinet had lost all confidence in the national and constitutional leaders. Therefore there could be no hope of their being supported against the Russian faction, but now arrived men who had not been mixed up in a civil conflict; men, whom the three greatest powers in Europe had solemnly pledged themselves to support; men thus evidently raised above the sphere of partial influences. It was hoped, therefore, that their conduct would lead the British Ministry to discover who had been the originators of all the anarchy in Greece; and that as Lord Grey's Cabinet had shown itself opposed to the irrational movement in

England and in Europe, and marked its fear of democratic excitement, the last thing it would do would be to countenance revolutionary measures in Greece; for any intrigue on the part of any foreign power against the majority of the Regency as constituted by the Protocols must be branded as a revolutionary measure.

Every Greek patriot now hoped that the conduct of these new men would, in process of time, dissipate the illusion that blinded the British Secretary of State, and that he then would direct his political course so as to refute practically the charges that have been brought against us by Russia, that we are the disturbers of the public peace, hurling back those charges on herself with fearful retribution.

In the end of January, 1833, a fleet of fifty-five transports, escorted by ships of war of the Allied Powers, under the command of Captain Lyons in the "Madagascar," brought to this desolate land a Prince whose character gave promise of the highest qualities of the heart and head, a Regency composed of statesmen of great consideration in Germany, three thousand Bavarian troops under choice officers, and pecuniary

resources amply sufficient, with tolerable economy, to meet all the future wants of the new state.

On board the squadron every one had been inspired with respect for the name of England through the admirable management of Captain Lyons, whose services in superintending the whole expedition and whose judicious attentions to the court who were his guests had impressed the Bavarians with enthusiasm for every thing British.

The spectacle on shore offered the most affecting contrast to the interesting scene in the bay.

Persecuted by the Capodistrian bandits, the peasantry crowded to the beach with streaming eyes. No persuasion could induce them to believe that the news of the King's arrival was not a fable, until they saw the fleet before them.

No spectacle could offer greater historical interest than the landing of King Otho. The squadrons of five European powers amounting to five-and-twenty men-of-war formed in the Bay of Nauplia. Seventy boats manned by nearly a thousand oars accompanied the barge

of the King who landed from the "Madagascar," under a royal salute from the batteries, from the rock of the Palamede, and from the whole of the vessels dressed in flags and with manned yards. An antique Greek galiote with lofty prow and stern, crowded with orphans of the revolution arrayed in white, was placed in the centre of this warlike amphitheatre of guns, and between the peals of artillery were heard the silvery tones of an anthem, invoking the blessing of Heaven on their adopted Prince, and the August Powers who had saved their country from destruction and emancipated it from anarchy.

All things seemed to combine to render this day one of great and solemn national rejoicing, to make it the link between the anarchy and calamities that had passed by, and the new order of peace and prosperity now about to commence. A Monarch landed on the soil of Greece which he had but to touch, to dispel the spirit of faction, to heal the deep wounds that had been inflicted, to unite the parts that had been torn asunder. On that soil he landed, backed by the influence of the whole of Europe,

whose wisdom had foreseen and provided against the minutest difficulties, whose generosity had furnished him with the amplest resources. What then could now be apprehended in the future? When were ever such enormous means applied to any undertaking, however vast or difficult, and here what difficulties did there remain to overcome?

(To be continued.)

STATE OF SYRIA.

[The following important Letter on the present State of Syria appeared a few days ago in the "Morning Herald." It was our intention, in inserting it, to have offered some observations on the present position of Mehemet Ali, and the deleterious effects produced on the whole Turkish Empire, through the maintenance, by our government, of the status quo.]

FROM AN OCCASIONAL CORRESPONDENT IN THE EAST.

Beyroot, May.

I quitted Egypt under the full impression that never again should I have to witness such an accumulation of absolute misery and wretchedness. Not so, my dear friend. A few days' travelling in Syria convinced me that the same iron rod that has desolated Egypt, that has left nothing but the decrepid and infirm, women without husbands, and infants without fathers, to pine away disconsolate and in want, is also swayed with a mighty and cruel hand in these once fair regions, which now groan under the effects of unheard-of despotism and tyranny.

Mehemet Ali, this vaunted friend of civilization, absorbed in his plans of aggrandizement, and too ambitious to relinquish them on any plea, is totally indifferent to the cries of his distressed people. To maintain his usurpation, and to further his projects he has adopted the same pernicious measures in regard to his people as he has done in regard to his land; he sweeps away every thing: having monopolized the military services of all his subjects, capable of being enrolled into his armies, or of manning his navy. The consequence is, that the greatest part of Egypt remained uncultivated, from want of able-bodied men; and the few who have escaped the huntsmen (for in Egypt they hunt down the peasants for conscripts,) are not occupied in tilling their own ground, but that of their lord. The Delta, that blessed land, that never fails to recompence man's industry by the profuseness of her rich returns, notwithstanding the overflowing of the Nile, remains without culture.

With the exception of Cairo and Alexandria, which yet main-

tain an appearance of opulence (and this is easily accounted for, they being the abodes of the "Corps Commercial," at whose head is the prince of Egyptian merchants, Mehemet Ali), the eye meets with nothing but a squalid, starving population, living half naked amid filth and mud, and bewailing their hard fate. Yet, strange to say, the scenes that strike the traveller with pity, to find human destiny cast in so hard a lot, to see his own species reduced to a level with brutes, are looked upon with indifference by the Franks. So accustomed are they to such scenes, that they cease to excite their sympathy.

Will it be believed that Syria in so short a time has become the theatre of similar scenes; that her population should have diminished by one fourth; that her ancient and wealthy cities should witness the destruction of their traffic; that their bazaars should cease to be tenanted; that their inhabitants should be dragged away to the army, to become the fresh instruments of further oppression, to deprive the rest of their countrymen of homes which their own hearts must have ached to be torn from, without the hope of ever seeing them again; their families abandoned to penury, and hunger, and cold; their fields to desolation, for the peasants are compelled to work for their master, chiefly, not in cultivating the land, but in assisting at the construction of forts, barracks, and roads, in cutting down trees, and in working at the iron foundries and mines. Even so it is, and, however unsuited their present occupations may be to their pastoral habits, the bastinado and the thong never fail to correct any deficiency or awkwardness in the exercise of their novel professions. Can it be wondered at, then, that Syria, in the short space of only five years, should have undergone such a change?—that she should now resemble a desert? And should the same system be allowed to continue, can it be denied that the resemblance will soon be turned into the reality, a fertile and populous country into a vast and untenanted wilderness?

While I was at Damascus, the fourth conscription took place Never before did I witness such a scene. So soon as the gun was fired, the people, understanding the mournful signal, fled in all

directions. The utmost confusion and disorder prevailed. The soldiers, more like wild beasts than men, committed every possible outrage upon the Damascenes. The old, the blind, and the decrepid inhabitants were lashed together and driven into the castle; but a detailed description of the tumult and cruelty that ensued cannot be contained within the limits of a letter. What tyranny and brutal inhumanity could do was done. Let me add, however, for the information of Englishmen, that the British Consulate was again violated. With an insulting indifference to the name and authority of England, the servants of the consul were taken from him, and, with the rest of the captured inhabitants, were driven to the locust army of the Pasha.

And why all this? That the usurper may maintain his ill-gotten power — that he may menace the peace of the Sultan's dominions — that he may oblige him to strain and exhaust his resources — that the weakness of his sovereign, in short, may enable him to revel safely in the success of his avaricious and bloody-minded schemes.

That Europe should remain an unconcerned spectator of the passing events of the East is unaccountable to one unacquainted wtih the policy of its Cabinets. But let humanity have a voice in their councils. She had a voice in the abolition of the slave-trade; why may not she in the abolition of slavery in Syria and Egypt? Do not the suffering inhabitants of these countries form a portion of God's creatures, like ourselves? Why do we, then, the enlightened portion of mankind, regard with indifference, and even with contempt, the degradation and misery that should excite our sympathy, and stimulate us to extend a saving and protecting hand? I fear the principle of oppressing the oppressed and rendering more wretched the miserable, though not openly allowed to exist, neither the matured civilization nor the benevolent tendency of the religion of Europe has been entirely effective to eradicate. Oh! that no less than a Wilberforce should suffice to make Christian men act up to the simple precepts of their religion!

The Syrians, at this moment, with eyes fixed on Christendom,

are in a state of anxious expectation; and to England it is they turn with fond hopes that the humanity of that country will be experienced in their behalf. The late Firman has shown them that their miseries are not regarded with indifference by Englishmen, and they look upon it as the prelude to some more active interference. This ray of hope makes them bless the givers of it, and speak of them in terms that it would make them proud to hear. Still, it is the opinion here of those who are able to appreciate Mehemet Ali's character, that the subtle despot, notwithstanding the feigned submission he is compelled to yield, will find means to evade the injunctions of the Firman. Nay, the long consistency of his conduct—a system of gross deception practised upon Europe—remains to this moment, I may say, unbroken. The Firman was received by Mehemet Ali submissively enough, as it seemed, but no change in his policy followed, for he *forgot* to issue orders in observance of it.

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I hope our government is really inclined to use the ready means it possesses of humbling this fierce tyrant of the East, of convincing him that his political existence is not so very essential to the preservation of an equilibrium of power in the world. For he has the audacity to imagine that a desire to keep him as a balancing weight in the scale of European power will induce us to tolerate patiently his perpetual infractions of the common rights of man, and his scorn of the laws of nations. I cannot help thinking it is degrading to England to condescend to treat with this cunning Pasha, when a proper sense of indignation for the insults she has received and a sufficient knowledge of his tottering condition should rouse her to seize and drag him to the tribunal of his injured master. I hope I am not too sanguine in joining the Syrians in their belief that the Firman is the herald of some decisive measures already determined upon.

A TRAVELLER.

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AT NAPLES.

The following has been received at Lloyd's:—

Sir,

You will much oblige me by publishing the following, for the information of merchants and all interested.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) H. S. Minasi, Sicilian Consul-General.

15, Cambridge-street, Connaught-square,
June 24, 1836.

Naples, 21st May, 1836.

The Board of Health, having been informed that in the kingdom of Great Britain vessels are admitted to pratique, arriving from the United States of America with cotton, at a time when the yellow fever was prevalent in those parts, has, after due deliberation, determined (in conformity with what has been already prescribed with regard to vessels arriving from France, laden with cotton of America), that vessels coming from the United Kingdom of Great Britain, having cotton wool on board, should be sent to the port of Nisida, where, on its being found that the said cottons are originally from America, and that they have no certificate of immediate purification in a foreign lazaretto, they shall be excluded, together with the cargoes.

No alteration will take place in the usual sanatory treatment of vessels not having the aforesaid cottons on board.

The Board of Health in Palermo, guided by the same views, has determined that vessels laden with cotton wool, originally from America, arriving from the said ports, shall only be admitted into the ports of Palermo and Messina, when, if not provided with the above-mentioned certificate of purification, they shall not be admitted.

[The following Despatch offers a painful illustration of the power which Russia derives from the total indifference of the British Legislature to international affairs. It forcibly displays the power and influence which Great Britain may exert at any moment that she chooses to stand forth as the champion of the independence of other states, or as interested in preserving the balance of power.]

DESPATCH FROM COUNT NESSELRODE

TO

HIS IMPERIAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUKE CONSTANTINE.

St. Petersburg, Feb. 24, 1829.

MONSEIGNEUR,

The principal object of the arrival of General Count Ficquelmont, who has replaced his Serene Highness the Prince of Hesse Homburg at the Court of his Imperial Majesty, was to afford explanations on the political course which Austria has recently pursued; and to manifest, in the name of this power, her desire to re-establish her former relations of intimacy with the Court of Russia. I cannot make your Imperial Highness better acquainted with the nature of these explanations, and with the reception which they have met with here, than by submitting to you a copy of the letter, of which

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Copie d'une Dépêche du Comte Nesselrode adressée au Grand Duc Constantine, en date de St. Petersbourg le 24 *Fev.* 1829.

MONSEIGNEUR,

L'arrivée du Général Comte de Ficquelmont, qui est venu remplacer auprès de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, S. A. S. le Prince de Hesse Hombourg, à eu surtout pour objet de fournir des explications sur la conduite politique que l'Autriche à tenue dans les derniers tems, et de manifester au nom de cette Puissance le désir de rétablir ses anciens rapports d'intimité avec la cour de la Russie. Je ne saurois mieux faire connoître à Votre Altesse Impériale la nature de ces explications et l'accueil qu'elles ont trouvé ici qu'en lui soumettant copie de la lettre que le Comte de

Count Ficquelmont was the bearer, from his Sovereign to his Majesty the Emperor, of the answer which his Majesty has just returned to it; and, finally, of a confidential despatch addressed on this occasion to M. de Tatistcheff.

The Emperor could not but appreciate the step which the Cabinet of Vienna has thought fit to take. His Majesty has hastened to meet its wishes to restore to the relations between the two Courts that character of intimacy which they formerly possessed.

But he has thought it his duty not to leave it in ignorance of the conditions upon which alone this intimacy can be revived, and of the services which Russia expects from Austria, not for her exclusive interests, but for those of the whole of Europe.

Such, Monseigneur, in a few words, is the

Ficquelmont à remise de la part de son Souverain à Sa Majesté l'Empéreur, de la réponse que Sa Majesté vient d'y faire, enfin d'une dépêche confidentielle adressée à cette occasion à Mr. de Tatistcheff.

L'Empereur ne pouvoit qu' apprécier la démarche à laquelle le Cabinet de Vienne à cru devoir se porter. Sa Majesté s'est empressée d'aller au devant de ses vœux de rendre aux rélations entre les deux Cours ce caractère d'intimité qu'elles avoient autrefois.

Mais elle n'a pas cru devoir lui laisser ignorer les conditions auxquelles seules cette intimité peut renaître et les services que la Russie attend de la part de l'Autriche, non dans son intérêt particulier, mais dans celui de l'Europe entière.

Telle est, Monseigneur, en peu de mots, la substance des pièces,

substance of the documents which I have the honour to lay before your Imperial Highness.

I take the liberty of referring to the contents of the despatch to M. de Tatistcheff for the intelligence which has reached us from London, since the arrival of Count Matuszewiz in that capital. To the first results which this despatch announces, and which augur well for the negociations relative to the future fate of Greece, is to be added the speech on the meeting of Parliament.

This document, when we compare it with that of last year, appears to be as satisfactory as we could have expected under existing circumstances. The questions relative to the state of Ireland, and to the Emancipation of the Catholics, appear as if they must necessarily absorb, for the moment, the exclusive solicitude

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que j'ai l'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de Votre Altesse Imperiale. J'ose me référer au contenu de la dépêche à Mr. de Tatistcheff pour les nouvelles qui nous sont parvénues de Londres depuis l'arrivée du Comte de Matuszewic dans cette capitale. Aux premiers résultats que cette dépêche annonce, et qui sont d'un heureux présage pour les négociations relatives au sort futur de la Grèce, est venu se joindre le discours d'ouverture du Parlement.

Ce document, si on le compare à celui de l'année passée, paroit être aussi satisfaisant que nous aurions pû nous y attendre dans les circonstances actuelles. Les questions rélatives à l'état de l'Irlande et à l'émancipation des Catholiques semblent devoir exclusivement occuper dans ce moment la sollicitude du Gou-

of the British government, and consequently prevent it from creating impediments against us during our approaching campaign in Turkey. On the other hand, the dispositions which the Court of Vienna has announced to us through Count Ficquelmont, its evident desire to draw closer towards us, and the declarations which it has so recently made to us, of which your Imperial Highness will deign to convince yourself, by the accompanying copy of a despatch which I have just received from M. de Tatistcheff, appear to be of a nature to re-assure us entirely on this side, so that every thing authorises us to hope that, in our political relations with the other Powers of Europe, nothing will occur to prevent the Emperor from pursuing the operations of a second campaign against the Turks, with all the vigour necessary to lead

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vernement Britannique et par conséquent ne pas lui laisser les moyens de nous créer des entraves pendant notre prochaine campagne en Turquie. D'autre part, les dispositions que la Cour de Vienne nous à annoncées par le Comte de Ficquelmont, son désir évident de se rapprocher de nous, et les déclarations qu' elle nous à données tout récemment encore, ainsi que Votre Altesse Impériale daignera s'en convaincre par la dépêche ci-jointe en copie que je viens de recevoir de Mr. de Tatistcheff, paroissent de nature à nous rassurer entièrement de ce côté, de sorte que tout nous autorise à espérer que dans nos relations politiques avec les autres Puissances de l'Europe, il n'y aura rien qui puisse empêcher l'Empereur de poursuivre les opérations d'une seconde campagne contre les Turcs, avec toute la vigueur necessaire pour amener la

to peace, and that the apprehensions which we could not but entertain on this head, at the close of the last campaign, are almost entirely dissipated.

Your Imperial Highness will deign to remark, in the despatch of M. de Tatistcheff, the explanations which he has had with Prince Metternich relative to the project of European intervention, which the Court of Austria has latterly brought forward; a project which this same Court now formally disavows. The Emperor has entirely approved of the conduct of his Ambassador in not having pushed this vexatious discussion any farther. The accompanying despatch, which I had just addressed to M. de Tatistcheff when his last courier reached us, already authorized him to pursue this affair no farther, more especially because His Imperial

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paix, et que les appréhensions que nous ne pouvions pas nous dissimuler à cet égard lors de la clôture de la dernière campagne, se trouvent presqu' éntièrement dissipées.

Votre Altesse Impériale daignera remarquer, dans la dépêche de Mr. de Tatistcheff, les explications qu'il à eues avec le Prince de Metternich relativement au projet d' intervention Européenne que la Cour d'Autriche à mis en avant en dernier lieu, projet que cette même Cour frappe aujourd' hui d'un désaveu formel. L'Empereur à parfaitement approuvé son Ambassadeur de ne pas pousser plus loin cette facheuse discussion. La dépêche ci-jointe, que je venois d'adresser à Mr. de Tatistcheff, lorsque sa dernière expédition, nous est parvenue, l'autorisoit déjà à ne plus donner suite à cette affaire, par la raison surtout que sa Majesté Impériale désire elle

Majesty himself desires to avoid every thing that might farther envenom his relations with a Power, which appears at least sensible of the wrongs which she has so gratuitously inflicted upon us.

It remains for me now to lay before your Imperial Highness the accompanying Turkish proclamation, which has been intercepted by our military authorities in Georgia. The Sultan, in this document, aims at nothing less than to rouse all the Mahometan subjects of the empire, and he specially summons to revolt the inhabitants of Daghestan and the mountain tribes of the environs. The Allied Courts have received the communication of this remarkable document, the tenor and tendency of which have occasioned deep regret to the Emperor, for

même eviter tout ce qui pourroit envenimer d'avantage ses rapports avec une Puissance qui semble enfin reconnoître les torts qu'elles est si gratuitement donnés envers nous.

Il me reste aujourd'hui à porter à la connoissance de Votre Altesse Impériale la proclamation Turque ci-jointe, qui à été interceptée par nos autorités militaires en Georgie. Le Sultan, dans cette pièce, ne vise à rien moins qu' à soulever tous les sujets Mahométans de l'Empire, et il appéle nommément à la révolte des habitans du Daghestan et les peuples montagnards des environs. Les Cours Alliées ont reçu communication de ce document remarquable, dont la teneur et la tendance ont causé de vifs regrets à l'Empereur, car il voit avec peine que par l'opiniâtreté et l'aveugle fanatisme de la Porte, la guerre actuelle

he sees with grief that, in consequence of the obstinacy and blind fanaticism of the Porte, the present war seems likely to assume a character which is foreign to the intentions of His Majesty, and which will only farther delay the epoch of the pacification of the East.

I am, with profound respect,
Monseigneur,
Your Imperial Highness's
most humble, most devoted,
and most obedient Servant,
NESSELRODE.

St. Petersburg, 24th February, 1829.

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semble devoir prendre un caractère qui est étranger aux intentions de sa Majesté, et qui ne fait que reculer encore l'époque de la pacification en Orient.

Je suis avec un profond respect,
Monseigneur,
De Votre Altesse Impériale,
le très humble, très devoué
et très obeissant serviteur,
NESSELRODE.

PRECIS OF A REPORT ON THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1828 AND 1829,

DRAWN UP FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CHESNEY.

The Balkan Mountains, which form the important barrier on the land side between Russia and the possession of Constantinople, vary in breadth from twenty-one to fifteen miles, and the face of the country is covered with wood. The range of mountains may be crossed by five roads, more or less practicable for heavy artillery and Turkish waggons. The most difficult road is that from Rachova to Sophia. The road from Turnova by Gabrova and Shipka is less so. The most practicable one is that by Aidos.

Shumla, by its position, covers three of the passes, viz. the pass westward by Turnova and Gabrova, that south-westward by Karnabat and Yamboli, and the third by Kiuprekiu and Aidos. Shumla is now called Gaza, or triumphant; it is not impregnable.

When a moveable army takes post at Shumla, as a centre of operations, no place can well be more important, as it opens on Varna, the mouths of the Danube, Silistria, and Rudshuk; all within three days' march.

The fortresses on the Danube are Adakali, a formidable defence; Widdin, an admirable fortress; Lorn; Rachova; from hence the women and children were carried into Russia as prisoners, on account of the bravery of the defence which they made.

FIRST CAMPAIGN.

The Russians, with two corps, and part of a third, amounting in all to one hundred and sixty thousand men, entered the pro-

vinces on the 8th of May without provisions, levying them on the peasants without payment. The provisions collected in this manner were soon consumed. Fresh supplies were then brought from the Pruth, by forced labour. A great mortality amongst the peasants ensued; the murrain made havoc amongst the cattle; and, at the same time, the plague broke out at Bucharest. The capture of Ibrailow, Isaacza, and Hirsova, succeeded. At the end of June, the Turks had assembled thirty-one thousand eight hundred infantry, and thirteen thousand cavalry, at Shumla, under the energetic Hussein Pacha. At this juncture, the Russians moved simultaneously against Varna, Silistria, and Shumla; twelve thousand men against the first of these fortresses, forty thousand against the second, and twenty-four thousand under Wittgenstein against the third. The results of the campaign were, the capture of Varna, and the raising of the siege of Silistria. Thousands of men died of the plague. Thirty thousand horses were lost.

In the winter the Turks remained inactive; the Russians made every preparation for the ensuing campaign; many of the Turks returned to their homes, and the Russian trenches before Shumla and Silistria were left unharmed. In the spring of 1829, the Turkish force was rather less than in the autumn of 1828.

SECOND CAMPAIGN.

The Russian force, at the commencement of this campaign, amounted in all to one hundred and fifty thousand men. Of these, forty-five thousand men moved to attack Silistria. On the 17th of May, the Grand Vizier attacked the Russians at Eski, Amandlar, Devra, and Koslugee; at the two latter points with success. The Grand Vizier, seeing the importance of Pravadi, which the Russians occupied with ten thousand men, attacked it with thirty-five thousand men: and, whilst he was occupied in besieging it, Diebitsch planned and executed the passage of the Balkan.

General Diebitsch marched from Silistria, desiring Generals Roth and Rudiger to enclose the Turks in the defiles of Pravadi (with the garrison of that place closing them in the rear) until he himself could arrive with his army. Meantime, Ibrahim Pacha, who was left at Shumla, summoned the Grand Vizier to his relief. A battle ensued in the afternoon, in which, in consequence of the blowing up of four caissons, the Turks fled. The Russians had in the battle forty thousand men and a hundred guns.

The Grand Vizier, during the battle, ordered out the whole garrison of Shumla, to make a diversion in the rear of General Diebitsch. They attempted to do so, but retired afterwards, abandoning even the redoubts, so that General Diebitsch might have had the double triumph of taking it and passing the Balkan. The battle took place on the 11th of June.

On the morning of the 13th of June, the Grand Vizier regained Shumla, and ten days afterwards his force was thirty thousand men. He lost, in the engagement of the 11th, three thousand men, and the Russians very little less.

The Pasha of Silistria was obliged to surrender for want of powder to stand an assault; the Russians having prepared five mines and two practicable breaches.

General Diebitsch then made a feint of attacking Shumla, till the Grand Vizier had recalled his detachment from all the passes. In order further to deceive the Turks, Diebitsch retreated on Yeni Bazaar, six leagues on the road to Silistria. He then turned suddenly towards Devra and Kiuprekiu. In order to pass the Balkan, each soldier was supplied with four days' food, and the waggons brought sufficient for ten days more. Ten thousand men were left to watch Shumla, and to assault it if the Vizier moved. The Vizier sent instantly ten thousand men to intercept Diebitsch at Kiuprekiu, but the Russians had already passed through, and were on their way to Selimnia. The Russians passed the Balkan with only forty thousand men, of whom, in ten days afterwards, ten thousand were in the hospitals. If the Turks had shown front from place to place, the Russians must have retreated towards the sea for provisions.

The forces of Turkey, during the campaign in 1828, never exceeded thirty thousand regular troops, most of them boys.

Exclusive of the forces of Scodra Pacha, they had never at any time in the field more than one hundred thousand irregulars, nor more than forty thousand regulars. The Bosnians only advanced to their own frontier. Amongst the Servians only a few Mussulmans took arms.

The Russians suffered dreadfully from sickness, the Turks not at all, probably in consequence of the religious practice of constant ablutions. The Russians also suffered from the diminution of food, before it reached them, after passing through the contracts of the officers of the regiments.

At Buckarest, in December, 1829, the medical chief acknowledged a loss of twelve thousand Russians, who had died of the plague. At Varna, the officers admitted a loss of ten thousand men. At Silistria the loss was dreadful. At Adrianople, of six thousand sick, every one died in three months. The fever was carried into Bessarabia by the second corps, which returned thither.

In January, 1830, there remained in the Turkish territory forty thousand Russians, of whom twenty thousand were cantoned to the south of the Danube and the Balkan. The total loss of the Russians in the two campaigns was one hundred and forty thousand men and fifty thousand horses.

NARRATIVE OF THE AFFAIRS OF GREECE.

PART IV.

"Trust not for freedom to the Franks."

BYRON.

The desolate condition, both as to material and intellectual means, in which King Otho and the Regency found this poor, unhappy country, on their landing on the classic soil, in February, 1833, has been already described in our last Number. The nation was without an administration, without tribunals, schools, a marine, any troops obedient to the Executive, in the utmost financial extremity, everything split by parties inflamed by the most violent passions — the country on the verge of general dissolution.

The first steps of the Regency were directed to restore tranquillity and order which had been shaken to their foundations—to pacify the excited dispositions—to approximate contending parties — to create for the new government confidence, recognition, and esteem.

Immediately, therefore, on their landing, a proclamation inspiring confidence was addressed to the nation, and a general amnesty was passed for all political crimes. The nation on its side hastened to acknowledge the authority of the Regency, by taking the oath of allegiance to King Otho and the laws, in exchange for the pledge of their Sovereign to defend the laws and independence of Greece. We must bear in mind, that amongst these laws were considered the Protocols that defined the attributes of the sovereignty, as well as the constitution of the Regency, established with the

consent of the four powers, and which was to exist inviolate until the majority of the young Prince. Severe measures were provisionally taken to preserve the peace, and three courts were instituted in Nauplia, Missolonghi, and Thebes, to which were attached the best judges Greece could supply, and their sentences were carried into execution with a promptitude hitherto unknown in that country. The use of fire-arms was restricted; an administration, an army, and a marine, were created; the schools previously existing were improved; commissions were appointed to consider of the affairs of the church and public instruction; and a corps of gendarmerie was instituted.

During three months all was harmony and tranquillity at Nauplia, throughout the whole continent, and throughout all the islands of Greece.

At the house of Count Armansperg, the King and his uncle, the Prince of Saxe-Altenburg, together with the diplomatic corps, the military and naval officers of England, France, and Russia, Bavarian gentlemen and travellers from various countries, formed a nucleus of society, in which all the leading Greeks had an opportunity of becoming acquainted with their Prince, whose exemplary and engaging conduct gained every heart.

The Primates and Capitani, whose passions had been so lately excited with deadly animosity, met hand in hand in rivalry of good feeling and loyalty to their Prince. The splendour of their arms, the variety of their costumes, their exploits in the war of independence, the legends of their civil feuds, became the theme of curiosity and deep interest to the King and the Bavarians. From far and wide the Hellenists repaired to Nauplia, to witness the spectacle of European society, and the whole country resounded with benedictions on the Alliance, as having fulfilled all that their utmost hopes could have aspired to.

Whilst the Count and Countess Armansperg fulfilled the task of representation, which was the most popular and least arduous of the duties of the Regency, the three other councillors were incessant in their labours. They admitted the visits of every man, listened to all opinions, investigated every question, disclaimed all feelings of party, and in the appointments to be made looked only to the good of the Royal Government. The pretensions of the factions of the past were all impartially discountenanced: the senate of Capodistrias was allowed to expire without mention even of its name. The Regency endeavoured to extinguish in the minds of all parties the memory of the anarchy of the past, and directed the national mind to look to the future alone with confidence and hope.

One of the first measures of the Regency was to disarm the Palikars, and to withstand the extravagant demands of the Capitani. They wisely judged that to show any weakness in this matter would open the door to the monstrous claims which every family in Greece had drawn up, with the expectation that the loans of the Allied Powers were intended to defray their past services, and were inexhaustible. This idea had been infused into their minds by Capodistrias, who in his communications to Prince Leopold acquired popularity with the Greeks, by fraudulently advocating these ridiculous pretensions. This he did to alarm Prince Leopold with the idea that unless he applied his funds to this purpose he never could expect to reign over the Greeks, at the same time that he discountenanced their claims himself.

The disarming of the Palikars, and the coldness of the Regency towards the military chiefs, were extremely unpalatable to General Church, whose favour with the Court made him the natural advocate of his former comrades in arms. He remonstrated with Count Armansperg on the decree of the Regency, upon which the latter imparted to

him that the decree was the work of his colleagues—that it did not meet with his own approbation—and that it should be altered.

Most unfortunately for the tranquillity of Greece, this was communicated by General Church to some of the Capitani, and naturally enough the whole corps thenceforth looked to Count Armansperg as their protector; and to M. de Maurer, General Heideck, and Mr. d'Abel, as inimical to their interests. This encouragement of the Capitani by General Church produced the most disastrous consequences. His disinterestedness, high-mindedness, and chivalrous feeling, are too well known to require eulogium from any quarter; indeed, no man conversant with Greek affairs can fail to appreciate the noble qualities by which he is distinguished; yet this was the third time in which the enthusiasm of his character had become the indirect means of serving Russian designs.

The first definitive Greek administration formed by the Regency was as follows:—

Tricoupi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, President of the Council, and Minister of the King's Household.

Mavrocordato, Minister of the Finances.

Praides, Minister of Justice.

Psyllas, Minister of the Interior.

Coletti, Minister of the Marine.

The first four of these Ministers, as we have already observed, had at the National Assembly of Pronia deserted the purely constitutional party, at the instigation of the Residents and Admiral Ricord. Coletti, on the other hand, equally attached to the monarchical form of government, had remained faithful to the National Assembly, and was still the Representative of the Constitutionalists, all of whom had professed their warm adherence to England, and looked upon Tricoupi and Mavrocordato, not indeed as Capodis-

trians, but as men whose political consistency could not in future be depended upon.

The organization of the country advanced for some time with perfect success. It was divided into nomarchies, districts, and municipalities, with executive functionaries over each, to be assisted by provincial, district, and municipal councils, to be elected freely by the people. The organic law of election was postponed, because more pressing business occupied the first moments of the Regency; and indeed it was not a matter of prime importance, since freedom of election exists in the habits of the people from time immemorial.

The first embarrassments which the Regency met with arose from the financial arrangements of Mavrocordato, which gave rise to much discontent: he made all the fiscal appointments independent of the local or provincial authorities, and responsible only to the Ministry of the Finance. In contradistinction to all the former usages of Greece, he covered the country with bands of ephors or tax-gatherers, and thus, by means of an usurpation of patronage, he made a powerful party dependent upon him individually: but the rapacity, ignorance, and uncontrolled vexations of these harpies, who plundered the country for their own profit, drove the peasantry to such despair, that many of them crossed the frontier with their flocks, and abandoned Greece altogether.

The pretext for introducing this new system of levying the taxes through the agents of centralization was that it would be a saving of thirty per cent on the system of farming the revenue, which had been observed by Capodistrias, which, however defective that system might have been, was superior to Mavrocordato's scheme, in that the peasantry were able to complain immediately to the provincial governor, who might rectify the abuse. The error of Capodistrias

was in acting contrary to the habits of the country, that of Mavrocordato in not returning to those habits. By Capodistrias' system, also, the government were better able to be aware of the resources of the country from year to year, and thereby prevent private peculation; for, when the revenues were about to be farmed, two auctions were held, and the highest bidder at either of these auctions received the preference. The one was held in the district or locality, where the tithes and other produce of the revenue were to be collected; and the other in Nauplia, at the seat of the central government, where, of course, there was more wealth: but Mavrocordato's scheme, although it might have in appearance saved thirty per cent to the revenue, was in the highest degree injurious. If the tax-collector committed frauds upon the people, it was only the distant financier that could do them justice; and, unless this same Minister of Finance had exceedingly exact statistical information with regard to the produce from year to year, there was a great power of defrauding the public revenue. As this was not the case, and as the number of ephors was necessarily inadequate, it was arranged that none of the farm produce could be even stored until the ephors visited it for personal inspection. Thus the corn was not allowed to be threshed until the ephor was on the spot, and the grapes and currants were liable to be destroyed by autumnal rains; and anybody acquainted with the nature of the country, and the habits of the underlings of government, the deficiencies of communication, &c. must perceive that herein lay the germs of distraction, anarchy, and misrule, greater than anything that had happened before; whilst the Regency would be unable to see the source whence these distractions arose. The Regency, new to the country, having their reasonings necessarily biassed by European calculation, are to be expected to have made this mistake, but no excuse can be found for Mavrocordato: it was either

unpardonable ignorance, or worse. According to his own admission, he stands personally responsible for this measure, which he defended in the "Augsburg Gazette."

But Mavrocordato's other measures were still more obnoxious, because they were still more opposed to the practical common sense of the people.

Introducing the European fiction, so contrary to the rights and feelings of the whole population of Greece, that all property held of the crown under the Sultan, he asserted that the privileges of private property were only the result of the supineness of Turkish power, but that, Greece now entering into her rights as an independent state, the nation claimed all the pasturages, the uncultivated lands, and the woods. In this manner, all private proprietors were defrauded of the best part of their estates, which they had enjoyed the benefit of, under the Turks, from time immemorial.

There is no point on which a more unfortunate error exists, in the minds of Europeans, with regard to the East, than that of the tenure of property. The feudal system in Europe having established the principle, with regard to the nations where western feudalism existed, that all land holds of the crown, predisposed us to find the same principle elsewhere; and, connecting feudalism as it really is in Europe with that tenure, the observations of many of the incidents of feudalism in the East has confirmed the belief that property is there also held of the crown. The errors committed by our government in India, and now repudiated by the best authorities, were reproduced in Greece, and, at the Assembly of Pronia, the Greeks maintained the Eastern principle, and were opposed by the Residents, who, in this respect, committed an egregious blunder. The measures of Mavrocordato soon became the topic of universal discourse and general complaint.

The Regency now proceeded to organize an armed force. The only national force in Greece consisted of about two thousand regular troops, who had been kept in a fair state of discipline. General Heideck organized a corps of mounted police, into which the Palikars were invited to enlist; but the mountaineers, attached to their picturesque garb, disliked the uniform of a gendarmerie. This body, however, rendered most efficient service, in keeping the police of the towns.

During all this time, Greece enjoyed unbounded liberty of the press. Every man had the means of freely expressing his opinions, and criticizing the march of the government; and such was the freedom and security of persons and property, and the carefulness of the government to respect private rights, that no policeman could enter the house of a citizen without a special warrant. At this period, Greece presented herself under an aspect most deeply interesting. The experiment of a wise, indulgent, yet firm government seemed to be succeeding admirably, and time alone appeared requisite to secure the foundation which had been thus happily laid. The past anarchy of Greece had been banished from remembrance, and the man who could have foretold a recurrence of such calamities would have been looked upon in Greece as a gloomy visionary.

During all this time, the Russian faction had remained apparently quiet. Colocotroni had retired to Arcadia, and the greater part of the Capitani, after enjoying the gaieties of the new court, had gone to their homes. But, the moment the Emperor of Russia discovered that the Regency had determined on founding an independent system in Greece, and leant on England and France instead of leaning exclusively on Russia, he appointed an envoy extraordinary in the person of M. Catacazy, a Fanariote Greek, who had been mixed up with Greek affairs on several occasions, and

who, during the battle of Navarin, had watched the action in a ship of war outside the harbour. M. Catacazy was first of all despatched on a special mission to Munich, in order that he might bring with him to Greece the double influence of his own court and that of Bavaria. He had been ordered to instil into the mind of the King of Bavaria distrust of the Regency, and the arguments he used were such as would disturb a German Prince; viz: that the Regency were governing the kingdom of his son according to revolutionary doctrines.

The Augsburg Gazette thenceforth was instigated to misrepresent their administration.

M. Catacazy landed in Greece in the end of May, and expected to carry every thing before him. He had adopted, as the guide of his policy, the conduct of Count Stackelberg at the court of the unfortunate Stanislaus Augustus. His first attempt to overawe the Regency wholly failed, but his power of threatening them with the displeasure of their own sovereign in Bavaria, whose early encouragement of the Russian faction we have above alluded to, placed the four councillors in a very embarrassing situation.

The intrigues, and pretension, and interference of M. Catacazy in their affairs, were so vexatious, that at length they wrote to St. Petersburgh, to entreat that he might be recalled, as they could not believe that he represented the real wishes of his sovereign.

A measure was now adopted by the Regency, at M. de Maurer's suggestion, which can bear a comparison with that portion of British history which we are so proud of, viz., the cutting asunder of those ties of spiritual despotism that bound us to a foreign ecclesiastical potentate, and procured for us religious independence.

Penetrating the long cherished designs of the Emperor, to be acknowledged, *at the proper time*, Supreme Head of

the Greek church, and seeing that, by such an act, the independence of the nation and the monarchy must be overthrown, M. von Maurer convoked the high clergy of Greece at Napoli, and, with their deliberate and grateful support, instituted an independent synod, and placed King Otho at the head of the church of his own kingdom. This measure was in imitation of that adopted by Peter the Great, who separated the church of Russia from dependence on the Patriarch of Constantinople; but such was the national spirit of the Greek clergy, that, on an allusion being made to this example, they stated, "Our's is the mother-church, of which the Russian is the daughter; St. Paul preached, not to Russians, but at Athens." M. Catacazy, with his numerous suite, absented himself from the grand ceremony on this occasion, to which the diplomatic body was invited, and the English representative equally absented himself by going to Athens. Any person knowing the state of Greece would perceive that his absence must have given the public mind the impression that he was not favourable to this measure.

The continued progress of the Regency to organize the country on durable grounds must have wholly extinguished amongst the anarchists of the past all hope of again plunging Greece into confusion. The flourishing state of the country was daily lessening the influence of the Capitani, and was giving confidence to all classes, when the Regency were awakened from the pleasing contemplation of the present, and their sanguine anticipations of the future, by the timely discovery of a ramified conspiracy.

In order to give this in its full bearings, we must retrace our steps to the month of March.

The measures of the Regency, in disarming the Palikars, had excited the turbulence of their leaders. Colocotroni had written to the Court of St. Petersburg, on the 3d of

February, when he found that the Regency were not willing to recognise the Capodistrian Senate as a constituted body, to inform Count Nesselrode that, if he did not assist the Russian faction, the influence of Russia would be extinguished. The first answer made to this request was, as we have seen, the appointment of M. Catacazy, with a rank only inferior to that of an ambassador. It can hardly fall within the limits of this narrative to give in detail the history of all the manœuvres he set on foot to embarrass the Regency in the capital, but it remains to observe the effect of his arrival upon the discontented portion of the Greeks, and how it inspired with audacity all the friends of anarchy.

Two months hardly elapsed when secret meetings began to be held in the different towns of Arcadia, where the disaffected chiefs still retained their influence. But no determinate measures were taken until the arrival of an autograph letter from Count Nesselrode, in the Emperor's name, to Colocotroni. We feel that it is almost needless to refer to the contents of that letter. The very transmission of such a letter is sufficient to prove, more than any words of our's, all that we have been endeavouring to establish by elaborate testimony. But there is one inference to be drawn from it, viz. the proof of the thorough moral and political unimportance of a faction which could be supported by such contemptible and disgraceful means. When Admiral Ricord passed with his squadron through the Dardanelles to Odessa, on his retirement from the Greek station, he left a Russian document with Colocotroni, which the latter was to use as he liked. It stated that all Russians coming to Greece were to put implicit confidence in him as the first and greatest friend of Russia.

We now come to Count Nesselrode's Letter, which we only analyze in order that its bearings may be rendered intelligible to those who are unacquainted with the previous

history of the country, and the character of its inhabitants. It was only several months after the arrest and imprisonment of Colocotroni that the secret of this letter transpired, and the circumstances of its discovery and production were not the least interesting feature in this romantic drama.*

* For the curiosity of our readers we insert the letter entire.

St. Petersbourg, le 11 Juillet, 1833.

Monsieur le Général,

J'ai reçu avec bien du plaisir la lettre que Vous m'avez adressée en date du 3 Fevrier, et me suis empressé de la porter à la connaissance de l'Empereur.

S. M. Impériale a daigné voir avec satisfaction la profonde gratitude que Vous m'exprimez tant en Votre nom qu'en celui de vos compatriotes pour la protection et l'appui que M. Ricord et M. Ruckman ont constamment prêté, d'après ses ordres, à tous les paisibles et bons habitans de la Grèce, en s'opposant aux progrès de l'anarchie, dont votre patrie a manqué de devenir la victime.

L'Empereur avait été dans le tems péniblement affecté par ces disastreux évènements auxquels il ne devait pas s'attendre, aprés les soins constants et les gènéreux sacrifices que, d'accord avec. Ses Alliés, il avait prodigué pour assurer l'indépendance et le bonheur de la Grèce. Il aime a Se flatter que l'avenir effacera entièrement les tristes impressions du passé et qu' instruits par les dernières calamités, les Grecs de toutes les classes et de tous les partis se seront empressés de se rallier avec amour et soumission autour du trône de leur Jeune Souverain.

Appelé par la Divine Providence à réparer leurs maux et à protéger le développement du bonheur de leur patrie, le Roi Othon saura, n'en doutons pas, accomplir cette noble vocation.

Les voeux que S. M. Imperiale forme à cet égard, sont d'autant plus sincères, qu' unie à la nation Grecque par les liens d'une commune croyance réligieuse, elle lui vouera constamment un intérêt plein de sollicitude.

Puissent les Grecs ne point oublier, que leur soumission au

It commences thus: "His Imperial Majesty has vouchsafed to view with satisfaction the profound gratitude that you express to me (Nesselrode), as well in your own name as in that of your compatriots, for the protection and support continually afforded, according to his orders, by M. Ricord and M. Ruckman, to all the peaceable and good inhabitants of Greece opposing the progress of anarchy, of which your country has just escaped becoming the victim." This is most important, as showing that Russia had all along made use of the Conference of London, to support an antinational

gouvernement qui les régit et leur fidélité aux dogmes de leur religion, dépôt précieux que leurs ancêtres leur ont légué intact, sont tout à-lafois la condition et la garantie de leur prospérité nationale.

Pour ce qui vous concerne personnellement, Monsieur le Genéral, l'Empereur connait et apprécie votre patriotisme, ainsi que la loyauté de votre caractère, et Il ne doute pas que vous ne trouviez dans la bienveillance du Roi Othon et dans l' estime de vos compatriotes la récompense de vos services signales.

En vous offrant ce témoignage des sentimens que S. M. Impériale se plait à vous conserver ainsi qu' à votre nation, je ne saurais terminer, Mons. le Général, sans vous assurer, que prenant en mon particulier une vive part à l'heureuse reussite d'une combinaison, qui à eu pour objet l'indépendance et le bienêtre de la Grèce, je me féliciterai de pouvoir, en toute occasion, et conformément aux hautes volontés de l'Empereur, mon Maître, concourir à reáliser ses bienveillantes intentions à l'égard de votre patrie.

Veuillez recevoir avec cette assurance celle de ma considération très-distinguée.

NESSELRODE.

Sur l'adresse

A' Son Excellence

Monsieur le Général de Colocotroni.

No. 1558.

faction, and to reduce Greece to the state of anarchy which we have seen in our last number. Of course the brigand chieftain was one of these peaceable and good inhabitants of Greece, supported by the Russian admiral and resident. We have seen how this chieftain, assisted by his coadjutors, opposed the progress of anarchy. We have seen how that unfortunate country, Greece, became the victim of anarchy. We have seen how it was rescued from it.

The Emperor pathetically laments the disastrous events which he could not have *anticipated*—" after the constant and generous sacrifices which, in accordance with his allies, he had lavished, in order to secure the independence of Greece," and the still more generous sacrifices that he had lavished without the concurrence of the allies; and was still willing to lavish, in order to secure anarchy, demoralization, and ruin in that hapless country. He proceeds, in the same patronizing strain that characterizes all the official emanations of the Russian cabinet, which we have been enabled to expose to the public hitherto, " to flatter himself with the hope that the future will wholly efface the melancholy impressions of the past," and " that, instructed by the late calamities, the Greeks of all parties and of all classes would rally with love and submission round the throne of their young sovereign"—in order to enjoy all the benefits that Russia has prepared for every one of her victims. " Called by Divine Providence to repair their evils and protect the development of the happiness of their country, King Otho will without doubt know how to accomplish this noble vocation."

The next paragraph we request the reader will pay the most earnest attention to. It appeals to the religious sympathies of the people. Guised in that artful language which characterizes the Bulls of the Popes in the earliest history of Papal usurpation, that seeks to make ambition assume the mask of religion, and clothes revolutionary and rebel-

lious actions with the most plausible appearance, it identifies the march of Russian encroachment with Papal ambition, inasmuch as they both lay the foundation of gigantic power upon Jesuitical appeals to feelings that reflect the highest credit upon unsophisticated nature, which cannot penetrate through the lurking frauds of unprincipled diplomacy. It was by the ties of a common faith that Capodistrias in 1819 attempted to turn to the profit of Russia, by means of the lever of religion, the revolutionary movements of which he had been the promoter. "The desires," adds the letter, "which His Imperial Majesty entertains on this subject are the most sincere, since, united to the Greek nation by the ties of a common religious belief, he shall constantly dedicate to it an interest of deep solicitude. May the Greeks never forget that their submission to the Government now ruling over them, *and their fidelity to the dogmas of their religion*, the precious deposit which their ancestors have bequeathed to them, *are altogether the condition and the guarantee of their national prosperity!*"

The Letter ends with some personal compliments to Colocotroni from the Emperor, who "knew and appreciated his patriotism as well as the honesty of his character," suggesting "a recompense for his signal services from the benevolence of King Otho and the esteem of his countrymen," and it concludes by expressing Count Nesselrode's own desire for the welfare of Greece.

In this remarkable document the Regency is not even mentioned. It would appear as if at St. Petersburg it was not known that such a body legally existed. Perhaps the answer to Colocotroni's letter had been delayed until it was supposed that, by the double influence that M. Catacazy wielded, its existence should have ceased de facto, and that that Minister would have availed himself of the loose manner in which the Protocols were drawn up for putting an

end to the Regency, on the plea that as King Otho had come to his majority on the 1st of June, 1833, as a Bavarian Royal Prince, according to the family statute, he might also come to a premature majority, as Sovereign of Greece, contrary to the stipulations of the Quadruple Treaty, through the dexterous management of M. Catacazy. If it was so, this was a miscalculation of Russia, capable of unmasking her unscrupulous designs, and yet this very miscalculation turned to account against us. The way that it did this was by pointing out to Colocotroni the plan that he was to adopt. The Emperor knew and appreciated the patriotism and upright intentions of Colocotroni. He knew how to esteem merit that was unappreciated by others, and accordingly, to the Emperor his protector, his friend, and his father, Colocotroni was to apply against the Regency, who would not even place him in a lucrative post. The plan was concerted. A petition was drawn up to pray the Emperor to proclaim the majority of the young King, to produce the recall of the Regency, and, in order to enforce this request, and to prove its necessity, the country was to be made a prey to brigandage and anarchy; the Palikar attendants of the Capitani, "those peaceful and good inhabitants of Greece," were to be let loose on "the anarchists." The 14th of September was the day fixed for raising the standard of revolt. They had decided on carrying fire and sword through the land, and they had marked out the names of the victims whom they had doomed to death. A letter, written from Livadia on the 24th of August, stated explicitly that the military of Continental Greece were on the wing; that every thing was ready; and that they only waited the sound of the trumpet to march.

It is necessary here to remark, that the four contracting powers had entered into a solemn compact to support the Regency as a body up to the 1st of June, 1835, "as the

permanent and definitive government;" that it was stipulated that every one of the Residents, English, French, and Russian, was "to give them all the support which their weight and influence might enable them to afford;" that the four powers together could not dissolve this Regency according to their own engagements, much less one; and that, in addition to this, as King Otho, in return for the oath of allegiance which the Greek nation had taken to him, had sworn to abide by this arrangement, he could not sanction the breaking up of the Regency without endangering the existence of the social tie which united him to his people. Here, then, we find directly who is the revolutionist, and, if revolutionary principles are the scourge of Europe, against whom the arms of good order should be directed.

About this time, as M. de Maurer states in his work, a letter was received by an individual at Napoli from a person of high consequence in London, stating that it was believed in England that Count Armansperg was the only efficient Minister in the Regency; and that, if so, it were a pity that the exclusive power had not been placed in his hands. In fact, it appeared that public men in England were strangely misinformed, as well with regard to the Constitution of the Regency itself, in which it was supposed that Count Armansperg had a *deciding voice*, or nearly so, as with regard to his efficiency, his administrative talents, and his industry. This letter was shown to the English Minister, and he, without any authorization, showed it to Count Armansperg, which, of course, disposed the Count favourably to intimations that were made to him afterwards.

It was by means of this letter that the English Representative worked upon Count Armansperg's mind, and it was most probably in allusion to this circumstance that the Count, when compelled subsequently to explain himself before King Otho, represented Mr. Dawkins's conduct in the blackest colours.

At this period there arrived from Zante a Count Roma, who enjoyed the title of a Senator in the Ionian Islands. He had been formerly connected with the Russian faction in Greece, who had wished to make him President before Capodistrias was talked of. He was connected by ties of marriage with Prince Gustavus Wrede, a man so devotedly attached to the Capodistrian party, that he had been selected by the President to go as his Envoy to Prince Leopold, to delude that Prince, had the letters of the President been less successful. In fact, Prince Wrede was deeply involved in that dark affair.

Count Roma remained about a fortnight at Nauplia, during which period he received great attentions from Count Armansperg and M. Tricoupi. He was presented to King Otho at the express desire of the English Minister, and shortly afterwards set out on his travels to return to the Ionian Islands.

It subsequently appeared that Count Roma, during his tour, had held conferences with the Capitani, in which he had counselled them to alter their plan, and, instead of recommending the Emperor of Russia to remove the whole Regency, that they should petition the King of Bavaria to remove M. de Maurer and General Heideck. Count Roma also alleged (what was not the fact), that he had been at Munich, and that, from his knowledge of the sentiments of leading personages there, he was convinced that such a petition would not be received unfavourably at the Bavarian Court. There are good grounds for believing that Count Roma also saw the letter that we have above alluded to, on which account he stated that he had come from Munich. The Capitani were disposed to accede the more readily to the proposition of Count Roma, because Count Armansperg, as we have seen, had taken care to show that the disarming of the lawless Palikari was not a measure that he approved

of; and because it was particularly the energy of M. de Maurer and M. d'Abel that they feared, and also because the spreading of bandits over the country would demonstrate to Count Armansperg their own power, and oblige him to govern Greece according to their own will. This scheme was not adjusted definitively, when the Regency heard of their danger. Colocotroni and his associates were arrested, and, in consequence of subsequent depositions, a warrant was issued against Count Roma, who escaped to Zante. It further appeared that with Count Roma was joined the private secretary of Count Armansperg, a Dr. Franz, and that this person had drawn up an address to the King of Bavaria in ancient Greek, which Count Roma was endeavouring to get signatures attached to. The general surprise was extreme when, within a week afterwards, public opinion from every quarter denounced the English Minister, Captain Lyons, and General Church, as privy to the conspiracy; and, indeed, a letter was found in Roma's own hand-writing to a Greek gentleman, stating that General Church was a party to the conspiracy of Dr. Franz, and begging to be remembered to him.

In the mean time the Regency assembled, and the majority of the councillors expressed frankly the difficulty they were placed in to Count Armansperg. The Count was extremely embarrassed. He owned that Dr. Franz had broken the question to him as to whether a sole Regent would not be more effective, and that he had replied (an answer which Dr. Franz characterized as diplomatic), "that he was aware things would go on better under a sole head, but that any of his colleagues were equally fit for the office as himself." This answer characterizes the equal footing on which all the members of the Regency stood in Greece. It was asked of Dr. Franz whether Count Armansperg had not informed him that no changes could be made in the

Regency, until the majority of the young king, according to the stipulations of the Protocols. The reply was in the negative. Upon this, the counsellors were willing to put Count Armansperg to no further pain. By their frankness they had shown their moral superiority over this weak-minded man. They further asserted it by magnanimously refusing to examine Dr. Franz's papers, nor did they put any question to him further than to establish his own guilt; and, when they had done this, they sent him out of the country. They thought that Count Armansperg would know how to appreciate this delicate mode of acting, and that he would for the future co-operate with them with honesty and good faith.

However, Dr. Franz wrote from Trieste to a correspondent at Nauplia, saying, "I reported the exasperation of the Greeks, and the desire that the Regency should be changed, and wherefore? *With the approval of Count Armansperg, to whom I gave myself up from the beginning, as to a wise Mentor.*" In this letter he alludes to there having been anterior dissensions in the council of the Regency, a fact which the majority of the Regency deny, as is seen in M. von Maurer's work, *passim*. Now, Dr. Franz was not present at the sittings of the council, nor were any dissensions in the Regency spoken of at Napoli until the conspiracy of Count Roma was discovered. It must be remarked that Count Armansperg, as M. von Maurer states, and as was matter of notoriety at Nauplia at the time, endeavoured by every means in his power to attach Dr. Franz to himself. This letter from Trieste concludes by stating that Dr. Franz had the promise of a higher protection, and an amelioration in his condition, though not an early one.

In establishing Count Armansperg's connexion with Count Roma's plot, it must be remarked that the two witnesses who betrayed to the Regency the existence of this plot were

Nicolaides and subsequently Prince Gustavus Wrede. Nicolaides was one of those men at Nauplia that used to wander about the town without any ostensible business. Accidentally coming to the knowledge of this plot, he went and informed General Heideck of it, who asked him on what grounds he could establish his evidence. He informed him that he had seen the papers, and that he would procure them for him. A few days afterwards, he brought both the address and the petition. They were both in Dr. Franz's own hand-writing. Prince Gustavus Wrede came from the provinces, where he had been himself intriguing. Seeing that the whole thing was discovered, he determined to save himself by turning king's evidence. Ever after this, Nicolaides, who had been before on a footing of intimacy in the Count's house, was not received with common courtesy; and with regard to Prince G. Wrede, the Count was not very delicate in his language towards him, which, however, was all very right, as he was deeply implicated in the plot. Indeed, a short time afterwards, he was brought in a prisoner to Nauplia, for the continuation of his malpractices.

M. de Maurer behaved with the same frankness to the English minister that the Regency had displayed to Count Armansperg. At Mr. Dawkins's own request he repeated to him all the different conversations he was stated to have held in public against the junior members of the Regency. Mr. Dawkins told him that he was misinformed; upon which M. Maurer, knowing how extremely guarded a man must be in a country like Greece, which had so long been a prey to intrigue, said that he would think no more of it, but begged Mr. Dawkins to be for the future more upon his guard, for otherwise the Regency would have to take stronger measures.

The conspirators who were arrested on this occasion were Theodore Colocotroni, Coliopulo, Zavellas, Mamouri, Rou-

kis, Spiromilio, and Grivas. They were the most powerful Klephtic chiefs, and the manner in which they were arrested in the midst of their armed followers shows that the mass of the people were entire strangers to this revolt, and that, whatever grievances they might have had to complain of, they wished for any thing rather than the ascendency of these notorious brigands. On the person of Zavellas was discovered the copy of a letter to the Russian envoy, offering him his services to the extent of his life.

By this bold measure, public order was restored, and the anarchists were confounded; and, so far from dissatisfaction having been created, the nation rang with applause, and many addresses of thanks and congratulations were sent in from the provinces, with petitions requesting that the conspirators should be punished with the utmost rigour of the law. In one place, however, a partial tumult broke out, viz., at Tinos, where the Capodistrian faction had been very active in making preparations for what they had intended should be a general revolt.

It must be remarked that this island had been a stronghold of the Capodistrian faction, and their partizans there availed themselves of the abuses committed by Mavrocordato's ephors to excite the people against the Regency; but, by the promptitude and decision with which the royal government acted, and by their moderation in rectifying abuses, the insurrection was quelled. The principal agent in this partial insurrection was the bishop of the island, who fled to Constantinople and subsequently to Russia, and the manner that he spoke of the Synod established by the Regency, and his misrepresentations and exaggerations at the instigation of Professor Stourdza, show again how the Russian party were endeavouring to avail themselves of religion as a lever of intrigue.

The difficulties of the Regency were increased by further

diplomatic complications. M. Catacazy, finding that, notwithstanding his visit to Munich, he could obtain no influence over the Council, wrote to apprize the Court of St. Petersburg of his ill-success, and, consequently, a Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires, M. de Gasser, was sent by his sovereign to Nauplia, in order to strengthen Russian influence by all the means of action which a Bavarian diplomatist could be supposed to exercise over the Bavarian councillors of a Bavarian Prince. The majority of the councillors on this occasion declared that the King of Bavaria had perfectly mistaken them; that they had been constituted an Independent Power by the Protocols; that this Power they were determined to use; and that they would persevere in the steady course of their duty until the majority of the young king. But M. Catacazy's conduct was such, especially since the institution of the Synod, that they renewed the appeal to the Emperor to recall this diplomatist, and they gave him intimation to that effect. M. Catacazy upon this produced a letter from Count Armansperg, which the Regency were totally unacquainted with, whereby it appeared that, whilst they were writing continually to complain of his conduct, Count Armansperg, contrary to the express constitution of the Regency, had written to say that he gave every satisfaction, so that not only had Count Armansperg allied himself with the Russian faction in Greece, but he had broken through every law in Greece to show his devotion to the Emperor of Russia.

The investigations that were carried on in the provinces after the arrest of the conspirators led to the examination of the officers the Regency had appointed to superintend the government of those provinces, and there it was found that there was either connection with, or connivance in the plot, or else most culpable apathy or supineness. Zographos was nomarch of Arcadia, the stronghold of the disaffected

party. He had been formerly of the English party, but, previous to the arrival of the King, had acted with so much vacillation as to have lost, together with Mavrocordato and Tricoupi, the confidence of the constitutional primates of the Morea. However, when the Regency arrived, these doubtful indications were altogether sunk in oblivion, and he was allowed to be a candidate for an office whereby he could show his attachment to the royal government. Previous to the arrival of the Regency, Colocotroni possessed the important military position of Carytena, and it was feared that the Regency would be obliged to have recourse to force, in order to occupy it. But Colocotroni was too sagacious. Rebellion against the royal government at that moment would have been too barefaced. Consequently, he surrendered the castle, requesting only that the Regency would so far consult his feelings as not to appoint in the command of a province, where he had so long held supreme influence, any one of his political enemies. The Regency, who were new to the country, and were unaware that it was impossible to conciliate such a man, and did not see that he was only temporizing, acceded to the request. They appointed Zographos, who was supposed at that time to be moderate, and thus they allowed Colocotroni to retain a great part of the influence which afterwards he used to such destructive ends. Whether Zographos was unsuited for his post for want of capacity, or whether he connived at the conspiracy, is immaterial to decide on. The conspiracy was hatched almost under his very windows, and yet, during months, he gave no intelligence to government of their danger. He was accordingly removed; but, as the Regency did not wish to alienate his affections entirely, they gave him an opportunity of retrieving his character on a new field, and sent him as minister to Constantinople.

The adjoining province of Maina had been confided to

Andrea Metaxa, the man accused by his countrymen and M. Thiersch of the atrocities at Argos, of the outrage on the National Assembly of Pronia, and of all the misdeeds of his party, during the unhappy period of Capodistrias's sway. It is to be remarked that the Regency, on their first arrival in Greece, allowed themselves to be directed by the English representative in most of the appointments, being desirous of availing themselves of his local information and long experience of the country, and also of showing their attachment to England. When they applied to him for advice on the subject of filling the important office of Minister of the Interior, he replied that there were only two whom he could recommend — Psyllas and Metaxa; and that the Regency had only to take their choice between intriguing cleverness and well-intentioned stupidity. As they considered the latter the less of two evils, they nominated Psyllas as Minister of the Interior. Thus we can perceive how much the local information of the English Resident served them on this point. But the English Resident was of opinion that in the appointments it would not be advisable to pass over Andrea Metaxa, and consequently he was nominated a Councillor of State. But it was further recommended from the same quarter that he should be given some post of active employment, and in consequence of this he was named governor of Maina.

The Mainotes are proverbially the most uncultivated of all the inhabitants of Greece, and as such were calculated to prove the most efficient tool in the hands of a designing man. It was particularly necessary then to consign such a province into the hands of a person whose attachment to the Royal Government was undoubted; and this necessity not only appears by looking at the previous history and habits of Maina, but also by casting a glance at its position on the map, and the natural form of the Province. Under the

Turks they had maintained themselves in a state of wild independence under the Bey of Maina, and had steadily resisted every approach towards civilization. Their native mountains had afforded them impassable barriers, which broke off, in a great degree, communication and interchange of thought. Of course, then, it was necessary to place over this province a man who would loyally co-operate with the Regency in their task of breaking up the prejudices of this untutored people, and organize the country in a manner that would reclaim them from their piratical and anti-social habits. The Bey of Maina had shown his desire to introduce improvement among them; and he had renounced all the immunities and power that he enjoyed under the Turks, for the sake of his country's welfare. He would have rendered every assistance to the Regency in carrying their views into effect, had this province enjoyed the good fortune of falling under the charge of an honest man. The position, at the same time, of the province was so commanding, that the inhabitants of the adjoining Messenia and of the plain countries around were exposed to imminent danger, if the Mainotes took up a position hostile to the Government. It must be further observed that the mountainous tract of Maina joins on to the mountainous province of Arcadia. We are at a loss to conceive what motive could have induced the English Minister, when he found all his recommendations acceded to, not to warn the Regency of the extreme inexpediency of entrusting such a province to a man who had been so notorious and successful an intriguer at every critical period in Greece, and was politically linked with Colocotroni, who, as we have before observed, had managed to retain his influence in Arcadia.

During the rule of Capodistrias, attempts had been made by the President to weaken the influence of the Mavromichali family; and he had so far succeeded, as to create

in Maina a party against them, by availing himself of petty jealousies. However, Capodistrias's influence was insignificant. The revolution against the President broke out in Maina simultaneously with the revolt of the islands, and all efforts at bringing over the Mainotes to his views, whether by force or by diplomatic intrigue, failed. The best definition of a constitution, perhaps, ever given was the answer of a simple Mainote to the wily President himself. He asked them what their idea was of a constitution. The answer was, "A constitution is to teach us our duty to you, and your duty to us." Maina held by the constitutional party during the distracted times that occurred between the death of Capodistrias and the arrival of the Regency.

The means that Metaxa now possessed of breaking up the constitutional party were obvious. He came to them at a time when the people were off their guard, as it was conceived that all party distinctions were to be merged in loyalty to their Prince and to the Regency. He was recommended by the English Minister, and the French Minister passing through the country was received by Metaxa with such extraordinary distinctions that, of course, it appeared that whatever he did was in a manner sanctioned by the English and French Cabinets, whom the simple mountaineers * had been taught to regard as the true friends of Greece. Every engine of intrigue was taken advantage of by Metaxa to gain for himself a party; and, as soon as the regulations with regard to the church establishment had been settled by the Regency, he took care that the most erroneous and exaggerated notions should be disseminated among the people with respect to their design in destroying

* Is it not a singular coincidence, that at this identical period the progress of Ibrahim Pacha through Asia Minor was supported everywhere by the understanding that it was undertaken by the direction of England and France? The whole of this drama of the East is truly wonderful.

the purity of their faith. No doubt was entertained at Napoli of his active co-operation in the rebellion of Colocotroni: indeed, it was said that Colocotroni acted at his instigation throughout the whole affair, and this is the more probable, as he was always considered the head, whilst Colocotroni was considered the right arm, of the Russian faction.

Before the conspiracy had been discovered, the young Monarch had determined to make a tour in the provinces. When he arrived at Maina, just after the arrest of the prisoners, he was surprised at not being met by the Governor at the frontiers; but in the evening he received a message to inform him that Metaxa had failed, not from any want of respect, but because he was suffering from severe indisposition. The amiable King, fearing that in that sequestered spot he might be without good medical advice, sent to him his own physician, who thought it his duty to write to the Regency that Metaxa was suffering, not from bodily infirmity, but from extreme mental agitation. Information of various kinds having reached the Regency at the same time with regard to Metaxa's connection with the conspiracy, he was summoned to Napoli, where he was given his choice either to stand his trial, or to retire as Consul to Cairo. Of course he preferred the latter; and it was said at Napoli that never had a man so narrowly escaped with his life. He delayed his departure from Napoli for some months, under the pretext of ill health, during which time, notwithstanding that he was placed under surveillance, he contrived, through means of his agents in the province of Maina, to get up another conspiracy, which broke out about the time of the trial, and which we shall presently come to.

In the meantime, the Regency, finding that they could not continue their principle of employing men of different parties, finding that so many of those had failed them who had been

compromised formerly with the Russian faction, and who were either blameable for culpable indifference or else for active treason, determined now to throw themselves on the Constitutional party, and by that means to acquire a ministry that was undivided. Tricoupi's ministry was therefore dissolved. The President of that ministry, the Minister of the Interior, and the Minister of Justice, were culpable for not having known of the conspiracy, or rather for not having communicated it. But, in the actions of the Regency, in this very change of ministry, we find so much judgment, so much tact, and so much delicate observance of the feelings and inclinations of each of those who were dismissed, that they cannot but elicit much commendation. To Mavrocordato was given the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs, which office, although the Regency looked upon it as one of minor importance in Greece, since all foreign questions had been settled by the Protocols, was suited to his character, in which sagacity and finesse predominate. Naval affairs were added to this, as it is well known that the Prince prides himself on his knowledge of naval architecture. Tricoupi was sent as minister to London, and it was hoped that this moderation and forbearance would open his eyes and show him the position he had been placing himself in, by conniving at disaffection; and that now, in a new field, where he could assist by his knowledge of the English language, he might prove useful to his country. But Tricoupi's watchword, *moderation miscalled*, was to be banished, and a more intelligible and practical principle was to be made the foundation of the ministry. Tricoupi's moderation meant simply doing nothing.

It was now determined, without further delay, to bring forward regular and systematic codes of laws, and the municipal organization, which were the principles for which this new ministry was characterized by the English Re-

presentative and M. Catacazy as revolutionary and republican.

We cannot help pausing here to observe how completely this country has been at the disposal of foreign combinations. At every turn and under every circumstance complete control and power has been exercised over it by the Residents of the three Powers. This is the result, on the one hand, of the dispositions of the people, which, in the mass, certainly looked upon England with almost exclusive regard and devotedness, the degree of which was shown by their placing their political existence in 1825 under our absolute protection; and, on the other hand, it is the result of the complete maritime control placed over this maritime state by the presence of our navy, and the neighbourhood of our Ionian possessions, within view from a great portion of the Morea. What is the inference to be drawn from this, but that England had in reality complete power over the whole country, that the influence of Russia and France was solely derived from England, and that any measures England chose to enforce must have been carried in spite of the opposition of the others, and therefore it is not at all necessary to show that England was culpable for the commission of error, for the support of antinational principles, or of Russian views, but that the mere non-success of the object for which she interfered imposes upon her the consequences of all the responsibility that ought to attach to a government which interferes for objects which it fails in obtaining, having at her disposal a power which rendered its authority supreme, if ever that authority had been questioned.

In forming the new administration, the Regency nominated Coletti Minister of the Interior. It was requisite to have a man of his experience, local information, and decision of character, to find out all the ramifications of the rebellion. A man of equal energy and firmness was

nominated Minister of Justice. This was M. Schinas, who had been recommended to the Regency by Professor Thiersch, but who had not less recommended himself by his services when Secretary to the Ecclesiastical Synod, to the institution of which he mainly contributed. M. Theocaris was nominated to the Finance Department; the moderation of his views, the dispassionate tone he had ever held amidst the violence of conflicting parties, and the apprenticeship he had served when chief of the statistical board, especially recommended him for this post.

When these new ministers were installed, the English minister refused to call upon them, which we believe to be contrary to diplomatic decorum, and publicly spoke of them in the most disparaging manner. It was tried to be represented at Napoli, by the Russian and his adherents, that the new ministry was a "Tricolor" and "Sans Culotte" cabinet, and the foundation of this was the most absurd misrepresentation of a fact which will appear perfectly simple to any one acquainted with Greek customs and the strength of Greek superstition.

George Mavromichali, the assassin of President Capodistias, had, in his will, conjured his wife four times not to marry again. She became tired of her widowhood, and had actually fallen in love with the brother of Chlonaris, who was counsel for the accused Colocotroni. But she had some scruples in going contrary to the will of her deceased lord, as long as he reposed in unconsecrated ground; and she declared that, until the bones were taken up and buried according to the formularies of her church, she could not espouse another. The ceremony of disinterment was performed by a bishop at Napoli, who happened, in the evening, to dine with the King; and on this slender foundation was built a mysterious fabric, that the ministry and the Regency wanted to terrify the President, Count Armansperg, into revolutionary mea-

sures, by holding up to him the canonized bones of the assassin of a former President.

It may be amusing to observe upon the different and contradictory charges that were brought against the Regency in Napoli. It was first said that Messrs. von Maurer and Heideck were incarnate aristocrats; that they opposed the measures of Count Armansperg, who was the only liberal, and the only talented, man in the Regency; that he was envied, and therefore thwarted; that he had grand views, and that his usefulness was impeded by the opposition of the majority, &c., &c. After this it was stated that M. von Maurer and General Heideck were incarnate democrats, and that they opposed the Count, who was the prop of the monarchical principle. M. von Maurer was accused of ambition; of envying the Count for being President of the Council; that he himself aspired to that office, making it a stepping-stone to the dignity of Arch-Chancellor, which he hoped to be, after the King's majority. It was said by some that these men were sold to Russia; by some to France; and by others, again, as sold to England. The graver and the better informed thought that they were sold to all three; whilst, again, these same worthy people shrewdly imagined that they were advocates of legitimacy, fierce aristocrats, and imbued with the levelling spirit of France.

We shall notice all these different discordant opinions, whereby we shall see that, up to a certain point, the latter people were mostly right. But first, with regard to Count Armansperg's talent, industry, and perseverance. M. von Maurer declares that Count Armansperg, at the council board, assented to every proposition they made, without ever expressing, on any occasion, a dissentient opinion, and that the grand views, of which Mr. Dawkins so frequently talked, remain to him and to his colleagues a mystery to this day. He says that the President of the Regency suf-

fered himself to be frequently remonstrated with by his colleagues, individually and collectively, for his inactivity with regard to measures of finance, which was his department of the labour; and that the Count never said that these remonstrances were unjust; and, as a voucher to the truth of his assertion, M. von Maurer not only appeals to the evidence of his colleagues and to Count Armansperg himself, but also offers to publish the minutes of the council board, if people are disposed to question his veracity. So much for the Count's usefulness and profound views.

Then M. Maurer is himself accused of ambition. We must observe that he had discountenanced the insidious propositions of Mr. Dawkins to make him Arch-Chancellor of Greece, after June, 1835. Secondly, that the King of Bavaria had offered to M. von Maurer, when his majesty was indignant at the domestic intrigues going on in Count Armansperg's family, which we shall speak of hereafter, to recall Count Armansperg, whereby M. von Maurer would have become President of the council, as being the second member; and that M. von Maurer had begged the Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires distinctly to inform his sovereign that if the Count were recalled he also would retire. And, thirdly, as M. von Maurer says, how was it possible for him to be jealous of Count Armansperg! when the Count never once dissented from him at the council table, and allowed his more industrious colleagues to prepare their measures, to which he gave his unqualified assent. This at a council board, too, where all the members were equal, where no one had a superiority of power or influence, excepting what they acquired by greater exertion and superior industry. M. von Maurer, in his noble appeal to the world, clearly proves that if he was actuated by ambition, it was of the highest kind, viz., the strict fulfilment of the duties of the high trust which he had been solicited by the King of

Bavaria to assume; and the strictest deference to the treaty engagements which had been entered into by the five powers.

The majority of the Regency were termed anti-English. This was the dexterous turn that the English minister sought to give to opinion, when the Regency withdrew their confidence from him. This circumstance showed that their interests and those of the English nation were one and the same. They withdrew their confidence from the Minister of England, not because he was English, but because his conduct was such as to leave the impression on the minds of the Regency that he was in collusion with the Russian envoy.

We shall now allude to the accusation against the majority of the Regency, that they were *aristocrats*.

The very use of the word aristocrat, as applied to Greece, is an indication of sinister designs. It is impossible that such a term could be introduced by any person conversant with the country, excepting for the purpose of misleading opinion.

There is no such thing as aristocracy in Greece, as we understand it. Influence cannot be inherited. It is attached merely to the person. The aristocracy of Greece were not a body of hereditary nobles, but men who had been raised to conspicuous posts by formal election, previous to the revolution, or who else had brought themselves into notice during the war. So that if the Regency had thrown themselves completely into the arms of the constitutional primates, they could not be termed favourers of an aristocratic government, as we understand the term. But afterwards it was deemed a better watchword to call them favourers of democratic principles. At one time, they are said to be Russians; at another time, favourers of French influence. The words "Tricolor" and "Sans Culotte" were used so as to convey different ideas, according to the different

antipathies of the persons to whom they were addressed. These two words may be applicable either to a favourer of French influence, when France should seek again to break through her natural limits, and to establish a rule in foreign countries; or else to one who had a bias towards those visionary schemes of popular liberty, which had convulsed France and Europe, and had overthrown every principle of social order.

This accusation imparted to the English government would fall in with the lurking fears and jealousies of French ascendency, if they were entertained, as we believe they were entertained by our Secretary of State; and would be likely to prejudice him against the representations of Prince Talleyrand, who had orders from the French cabinet to remove the erroneous impressions that were entertained by the British ministers with regard both to Count Armansperg's power and capacity. It must be borne in mind that Prince Talleyrand had at first been the person to whom the Count had, as it were, owed his nomination.

The idea of the possibility of French ascendency in Greece appears absurd to any one that glances upon the position of that country on the map. While we retain our maritime supremacy in the Mediterranean, nothing but the most culpable neglect could render France triumphant over England, for we possess every means of connecting ourselves with Greece that France does, whilst we possess many advantages that France does not. The only power that can gain any ascendency in Greece, to the prejudice of England, is Russia. She is bound, as the Emperor himself states, by the ties of a common creed, a tie not of any natural force, but rendered by our neglect and her intelligent diplomacy something of a formidable description. The ties that bind Greece with England were many: First, similarity of pursuits. She is essentially a commercial and maritime country. Secondly, a similarity of sentiment and character.

This identity may be established by the testimony of every individual who has come in contact personally with that people, and who has had opportunities of studying their character and institutions. The influence of that similarity is of course matter of perfect indifference to England, the stronger power, as regards the weak power; but, on the weaker, the dependent, the endangered state, it exercises an influence which may be measured by the relative position of the two countries, by the extent of our power, and the precariousness of her existence.

With the feeling, therefore, in their minds that England sympathises as a nation with them, that our habits, ideas, and pursuits resemble their own, with the proof of the truth of this conviction afforded by the former part taken by England in the Revolution, the desire, the necessity, pressing on the national mind, is more than to obey the will, it is to secure the favour and the good opinion of England; and if any thing could tend to strengthen more than another this feeling, it is the contrast to England afforded by Russia, a contrast of two kinds, the condition of her populations, and the policy of her government.

These are considerations to which no country can be indifferent. What their influence has been on the warm imaginations, the active and ardent spirits, of the Greek population, is a thing which it is wholly impossible for those to imagine who have not had the opportunities of observing it. In England it is wholly unknown, and cannot be appreciated, for England herself has not only been ignorant of the political and diplomatic drama which has been carrying on in the East, and of the power and predominance which Russia acquires and secures by means which are wholly contemptible or insignificant; but she has been a deceived spectator of that drama, and an unconscious agent in that action. We put these considerations together, because these were

the grounds, and these were the sources of that despair in the minds of the Greeks, and of the reaction against us, of all that excitement in our favour, when they came to find that England betrayed their hopes, sacrificed her own interests, misused her power and her influence, and not only was ignorant of the state of matters in their country, but reviled them for facts which were not true, and for dispositions which were the reverse of the truth.

Now what were the measures which the Regency were about to introduce into Greece?

They were to revive, in a partial degree, the same popular municipalities which existed among the Turks; to found tribunals upon the same principles as we have in England, and to form a code of laws generalizing the principles of those customs, which had grown up out of the municipal development,—in fact, systematizing that which had been before unsystematic.

In this manner the Regency attempted to place our influence in Greece upon the strongest and most durable basis, thus sought to lend an additional prop to that moral power of England, which is the grand element of our strength; first, by connecting us by similarity of political character with the Greeks: and secondly, by the municipal charter, and by the stability of the tribunals, giving a fresh impulse to commerce, and connecting us by those links of common interest and common advantage which are the most binding of all international ties.

But the use of this term "Tricolor" was not without art as addressed to England.

It was well known that Lord Grey's apprehension to prevent the excitement created by the Reform Bill from degenerating into any movement which might have the character of being revolutionary had rendered the British government fearful of the very term, and, in consequence

of that apprehension, more liable to be imposed upon by the use of words, and particularly so at a time when there was no apprehension of any projects of aggression being entertained by Russia, when indeed a total indifference with regard to foreign affairs prevailed in the government itself, and when the national mind was entirely absorbed in internal struggles.

By administering, therefore, a term of this description to the English government, various effects were produced at very little cost. Its alarms were excited and directed against the individuals who were the supporters of English influence; its suspicions of Russia (if a few faint misgivings had really passed over the minds of our government at that time) were calmed by finding Russia linked with us in Greece in opposing the spirit of the movement; while the adoption of the epithets was a concise explanation; and the possibility of adopting an epithet, an explanation, or a line in accordance with Russia, relieved the government from the necessity impending over it, of inquiry into the complicated affairs of Greece, and the appalling task of continual opposition to so able, active, persevering, and all-knowing an antagonist as the Russian cabinet.

In transactions which extend over the space of several years, crowded with facts, incidents, negociations, and changes of the most extraordinary and important character, extending over so large a portion of the surface of Europe, involving considerations so distinct, agents so numerous, and characters so varied, where each month and week, and often hour, has seen Russia presenting herself in new, contradictory, and generally for the moment inexplicable positions, different to all men in the various fields where diplomatic action is exerted, and on the same spot, as occasion required, shifting her grounds, and varying her weapons, and still throughout the whole, from year to year in London,

Munich, Petersburgh, or wherever any objects were to be gained or lost, acting by one uniform and constant system, aiming at one invariable end—it is, we say, under such circumstances, a position of peculiar embarrassment in which one is placed, in endeavouring to unravel the intrigues by which her ends have been brought about, or to render intelligible events, the antecedents to which are so voluminous as to be a study of themselves, and of a character so heinous, that the charges can scarcely be entertained, unless the complete chain of evidence be established.

We have endeavoured to explain that, by any one who wished to misrepresent the conduct of the Regency to those who do not understand the state of Greece, they might be termed "Legitimates," because they did not propose to curb the prerogative of the Prince by a legislative assembly, —"aristocrats," because they considered that the Primates were individuals more interested in the preservation of social order than the Klephts and their lawless Palikari; and "democrats," because they laboured to develop the municipalities on broad principles of popular election. Again, they may be misrepresented as opposed to England, and, therefore, favourers of Russia, because they opposed an English Minister acting in the interest of Russia. They are immediately set down as French, when the words "Tricolor" and "Sans-Culottes" are applied to them; and as partizans of England, when they derived instructive lessons from passages in English history.

We have already remarked, that the Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires in Greece had received instructions from Bavaria to support M. Catacazy. When he arrived in the country, he found everything so perfectly different from what he had learnt at Munich, that, upon his own responsibility, he acted contrary to his instructions; and wrote to Bavaria, revealing the designs of M. Catacazy and Count Armans-

perg. But so great were the fears entertained by the King of Bavaria of liberal notions, that every instruction that M. de Gasser received was to put himself strictly under the guidance of M. Catacazy. For two or three days after the reception of these instructions, he used to obey his orders, and then afterwards to break from them. He was placed in a curious predicament, between his instructions on one hand and his sense of duty on the other. He saw the flourishing condition of the country in general, in spite of the erroneous financial arrangements; the confidence that the people placed in the good intentions of the Regency; and that during this very year the single article of corn had been produced in such abundance, that one-third of the whole production of Greece, which is not naturally a corn-producing country, had been exported to Odessa, which was then suffering under famine; a port, be it remarked, whence Greece, in her years of anarchy, had received corn. M. de Gasser saw that the measures of the Regency were calculated not only to increase the happiness and prosperity of the people, but, as a natural consequence, would give stability to the Royal Government: he was requested by the Council to put his Cabinet at Munich on its guard against the intrigues of the Russian Envoy, and, subsequently, he wrote to apprize the King that the Countess Armansperg was endeavouring to obtain the uncle of King Otho, the Prince of Saxe-Altenburg, if not the King himself, as her sons-in-law. He also gave the Bavarian Cabinet information of Count Armansperg's participation in the conspiracy of Count Roma.

These communications produced conflicting feelings in the mind of the King of Bavaria. On the one hand, he was alarmed at the liberal march of the Regency; on the other hand, he was indignant at the proceedings of Count Armansperg. His old feelings of antipathy were awakened.

The Queen in particular was indignant at the idea of a Bavarian subject seeking to establish family connexion with the blood royal of Bavaria. We know well the strength of the prejudices that Germans entertain against a *mésalliance*. In consequence of this the Prince of Saxe-Altenburg was desired to return home. But, again, on the other hand, the King of Bavaria dreaded any measure that appeared in the least like liberalism. We know the position in which Germany has been placed since the revolution of the "trois journées." Trial by jury, the freedom of the press, and the very name of popular election, even as connected with municipalities, are the bugbears of the German Princes. Thus, on the one hand, we find the King of Bavaria at one time talking about forcing Count Armansperg to resign, which, however, was opposed by the Regency; and, on the other hand, writing repeatedly strong remonstrances to General Heideck and M. Maurer, warning them against liberal proceedings. The latter feeling gained the predominance in his mind, as we shall see in the sequel. In answer to these remonstrances, the Regency requested the King of Bavaria not to reason against measures for Greece on arguments that might hold good with respect to Bavaria; but that, if he was determined to come to a decision on the subject, they entreated him to suspend his judgment until he could visit Greece, and see the state of things with his own eyes; and that then they were sure that he would be convinced, as they were themselves, that not only popular elections with respect to the municipalities, and other liberal measures respecting the press and the tribunals, were not revolutionary, but also that they were adapted to the state of the country, and that it would be dangerous to withhold them; that, in fact, they were the only species of conservative measures suitable to Greece.

On the change of the ministry in Greece, the conduct of

our Representative had violated in so public a manner every kind of decorum, that the Regency instructed Mavrocordato to write a letter, requesting our Secretary of State to suspend his judgment with respect to Greek affairs, until the arrival of their own Envoy in England; for they were convinced, by the conduct of the English Minister, that he could not be giving his Government correct information; and Tricoupi was ordered, on reaching England, to request his recall. But, as M. Tricoupi had been allowed to remain several weeks at Paris, the interval was all-important, as the trial of Colocotroni approached; and the Regency required, on this occasion, the whole support of England. Under these circumstances, which the Russian faction would inevitably have taken advantage of, the Regency thought it expedient at once to send a Chargé d'Affaires to England, solely charged with their request; and, accordingly, they despatched M. Schinas, the cousin of the Minister of Justice, with the utmost expedition.

M. Schinas, on his first interview with Lord Palmerston, was astonished at his Lordship's interrupting him in his appeal, by accusing M. von Maurer *of being Russian*, which showed the nature of the representations of the English Minister to his Government.

It is a fact that requires comment that there was a letter also from Count Armansperg requesting the recall of Mr. Dawkins. The history of this letter is as follows:—

The dissensions in the Regency had become the theme of general conversation at Napoli: the majority of the Regency had always attempted to silence these reports, because they were unwilling that the secrets of their sittings should transpire. However, their attempts were ineffectual, because Count Armansperg himself said that dissensions did exist, and Mr. Dawkins was sedulous in spreading the report. The rest of the Regency complained to Count Ar-

mansperg of his own and Mr. Dawkins's proceedings, upon which the Count denied the charge, and demanded proof of their having acted in this way. The Regency at length found it necessary to give the name of one of their informers, and introduced the Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires, who communicated Mr. Dawkins's conversations to the Council. Upon this, Count Armansperg, seeing his intrigues exposed, appeared as if desirous of separating himself from the English Minister, was inexhaustible in his abuse of him, and declared that all the past, present, and haply future miseries of Greece were owing to his intrigues. This language he not only held to the Regency, but afterwards to King Otho, whom Count Armansperg requested to be on his guard against the English Minister. It was in this moment of redeeming remorse that he wrote a letter, expressing his own personal wish for Mr. Dawkins's recall.

In the end of April, news arrived in Greece, and, as M. von Maurer observes, in terms unparalleled in diplomacy, that the English Minister would not be recalled. Consequently, the Ministry in England approved of the conduct of their agent. By a parity of reasoning, Count Armansperg's intrigues against the majority of the Regency were also approved of, the schism in the Regency was confirmed, and thus Count Armansperg stood forward as the centre round which all the foes of the Regency, whether masked or open, were to rally.

The Regency felt it of such importance to obtain the recall of Mr. Dawkins, who, by perpetuating schisms in the Council, was endangering the principle on which the Monarchy was founded, that they drew up a voluminous list of charges against him; and, recalling M. Tricoupi, nominated a third Envoy to press the matter with Lord Palmerston.

As it is necessary to remark minute circumstances in tracing effects to their causes in a country like Greece,

where every minute circumstance does not escape observation, it was said that, from the time that the conspiracy broke out, and up to the time of the trial, Count Armansperg was labouring under a severe indisposition. This was denied by his medical adviser, the king's physician. However, he availed himself of the pretext to absent himself from Napoli. The Regency were characterized as cruel in not immediately removing to Athens, since the Count required change of air, although the difficulties that lay in the way of this removal were well known to every one in Greece. He subsequently removed to Argos, and from that the Russian faction drew the conclusion that the Count was not one with the rest of his colleagues.

Immediately after the news arrived that Mr. Dawkins was not to be recalled, Captain Lyons, who commanded the "Madagascar," gave a fête on board his frigate, where the obervant Greeks remarked that while the Armansperg family and the king were present, the remaining members of the Regency had not been invited, and, consequently, it appeared as if Count Armansperg was the only person recognized by the British authorities as worthy of consideration, which tended further to confirm the idea that Count Roma's conspiracy had not been looked on unfavourably by England.

King Otho was so indignant at being thus made a tool of intrigue that he declared that he would see Count Armansperg's family no more, and he retired from the capital. But the Regency, seeing the necessity of removing all future misunderstanding as to Count Armansperg's real position in the Regency, reduced the sum of money that had been set apart for his use for the purpose of representing their corporate authority. Count Armansperg protested, and the matter was referred to the King of Bavaria. The money had been voted to the President by a private com-

pact, of which the conditions had been drawn up by the King of Bavaria. It was, therefore, referred to him, as he was best able to judge of the conditions which he had himself drawn up; and he accordingly despatched an officer to inquire into the matter. Before an answer could arrive, certain measures, which M. von Maurer and M. d'Abel brought forward, revived the antiliberal prejudices of the King, and turned him completely against them. These measures were the Municipal Bill, which was most necessary to the country.

Four codes of law were also brought out, founded upon the customs of Greece, which M. de Maurer had carefully collected and compared. The civil code was delayed on account of the still greater delicacy that was necessary in generalizing the principles deducible from complex customs in this department. In fact, these codes were built upon the same principle as the common law of England, and originated from similar causes, namely, the previous municipal institutions. These measures had been hitherto kept back, although the Regency felt the importance of bringing them forward from two considerations: first, from the apathy and dilatoriness of the so-called moderate Cabinet of Tricoupi, and secondly, from a fear of setting in hostile array against them the antiliberal prejudices of the King of Bavaria. With regard to the code of laws in particular, he had desired that they should be drawn up as well in German as in Greek, in order that he might judge of each provision: but the Regency, now seeing that the crisis was impending over them, and the necessity of consolidating the monarchical power, waved every other consideration, and by the help of the more active assistance they gained by the new ministry, brought these measures forward at once.

At length the trial of Colocotroni and Coliopulo, the principals in the conspiracy, came on, and then it seemed that

the most extraordinary efforts had been made to impede this process. Mavrocordato had contrived to establish throughout the country a sort of hetæria, and had endeavoured to create a diversion in Roumelia, where the Klephts were excited to brigandage. By a similar process, Maina had been brought into a revolt, which we shall subsequently allude to.

We have, in an earlier number, had occasion to remark on the intrepid conduct of an Englishman of the name of Masson, who, during the excitement produced by the fall of Capodistrias, had stood forward as the advocate of the unfortunate George Mavromichali.

The character for disinterestedness, humanity, and benevolence, which had so pre-eminently distinguished Mr. Masson during a residence of some years in Greece, had endeared him to every family in the country, and on the arrival of the Regency the spontaneous homage of almost every Greek of respectability had recommended him to M. von Maurer. He was accordingly named king's advocate, and on the arrest of the conspirators the whole arrangement of the prosecution was entrusted to his hands. When Mavrocordato discovered that M. Masson was inaccessible to bribes, he endeavoured by every means in his power to procure his resignation.

Count Armansperg's sympathy with the prisoners was so notorious, that he did not hesitate to assign this as the cause for the representation money having been taken away from him. It even appeared that two out of the five judges had been tampered with. One was the President, Polyzoides, a man of Mavrocordato's party, and the other Terzetti, a constant inmate in the house of Count Armansperg. These men even refused to do their duty, stating, "whatever we do displeasing now, will be approved of six months hence," and, contrary to the rules of a judicial court, which does not admit of disagreements of opinion amongst the

different members of a tribunal from being known publicly, they showed it by their words and actions during the sitting of the court; and, finally, when the sentence was to be read by the President, after its being determined on by the majority, he refused to take his seat, and, assuming the appearance of an injured martyr of liberty, declared he would only yield to force. Force was accordingly used, and the President read the verdict, which was death. This was commuted by the royal clemency into imprisonment for twenty years. This sentence produced a magic effect on the country, which sank, for a time, into the profoundest repose.

The firmness and decision which were displayed on this trying occasion, when attempts were made to screen the chiefs of the Russian faction from justice by such ramified intrigue, reflects no small credit upon M. von Maurer, Heideck, and d'Abel, in the first instance, and on M. Coletti, Schinas, and Masson, in the second.

With regard to the whole of the complications of this affair, we must observe, first—that the English Representative had compromised Count Armansperg with the rest of his colleagues, and had thus created a schism in the Regency. Being thus compromised, Count Armansperg became connected with the Russian faction, who were supporting his private plans of ambition. Count Roma's conspiracy had shown that there was one of the Regency who could be detached from the rest. To him, therefore, all the disaffected portion of the Greeks looked up, to baffle the plans of the Regency in establishing good order. Count Roma's conspiracy had further compromised the party of Mavrocordato, for it was in consequence of this that the ministry in which he had supreme sway was dismissed, and the friends of Coletti were substituted in their stead. Thus then by a simple process of reasoning all the subsequent ascendency of the

Russian party, all the anarchy in Greece, all the unhappy effects that have resulted since to Greece, are traceable to the unaccountable levity of a British Representative. Had the Regency been upheld by all the weight and influence which a Minister of England can wield, the intrigues of Russia would have fallen powerless; and had the local information, which Mr. Dawkins's long residence in Greece had acquired for him, been turned to the supporting of that country, men would not have insinuated themselves into office who afterwards proved traitors; and if he had pursued an upright and straightforward course of policy, dissensions in the Regency would never have occurred.

We have already alluded to the conduct of Metaxa in fomenting disturbances in Maina. The rebellion broke out while the trial was pending, and was obviously intended to deter the Regency from their course. The means by which this was fomented we shall now characterize.

The well disposed inhabitants of that province, desirous of participating in the benefits which the administration of the Regency held out to every portion of the country, applied to the royal government for some form of organization which might put a stop to the abuses which so long reigned in that district, particularly the sanguinary law of blood for blood, and the right of the strongest. The province was covered with numberless small towers, which, like the baronial castles in the feudal ages, were at once the dwelling places of the principal people, and their strongholds of defence. From these places they sallied forth, marauded, pillaged, and murdered, in order to avenge some family feud, or resisted the attacks of their neighbours, to whom they owed a debt of blood. As it was necessary, therefore, to convert these towers into simple dwelling places, and to wean the people from their lawless habits, it was considered advisable to garrison some of these pyrgi with Bavarian troops. To this end the minister

of war was desired to hold forces in readiness, for force was necessary to impose, although it was intended to carry every thing by means of persuasion. At the same time the minister of marine, Mavrocordato, received orders to equip a naval armament. But such was Mavrocordato's neglect of his duty that considerable delay was occasioned, during which interval Metaxa contrived to get intimation of the intentions of the Regency, and he laboured to thwart their views by fomenting intrigues in the interior of the province. How he got this information we do not know. It is easy to guess, for there were many traitors in the camp. We have before noticed that Metaxa was living in surveillance at Napoli, notwithstanding which this wily politician contrived to despatch secret emissaries to the partizans he had created in Maina, informing them of the preparations the Regency were making, to what spot these preparations were destined, and raising a spirit of resistance by misrepresenting the intentions of the Regency. He first sought to rouse a revolutionary feeling. The most absurd stories were circulated amongst this simple and credulous people, which we cite merely to show the soil on which an intriguing man had to work. Their children were not to be baptized until their twelfth or twenty-fifth year, and then not in water, but in vinegar, &c. &c. Then, after that, they were disarmed and their towers dismantled, and thus all possibility of resistance taken away from them; they were to be subjected to the payment of the haradsch, an impost which they had been exempted from under the Turks, and the idea that was associated with this tax was the being exposed to all the contempt which a Rayah had to endure from the Turks, which their independent spirit could ill brook. Thus, naturally, when the Bavarian troops appeared, they found Maina in a state requiring the use of force. The consequences can easily be conceived. The resistance so carefully prepared led to violence in men ignorant of the

country, the object of calumnies they could not refute, and the authors of evil which perhaps they themselves did not comprehend. The resistance which at first was factious became legitimate, and the force which at first was legitimate became violence. Fault led to fault, wrong was interchanged for wrong, and here, as in so many other instances of the actual history of Greece, causes were lost sight of in their effects, and the tortured Greeks became not only the victims of foreign intrigue, but were calumniated, reproached, and abandoned, because the cabinet of St. Petersburg was dexterous. In this particular instance the insurrection brought about by the means we have indicated was made use of as a reproach to the two members of the Regency who were opposed to Count Armansperg, and from that time it became habitual to throw the blame of every event in Greece, however understood or interpreted, on those two individuals.

The various malpractices of Mavrocordato, particularly the formation of a secret society that he attempted to spread through the country in order to impede the march of the government, not to mention his opposition to bringing the rebels to justice, his disseminating through the provinces by means of his secret agents that these men would never be brought to trial, having come to the knowledge of the government, it was necessary to remove him from his office, and it was deemed advisable to send him out of Greece to prevent him from intriguing and establishing revolutionary clubs throughout the country. He was accordingly sent as Minister to Munich. It may seem extraordinary that to men who were disgraced at home, and whom there was little hope for the time of reclaiming, were given diplomatic posts abroad. But it must be borne in mind that the first object of the Regency was to tranquillize the country, and that, if order could be established there, foreign intrigue

would necessarily fall to the ground; at least so the Regency calculated. Mavrocordato sailed from Napoli; and, under pretence of the illness of the captain, put into Navarin, where, it must be remarked, that a new conspiracy was fomenting amongst the friends and adherents of Colocotroni and Coliopulo, which had for its object to render the tenure of the majority of the Regency impossible in Greece.

In the mean time M. de Maurer, General Heideck, and M. d'Abel, seeing the extreme difficulty of struggling against the intrigues of Russia, when backed by the Court of Bavaria, and by the whole diplomatic action of England, whose exclusive support of a minority in the Regency was not only a direct violation of the engagements of the four Powers, but was an encouragement to the friends of anarchy to persevere in rebellion, expressed to the King of Bavaria their readiness to resign their appointments.

But, as these resignations were not accepted, they were unprepared for what followed. It was not intended that M. von Maurer and the others should leave Greece apparently by their own free choice, and in a peaceful and orderly manner. Their disgrace was to be public; they were to be forcibly ejected, in order that Russia might prove to the world that no government could be carried on in Greece, unless her party were triumphant. M. Kobell was despatched from Munich with letters to Count Armansperg and to M. Catacazy, the latter having received orders from his Court to place Russian bayonets at the disposal of M. Kobell and Count Armansperg, if M. von Maurer and M. d'Abel were disposed to abide by the provisions of the Quadruple Treaty, and to persevere in holding their posts accordingly. Care was taken that this should be made public in Napoli. M. Kobell was nominated to succeed M. von Maurer, and M. Greiner to succeed M. d'Abel as supplemental Member.

In the Manifesto of the Regency, which has been published in Germany, this event is so graphically described, that we are induced to give it in M. von Maurer's own words:

The world then witnessed the extraordinary spectacle, that the successor of the man who had been denounced to the British government as too warm an adherent of Russia himself arrived at the hotel of the Russian minister in Greece, to eject, if necessary, the man denounced as a Russian, with Russian arms. Count Armansperg, however, took care at least to execute the Russian despatches.

If M. Kobell, which, however, I do not believe, as I simply relate facts, should be of opinion that his honour is in any degree wounded by my assertion, I am ready to publish the Despatch he brought, besides some other documents, by which the history of the Regency may be somewhat further elucidated.

On the 31st of July, 1834, which, as if in bitter mockery of all our toils, happened to be the anniversary of the emancipation of the Greek church, M. d'Abel and I received our letter of recall, after having a few days previously acquired the knowledge of it.

The blow came like lightning from a serene sky, for of the intrigues in foreign countries people in Nauplia had not known a word; and, with the exception of Count Armansperg, no one had thought of the possibility of breaking up the Regency.

King Otho was deeply affected when Count Armansperg communicated to him our recall. And the words of the young monarch, in answer to the phrases of the Count, ran from mouth to mouth.

The firm bearing of the youthful Prince endowed with the highest qualities of the heart and head, his affectionate behaviour, and his tender farewell of the two members of the Regency who were recalled—were the sweetest recompense for all our labour and troubles—for the deep vexations to which we had been exposed.

But the Greek people are also not ungrateful. There were some, indeed, who showed their joy at the event, for where is the country in which changes of government are not looked to with pleasure by many, in the hope of gain?

But, on the other hand, there were expressions of the most honourable and most exalted sympathy for our fate, which were of themselves an indication of the purest and most dignified national character.

When, as we have stated above, the abusive article inserted against us, at the instigation of Count Armansperg, appeared in the journal, "The Minerva," the "Sauveur" answered it with manly courage, and the "Minerva" was trampled under foot in every coffee house and place of public resort at Nauplia.

When John Coletti, Rizo Neroulos, and other men of character manifested their firm determination to send in their resignations, they could only be deterred from executing their purpose by our remark that their duty was to serve their king and country, and not private persons.

When M. Lesuire, the Minister of War, had prepared to adopt military measures against M. d'Abel and me, a Greek officer of gens d'armes presented himself in order to ask permission, in the name of his corps, to arrest the minister of war himself, who had taken the oath to the Regency.

And the answer of a noble Philhellene, Edward Masson, well known for his glorious exertions at the trial of Colocotroni, when advised by Count Armansperg to see me no more, was worthy of a free and independent Briton.

The consequences of our recall were, indeed, easy to be anticipated—by those, at least, who knew the relations, the country, the people, and our successors!

Had it come only a few months later, Greece would then have had her tribunals, her schools of learning, her university, her academy of science, and in general a firmer foundation for future times.

May the blessings of Heaven be still showered on Greece and its excellent monarch!

While M. von Maurer and M. d'Abel were thus ignominiously expelled, no little ingenuity was displayed in the protracted sufferings which were prepared for General Heideck. The resentment of Russia against the General was embittered by disappointment. She had conceived that he was unfriendly to England, and thus she had reckoned on a majority in the Regency. Consequently, expulsion with éclat was even too small a punishment for him. Although he requested a second time permission to retire, he was ordered to remain; and, in order clearly to understand the estimation in which he was held by his future colleagues, it was given out that the two others had been expelled because they were Russians, and that he was permitted to remain because he was weak enough to have allowed himself to be seduced by them. He was to remain to witness the new Regency follow out measures diametrically opposed to those in which he had taken an active part, without the possibility of counteracting them; to listen to his former colleagues being denounced as the originators of the confusion into which Greece was again plunged; to hear them rendered responsible for the errors and incapacity of the new administration; to see himself held up to the pity, contempt, and hatred of all Greece. We can scarcely conceive a position more painful to the feelings of a man of honour, and, had not so many instances come to our knowledge of the relentless inveteracy with which Russia pursues her foes, we might have cited this as an extraordinary instance of refined malice.

General Heideck, however, bore up under this pressure with extraordinary magnanimity and forbearance. He remained a passive spectator of the development of the "grand views" of Count Armansperg until the majority of the king, when his engagement expired, and he quitted Greece, leaving behind him a character far different from that which his

enemies hoped, from the difficulty of his position, they might have been enabled to fix upon him.

But we must observe upon the singular conduct of the King of Bavaria, in thus taking upon himself to break up the Regency. In the Protocols that define the constituted government of Greece, we find it enacted that the Regency were "to exercise the Sovereignty in all its plenitude." It was also observed in the same documents, that the union of the two Crowns of Greece and Bavaria would endanger the balance of power and the tranquillity of Europe.

Now we find the King of Bavaria interfering in every question relative to Greece, whether of domestic or foreign policy. We find that every law was to be translated into German, in order that His Majesty might judge of its expediency. We find him on all occasions obstructing the march of the Regency, whenever he judged that their measures savoured of liberalism. We find him dictating to them the party on whom they were to lean, and pointing out the Foreign Powers on whom they were to place reliance. Finally, we find the Regency recalled, because they pursued an independent course. Was it, then, the King of Bavaria or the Regency that exercised the right of Sovereignty? Was the Regency more independent of his authority than the Ministers, in his own dominions? It is evident that the union of the two Crowns on one head was effected in all but the name.

Further, it was enacted that the Regency was to be "the permanent and definitive government of Greece" until the majority of King Otho. This was an essential part of the fundamental laws which the Greeks swore to abide by, at the same time that they took the oath of allegiance to their Sovereign. It was for conspiring against the members of the Regency that Colocotroni and his associates became amenable to the laws, and were condemned to death as

guilty of high treason; and yet we find the King of Bavaria setting aside all the engagements by which he was bound, and, contrary to every principle of right, accomplishing the objects of the conspirators. When such examples are afforded in the highest quarters, how are we to expect that any political morality can survive in Greece? The principle on which the monarchy was based was here overthrown, and the tie that mutually bound the prince and subjects was forcibly torn asunder.

But blame is not to rest with the King of Bavaria alone. None of the intrigues against the constituted government of Greece could have succeeded, but for the active co-operation of England. England conspired against M. de Maurer, because he was in collusion with Russia! Would Russia have yielded up her friends without a struggle, when she had such strong grounds to go upon, when she might have appealed to our engagements, cited the very words of the Protocols, shown that we ourselves as well as herself were equally bound to suffer no changes in the Regency until a specified time? Does the antecedent history of her policy up to the present hour justify such a supposition? But, even if they were Russians, are treaties to be violated whenever it suits the convenience of one of the contracting parties? Are national faith and honour an empty name?

But further, the loans to Greece were guaranteed by the British Parliament after the quadruple treaty had been laid before them; and the country was given to understand that the Regency was the only constituted government until the majority of the king. Thus the British government, in even allowing any changes to be made in the Regency, broke its faith with the nation.

The conspiracy which Mavrocordato and Metaxa had been hatching from Napoli was too far advanced to be put a stop to by the departure of the members of the

Regency, who were obnoxious to the Russian party. Civil war broke out. One of the nephews of Plapoutas proclaimed himself Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, and hoisted Russian colours. They appealed to the Protocols and other documents that had emanated from the Conference of London, declaring that they had been promised thereby a Constitution, and had been enjoined to aid the young King in forming one; and asserted that they were merely assembling in arms in order to assist him in that office. As we shall make good hereafter the connexion of Russia with this plot, we shall merely remark here how dexterously she can avail herself of the watchwords of struggling opinions in Europe, whenever they are likely to favour her designs of aggrandizement. Of Count Armansperg's connexion with this plot there is every moral evidence. He hoped thereby to hasten the decisions of the Court of Bavaria against his colleagues; but circumstances outshot his calculations; and the conspiracy which was formed to subvert his colleagues now recoiled upon himself, when he was in possession of the majority of the voices in the Regency. He was then obliged to have recourse to the assistance of the same man, of whose services his colleagues had availed themselves in the preceding conspiracy, and thus the Ministry of Coletti was prolonged. Troops, accordingly, were despatched, engagements were fought, the rebels defeated, and the country tranquillized. Metaxa, after having been arrested, was sent out of the kingdom, and retired to Marseilles. When the troubles were appeased, a Commission was instituted in order to investigate into the causes of the revolt; at the head of which, contrary to the desire of Coletti, was placed Zaïmi, a man who had been formerly of the English party, but who had subsequently ranged himself under Russian colours. *He was ordered to correspond directly with Count Armansperg, and not with the Minister of the Interior, as*

had been the habit before, and the sequel of the whole was, that while a few of the subordinates, and many of the unfortunate peasantry were executed, for having been misled by factious men, the really guilty leaders escaped. Some of the most implicated were set at liberty at once; and the whole was a mockery of justice. Calergi, a Russian Greek, who had been deeply implicated in the attempted massacre of the Roumeliote Deputies at Argos, and who, since his recent return from St. Petersburg, had been very lavish with Russian money in order to foment this insurrection, was taken in the rebellion, as well as Spiliades, formerly Minister of the Interior under Capodistrias. They were set at liberty without any trial whatever. Colinos Plaponta, and Gemaiôs Colocotroni, Niketas, Valsamaki, and Gregoriades, were brought before the Court at Navarin, which refused to take cognizance of the crime of high treason preferred against them, and they were consequently sent to the Court at Athens, although the evidence deeply implicated them as the authors of the rebellion. One of the witnesses declared that he had frequently conveyed letters and verbal messages from Colocotroni, when in prison, to the chiefs of the revolt in the country, and that on one occasion Colocotroni had reproached him with lukewarmness, and urged him to raise the country at once, adding, "Fear not, we have Russia on our side; an hundred thousand dollars are on board the Russian vessel in this port ready for you. Go. Be quick; arm yourselves to defend our rights and our religion."

Notwithstanding this, these men escaped the punishment due to their crimes, and yet this is a tribunal that all the public prints conspired to praise for its justice and moderation.

As in the former conspiracy, so now, we find Russia aiding and abetting these intrigues; in fact, they were in some measure the result of the former conspiracy, for doubtless the

leading conspirators were animated with the hope of setting at liberty their friends and relations who were in prison, namely, Colocotroni and Coliopulo, and these men, great as their audacity may be, would never have ventured to excite disturbances against the royal government, had they not been instigated to it by foreign influence. But Russia's finger becomes more discernible when we find that Calergi, who had lately arrived from St. Petersburg, had brought with him money that he was distributing; when it appears that Russian money to the amount of £7000 was found in the house of one of the conspirators; when, further, M. Catacazy withdrew from the country at this particular time, and took with him the consul-general. Besides, Colocotroni was the correspondent of Count Nesselrode, and he informs us that Russia was with the conspirators.

But it is evident that foreign intrigue can never act on a country in which there are not grounds of internal discontent, and that in proportion to the extent of that discontent will that intrigue become powerful and effective. In Greece there was evidently no want of such internal causes, but there was one evidently effective above all others, for bringing the designs of Russia to maturity, and this was the introduction of financial principles, which convulsed the existing order of things, affected the most material and most universal interests, and changed the whole character and principles of the Administration. It is singular how exclusively Russia has command of these means. Her influence, in this respect, we have already traced in Turkey; and yet the whole of Europe is not only ignorant of her possessing such a means of action, but is in entire ignorance of this being a cause by which any political effects can be brought about.

The peasantry in Greece had serious grounds of complaint, alltraceable to the odious financial measures that Mavro-

cordato had instituted. Now, in what manner could these abuses have been rectified? The farmers of the revenue, under Capodistrias, had been abusive; the system of the Ephors more so. The only way of alleviating the peasants was by handing over the collection of the direct taxes to the municipal authorities. The municipal organization had only just been instituted when the framers and originators of that measure, who had so far appreciated the value of municipal government, that we have a right to infer that they would have penetrated further into its bearings in time, and by experience with eastern institutions, were removed by the individual act of the King of Bavaria, because they had partially restored to that country the popular institutions that existed under the Turks. We must further remark that the people had been familiarized with the idea of revolting against the royal government. The example had been set them of interfering with that authority in the highest quarters. It was well known in Greece that Count Armansperg had been long intriguing to supplant the majority of his colleagues. These were afterwards dismissed with ignominy, and it was given out publicly that if they had attempted to resist, Russian bayonets would have been used against them. The influence of England appeared as revolutionary, and Russia was well known as the patroness of all revolutionary principles in the East. It was not the unhappy peasants that are blameable for resisting a constituted government, but it was the intriguers that had set them the example, and thus a highly susceptible and excitable people were driven forward as victims of European interference. Well might the unhappy Greeks cry out: "We have driven away the Turk who, after all, was a generous master, and have gained others equally arbitrary, but much more grasping and costly."

When Count Armansperg had it all his own way, the

first person whom he removed from office was Schinas, the minister of justice, and in his room he placed his predecessor, Praïdes, thus showing what his future actions have evinced. Coletti expected every moment to be removed from office; in fact, it was only the ill-timed breaking out of Plapouta's insurrection that caused him to be retained. Mr. Masson was also dismissed, and the advocate of Colocotroni was made Procureur du Roi in his stead. In England the advocacy of a cause does not mark the political bias of the advocate excepting in a minor degree, but in Greece the bias of legal men is judged of by their acts and their speeches, even when performing the duties of their profession, and Chlonaris, from the time that he defended the cause of Colocotroni, was considered, and indeed became, a partizan of that factious chief. Thus we have, in these two first appointments of Count Armansperg, two of the most efficient offices handed over to men who had looked with no unfriendly eye upon the revolutionary measures of the Russian faction.

But M. von Maurer and M. d'Abel, after having published their four codes, had assiduously wrought to constitute the tribunals in a manner to render the laws effective. They had arranged that promotion was to proceed by gradation, so that no one should be admitted to office until his qualifications were ascertained, which was contrary to the practice of Capodistrias, whose judicial system we have noticed. Since that period Greece had been without some of the most essential courts, so that had this happened in a country where the inhabitants were less patient and less docile, every thing would have been thrown into confusion. It was further intended, that no person should be placed in any influential position in the legal career, whose character did not give a sufficient guarantee that he loved above all things the independence of his country; and thus that party

which looked for support to a foreign power, whose designs menaced the independence and existence of Greece, would have lost all their influence; and a "national sense" would have been created, in which would have merged all party dissensions. This institution had been prepared by M. von Maurer and M. Schinas, before they were dismissed. Count Armansperg availed himself of the labours of his former colleagues, whilst he took the credit of them to himself: but, instead of appointing those who were the stanch friends of the independence of Greece, eighty appointments out of one hundred and seven were filled up by the Russian faction. We put in these details merely to show that, whatever may be the assurances of Count Armansperg, he is no friend of England, unless English policy is identified with that of Russia.

We have seen that the King, on the departure of M. de Maurer and M. d'Abel, had shown considerable emotion: he was personally attached to the gentlemen who were torn from him: his political sentiments coincided with their's. It was necessary to wean the affections of the young Prince from them; and Count Jenison, who had been Bavarian Minister in England, was sent for this purpose to Athens. Coming straight from the Court of St. James's, he was able to apply such arguments as showed to the King that it was chivalrous weakness to look back upon his friends, for that England, France, Russia, and Bavaria, were all leagued against them. For fear that this should fail, Sir Edmund Lyons, after having been made a Knight of the Order of the Guelph, was sent out with a letter from the King of England to King Otho, recommending to him to choose able councillors. What his verbal instructions were we know not: the only thing that we can say is that, as soon as it was known in England that Count Armansperg was made Arch-Chancellor of the kingdom, Sir Edmund Lyons was

nominated, by rather an unusual transition from the naval to the diplomatic service, Minister Plenipotentiary in Greece in the room of Mr. Dawkins, who, however, refused to return to England on his retiring pension, until all his acts had been entirely approved of.

It is not necessary to designate every expedient that was used to turn the mind of the young King against his former friends: that they really succeeded we much doubt, for we know the strength of his affections and the integrity of his character, and how sagaciously he saw through intrigue on more than one occasion. However, he did yield to the necessity of his position, and signed a paper nominating Count Armansperg Arch-Chancellor of Greece, the evening before he attained his majority.

It is right to remark the power that Count Armansperg thus acquired for himself; how it completely destroys the just prerogatives of the Prince; how this Prime Minister has procured for himself inordinate power without the necessary control over it, so that, should his measures be bad, and he be inclined obstinately to push on the King to his ruin, on any occasion, there is nothing left to the Greeks, except breaking out into a revolution, and attacking their Prince himself. Whilst Count Armansperg's Master and Sovereign cannot, by the constitution of his power, sign any paper without its being countersigned by the Arch-Chancellor, the Arch-Chancellor himself can sign any paper without the knowledge of the Monarch, or without his participation; for which, however, the Monarch is of course responsible in the eyes of the nation. Here we have a check upon the royal authority of the most deleterious nature. It is not a Prime Minister who is responsible at once to his Monarch and the Representatives of the people, but one neither responsible to the Crown nor to the people, an authority similar to that of the Mayors of the Palace under the unworthy successors

of Clovis; and not acquired, as had been that of Pepin and Charles Martel, whose personal characters overshadowed the weak and vacillating Monarchs of France; but acquired by foreign influence, the most unworthy intrigues, and during the minority of the Prince.

The Arch-Chancellor nominates to all the offices in the state. If a measure is displeasing to the people, the blame is thrown on the Minister, who countersigns it, or else directly on the Prince. If any is pleasing, the Arch-Chancellor has the power of taking it to himself. This Count Armansperg has a right to do, and that he will do it is proved by his previous career. In these provisoes we see no end to the delusion that can be created.

When by this measure Count Armansperg had consolidated his own power, Coletti was removed from office, which threw the Constitutional Primates in Greece into despair, for, as Coletti was sent as Minister to Paris, they were left without a chief. In his room was appointed Michæl Sontzo, a pensioner of Russia. This Michæl Sontzo had been formerly Resident at Paris during the time of Capodistrias; and when he heard of the revolution against that President, he wrote to him a letter, telling him that he was devoted to the Russian party, and asking him how he could best serve him. This is the man whom Count Armansperg appointed to the most important ministerial office in Greece. Sir Edmund Lyons protested against this nomination, which was cancelled, and, upon the strength of this triumph, the British government were led to believe that Count Armansperg was anti-Russian. We may well say of the Greek as of the Turkish question, it is the history of the aberration of the human mind.

After Count Armansperg had got rid of Coletti, Metaxa was informed that he could safely return to Greece, and he was appointed Minister to Spain. We have not yet heard

whether he has reached the camp of Don Carlos, or the court of Christina. Colocotroni and all his associates were released, and their families and adherents taken into favour; and whilst nothing has been done to rectify the abuses in the country, no measure even devised to collect the taxes in a manner that would give greater satisfaction, a measure has been adopted which at once sanctions every act of public dishonesty.

The national lands, which were mortgaged to the Greek bondholders in England, have been put up to public auction and sold. The Ambassadors at Poros, and the Constitutional Assembly of Pronia, previous to the arrival of the Regency, had declared that the imprescriptible rights of the English capitalists must, of necessity, be secured previous to any financial arrangements that could be entered into with the Greek State. These rights have been set at nought by the stroke of Count Armansperg's pen, and apparently with the sanction of the British government; and what chance the English capitalists have of being paid may be guessed, when there are other claimants on the public purse of Greece, who have made loans on a surer guarantee, since the establishment of the royal government. The debt to England is the prior debt; but, even supposing that Count Armansperg is inclined to be honest, France and Russia may warrantably come forward and demand the re-payment of their debt to the exclusion of us, should the funds of Greece not be sufficient to satisfy both, for His Majesty's government itself has sanctioned this act of public dishonesty.

This measure was framed with a view of courting popularity, and giving peaceful employment to the Palikari. The result showed that the Count miscalculated, and the country became the prey of anarchy and confusion.

Lawless bands spread themselves over the land, which was to be expected when men like Colocotroni were re-

warded, instead of punished, for their treasonable and revolutionary conduct, and when a premium was offered to men to convulse society.

These disturbances led to the formation of a Consultative Council, in which six only out of twenty are of the Constitutional party. The rest, among which we find the friends of Mavrocordato and Tricoupi, have all declared themselves Russians — so expeditiously has the Count worked in detaching from us every supposed friend of England, and turning him into an open and avowed foe. This consultative assembly exactly corresponds with the attempts of Capodistrias to nationalize the Russian faction in his institution of the Panhellenium. Capodistrias failed at that period, but time and perseverance have done wonders against all hope and expectation.

The state of Greece was such, that the King of Bavaria went out to look into the state of his son's kingdom: but what could he effect?

The only enemies of Russian ascendency are the constitutional party. Against this constitutional party he was deeply prejudiced, and even if he had been disposed to listen to their exposition of the past history of Greece, such was the finesse with which Count Armansperg managed to prevent his having access to the Greek Primates, that no progress in the investigation of truth has resulted from his visit. Besides, there are further financial difficulties. The budget of 1836 shows that the expenses exceed the anticipated income by one third, and that the two first instalments of the loan have been entirely consumed. The surplus of the expenditure over the revenue for 1835 is not stated, and the financier that Count Armansperg employs was notorious for his character in Germany. When M. von Maurer left Greece, the Treasury was in a far different state, as any one may see by turning to the prints of that day; and when Coletti left Greece a year afterwards, the Treasury contained nine millions of drachms.

In tracing this melancholy picture, we naturally ask what will be the future fate of Greece? Of course, if the Russians gain possession of Constantinople, it becomes dependent upon that power in toto, and Russia will be able to excite the seamen of that maritime state, amounting to thirty thousand men, in union with herself, to deprive us of our maritime ascendency in the Mediterranean; and, by one of those artful and dexterous memoirs, of which we have offered so many examples, She will inflame the animosity of the Greeks against us, showing that we have been the cause of all the troubles in Greece, and that their confidence in us has been misplaced. Admiral Ricord attempted to overthrow their confidence in us before. He addressed the constitutionalists at Hydra and at Syra, showing them that it was impossible to resist Russia, that England could not, would not, dared not, assist them. His words were disbelieved; the Greeks reposed confidence in us, and they were disappointed. Again and again they have hoped in us; disappointment has been always the result; but endurance has its bounds, and the feelings of a high-spirited and generous people will not be trifled with with impunity.

The very susceptibility of the Greek character will render it a task of less difficulty on the part of a designing power to fill them with feelings of animosity against us as having so powerfully contributed by our double-faced policy to all their misfortunes, whilst it will easily be forgotten that Russian ambition was the primary cause. As an instance of this, whilst the conduct of the Russian agent has attracted little attention, the proceedings of the English Representative have called forth from those he sacrificed the bitterest expressions; but that feeling which was directed against him individually is easily convertible into rancorous hatred against the nation, his government having taken upon itself the responsibility of all his acts, which have met with their entire approbation.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE TREATY OF UNKIAR SKELESSI.

We congratulate Lord Ponsonby on the signal triumph he has gained at Constantinople, in obtaining the dismissal of Akif Effendi. We felt convinced that his Lordship would carry his point if he persevered, knowing as we did that the Sultan had attempted ten months ago to get rid of this Minister, on discovering that he was in the receipt of a stipend from Russia, but had failed because he was unable single-handed to cope with the ascendency of the Russian Envoy over the Divan.

We have heard it asserted that the reparation demanded by Lord Ponsonby was disproportioned to the offence. No other satisfaction than the dismissal of the Reis Effendi would have been considered in the eyes of the Turks as a satisfaction for such an unprecedented violation of Treaties.

It must be remarked, that the Treaties of European Powers with the Porte expressly guarantee to the European stranger an immunity from all Turkish tribunals. This is in consonance with the Turkish mode of administration. The Turks, on conquering the different provinces of their Empire, allowed the conquered subjects to be governed by the laws to which they had been accustomed, administered by officers appointed according to the form, and consonant with the habits, of the peculiar populations; and this is the admitted principle at the present day, although, in consequence of the complications which have been introduced by the intrigues of Russia with the subjects of the Porte, there have been some occasional violations of the principle in latter times.

When the European Powers sought to establish an inter-

course with the Porte, the basis of their Treaties was that European Residents in Turkey should be governed by the laws of their native countries, administered by officers appointed by their own Sovereigns. This was at once in accordance with the habit and system of the Porte, and in accordance with that principle of hospitality which is the basis of all the international relations of the Turks. Consequently, when Akif Effendi refused to deliver up Mr. Churchill at the demand of the Ambassador, he not only violated the patent Treaties between England and the Sultan, but also acted in a manner perfectly un-Turkish, and which, if passed over unresented, would have afforded a precedent by which Russia might have embroiled the Sultan with every European Power.

But the success of Lord Ponsonby is only to be considered as a means to an end.* So long as Turkey remains in a state of dependence upon Russia, Russia possesses the same power over the functionaries of the Porte, in forcing them to co-operate with her; nor will it be possible for them to maintain their ground against Russia, until Constantinople is saved from that continual menace, by means of which Russia solves every difficulty, and enforces measures which must lead Turkey to destroy herself; until that Treaty is annulled which binds Turkey to Russia, as a slave is bound to his master.

It has generally been conceived that the pith of the

* We are surprised that the "*Morning Herald*," which in general is so well informed, and takes so sane a view on questions of our foreign policy, should have mixed up party politics with a question of such purely national importance. We have no hesitation in believing that it is owing to the energy of Lord Ponsonby that Akif Effendi has been dismissed. We are equally aware that it does not suit Russia that this should, in fact, appear to be the case; and she will, consequently, endeavour, by all the indirect means which she has, of influencing Pera to make it be believed that this is any thing but a triumph of English diplomacy.

Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi is to be found in the separate and secret article which is appended to it.

Of course that article ought to have its due weight; for the circumstance of two powers entering into secret engagements, one with the other, has generally been considered by the practice of nations an act of hostility towards the other Foreign States, whom it may concern. Therefore, that secret article was, in effect, a declaration of war by Russia, who forced it on the Porte, against England and France, who remonstrated.

We consider that in consequence of undue prominence having been given to this article, the public mind has been diverted from points of infinitely deeper import in the body of the Treaty itself, and thence, it has generally been admitted that the Unkiar Skelessi Treaty is a dead letter, excepting in a time of war, formally declared between Russia and any European Power—we say formally, because we consider that in any former period of history the repeated acts of Russia would have been considered barefaced hostility.

The preamble of the Treaty states that "the Emperor of Russia and the Emperor of the Ottomans have resolved to *extend* and to strengthen the perfect amity and *confidence* which reign between them, by the conclusion of a Treaty of *defensive alliance*."

The necessity of a defensive alliance could only have arisen from the real or pretended danger of domestic or foreign attack. Now, as real danger is not likely to threaten Turkey from any European power, except Russia, Russia must have misrepresented some power as hostile to Turkey; and it is clear that Russia meant England, who had shown her indifference to the welfare of the Sultan, by refusing to assist him against the hostile armies of a traitor and a rebel, to whom England at the same time gave moral support, by accrediting to him a diplomatic agent.

Thus was England made a tool in the hands of Russia, to obtain for the Emperor a position and an influence, which, but for England's support, not all the arms, the power, or the millions of Russia, could, by possibility, have acquired.

Well might the Emperor afford to say, Henceforth war shall never again take place between Russia and Turkey.

The first article of the Treaty is as follows: "There shall be for ever peace, amity, and alliance between the Emperor of all the Russias and His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, their empires and their subjects, as well by land as by sea. This alliance having solely for its object the common defence of their dominions against *all attack, (empiétement)*, their majesties engage to come to an *unreserved* understanding with each other *upon all the matters* which concern their respective *tranquillity* and safety, and to afford to each other *mutually for this purpose* substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance."

We conceive the chief importance of the Treaty to be embraced in this first article.

It gives to Russia the right to an *unreserved* communication from the Porte on every matter whatsoever which the Russian Envoy may imagine to concern the tranquillity and safety of Turkey, or of Russia, whether connected with the internal or external relations of the Porte; and, unless the Porte communicates freely with the Russian Envoy on every point, an *unreserved* understanding cannot be said to subsist. Consequently, the slightest reserve towards Russia on the part of the divan on any matter which the Russian Minister may conceive or choose to construe as dangerous to the tranquillity of Turkey would, in fact, be an infraction of the Treaty of Alliance and a ground of hostility.

By this Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, Russia claims to

herself the right of interfering in every matter that she asserts affects the tranquillity of the country. She must virtually have the appointment and removal of ministers, ambassadors, admirals, and generals. The whole diplomacy of Turkey must be directed by Russian counsels. The relations between the sublime Porte and her dependencies, whether they be the Christian princes of the provinces, or the Mussulman governors of Egypt, Syria, Tunis, and Tripoli, must be managed according to the commands of Russia; and, further, the internal and financial administration, the arrangements respecting the different religions, must be controlled by Russia; otherwise a pretext is presented to the Court of St. Petersburg to seize on Constantinople, as the Sultan has failed in his engagements. Thus we may see that this Treaty is not a dead letter in its whole extent until Russian designs are sufficiently matured, and that it is, at the same time, a living principle incessantly at work for maturing those designs.

Thus, when Russia succeeded in the object, at which she had been so long aiming, of rendering the Armenian nation religiously dependent upon a patriarch residing within her own frontiers, she only succeeded in gaining one of the objects for which the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was planned.

When she forced the Porte to put to death those young officers that looked upon a Russian decoration as a stigma of disgrace, she only effected another object of this Treaty, which was to destroy all national feeling to which the Sultan has hitherto owed the stability of his throne.

In fact, every single transaction of the Porte, down to the outrage committed on Mr. Churchill by the Reis Effendi, are illustrations that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi is no dead letter. For this outrage is not to be taken in an isolated point of view. The Reis Effendi had repeatedly encroached upon the privileges enjoyed by Englishmen at

Constantinople, whereby it appears that this insult, accidental as it was in its origin, was part of a system which Russia had encouraged the divan to pursue, to try how far our forbearance would go, to render our power contemptible as well in the sight of the Turks as in that of the European Representatives at Constantinople, and to produce an estrangement between the Turks and the English Residents in Turkey, which would re-act on opinion in England.

The article is, in fact, the most complete instrument that human ingenuity could have devised to enable one state to exercise supreme command over the destinies of another. It gives to Russia the power of fomenting internal convulsion in Turkey by the most odious of all means, namely, foreign interference, and of plunging the nation into civil war and anarchy, and collision with foreign Powers, whenever it may suit the Autocrat to desire to be called in as the friend, the protector, and ally of the Sultan, and to extend to him that sort of amity and confidence with which Cortez upheld the dignity and the "entire independence" of the unfortunate Montezuma.

We have, however, only yet touched upon the first article of the Treaty.

The second article stipulates that not only the Treaty of Adrianople and the convention of St. Petersburg of the 14th of April, 1830, but the arrangements concluded at Constantinople, on the 21st of July, 1832, relative to Greece, are confirmed throughout all their tenor by the present Treaty of defensive alliance, as if the said transactions had been inserted in it word for word.

Thus the whole of the arrangements which remain to be concerted between Greece and Turkey, resulting from the delay in the settlement of the boundary, viz. the rights of emigration and the sale of Turkish and Greek property in Greece and Turkey respectively, are made to depend upon

the "unreserved understanding" which must subsist between Russia and the Porte, and thus Russia secures to the last hour the power of directing the quadruple alliance of May the 7th, and continuing to make England, France, Bavaria, and Greece subservient instruments to the furtherance of her designs for distracting every portion of the Levant.

The third article of the Treaty states: "In the event of circumstances occurring, (contingent of course on the acts of the Russian Envoy), which should again determine the Sublime Porte to call for the naval and military assistance of Russia, the Emperor engages to furnish by land and by sea as many troops and forces as the *two high contracting parties* may deem necessary." Not as *Turkey* may deem necessary, but as the "*two high contracting parties*" may deem necessary, that is to say, Russia acting with Turkey on the compulsory "unreserved understanding," which is the object of the Treaty. This very admission of Russia to decide on the number of the forces proves distinctly that this Treaty was forced upon Turkey by the dictation of Russia. This article ends thus. "It is accordingly agreed, that in this case the land and sea forces, whose aid the Sublime Porte may call for, shall be held at its disposal."

By this clause Russia obtains a convenient pretext to hold a fleet and an army in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, to be ready to *occupy the capital* on the occurrence of any circumstance which she may at *the fitting time* bring about.

We must now entreat the attention of our readers to the separate and secret article, requesting them, however, to remark the following facts. The patent Treaty and the separate and secret article bear the same date. But they were communicated at the same time to the British Government by the Russian Ambassador in London. This did not, however, take place till six months after their ratifi-

cation, the Emperor having discovered during the interval t at his august allies would submit to every insult he chose to heap upon them.

"In virtue of one of the clauses of the first article of the patent Treaty," which is to the following effect, this Alliance between the two powers having solely for its object the common defence of their dominions from *all* attack *(empiétement)*, their Majesties engage to come to an unreserved understanding with each other upon all the matters which concern their respective tranquillity and safety, and to afford to each other mutually for this purpose substantial and the most efficacious assistance, "the two high contracting parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance for the safety of their respective dominions." "Nevertheless," the separate article states, "as the Emperor of Russia will not ask for that substantial aid, the Sublime Porte, in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish *in case of need*, according to the principle of reciprocity of the patent Treaty, shall confine its action to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter within the Dardanelles under any pretext whatsoever."

The principal reason why this Treaty has been so completely misunderstood arises from the very general misconception entertained, not only in Europe but by the British Government itself, that the Treaty has no operation except in time of war.

But the Treaty does not even allude to the word war. The aid which Turkey is bound to furnish is to be furnished "IN CASE OF NEED," that is to say, in the event of any circumstances occurring which might induce Russia to deem it *necessary* that the Dardanelles should be closed: circumstances which she has the power at any moment of commanding.

We feel it to be utterly impossible within the limits of a single article to expose the infinite modes in which this

Treaty secures to Russia the power of controlling England, without the word War ever being mentioned, excepting as a thing that England must avoid.

But let us suppose, for a moment, that either from accidental misunderstanding, or through Russian incitement, any insult is offered, either to our merchants, or to our flag, by the Turkish authorities on the Euxine, the Bosphorus, or within the Dardanelles, and that England fails in obtaining redress by amicable means, what steps can she take? It only remains with the Russian Ambassador to interpret our demands for redress into an appearance of hostility, for him to exercise his right of intervention, and to bring down those "material succours" which would be the occupation of Constantinople.

The reason why we obtained redress for the outrage on Mr. Churchill is, because the schemes of Russia are not sufficiently mature; because hostility to the Russian name still survives among the Turkish people. The Sultan still hopes to be able to shake off the yoke by means of England. But, as soon as an army of occupation would no longer run the risk of being exterminated by national hatred, an opportunity of sending it will be easily found, since the right of sending it has been established by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The only circumstance that renders that Treaty to a certain degree a dead letter is the nationality of the Turks.

But, supposing Russia injures our commerce, instead of offering us satisfaction, she closes the Dardanelles against us by Treaty.

Again, there is another independent population inhabiting the coasts of the Black Sea, against whom Russia is carrying on war, whose coasts she blockades. This blockade is unrecognised by England. If a British merchantman is sunk for trafficking on that coast, is reparation to be obtained or not?

But endless complications may arise from the different populations that inhabit that part of the Black Sea subject to Turkey, and how, in any one solitary case, is England to protect the interests of her subjects? It is only by the presence of British men-of-war in the Black Sea, that the possibility of injury or insult to British commerce can be anticipated. The absence from it at a time when English interests are menaced is a practical commentary on the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The Court historian of the Russian empire, Karamsin, whilst giving a short picture of Russian policy, explains admirably this Treaty, whilst showing us, also, the signification of "peace, amity, and friendship," in the mouth of the Russian Autocrat.

"*Nothing changes in the character and views of our foreign policy. We seek to be at peace everywhere, and to make acquisitions without war, always keeping ourselves on the defensive. We place no faith in the friendship of those whose interests do not accord with our own, and we lose no opportunity of injuring them, without ostensibly violating Treaties.*"

UNKIAR SKELESSI.

Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated 19 February 1836;—*for*,

A Copy of the Treaty of Constantinople, of the 8th of July, 1833, (called the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi); together with the Separate Article of the same date.

(With Translation.)

TREATY OF ALLIANCE

CONCLUDED BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY ON THE $\frac{\text{26th June}}{\text{8th July}}$ 1833, (COMMUNICATED TO HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT BY THE PRINCE OF LIEVEN ON THE 16TH OF JANUARY, 1834.)

Au Nom de Dieu tout puissant.

Sa Majesté Impériale le très haut et très puissant Empereur et Autocrate de toutes les Russies, et sa Hautesse le très haut et très puissant Empereur des Ottomans, également animés du sincère désir de maintenir le systême de paix et de bonne harmonie, heureusement établies entre les deux empires, ont résolu d'étendre et de fortifier la parfaite amitié et la confiance qui règnent entre eux, par la conclusion d'un Traité d'Alliance défensive.

En conséquence, leurs Majestés ont choisi et nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires; savoir, Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, les très excellens et très honorables le Sr Alexis Comte Orloff, son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire près la Sublime Port Ottomane, &c. &c. &c.; et le Sr Apollinaire Bouténeff, son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près la Sublime Porte Ottomane, &c. &c. &c.

Et sa Hautesse le Sultan des Ottomans, le très illustre et très excellent, le plus ancien de ses visirs, Hosrew Mehmet Pacha, Seraskier, Commandant en Chef des troupes de Ligne régulières, et Gouverneur Général de Constantinople, &c. &c.; les très ex-

cellens et très honorables Ferzi Mehmet Pacha, Mouchir, et Commandant de la Garde de sa Hautesse, &c. &c.; et Hadji Mehmet Akif Effendi, Reis Effendi actuel, &c. &c.

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des Articles suivants :

Article 1. Il y aura à jamais paix, amitié, et alliance entre sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans, leurs empires, et leurs sujets, tant sur terre que sur mer. Cette alliance ayant uniquement pour objet la défense commune de leurs états contre tout empiétement, leurs Majestés promettent de s'entendre sans réserve sur tous les objets qui concernent leur tranquillité et sûreté respectives, et de se prêter à cet effet, mutuellement, des secours matériels et l'assistance la plus efficace.

Art. 2. Le Traité de Paix conclu à Andrinople, le 2e Septembre 1829, ainsi que tous les autres Traités qui y sont compris, de même aussi la Convention signée à St. Petersbourg, le 14 Avril 1830, et l'arrangement conclu à Constantinople le 9 & 21 Juillet 1832, relatif à la Grêce, sont confirmés dans toute leur teneur par le présent Traité d'Alliance défensive, comme si les dites transactions y avoient été insérées mot pour mot.

Art. 3. En conséquence du principe de conservation et de défense mutuelle, qui sert de base au présent Traité d'Alliance, et par suite du plus sincère désir d'assurer la durée, le maintien, et l'entière indépendance de la Sublime Porte, sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, dans le cas où les circonstances, qui pourroient déterminer de nouveau la Sublime Porte à réclamer l'assistance navale et militaire de la Russie, venoient à se présenter, quoique ce cas ne soit nullement à prévoir, s'il plait à Dieu, promet de fournir, par terre et par mer, autant de troupes et de forces que les deux hautes parties contractantes le jugeroient nécessaire. D'après cela il est convenu, qu'en ce cas les forces de terre et de mer dont la Sublime Porte réclaimeroit secours, seront tenues à sa disposition.

Art. 4. Selon ce qui a été dit plus haut, dans le cas où l'une des deux puissances aura réclamé l'assistance de l'autre, les frais

seuls d'approvisionnement pour les forces de terre et de mer qui seraient fournies, tomberont à la charge de la puissance qui aura demandé le secours.

Art. 5. Quoique les deux hautes parties contractantes soient sincèrement intentionnées de maintenir cet engagement jusqu'au terme le plus éloigné, comme il se pourroit que dans la suite les circonstances exigeassent qu'il fût apporté quelques changemens à ce traité, on est convenu de fixer sa durée à huit ans, à dater du jour de l'échange des Ratifications Impériales. Les deux parties, avant l'expiration de ce terme, se concerteront suivant l'état où seront les choses à cette époque, sur le renouvellement du dit traité.

Art. 6. Le présent Traité d'Alliance défensive sera ratifié par les deux hautes parties contractantes, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Constantinople dans le terme de deux mois, ou plutôt si faire se peut.

Le présent instrument, contenant Six Articles, et auquel il sera mis la dernière main par l'échange des ratifications respectives, ayant été arrêté entre nous, nous l'avons signé et scellé de nos pleins pouvoirs, et délivré en échange contre un autre pareil entre les mains des Plenipotentiaires de la Sublime Porte Ottomane.

Fait à Constantinople, le $\frac{26 \text{ Juin}}{8 \text{ Juillet}}$ l'an 1833; (le 20 de la lune de Safer, l'an 1249 de l'Hégire.)

(Signé) *Cte Alexis Orloff* (L. S.)
A. Bouténeff (L. S.)

SEPARATE ARTICLE OF THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE

CONCLUDED BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY ON THE $\frac{26\text{th June}}{8\text{th July}}$ 1833, (COMMUNICATED TO HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT BY THE PRINCE OF LIEVEN, ON THE 16TH OF JANUARY 1834.)

En vertu d'une des clauses de l'Article 1 du Traité patent d'Alliance défensive conclu entre la Cour Imperiale de Russie et la Sublime Porte, les deux hautes parties contractantes sont tenues

de se prêter mutuellement des secours matériels, et l'assistance la plus efficace pour la sûreté de leurs états respectifs. Néanmoins, comme sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, voulant épargner à la Sublime Porte Ottomane la charge et les embarras qui résulteraient pour elle de la prestation d'un secours matériel, ne demandera pas ce secours si les circonstances mettaient la Sublime Porte dans l'obligation de la fournir, la Sublime Porte Ottomane, à la place du secours qu'elle doit prêter au besoin, d'aprés le principe de réciprocité du traité patent, devra borner son action en faveur de la Cour Imperiale de Russie, à fermer le détroit des Dardanelles, c. à d. à ne permettre à aucun batiment de guerre étranger d'y entrer sous aucun prétexte quelconque.

Le present Article Séparé et Secret aura la même force et valeur que s'il était inséré mot à mot dans le Traité d'Alliance de ce jour.

Fait à Constantinople, le $\frac{26 \text{ Juin}}{8 \text{ Juillet}}$ l'an mil huit cent trente-trois ; le 20 de la lune de Safer, l'an 1249 de l'Hégire.

(Signé) *Comte Alexis Orloff* (L. S.)
A. Bouténeff (L. S.)

(Translation.)

His Imperial Majesty, the most high and most mighty Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, and his Highness the most high and most mighty Emperor of the Ottomans, being equally animated with the sincere desire of maintaining the system of peace and good harmony happily established between the two empires, have resolved to extend and strengthen the perfect friendship and confidence which reign between them by the conclusion of a Treaty of Defensive Alliance.

Their Majesties have accordingly chosen and named as the Plenipotentiaries ; that is to say, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the most excellent and most honourable Alexis, Count Orloff, his Extraordinary Ambassador at the Sublime Ottoman

Porte, and the most excellent and most honourable Apollinaire Bouténeff, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Sublime Ottoman Porte, &c., &c.

And his Highness the Sultan of the Ottomans, the most illustrious and most excellent, the most ancient of his vizirs, Hosrew Mehmet Pacha, Seraskier, Commander-in-chief of the Regular Troops of the Line, and Governor-general of Constantinople, &c., &c., and the most excellent and most honourable Ferzi Akhmet Pacha, Mouchir and Commander of the Guard of his Highness, &c. &c., and the most excellent and most honourable Hadgi Mehmet Akiff Effendi, actual Reis Effendi, &c. &c.;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Article 1. There shall be for ever peace, amity, and alliance between His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and his Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, their empires and their subjects, as well by land as by sea. This alliance having solely for its object the common defence of their dominions against all attack, their Majesties engage to come to an unreserved understanding with each other upon all the matters which concern their respective tranquillity and safety, and to afford to each other mutually for this purpose substantial aid and the most efficacious assistance.

Art. 2. The Treaty of Peace concluded at Adrianople, on the 2d of September, 1829, as well as all the other Treaties comprised therein, as also the Convention signed at St. Petersburg, on the 14th of April 1830, and the arrangement relating to Greece concluded at Constantinople, on the 9th and 21st July 1832, are fully confirmed by the present treaty of Defensive Alliance, in the same manner as if the said transactions had been inserted in it word for word.

Art. 3. In consequence of the principle of conservation and mutual defence, which is the basis of the present Treaty of Alliance, and by reason of a most sincere desire of securing the permanence, maintenance, and entire independence of the Sublime Porte, his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, in the event

of circumstances occurring which should again determine the Sublime Porte to call for the naval and military assistance of Russia, although, if it please God, that case is by no means likely to happen, engages to furnish, by land and by sea, as many troops and forces as the two high contracting parties may deem necessary. It is accordingly agreed, that in this case the land and sea forces, whose aid the Sublime Porte may call for, shall be held at its disposal.

Art. 4. In conformity with what is above stated, in the event of one of the two powers requesting the assistance of the other, the expense only of provisioning the land and sea forces which may be furnished shall fall to the charge of the power who shall have applied for the aid.

Art. 5. Although the two high contracting parties sincerely intend to maintain this engagement to the most distant period of time, yet, as it is possible that in process of time circumstances may require that some changes should be made in this Treaty, it has been agreed to fix its duration at eight years from the day of the exchange of the Imperial Ratifications. The two parties, previously to the expiration of that term, will concert together, according to the state of affairs at that time, as to the renewal of the said Treaty.

Art. 6. The present Treaty of Defensive Alliance shall be ratified by the two high contracting parties, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Constantinople within the space of two months, or sooner if possible.

The present instrument, consisting of Six Articles, and to be finally completed by the exchange of the respective ratifications, having been agreed upon between us, we have signed it, and sealed it with our seals, in virtue of our full powers, and have delivered it to the Plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Ottoman Porte in exchange for a similar instrument.

Done at Constantinople, the 26th June, 1833; (the 20th of the moon Safer, in the 1249th year of the Hegira)

(Signed) *Cte. Alexis Orloff.*
A. Bouténeff.

SEPARATE ARTICLE.

(Translation.)

In virtue of one of the clauses of the first Article of the Patent Treaty of Defensive Alliance concluded between the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two high contracting parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid and the most efficacious assistance, for the safety of their respective dominions. Nevertheless, as his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, wishing to spare the Sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned to it, by affording substantial aid, will not ask for that aid if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it, the Sublime Ottoman Porte, in the place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the Patent Treaty, shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever.

The present Separate and Secret Article shall have the same force and value as if it was inserted word for word in the Treaty of Alliance of this day.

Done at Constantinople, the 26th June, 1833; (the 20th of the moon of Safer, in the 1249th year of the Hegira.)

(Signed) *Cte. Alexis Orloff.*
R. Bouténeff.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF RUSSIA WITH THE COURT OF PEKIN.

PART II.

During the Congress, which lasted a considerable time, Count Sawa Wladislawitche employed himself in giving a good organization to the Russian Mongols dwelling to the south and east of Lake Baikal. Among the members of his council there were several of the elders of the Mongols and Bouriates, who, having a perfect knowledge of the country, were very useful in the discussions relative to the demarcation of the frontier. The habitations of the Russian Mongols were not yet sufficiently fixed, and the necessary surveillance was not yet properly established among the different tribes. The chiefs of the Tsongol, Sartol, Khori, and Bodgorodskoi tribes, were ennobled for the services they had rendered during the Congress. They received also annual pensions for themselves and for their descendants. Other elders were made members of the tribunals of the provinces, and the jurisdiction over their subjects was entrusted to them. Each tribe received a standard, which was unfurled on solemn occasions and at the general review. The elders of the Bouriates, that is to say, the Taichi, Dzaisang, Chuklinge, and Dzasohl, again took the oaths, and were obliged punctually to remit the tribute of their subjects, and to maintain (in proportion to the strength of the tribe) armed men to protect the frontiers. Every advanced post of these horsemen is commanded by a Russian subaltern.

The Chancellerie of the frontier, composed of the requisite judges, was established at Selenginsk: from that place the couriers for Ourga or Pekin were to start. Nine wersts from Selenginsk, and on the banks of the Tchikoi, was erected the small fort of Strelka, with a church dedicated to St. Peter and

St. Paul. This place, to which merchandise destined for the caravans could be conveyed by water, became its principal depôt, and the Custom-house for the trade with China was established there.

When the Congress of the frontiers, which lasted from the 10th of August, 1727, to the 21st of October of the same year, had finished its labours, and when the new treaty was signed, a caravan of two hundred and five persons was immediately sent to Pekin under the direction of Lange, the agent.

The following year, the first Russian guard-house was established near the Kiakhta, which rises in a high and wooded country, twenty-six wersts to the south of the Selenga. It flows from thence into Mongolia in a southerly direction. This fort received the name of Troitzoi Sawsk Krepost, after that of its church and of the Count Sawa. It is also simply called Kiakhta. By the treaty, the limit and the seat of commerce had been fixed at the distance of three wersts from Troitzkoi, in a valley watered by the Kiakhta. Two frontier columns were erected there, by which were placed the entrepôts of commerce on each side close to the frontiers, at the distance of one hundred and twenty toises from each other. On the Chinese column are the following words:—

Mai	
ye	Khôdaï
tchhu	ba

which signify "Place of Commerce." In the centre of the Russian entrepôt, which, like the Chinese, is of a square form, is the bazaar built of wood, in which is a chapel of stone. On the east is a Russian church, and on the south, near the Chinese gate, are the barracks, the great guard-house, and the house of the commandant. The habitations of the merchants occupy the rest of the space. This place is surrounded by chevaux de frise, and in the middle of each of the four sides is a gate surmounted by a belfry. The Cossacks destined for the service of the frontier live with their families outside the place. In their little suburb, surrounded in like manner with chevaux de frise, are the imperial

depôt of rhubarb, the offices of the government, the chancellerie a guard-house, and three chapels.

The fort of Troitzkoi Sawsk, situated higher up, contains a depôt of merchandize, with a church surrounded by chevaux de frise. The chancellerie and custom-house, afterwards transferred hither from St. Peter and St. Paul, or Strelka, are near the gate of the church. The house of the director of the customs and of commerce is opposite. The road which leads to it is bounded on each side by a very high parapet; it is crossed by a rivulet: the bridge which passes over it is closed by chevaux de frise, which are raised to afford free access to carriages. A sentinel is always on duty there. Merchandize and travellers, who go to the frontier, or who come from thence, are obliged to pass through this gate. The guard-house is on the left, and a second great church is opposite. From this place the road to the Chinese frontier turns to the south: on the right of this road is the chancellerie for the affairs of the frontier; this is a long building, near which is the residence of the commandant of the frontier. This place has a very considerable population; the streets are spacious, and the houses, though built of wood, are very neat. The crowd of traders with their servants, the garrison, the Cossacks of the frontiers, make this little town very lively. Among the inhabitants are merchants from Moscow, Koursk, Kazan, Siberia, Boukhares, Bouriates, Mongols, Eleuts, Toungouses, and many persons belonging to other nations, who resort thither for the purposes of trade. A suburb beyond the north-west gate is appropriated to commercial travellers and traders, and particularly to the Russian Mongols, who constantly bring cattle hither, to exchange them for merchandize. A great number of the latter encamp there under felt tents. They have commercial brokers, chosen from among their countrymen. They often hire themselves, to the number of fifty, for annual pay, to replace the Cossacks in the service of the frontier. The environs of Kiakhta are wooded, and abound in springs and in meadows. The Russian peasant makes a considerable profit by carrying goods to Kiakhta, where he exchanges furs, skins, and tallow for Chinese commodities.

We see, then, that the upper Kiakhta is much more important than the lower or middle Kiakhta. In the latter, only great exchanges are made; and always in great haste. After the conclusion of these bargains, the merchandize destined for Russia is brought, without delay, to the upper Kiakhta, to be examined at the Custom House, and to be sent to the place of its destination. To the right and left of the Russian boundary pillar is a fence of chevaux de frise, which extends to the distance of several leagues across the mountains and valleys. This prevents the cattle, which the Russian Mongols sell in great numbers to the Chinese, from returning to the place whence they came.

The Chinese town and entrepot is called Mai mai Tchin, or Town of Trade. This place, which likewise forms a square, is larger than the Russian entrepôt. The whole town is surrounded beyond the palisades with a close boarded fence, somewhat raised above the ground. The gates, on the Russian side, are concealed by large planks, joined together in the form of an immense screen, on which we read the character "Fou," or happiness.

The Chinese believe that these screens prevent the action of every injurious influence, and even of the imprecations which the Russians might call down upon them. This notion is derived from the doctrine of *fung choui*. There are guard-houses at the four angles of the town, and another on the north side, between Mai mai Tchin and the Russian entrepôt. It keeps a watch over the immense number of two-wheeled carts, in which the Russians bring the merchandize that they leave here in deposit.

The Chinese have many gardens, where they cultivate vegetables, without which they cannot exist. The rivulet is crossed by two bridges; near each bridge are wells of limpid water: that of the rivulet cannot be used, as it is muddy. The streets are broad, and lead to the gates, dividing the town into regular squares. In the centre, on the spot where the two principal streets cross each other, is rather a high tower, which is built over a vestibule, where the orders of the commandant are posted up. These orders are generally written in large characters, and pasted on boards, which are likewise exposed in other parts of the town. Four staircases, at the four corners, lead up to this tower. Bells, and

pieces of metal and glass, are hung to the edge of the roof, and make, with every breath of air, a jingling which pleases the Chinese exceedingly.

The houses are contiguous one to the other, and the windows seldom look towards the street. The principal door of every house leads to the court, round which are the apartments, the kitchen, the warehouses, and other buildings. Every thing is constructed in the Chinese style, of clay, which forms a solid wall, without being a defence against damp. On the outer door is generally the name of the proprietor, the allegorical title of his shop, or characters which signify "happiness or long life." Towards the court, the houses and trellises are painted with lively colours. On entering the door, you are received by the master of the house and his people, who drive away the enormous yard-dogs which are ready to tear in pieces all whom they do not know. The stranger is conducted into the reception room, where tea, sweetmeats, fruits, and tobacco are brought to him. Almost all the apartments are varnished, or fitted up with painted or stamped paper. There is an opening in the roof through which the air is constantly renewed. The Chinese windows are made, like those of Europe, of a frame divided into compartments; but, instead of glass, they have only white paper. In the middle of the window is a small opening, filled up with a square of white mica, which is less useful in admitting more light than in facilitating the view of what passes without. These windows admit light enough, because the paper is extremely thin. Externally, they are protected by the roof, which projects considerably, and prevents the rain and snow from injuring them. The streets and courts are remarkable for a cleanliness worthy of the Dutch themselves. The love of order and a careful disposition distinguish the Chinese from all other nations who carry on trade at Kiakhta: at the same time, they are more crafty and sharper than the Jew in Europe, and the Armenian in Mahometan Asia. The Chinese who go to Kiakhta are all from the northern districts of the provinces of Pe tchi li and Chan si. They pay a duty to their government for the permission of trading with the Russians. The

Chinese who live at Kiakhta are not allowed to have their wives there. Most of them have only the society of the young people in their service. Some rich men have Mongol mistresses, who live without the town, under felt tents Almost all the Chinese merchants speak Mongol, which they learn during their journey from Pekin to the frontier. There are some among them who speak Russian sufficiently to transact their business without an interpreter: but their pronunciation is often unintelligible. However, this imperfect knowledge gives them a decided advantage over the Russian merchants, who never learn Chinese.

To the left of the southern gate of Mai mai tchin is the residence of the Mandchou commandant, or the Dzargotchi (arbiter). There is in his court a corps de garde, consisting, in general, of from fifty to a hundred armed Mongols. The commandants are not always of the same rank, and the length of their residence is not fixed. Near the house of the Dzargotchi are two magnificent temples, one of which is dedicated to Gesur Khan: this is the Mongol name of a personified hero, who lived in the time of the San koue, or the three kingdoms, into which China was divided at the commencement of the third century of our era. According to Mongol traditions, he was from the country of Khoukhou noor, situated between Tibet and the province of Chen si. The Chinese say that he was from the town of Kiai liang, situated to the east of the Yellow River. His Chinese name is Kouan yu, or Kouan yun tchhang. He was general of the army of Lieou pei, which revolted in 199 from the Emperor Hian ti of the Hans. The following year, Kouan yu was made prisoner in the town of Hia pei, where he commanded, and which was taken by the celebrated Thsao tsao. He entered into the service of the latter. In the battle of Pe ma, Thsao tsao defeated other rebels, and Kouan yu performed prodigies, for he slew with his own hands Yan lian, and decided the fate of this memorable day. Thsao tsao, who esteemed Kouan yu very highly, did his utmost to attach him to his person: but the latter chose rather to remain faithful to Lieou pei, and to return to his service. He gained several other battles, and his valour was unequalled, till, in 220, he fell into the hands

of Sun kiun, who put him to death, with his son, and with other generals.

The Chinese believe that he is not dead, but that he ascended to heaven, where he took his place among the demi-gods. The Mandchous, who now reign in China, look upon Kouan yu as the tutelar spirit of their dynasty. They have given him the honorary title of Kouan mafa ta houang ti, that is, the ancestor Kouan, the great and august Emperor. In Chinese he is called Kouan ching ti kiun.

He is generally represented sitting, having on his left his son Kouan ping, who is standing, and on his right his equerry, with a brown or almost black face.

On entering his temple you see, first, an altar, covered with beautiful yellow silk, on which are placed fruits, meats, and sweet-meats, with a tablet bearing the following inscription:—"Thai thsing tang thai houang ti wan wan nian."—"To the great and sublime Emperor reigning in Thsai thsing ten thousand times ten thousand years." This temple is only frequented by Chinese. It contains deformed images of demi-gods and demons, to whom sacrifices and aliment are daily offered. Though the Mongols possess books which treat of the history of Gesur khan, they do not enter his temple.

Another temple is situated on the south side of the town; it is likewise very magnificent, and consecrated to the god called, in Mongol, Ergetou khomchin botisato, and Nide bère usuktchi. He is regarded as a divine incarnation, and it is supposed that he will appear at the end of this galpa, or epoch of the world, to judge all creatures. To him is addressed the Indian formula—"Om ma ny bat me khom," which the Lamaïtes have incessantly in their mouths. The emperors of the reigning dynasty in China, professing the religion of Buddha, maintain and honour patriarchs of this religion, at Pekin and Ji ho, in Mongolia. It is also the belief of the principal families among the Mandchous, and of all the civil officers at Kiakhta or on the Ourga. The religion of Fo, which is that of the greatest part of the Chinese, is only a sect of the Buddha faith, but it differs from the Tibetian branch. In

fact, though the sectaries of Fo honour the spirit of the Dalai-lama as a divine emanation, they do not regard him, like the Tibetians and Mongols, as the head of their church.

To the south of these temples are two painted and varnished columns; they are in the outer court of the house of the Dzargotchi. On solemn occasions, large flags and banners are hoisted there, and torches are burned there during the night. When I was at Kiakhta, the Chinese celebrated their new year, or the white month (in Chinese, Peyue, and in Mongol, Tsagan saran). All the houses, and even the middle of the streets, were adorned with flags and innumerable sheets of painted paper, on which were characters of happy augury, as "happiness, fortune, prosperity, longevity." At the four corners of the town, and at the ends of the principal streets, little chapels were constructed, in which pastry was offered to the idols, with a stunning noise of drums and flutes. Before the chapel were inscriptions on red paper, in honour of three principles (san yuan), the superior, middle, and inferior. These three principles are represented under the form of three old men, seated and praying. The first, Chang youan, is likewise called Thian kouan, or "Mandarin of Heaven;" the second, Tchoung youan, bears the name Ti kouan, "Mandarin of the earth;" and the third, Hia youan, is likewise called Choui youan, "Mandarin of water" Thus these principles represent the heavens, the earth, and water. Small pastils (hian) were burned in the apartments and before the images of the gods. The people did not seem to us to have any particular respect for the chapels, for they passed before them all with indifference, and amused themselves with the monotonous and whimsical music. In all the streets, crackers were thrown, which made a great noise; and thousands were thrown every moment.

Mongols and Mandchous of distinction often come to Mai mai tchin to purchase Russian and Chinese goods, which are found here more easily and cheaper than in their own country. Many Boukharians reside there in consequence of the rhubarb trade, of which they have a monopoly. The Russians of Kiakhta keep up a close connexion with the Chinese, who come

and go freely on commercial business. The Dzargotchi and the Russian civil officers respectively visit each other. This free communication is only permitted during the day; every one must be again at home as soon as the retreat is beaten on the Russian side, and as soon as the firework is let off in the court of the Dzargotchi, which announces the closing of the gates of both places.

The Dzargotchi exercises the jurisdiction at Mai mai tchin, and adjusts differences between the Chinese and Mongols. All the merchants who arrive from China are obliged to submit to him their permission to trade. His adjunct bears the name of *Bochka*, or Commissioner; he is generally a Mandchou; his authority is very limited. All that regards the immense frontier from the Gerbitchi to the Irtish is not only communicated in writing to the Chancellerie of the frontier at Kiakhta, but also to the Chinese Dzargotchi. Any matters of inferior importance are decided immediately.

For the better administration of the police of the frontier, it has been divided into different portions, each under an inspector. The latter is obliged to reside in one of the most populous places of the frontier, so that he is always much occupied. These inspectors are authorized to communicate personally with the Chinese and Mongol authorities nearest to their place of residence on any affairs which may arise. The Chancellerie of the Russian frontier arranges all that concerns the military inspection of its limits, by a Commissioner who treats with the Chinese *Bochkha*. Couriers are likewise sent from the Ourga to Irkutsk, and *vice versa*. The distance between these two places is nearly seven hundred wersts. The Dzargotchi is charged with expediting these couriers. Those who go from the Chinese side are always five at a time, viz., a *Bochkha*, with his adjunct, a copyist, and two servants. The journey is made on horseback, and with the greatest rapidity. Besides Mongol tea, the Russian couriers are supplied with two live sheep, with which they prepare their own meals. The skins belong to the Bochkha.

The Chinese, Mandchous, and Mongols, never take off their caps to salute, or show their respect even in the highest cere-

monies. They salute by dropping the arms, imperceptibly bending their knees down to the ground, and pronouncing at the same time some words of cold politeness. In this way they present themselves before the Governor of Irkutsk. The Chinese require the Russian employés to salute in the European fashion by taking off their hats.

The object proposed in establishing a commercial depôt at Kiakhta has been completely accomplished: but it has entirely failed at Tsouroukhaitou on the Argoun, because the situation of the last-mentioned place was extremely inconvenient. The Russian merchants can transport their merchandise by water to within twenty-six wersts of Kiakhta. This transport is effected on the Selenga to the village of Oust Kiakhta, near the stream of the same name, which rises to the north of the hill of Kiakhta. The route to Tsouroukhaitou, on the contrary, traverses rocky mountains, which render it very difficult and fatiguing. The Chinese carry but little merchandise thither. At present they repair to that place in the month of June, on their route from the town of Non, or Naun. A superior Mandchou officer and his suite accompany them. This officer is at the same time charged to inspect that part of the frontier which passes along the *Amour* and Argoun. The merchandise which the Chinese bring thither consists of *tea in bricks*, in Chinese, *Tchouantchka*—tobacco for smoking, coarse blue, and white cottons (*daba*); some silk stuffs, sewing silks, and various other trifles, as much in use among the Russians as among the Mongols. They exchange these articles for cattle, furs, sheep-skins, Russia leather, common cloths, and things of that kind. The Chinese only carry on this commerce in conformity with the treaty.

According to this same treaty, the Russians have the right to send every three years a caravan to Pekin. However, this permission has not been much used; and, since 1727, but six have been sent, viz. in 1727, 1732, 1736, 1741, 1746, and 1755. These caravans were productive of very little advantage to Russian trade. For this reason, the Empress Catherine II. forbade, by her decree of August 10th, (old style) 1762, any ca-

ravan to be sent to China at the expense of Government. At the same time she gave up the trade at Kiakhta to private individuals, in consequence of which it prospered considerably, and rendered the caravans to Pekin useless.

After the first treaty between China and Russia, concluded in 1689, a pillar of stone was erected at the mouth of the great Gerbitsi, and on the left of the Amour. This pillar is two thousand two hundred and fifty ly (two hundred and fourteen and a quarter German miles) distant from the Mandchou town, Tsitsigar, and one thousand six hundred and eleven lv (one hundred and fifty-three and a half German miles) from Sakhalyan oula khoton. It bears the following inscription in Russian, Latin, Chinese, Mandchou, and Mongol.

Stone on which is engraved the determination of the frontier, as it was fixed by the Envoys of the empires of the Thai thsing and of the Oros.

1. The rivers Dchorna and Ourounma, which run from the north, fall into the river of the Black Dragon, (Amour) and which are in the neighbourhood of the Gerbitsi, shall form the frontier. But, from the upper part of this river, the barren country and the advanced rocks of the great chain of Khinggan to the sea, with all the streams and rivers of the mountains which come from the south, shall belong to the empire of the Oros.

2. The course of the river Ergoune (Argoun) which falls into the Black Dragon (Amour) shall be the frontier. What lies to the south of its banks shall belong to the Chinese Empire, and what is to the north, to that of the Oros. All the habitations of the Oros which are on the southern side must be removed to the northern side, near the mouth of the river Merelka.

3. The fortress of the Oros, erected at the place called Yaksa, shall be demolished, and its inhabitants and all its property are to be restored without delay to the Tsakhan khan.*

4. Hunters and all others are to be strictly forbidden to pass

* White Khan. This is the name by which all the people in the interior of Asia designate the Emperor of Russia.

the frontier. If any evil disposed persons pass it, to steal or to hunt, they shall be given up to the commandant of the place which they last left. This commandant shall be obliged to punish them in proportion to their crime. If a troop of ten or fifteen men shall pass the frontier to hunt, murder, or plunder, a report shall immediately be made to the emperor, and they shall be punished without delay, in order that trifling circumstances may not lead to great disorders. In this manner, a good understanding will be kept up with China, and peace will not be disturbed.

5. All that has hitherto passed between the two empires shall be forgotten. The Oros who are in China, and the Chinese who are established among the Oros, shall remain there, and shall not be exchanged.

6. In consideration of the perpetual peace existing between the two empires, caravans are now permitted to travel with passports, and to trade by the way.

7. After the conclusion of this treaty of peace, no deserter shall be admitted; he shall be sent back immediately.

The Russian trade at Kiakhta is much less considerable than it is generally supposed to be. The amount of the merchandize exchanged there rarely exceeds the sum of twenty-four millions of francs per annum; and often only rises as high as six millions. Since the Americans and the English have brought a *quantity of skins to Canton, Russian furs have not so large a sale at Kiakhta.* To supply this deficiency in the annual balance, cloths of middling quality are sent thither; these were formerly bought in Silesia, *but they are now, in part, manufactured in Russia.*

ON THE POLITICAL OPINIONS OF GERMANY.

To the Editor of the Portfolio.

Banks of the Elbe, July 3, 1836.

Sir,

A lively writer, who has since applied himself to subjects of more serious import, (indeed to no less grave a theme than the "Defence of the Constitution,") once took it into his head, in a novel published some eight or nine years ago, to affirm, that at Munich or Carlsruhe the *Quarterly Review* would be considered one of the most liberal journals of Europe. This assertion, hyperbolical as it may appear, and startling as it may have been (if they ever noticed it) to the conductors of the Quarterly, must be admitted to have contained a good deal of truth at the period when it was hazarded. There are some subjects on which an Englishman, of whatever party, will speak out with an energy of feeling, and a native truth of expression, which can hardly fail of surprising any ear used only to the guarded allusions of a press shackled by the Censorship. Such is this present subject of the designs of Russia, as threatening the independence of every nation, into whose counsels she may insinuate herself by address, or whose territory she may be prepared to invade by open force; and it was, perhaps, through a similar impression, and from inadvertency to the language of most of the Tory journals, that an otherwise well-informed German paper was betrayed into a surmise that, by internal evidence, the reasonings of the Portfolio may be traced to the party-tenets of the "Radical Whigs." Yet, upon the whole, it must be granted, that the state of your domestic parties is better understood at present than it had been previously to the year 1831; and this is owing principally to the

intense interest with which the German people have watched the progress of English reform: an interest which gained upon them in the same measure as they turned away with disappointment from the course of events in France, subsequent to the revolution of July; while, on the other hand, scarcely any notice has transpired in England of the changes that "have come o'er the spirit of *our* dream," and the state of German politics may still be described as a *terra incognita* to the great majority of English readers.

I have been led into these remarks by the following extraordinary paragraph in Blackwood's Magazine, referred to in my first letter:—"*So strong has the reaction against liberal principles become*, under the combined influence of the revolution of the barricades and the reform triumph in England, that *the opinion is now general in the 'Fatherland'* that the whole representative system is a delusion; that a paternal despotism is the only government suited to the vices and weakness of humanity; and that the Roman sage was right when he pronounced a mixed government a happy dream, never likely to be realized, and, if so, speedily destined to perish."

I might ask this writer what he means by speaking of the "Fatherland?" But it seems clear that he means to speak of Germany in the lump—in that aggregate sense which that fanciful term of all others appears most fitted to convey, and which, for want of distinctness, is most to be deprecated. Now, if he means to include the ten millions of Germans living under constitutional government, I may simply refer him to the debates of the chambers, and to the result of the elections after dissolutions (for such things have happened) occasioned by a want of pliancy on the part of the majority. Or, if he should consider it too hard a task to look into those facts, by which his sweeping assertion may be effectually disproved, I am unwilling to inflict upon him the cognizance of details; I shall not even call upon him (as in fairness I might do) for the production of any one fact, of any isolated circumstance, which might appear to countenance his position. I shall content myself with alluding to the recent

institution, by the German Diet, of a Court of Compromise, to decide upon all points contested between government and the chambers. Surely this does not look as if the latter were prepared to waive their privileges, or as if the people had evinced any degree of fondness for a "paternal despotism" as the best of constitutions, since it appears that a dissolution is by no means expected to lead to the desired effect.

But it is quite true that attempts have repeatedly been made, and are still making, to preach the German people into a persuasion of those doctrines which have been erroneously described as opinions prevalent at the present day. It may be worth while briefly to point out the quarters from which such attempts have emanated; to introduce the self-constituted champions of those doctrines; and to describe the success with which their labours have hitherto been attended. In justice to these gentlemen, the remark may be anticipated that their characters do not lie open to suspicions such as those who lend their talents to the reaction have often incurred; for they have contrived to overdo the matter so thoroughly, that hardly any government (certainly none of the constitutional governments) could openly extend to them its patronage.

First of all may be mentioned M. Bucholz, of Berlin. His convictions have at least the merit of having been formed anterior to "the revolution of the barricades and the reform triumph." He had long been labouring to convince his countrymen of the utter worthlessness of the representative system. Both these events, of course, served to reanimate his zeal; and in 1831 he boldly launched the prophecy, that ten years more was the utmost period for which, by all the laws of social development, a system so vicious and destructive of all the foundations of social order might be still expected to stand. M. Bucholz is well versed in the history of England, and many of his arguments are borrowed from it, ingeniously commenting upon the weak points of her legislation.

It may be amusing to Englishmen to be informed of the advantages for which M. Bucholz gives credit to the liberty of the

press; "it has but served to confirm them in the rooted prejudice which they had conceived in favour of their Constitution, until experience has evidently brought out the truth, and dispelled all fallacies." Such doctrines may not be altogether unwelcome to a Court, which probably does not like to be reminded of promises volunteered, twenty-six years ago, by an Administration which has long since been disgraced. The views of this writer are eminently Prussian; and, setting aside the extravagance of his system, this circumstance alone would cause it to be received with caution, and perhaps distrust, by the rest of Germany. When the accession of the South-German States to the Customs' Union was under consideration, he took the occasion to develop them pretty plainly. He never attempted to deny that in some respects the States which should accede might be considered as all but incorporated with the Prussian monarchy. He added some pertinent remarks with regard to the propriety and necessity of the weaker party submitting to the stronger; and that, if they were wise, they would do so of their own accord He even declared that the whole matter would be very soon settled, but for the *continued existence of several Dynasties* being involved in it. After this very intelligible hint, it may be judged how far the doctrines of the *Neue Berliner Monatschrift* are likely to be relished, I do not say by the people, but by the Courts of the second and third-rate German States.

M. Bucholz would be any thing but flattered by the appendage to his name of that of M. von Pfeilschifter; nor am I going to connect them in any other way, except as far as they have both, for a series of years, been combating the principles commonly termed liberal, though with different skill, and, indeed, with different views. M. von Pfeilschifter is a Roman Catholic; he has lived in Spain; and it is not clear whether he has there been more fascinated by the beauty of absolutism, or more frightened by the dismal appearance of an ill-planned and ill-starred revolution. He was one of the very few who ventured to speak favourably of Ferdinand and of Don Miguel. He is not satisfied, however a writer may agree with him in hostility to liberal principles, unless

he go all the length of his Romanism and his Spanish predilections. He has taken the trouble of setting the world right concerning the insurrection of General Porlier, on which occasion he does not spare M. Bucholz; and he arraigns the Bavarian Censorship for admitting articles disrespectful to the Pope. His case, as a political writer, is hopeless; he has no chance of making any impression on Constitutional Germany, much less upon any part of the Protestant population.

It is difficult to speak of another writer, who, though not the most popular, is by far the most powerful, of the champions of re-action. Charles Ernest Jarcke is a convert to the Roman Catholic faith. The motives of his conversion are unimpeached; he is a proselyte in politics as well as religion; and those who knew him were not surprised, that, from an excessive love of liberty, in which he had for some time been associated with those young Reformers who have since paid so dearly for their reckless flights, he should have turned to the opposite extreme.* Yet he is no common enthusiast. When the first giddiness of youthful illusions was over, he felt the void, and clearly perceived the weakness of his former position; he was searching for a resting-place; and when he had discovered it in his new principles, his intellect taught him to entrench himself within their pale, and to defend them with the ingenuity and the courage of despair. Nor did he content himself with taking the defensive; but, after the fashion of all proselytes, he carried the war into the camp, from which he had but just made his escape. A less powerful dialectician might have successfully exposed the weak points of modern liberalism, which but too often stalks abroad with vain pretensions, and deals in hollow phrases; but all his vehement eloquence and merciless sarcasm was let loose upon his opponents, to prove that they must be fools or knaves, and that their liberalism serves as a

* Extract from the *Sun, July 4th.*

St. Petersburg, June 22.

The Emperor has conferred the Order of St. Stanislaus (a Polish Order, we presume,) on M. Jarcke, Imperial Austrian Councillor, and on M. Pelat, editor of the Austrian Observer —*Prussian State Gazette*, June 30.

cloak to cover the factious purposes of disappointed ambition. He is very severe upon those crowned heads whom he conceives to be guilty of the crying sin of "coquetting with the revolution;" and, though it has been observed that this, his favourite phrase, has never been distinctly applied, nor the charge brought home to any of the exalted individuals whom he might bear in mind, yet he cannot, in justice, be said ever to have betrayed a servile disposition. His avowed hostility to the recent Constitutional Charters does not, by any means, imply a direct commendation of absolutism. Though a strenuous defender of the right divine of Kings, and a scoffer at the rights of the people, he does not contest the sacred character of vested rights, always, of course, excepting those which, in the hour of weakness, may have been extorted to the disparagement of Majesty. It appears, then, that rights, in order to be held inviolable, must, in the first instance, be of long standing, (though we find it nowhere clearly stated to what century the parchments must belong), and, moreover, they must be held by virtue of a grant to a Corporation, whether of the nobility, or municipal, or ecclesiastical; since the nation, as such, has no rights to claim of its Sovereign ruler. Thus, he would not object to the restoration of the ancient Provincial States (Landstände), though he has hit upon rather an unwarrantable method of curtailing them in the recital; he would allow the deputies of the clergy, the burgomaster of a town, and perhaps the owner of some hundreds of acres, from time to time to present their humble petitions; but, as to the idea of a National Representation, that is held up to ridicule as a wretched copy of those institutions, which have, for ages of sorrow and distress, led England even to the "brink of ruin." Any Assembly destined to speak the will of the nation is considered no better than as an area of fruitless contention, and a hothouse of turbulent faction. It will be guided, not by the recorded wisdom of ancient tradition, but by the upstart interest of to-day, and the heedless freak of the minute. A government that would submit to govern by parliamentary majorities is not worth the name. If, among these doctrines, there are some that may appear well adapted to

the *present* domestic policy of Prussia, there are others exhibiting a singular contrast to the measures of Reform introduced by the late Baron Stein, with no very careful regard to vested rights and feudal traditions; and the Catholic inspirations of the *Berliner Politische Wochenblatt* emanated with an ill grace from the city which seems to affect the rank of the capital of Protestant Germany. Accordingly, the views of the government have never been identified with the writings of the *Wochenblatt;* and Jarcke himself left Berlin for Vienna,* where it is supposed his talents will be utilized, and his honest zeal will be directed by one, who is known to appreciate enthusiasm, without suffering himself to be carried away by it. In consequence of his removal, the *Wochenblatt* has lost in interest; its language had always been tinctured by a mystical philosophy, and its manner far from popular; a more than usual dryness has since been observable in its pages; it has almost ceased to be quoted by the other papers. By whom it is supported, is not known; but the present opinion is that, from the narrowness of its circulation, it cannot support itself.

To the same school with Jarcke (setting aside his religious views) may be said to belong Professors Lancizotte of Berlin, and Vollgraff of Marburg. The latter has published a work on the "Fallacies of the Representative System," which was burned by the students of Marburg, who further manifested their dislike by a most abominable charivari (*Katzen Musik* is the expressive German term). This, certainly, is no proof of the soundness of their criticism; but it is a sample of the reception which those are likely to meet with who maintain that "the whole representative system is a delusion."

After mentioning these names, I should not think myself warranted in adding that of a gallant officer, without observing that he is not a theorist; but that the remarks which I am going to quote (chiefly on account of the sensation which they have produced) appear to have been casually dropped, rather than dogma-

* The knowing in these matters will be reminded of the invitation from Berlin to Vienna of Gentz and Friedrich von Schlegel.

tically put forth. Lieutenant-General von Bismark, late Envoy Extraordinary of the King of Wirtemberg to the Court of Berlin, was invited, in 1834, by the Emperor Nicholas, to pay a visit to St. Petersburgh. In the course of last summer he followed the call, and the results of his personal observations he has just given to the world in a work "On the Military Forces of Russia in 1835." After so many years of peace, his heart was of course warmed by the sight of a body of ancient warriors, and of the brilliant manœuvres executed by them under the eye of the Emperor; and, as we are left to conclude, for the gratification of the honoured guest. How different this scene from what will happen in most of the States, where the time of service is conventionally short—a succession of raw recruits, or of soldiers who, however well trained, will in their hearts be indifferent to the service, thinking of the period when their term shall be expired, and when they may be allowed to return to their domestic occupations. Standing armies appear to his mind to be identified with the cause of civilization *. He expatiates upon the present extent and future destinies of Russia, and he intimates, that "to this power must ultimately belong the decision (*das Richteramt*) of the great contest of human or illegitimate rebellion against the divinely-instituted or monarchical order of the world." Such and the like phrases were, immediately after the publication of the book, made the subject of animadversion in the Chambers, as not very well compatible with the principles of a free constitution; and a severe critique of the work found its way into the columns of the "Beobachter," a Stuttgart opposition paper. General von Bismark, who is considered an authority on military affairs, stands high, and deservedly high, in the personal estimation of the King; and it has been observed, that the fact of the admission of such a critique by the ordeal of the censorship seems to indicate a conviction, on the part of this Government, "that an undue leaning to the system of the East is quite as *un-German*, and open to censure, as the opposite inclination to the principles of our Western neighbours to the prejudice of German nationality."

* As they seem to be in Egypt.

While I am on this subject, allow me to add an extract from a review of the "Portfolio," in the "Hanoversche Zeitung." This paper is deserving of notice from its quasi-official character, and from the ability with which its leading articles are generally drawn up. Great credit for sincerity is to be given to the "Hanoversche Zeitung," when it affirms that "it would be quite superfluous to discuss the idea of a Russian protectorate, which is not so much as dreamt of in Germany;" and when it goes on to say, "The natural ally of Germany is England. Between these two countries a relation of dependence is out of the question; but they are standing in need of each other; they will mutually make up for what each of them, single-handed, would not attain; and when the international relations occasioned by the revolution of July shall have relaxed, *they will meet again in the first crisis of European affairs.* Both these nations, of Teutonic origin, the one the greatest maritime, the other the greatest continental, power, are enabled and called upon unanimously to defend their own independence and the liberty of the world against any inroad by the Slavic or Romanic nations, as they have done twenty-one years ago." When it is added, that circumstances such as those of 1813 would justify the renewal also of a Russian alliance, this is what no one will feel inclined to dispute; since it would be folly to suffer the balance of Europe to be put into jeopardy from aversion to a power which may, for the time being, have a similar interest in maintaining it. The question is not of alliance, but of protectorship; and the "Hanoversche Zeitung" might have spared the remark, if it had attended to the distinction between hostility to Russia and opposition to *any* encroachment upon national independence. A few conciliatory observations are added upon the subject of Prussia. They are, indeed, remarkably good-tempered; and enough has been said to show that the publication of the "Memoir on the Policy of Prussia" has not been thrown away. After observing (in which, indeed, every German may concur) that, in 1814, the hands of Prussia ought to have been strengthened on the side of the Rhine, it is said that there are two ways for Prussia to assert her authority; that the

one — a refined, but *bottomless* policy—has been sketched in the Memoir in question, which appears to be the production of a private pen, *without any previous authorisation*, or *(as far as is known) any subsequent sanction*, while the *Conservative* principles of loyalty and good faith have been laid down in the "Memoir of Count Bernstorff."

I leave you to conclude what must be the state of the German press, when we must *feel our way* with the assistance of such slender materials, and when we must hail with satisfaction even such very slight indications of the recurrent tide of national feeling.

GERMANICUS VINDEX.

FURTHER AGGRESSIONS AGAINST CRACOW.

Cracow, June 28th, 1836.

M. Lieman, the Austrian Resident, in going to Vienna, was the bearer of a new project of reforms to be introduced into our political constitution and into that of the university.

This project had been drawn up by our little diplomatic trinity. According to the constitution sanctioned by the treaty of Vienna, the reigning senate was composed of twelve senators; the constitution, remodelled without the knowledge of Europe, in 1833, does not admit of more than eight. This number had appeared during the recent events too democratic still, and it was proposed to reduce it to four.

During this time, M. Ancillon, informed of the incorrectness of the reports of the Prussian Resident, sent to Cracow a certain M. Welke, charged with an order to the Prussian Resident to lay before him all the acts relative to the emigrants. The report of M. Welke, contradictory in many points to that of the Residents, seems to have attracted the serious attention of M. Ancillon, for he communicated it to Prince Metternich. That which has most struck the two ministers is the news which had been spread by the Residents respecting the pretended flight of General Chlopicki, a circumstance which has called forth a severe reprimand from the Austrian government to the Director of Police at Podgorze, for having neglected at the time to furnish an accurate report of it. In all this one has seen nothing more than a dirty Muscovite intrigue. As a consequence of this event, M. Lieman, who had set out in the hope of being named Resident at Cracow, has returned in the character of simple Representative, ad interim, of the Resident.

Since this period also the rumours of reforms have ceased;

and we flatter ourselves indeed that the Conference, this strange usurpation in an independent state, is about to suspend its functions.

Meantime the Residents have presented themselves before the Senate, to announce again the evacuation of Cracow by the Austrian troops, declaring that they only waited to see the new militia organized. But this organization is impeded by themselves in a thousand ways, and the inhabitants refuse to enlist, having recently seen the deportation to America of the greater part of the soldiers and officers of the militia.

The government of the kingdom of Poland has just reduced, from six to two florins, the tariff of Hungarian wines entering through Gallicia, leaving the old duty to remain on those which enter by way of Cracow. This is truly desolating for the commerce of our city, which, during three centuries, was the most considerable entrepôt of the wines of Hungary. The Senate of Cracow has thought itself able to complain of this inequality of duties.

Count Nesselrode has just transmitted to the Senate "the verbal answer of His Majesty, who has *deigned* to declare that he had given the order to diminish the duties on the frontiers of Gallicia, from regard to a friendly power; but that the city of Cracow could not claim in his sight any title to a similar privilege."

[It is with regret that we have so long delayed to present our readers with a statement of the present relations of the European powers with the coast of Barbary. We had long ago felt the necessity of preparing the public mind for events which are likely to take place immediately. We were on the point of concluding our remarks upon the Unkiar Skelessi Treaty, with the new complications that are about to arise out of it by the affairs going on along the coast of Africa, when the following letter was put into our hands, which we publish, as we are pressed for time.

We confine ourselves to making one remark, viz. the delicate and difficult position in which England is placed by this new complication. Of course, she cannot interfere on the side of France. She must interfere, and yet if she takes up arms against France, that war may be brought about which Russia has so long desired and hoped she might involve us in, by means of the affairs in the Spanish Peninsula.]

FRENCH EXPEDITION TO TUNIS

To the Editor of the Portfolio.

London, 16th July, 1836.

Sir,

It has struck me as a remarkable circumstance, that, while the affairs on the coast of Barbary have been for a long time preparing a crisis likely to affect in a material point of view the grand question which you have undertaken to elucidate, you have hitherto devoted to them no attention.

In the boundless field of inquiry that lies before you, doubtless you have some difficulty in choosing the point to which to direct the attention of your readers. But, I trust, that the information contained in this day's paper will show you the necessity of exposing the intrigues that have been so long working in that quarter, unknown to the public, or misrepresented.

If these few observations shall have the effect of directing your attention to them, I trust you will pardon my intruding upon your time.

There are many erroneous ideas entertained in this country respecting the Regencies, as they are generally called, which require to be cleared up.

First, with respect to their irreclaimable piratical habits.

Before we can suggest a remedy, it is necessary to know the origin of a disease, and, therefore, it is necessary to know why these states originally became pirates, or rather, as the sequel will show, why they placed themselves in hostility with every Christian nation.

Algiers, the principal of these powers, was founded by the unfortunate victims of Spanish fanaticism, and they seated them-

selves there for the purpose of regaining the possessions from which they had been expelled. As the struggle there had been placed upon the grounds of religion, so they kept up an hostility against Christian powers. This hostility was still maintained by Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second, until the island of Malta was consigned to the Knights of St. John, it forming the outpost of Christian piracies, the Regencies, the outposts of Mahometan piracies. Thus religious fanaticism and consequent hostility was kept up on one side and the other, as cause and effect. The crusading spirit yielded in the other parts of Christendom to the diffusion of knowledge and to other occupations; not so at Malta, where the vow of the Christian knight was eternal warfare against the Infidels. Up to the latest date of the possession of that island by the Hospitaller Knights, the Archipelago was filled with the piracies of these military monks, for which the Algerines retaliated in their turn. At last, the island was taken out of the hands of this fraternity; and, had any measures been pursued, excepting those that have been pursued by England and France, all hostility would have died away.

Owing to the dissensions that occurred at Algiers during the reign of one of the earlier Turkish Sultans, it was agreed upon all hands that it was better for them to place themselves under the protection of the Porte. It was then enacted that, on the death of the ruler of the Regency, the principal men were to assemble and elect his successor; the Porte approving or disapproving. But subsequently, the Porte was allowed to nominate with the approbation of the leading men. In process of time, however, in consequence of complications introduced into the Turkish Empire, the central authority was enfeebled, and the Pashas of different provinces held their authority contrary to the wishes of the Porte. We in Europe mistook this anomalous state of things, as it appears to any one reasoning from a centralized government for the independence of the Regency. But it is as great a mistake to talk about their independence as of the independence of Djezzar Pasha, or of Ali Tebelen of Jannina. On all occasions, internal differences were referred to the arbitra-

tion of the lord paramount; they, on their part, thus acknowledging a dependence on the Porte as well as the payment of tribute, which sometimes they withheld but never disavowed, and the Porte, on the other hand, claiming its sovereignty by the names of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers, appearing annually in the official list of nominations. This custom survives to the present day; Tripoli and Tunis appearing in that annual list, with the name of the Bey or Pasha governing; Algiers with a blank.

France was the first that showed practically her misunderstanding of the noncentralizing system pursued by the Porte, and sent agents who were to discuss directly all matters of disagreement between her subjects and the Barbary States. We followed her example, and not only rendered our agents there independent of the ambassador at Constantinople, but also made them correspond with a department which, in other respects, has nothing to do with foreign matters.

The Russians and Austrians pursued a different line. They did not acknowledge the independence of states that did not assert their independence. As the Porte claimed sovereignty over them, they demanded from it directly satisfaction for every injury, and we believe that there is not an instance on record of their having failed in obtaining full and complete satisfaction. I am sure that if England and France had acted in the same way, piracies would very soon have ceased in the Mediterranean. We should have been saved from having been brought into collision with the Mussulmans of Africa; our commerce in this quarter would have been extended: a much better understanding would have been established between ourselves and the natives, and thus the interest of our own commerce, as well as that of civilization generally, would have been promoted. We talk of these people as being essentially piratical and irreclaimably anti-social; and yet no efforts have been made to conciliate them, nor means taken to civilize them. Christianity has always assumed a hostile form towards them. Besides, our habits and their's are so extremely opposed, and there is so much of mutual repulsion between us, that it is evident the only means whereby they could be civilized would be through the medium of the Turks.

The Cabinet of Charles X. wanting to divert the attention of France from their attempts at subverting the Charter by a spectacle of conquest and military glory, availed itself of a pretended insult to their agent, and seized upon Algiers, considering it an independent State, and therefore that they were robbing no one but the Dey, who had offered the insult; and, so complete was the delusion in France, that M. Lamartine, in order to prove that Turkey was dismembered by its internal weakness, and not by the efforts of Russia, assisted by the active co-operation of all the European powers, asserts that the battle of Navarin produced no sensation at the Regencies, whereas it was deemed necessary to place centinels at the door of every Frank, on the news being known, to protect them from an excited populace. M. Lamartine adds, that the conquest of Algiers produced as little effect at Constantinople, although, to say nothing more, at the time that he penned these lines, a Turkish Ambassador was on the road to Paris, to claim the restitution of Algiers. I have thought it necessary to notice these facts, in order that we may perceive the antagonistic position in which France is placed, with regard to the Porte, by this act of unjust aggression. It now becomes a matter of inquiry how she was instigated to it.

At first Russia conceived the design of acquiring a plea of interfering in the affairs of these Provinces, by her taking the Knights of Jerusalem under her protection. But I presume that that scheme was abandoned from seeing that the spirit of the age took a different turn, and she conceived the idea of putting France in collision with the Sultan. That she was the instigator in the affair of Algiers is a matter of notoriety. Her motives recent announcements explained.

I now come to speak of the unwarrantable interference of the English agent in the affairs of Tripoli, which sufficiently shows the mistake we made in rendering him not only independent of the British Ambassador at Constantinople, but also in making him correspond with the Colonial Office, thereby rendering him irresponsible for all the complications he may introduce into our foreign policy.

The cause of its being arranged that he should correspond with

that office sufficiently evinces that he has overstepped his authority in meddling in the political arrangements of the people. As Malta is dependent on the opposite coast for provisions, it was necessary to have an officer resident at the Bey's court to render the intercourse as easy as possible, and he corresponded with the Colonial Office, because it was never contemplated that he should have other objects in view than facilitating the provisioning of our colony. But, as the nature of his office was not clearly defined and little controled, and as he aspired to the rank of a diplomatist, he must needs interfere in a domestic quarrel between the two sons of a Bey that had abdicated, and employ the whole force of his influence, namely, the influence that he possessed in virtue of his office, to excite the neighbouring tribes to carry on war against the government to which he was accredited, justifying this extraordinary conduct, to which I suspect he was led by a feeling of animosity, occasioned by a personal quarrel, by representing that the Bey, whom he cpposed, was sold to France; as if all the neighbouring states would not be sufficiently jealous of a Power that had so unscrupulously taken possession of Algiers; as if any thing but the distractions brought about by the Representative of England could induce them to throw themselves into the arms of France, if the idea could be contemplated for a moment.*

After a bootless struggle, the sole result of which was that the country was depopulated and property destroyed, both parties finally agreed to abide by the decision of the Porte, who sent troops, and endeavoured to rescue the country from the hands of the two contending parties. But they were betrayed into many errors, partly by their desire to establish what would be called in Europe supremacy over the Tripolitans, and partly by the instigations of Russia, who, by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, has a right to interfere in their domestic concerns.

The hostility of the Moors to the French army of occupation

* We refer our readers to the article on Greece to see what a convenient power France may be made, to terrify those who do not understand the questions discussed in the East, and to cover every sort of political delinquency.—Ed.

has given a pretext for France to attempt to extend her possessions on the coast of Africa, whilst the position that Russia occupies at Constantinople, together with the position in which France has placed herself, gives her an opportunity, by her double action on the Divan and at Paris, of bringing France and Turkey into collision.

Tunis, ready a year ago to throw herself into the hands of the Porte, is now estranged from her, seeing the errors she has been led to commit in the neighbouring Regency; whilst the Bey of Constantine, placed between Tunis and Algiers, may have to struggle for existence.

The Turkish and French squadrons are brought into hostile presence. In the event of an engagement taking place, which the Russian officers on board the former will endeavour to bring about, if the French are defeated, national animosity against the Turks revives in full vigour amongst the French, who will cry aloud for vengeance.

If the Turks are defeated, the forces of the Porte are weakened; national animosity is directed from their real foes; perhaps their confidence in us will be weakened by our supposed alliance with the French, which Russia will attempt to establish now as much as she attempted to invalidate it before: whilst in either event a *casus fœderis* will arise, and an opportunity be offered to Russia of garrisoning Constantinople on the plea that the Sultan is in danger.

Submitting these observations to the superior knowledge of one who possesses documents revealing the secret actions of the Russian Cabinet, whilst I can only put together facts of common notoriety,

I have the honour to be,

A CONSTANT READER.

POSTSCRIPT, JULY 20.

[The following extracts from Letters which we have this moment received from Greece realize the worst apprehensions we had entertained for the fate of that unhappy country.]

Nauplia, June 2, 1836.

THINGS are going on very badly in the Peloponnesus. There is no personal safety any where. Every part is infested by banditti, who make incursions even to the very towns. Thirty of these people appeared at Navarin, where they robbed and murdered several persons. Three days ago, seven of these banditti entered the house of Pazzaoura at Argos, and, after murdering him, wounded his daughter; but they did not succeed in plundering the house. Before this transaction, they had broken through the wall of Zinzo, receiver of Nomos, but could not discover his money. The ferment is great. You see what a state we are now in. God protect us!

I am very glad that the French government, referring to the reasons of the Minister, has at length consented to grant to the Greek government part of the third instalment of the Greek loan; but what benefit is Greece likely to derive from that?

Athens, June 5, 1836.

Though certain that you possess ample information concerning the unhappy state of our country, still I think that I ought to give you a description of what is passing. The deplorable state of Greece is such that it must make the heart bleed, not of a Greek only, but even of a friend of the Greeks. A public but perfectly just discontent pervades the hearts of all the Hellenes. The events in Acarnania are nothing but the immediate consequence

of this discontent. Those who are fond of disturbances and an ever-vacillating state of the country profit by the disposition of the public mind in Greece, and excite insurrections. Those who, under the impulse of this discontent, have taken up arms, and are now considered as rebels, promulgate their apology, and justify themselves by declaring that, while they were awaiting an end to the Regency, and regarding the accession of his Majesty to the throne, as the only efficacious means of a total cure of their ancient wounds, they have seen only an arch-chancellorship, administered by a man whose previous actions, and even whose present conduct, clearly display hostile sentiments towards the Hellenes and his unfitness to govern them.

My object is not to make an exhibition of my politics, but only to lay before you a picture of the present state of things. It is very true that the insurgents have been dispersed by the troops of the government, that they have been driven back beyond the frontiers of the kingdom, but unfortunately they still exist, scattered as they are over the bordering countries. But, apart from this, acts of pillage and rebellion begin to appear in the Peloponnesus. Government can undertake nothing against these men, though it has exhausted the public exchequer, and set all the military force in motion. The absence of his Majesty in such critical circumstances will no doubt be attended with a general insurrection, and he who has advised his Majesty to leave Greece at such a moment cannot be considered any other than its most inveterate enemy, and a traitor to the country.

Such is the sad and deplorable condition of our native land. The prime mover and provoking cause of the insurrection and all the disturbances is generally thought to be Count Armansperg. It is to him that the people ascribe all their calamities; and all, with one accord, wish for the banishment of the arch-chancellor, since the very term *arch-chancellor*, as a tyrannical expression, excites horror in every true Greek heart.

I repeat then, with profound grief, that a general convulsion is impending. Greek blood will certainly be again spilt in Greece,

if the arch-chancellor, with his Fanariote and Nappist* adherents, himself a Fanariote and Nappist, continues to stay there and to lacerate the bosom of our beautiful country.

Athens, June 7, 1836.

It is not long since I returned hither from a journey which I made through the provinces of Acarnania and Etolia, wishing to see with my own eyes the true state of those countries.

I conceive it to be a sacred duty which I owe to my country, to inform you of every thing, and to designate to you the first promoters of the late insurrection. According to my own observation, and according to the events, this movement has been excited by the Nappists and Mavrocordatoites. You know that Nicholas Mavromati went to Acarnania, under the pretext of family affairs, towards the end of November last. M. Sicilianos also went to Calussa, with the formal intention of pushing forward the insurrectionary movement. They were in connection with the Nappists and the Mavrocordatoites of this place (Athens), of whom Zaïmi has been the centre, and still remains so since his return here. M. Sicilianos traversed, during four months, the whole of Acarnania, where he made many partizans, united himself with the Maghina and Iscos families, and returned with Mavromati to Zante, after having excited many people to rebellion. From this island, he sent, through the hands of the brother of Malami, four hundred *okas* of powder, to the address of Dimozelio, and promised, as I understand, a great deal more.

The insurrection broke out about the end of January. Some days before, M. Mavromati and J. Karapanaki had left for Xeromeron. The former, repulsed from Prevesa, went to Leucadia. The latter, a cousin-german of Maghina, was at Arta, for the purpose of expediting from thence munitions of war to the insurgents.

Dimozelio, with the cousin of N. Zelio, Soter Stratos, Nicolas

* Nappist is the nickname for the Capodistrians.

Stratos, Nicolas Zervas, with his brother Christos, the two brothers Malami, Jean Bairactar, and Perles, showed themselves the chiefs of the insurgents. But the Capitani, Iscos, Staïkos, Bozzaris, and Macris, although having an understanding with the others, kept prudently in the back-ground, under the pretext of arranging their domestic affairs, but in reality to observe, beforehand, the turn that the movement would take.

The plan of the insurgents was, first, to take possession of the fortresses of Missolonghi and Lepanto, being already in collusion with the garrison commanded by Bozzaris, Macris, Zoggas, Panatuloas, and other Souliotes. A body of two thousand men had already arrived before Missolonghi on the 1st of February, besides four hundred men under the command of Tialion, Zerberi, and Gula, all comrades of the Makrys of High Zygos, who repaired thither on the part of Kuritide, and directed their steps to Lepanto. But the former, as well as the latter, completely failed; for, at the same time, not only the troops of the Government came to occupy Missolonghi, but Pharmakakis and Granassis declared themselves, at Lepanto, for the Government, to the great astonishment of their comrades, who, being in the minority, have not been able to keep their promise of coming to the assistance of the besiegers, and opening to them the gates of the fortress.

Missolonghi was besieged during a month, and the province of Lepanto was occupied by the insurgents.

Hardly a month afterwards, the Government found itself compelled to order two thousand Greek combatants to go to meet the rebels. They required fifteen days to prepare, and in this interval the insurrection gained the whole of Acarnania; and it would have extended much further, if the Government had not demeaned itself, even to flattery, in promising the rank of Colonel to Iscos, besides the decoration of the Sauveur. The acceptance of these offers on the part of this chief was regarded as an act of treason by the others, who, indignant thereat, demanded pardon of the Government, and obtained it. The Chiefs of Acarnania and Etolia took the same step, and the remainder of the insurgents, amounting to scarcely two hundred men, retired to Valtos, where

they united with the brigands, to the number of a thousand men, and formed their camp at Baritade, towards the 18th of March.

The Royal troops, coming from the side of Eastern and Western Greece, under the orders of Captains Zavellas, Grivas, and Mamouris, encamped there the 19th and 20th of March: one part at Arapi, on the side of Karavassera, and the other at Callidromi. Zavellas, at the head of eight hundred men, would have been defeated, if Grivas and Mamouris had not arrived in time to deliver him from the danger, and to repulse together the brigands, pursuing them to the bridge of Tatarne, and taking possession even of Baritade.

The brigands took refuge after the battle at Xarakia and Antifloro. Being defeated there also, and finally at the convent of Aretha, close to the frontiers of the kingdom, where, on the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th of April, they were so closely surrounded, they crossed the frontiers, having left on the spot many dead and prisoners. Amongst the former are found the brothers Balami, Christos Zervas, and Rupakias. Many others of inferior note have been wounded, and amongst the latter, Dimozelios. Alitrosamis and Malassiovas, two chiefs of brigands, have been made prisoners, as well as Gerolami of Acarnania, and others who were immediately sent to the council of war at Missolonghi.

During the course of this war, George Karapanaki of Arta, in union with the Turkish governor of this latter town, furnished provisions and munitions to the rebels. Tullias Goggos and Semkas offered them asylum and protection; the former to the family of Stratos and to Dimozelios, and the latter to the brigands who traversed the bridge of Koraki to go to Agrapha. As to Nicolas Zervas, he is gone, they say, to Jannina, and has been well received there by the Pacha. Meantime, Oriental Greece is not entirely delivered from the brigands, because they begin to reappear again on that side.

All these insurrectionary movements proceed no doubt from invisible causes, and tend to higher results; but you may easily conceive how injurious they are to our country.

The Nappists, the Mavrocordatoites, and the Turks, are eager to

slake their thirst with the blood of the Greeks, and to annihilate, if they can, our poor country: and I hope you will readily believe me if I tell you, from what I have learned in Acarnania, that two thousand Albanians are ready to make an irruption into Greece, and to unite with the banditti already there. Knowing the intentions and sentiments of those who move every thing, you will not be at all surprised.

But, after all this, Messrs. Zaimi and Maghina are taking the greatest pains to prove that they have no hand in it, and to attribute the cause of the insurrection to Coletti. The people, however, are not to be duped, and the government is well acquainted with the rights of the matter. The connexion of Coletti with Acarnania is well known: and all those who have been the instigators of the insurrection, and all those who have taken part in it, as well as the chiefs, are assuredly not friends of Coletti's.

Meanwhile, what is the government about? Instead of changing the direction, taking the course of the nation, that is to say, the constitutional direction, it continues to proceed as before, without object and without assurance; and I greatly fear that the enemies of the country may seize this fresh occasion to reduce the country to the brink of ruin — for, though the affairs of Acarnania are for the moment tranquillized, it is not said that the troubles may not break out again and even with greater violence — a moment which I fear is but too near at hand, from what I myself have seen on the spot.

END OF VOL III.

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